Locks in the strategic decision from 2026-05-05 secureblue research agent: pivot the technical base toward bootc/OCI, but as a layer over secureblue's `securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns` rather than a Containerfile-from-scratch. ## What changed - New: `docs/STRATEGY.md` — full hybrid plan (kickstart bootstrap → first-boot bootc rebase → bootc-only at v1.0). Documents secureblue rationale, our overrides (drop Trivalent, restore sudo + Xwayland), next concrete steps for v0.7 spike (BlueBuild recipe + GH Actions workflow + `veilor-firstboot-rebase` one-shot). - Updated: `docs/ROADMAP.md` v0.7 bootc-spike subsection — supersedes the Agent 3 Containerfile-from-scratch plan with the BlueBuild layering plan. Spike compresses 1 week → 2 days; hardening review inherited from 30 secureblue contributors. ## Why hybrid, not pure pivot - Anaconda's LUKS UX (single passphrase prompt + custom partitioning) is mature; bootc-image-builder's installer is not yet on par. Keep the kickstart as the bootstrap. - bootc upgrade gets us atomic A/B + signed image chain + instant rollback that we can't realistically build alone with our contributor count. - The kickstart work is not lost — it becomes the day-zero installer through v0.7. v1.0 deprecates it entirely once bootc-image-builder installer ISO matures. ## Why secureblue, not Athena (Arch) | Axis | secureblue | Athena OS | |---|---|---| | Maintainers | 30 | 8 | | MAC enforcing OOB | SELinux + custom policy | AppArmor active, profiles mostly unconfined | | Atomic / immutable updates | Yes (bootc/rpm-ostree) | No (rolling) | | Threat model published | No | Yes | | MS-signed Secure Boot shim | Yes (Fedora shim) | Yes (with auto-MOK) | Athena's only structural advantage is the published threat model. We're already drafting one (Agent 5 of 2026-05-05 wave) — we get that win regardless. secureblue's contributor count + atomic update infrastructure is the leverage. ## Strategic credibility win Publishing `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` BEFORE the v0.7 launch positions veilor-os ahead of secureblue (no threat model) and Athena (has threat model but smaller contributor base) on the one axis that matters most. ## Open questions documented in STRATEGY.md - secureblue contribution acceptance for upstream patches (USBGuard id-based-rules fix, threat model framework) - Brave vs Mullvad-Browser pick for default browser - bootc rebase first-boot fallback if rebase fails - Fedora 44 transition timing follows secureblue's release tags
302 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
302 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
# Roadmap
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Versioned roadmap for veilor-os. Targets are intentionally short and
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testable. No fluff. Items in earlier versions are blockers for later
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ones unless explicitly noted.
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For the historical record of what landed in each release, see
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[`../CHANGELOG.md`](../CHANGELOG.md).
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---
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## Lessons learned through v0.5.x install grind
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Five things v0.5.27–31 changed about how we plan:
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1. **Anaconda + RPM-6.0 + `--cmdline` is brittle** — three install
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failures, kernel cmdline written to four places before one worked.
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`--location=none` skips `CollectKernelArgumentsTask`,
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`kernel-install` reads `/etc/kernel/cmdline` not `/proc/cmdline`,
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and `transaction_progress.py` masks real failures if patched too
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broadly. Justifies promoting the bootc-image-builder spike to v0.7.
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2. **Test procedure must gate every tag** — v0.5.27 only surfaced four
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bugs in one VM run because the run walked every step in order.
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`test/TESTING.md` and `test/test-runs/` are now load-bearing.
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3. **Real hardware is not optional** — VM catches install logic, not
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KMS / fbcon / firmware. Spare laptop + friend's laptop must run
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pre-tag, every time.
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4. **Multi-agent debug waves work, but only with a verifier** — the
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v0.5.31 four-bug fix came from a 4-agent verification wave on
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v0.5.30 outcome. Wave + verifier = signal; wave alone = noise.
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5. **"We ask once, with sane defaults" is the distro UX** — every
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v0.5 install bug we shipped a workaround for (locale, hostname,
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USBGuard policy, drivers) is something `veilor-postinstall` could
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ask the user about cleanly on first boot. That promotes
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`veilor-postinstall` from v0.6 background item to flagship.
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---
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## v0.2 — green ISO + base hardening (DONE)
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Reproducible CI build pipeline. UEFI+BIOS bootable live ISO from a single
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kickstart. Single-prompt LUKS install. First-boot admin password flow.
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Full overlay applied (sysctl, sshd, sudoers, tuned profiles, KDE black
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theme, Fira Code, branded `/etc/os-release`). SELinux enforcing.
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firewalld drop zone. fail2ban + auditd + USBGuard active. The build
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chased five real bugs (DEST hardcoded, `set -eu` killing `cp`,
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os-release symlink, missing admin user, `LABEL=` vs `CDLABEL=` in
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livecd-tools) before greening.
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Released `v0.2.5` on 2026-05-01. CI on every push to `main`.
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---
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## v0.5.27–v0.5.31 — install path stabilisation (DONE)
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The bridge between v0.2 (greens at all) and v0.3 (looks polished). All
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install-path bugs surfaced by the formal hybrid-VM test procedure
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(`test/TESTING.md`). Five releases, ~hours of debug, three install
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failures before greening.
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- **v0.5.27 (DONE)** — `rd.luks.uuid` via `grubby --update-kernel=ALL`,
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GRUB rebrand, `fbcon=nodefer`, ASCII gum cursor.
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- **v0.5.28 (DONE)** — locale locked en_US.UTF-8, dropped updates repo,
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patched anaconda `transaction_progress.py` to silence `Configuring
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xxx.x86_64` scroll, excluded man-db.
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- **v0.5.29 (DONE)** — narrowed anaconda patch (was masking real
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failures), LUKS UX, initramfs assertion. Five-fix bundle from 7-agent
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research wave.
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- **v0.5.30 (DONE)** — broad error suppression, manual bootloader path,
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virtio log capture for post-mortem.
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- **v0.5.31 (DONE)** — `--location=none` was making anaconda skip
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`CollectKernelArgumentsTask`; kernel-install reads
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`/etc/kernel/cmdline` as source of truth, veilor never wrote it, so
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BLS entries shipped with empty cmdline. Three-path write
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(`/etc/kernel/cmdline` + `/etc/default/grub` + grubby) plus explicit
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`kernel-install add`.
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## v0.5.32 — next ship (active)
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Outstanding from the grind, immediate priority for the next tag:
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- **End-to-end VM green run** — v0.5.31 lands the kernel-cmdline fix
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but no full hybrid-VM pass has signed it off. Run the procedure in
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`test/TESTING.md` to install + reboot + login, file the report in
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`test/test-runs/`, then tag.
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- **Real-hardware run on the spare laptop** — VM is necessary not
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sufficient. Friend's laptop is mate's-test, spare is ours. KMS,
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fbcon, USB controller, real-firmware Secure Boot only show up here.
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- **gum input render glitch** — duplicate "Install", stray T in
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password fields on linux fbcon. Replace `gum input --password` with
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bash `read -srp`; cosmetic only but visible on every install.
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---
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## v0.3 — UX polish (in progress)
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The visible polish layer that v0.2 deferred for build velocity.
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- **Plymouth black theme** — boot splash matching the desktop. No Fedora
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drum, no white flash. `assets/plymouth/veilor/`.
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- **SDDM theme** — black login background, single-user prompt with
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`admin` pre-filled, no userlist.
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- **Konsole profile** — black background, Fira Code, transparent panel
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off (no compositor cost on resume).
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- **Wallpaper SVG** — flat black with subtle veilor wordmark, 1080p +
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4K + ultrawide variants.
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- **Re-enable memory hygiene on installed system.** v0.2.5 stripped
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`init_on_alloc=1 init_on_free=1` from the *live* cmdline because they
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5x'd KVM boot time. Re-add post-install via `veilor-firstboot` so the
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installed system gets the protection without the ISO penalty.
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- **USBGuard auto-snapshot on first boot.** Currently the operator
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runs `usbguard generate-policy` manually. v0.3 wires this into
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`veilor-firstboot` after the password step (with a clear
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"plug in trusted devices first" prompt).
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Target: this month. None of it is a kickstart change — pure overlay
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work.
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---
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## v0.4 — distribution + signing
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Get veilor-os to a state where the ISO is downloadable, verifiable, and
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trusted by Secure Boot without user shenanigans.
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- **GPG-signed releases.** Tag → CI builds → CI signs ISO + sha256 with
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veilor.org release key → GitHub Release artifact carries `.iso.asc`.
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- **Reproducible builds.** Pin Fedora compose ID, lock package versions
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via `dnf snapshot` or equivalent, document how to verify two builds
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match.
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- **Own MOK (Machine Owner Key) + sbsign for Secure Boot.** Currently
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veilor-os relies on Fedora's signed shim chain. v0.4 ships our own
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MOK, signs the kernel + initramfs at build time, optionally enrols
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the MOK on first boot for users who want a cleaner trust path.
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- **ISO download mirror** — static download page on veilor.org with
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current + previous release, sha256, gpg signature. **Not** an RPM
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mirror — veilor-os does not ship its own packages, only the spin
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configuration.
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- **Release process documented** — tagging, CI, signing, mirror sync
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in `docs/RELEASE.md`.
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---
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## v0.5 — hardening tier 2
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Hardening that builds on v0.2's foundation. Each item is opt-in unless
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specified — defaults stay sane for a daily driver.
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- **AppArmor profiles in addition to SELinux.** Stack-not-replace.
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Targeted at the browser, the mail client, and anything that touches
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attacker-controlled data. SELinux remains the primary MAC.
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- **systemd-homed** — encrypted-per-user `~`, suspend-aware, key
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unlocked at PAM login. Optional, opt-in via post-install helper.
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- **nftables ruleset** alongside firewalld defaults. Default firewalld
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policy stays drop; nftables provides advanced filtering for users
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who want it.
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- **Audit log shipping** — opt-in `auditd` -> remote syslog over TLS,
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for users running a central log aggregator.
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- **Installer kickstart split** — separate `veilor-os-install.ks` for
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installer ISO (real LUKS partitioning, not the live-rootfs
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simplification used in v0.2). Lets users install veilor-os as the
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primary OS without going through the live boot first.
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- **Audit baseline** — re-run the security audit (template in
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`security/audit-template.md`) and target a lower risk score than v0.2.
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---
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## v0.6 — ergonomics (PROMOTED — install grind proved we need this)
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Smooth the operator experience so day-to-day work doesn't fight the
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hardening. `veilor-postinstall` and `veilor-doctor` were v0.6 background
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items — promoted to **headline** features after v0.5.27–31 made it
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clear that "we ask once, with sane defaults" is what separates a
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distro from a kickstart.
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- **`veilor-postinstall`** (PROMOTED — flagship of v0.6) — first-login
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welcome menu, EndeavourOS-style but cleaner. Single TUI screen:
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keyboard layout, locale (deferred from install per v0.5.28),
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hostname override, package presets (dev / media / homelab), drivers
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(NVIDIA / Intel / AMD), Bluetooth opt-in, USBGuard snapshot, audit
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baseline run, `veilor-doctor` first run. Each step skippable, runs
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once on first SDDM login, self-deletes the autostart after. This is
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the **only** UX feature that ships in v0.6 day one — everything else
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builds on it.
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- **`veilor-doctor`** (PROMOTED — user-facing, not just dev tool) —
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the post-install audit. Walks `getenforce`, `mokutil --sb-state`,
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`firewall-cmd`, fail2ban, USBGuard policy, sysctl drift, and reports
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drift from baseline. Runs from `veilor-postinstall` on day one, then
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weekly via `systemd --user` timer. Plain-English output ("your
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firewall is OK", "USBGuard policy has 3 unknown devices"); not a JSON
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dump. **Stretch:** machine-readable mode for `veilor-server` later.
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- **`veilor-update`** — wraps `dnf upgrade` AND `flatpak update` in
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one command. Per `feedback_system_update.md`, partial-update is a
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recurring trap; veilor's update tool covers both by default. Adds
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pre-check (snapshot available?), auditd pause, post-update SELinux
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validation.
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- **Opt-in installer ISO** — flip from live-only to live + installer,
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user picks at boot menu. Installer uses the v0.5 kickstart with full
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LUKS + btrfs subvols + zram.
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- **First-boot UX** — replace TTY password prompt with a small
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Plymouth-rendered dialog. Less raw.
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- **Bluetooth opt-in helper** — single command to enable + bring up
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the daemon + add the user to the right group.
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---
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## v0.7 — public flex + bootc spike
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Take veilor-os out of "private repo, contained audience" mode. Order
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matters: people demand threat model FIRST when a security distro goes
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public, benchmarks come after.
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1. **Threat model published** (FIRST — gating item) — what veilor-os
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defends against, what it does not. Honest scope. No claim of
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anti-state-actor; concrete on lost-laptop, USB-attack, browser
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compromise, supply-chain. Reviewers will demand this before reading
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anything else.
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2. **Public docs site** — Hugo or mdBook on `veilor.org`, generated
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from `docs/`. Single source of truth.
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3. **Repo public** — flip GitHub visibility, announce.
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4. **Comparison + benchmarks** — published numbers vs stock Fedora KDE
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on cold boot, idle RAM, idle network egress, suspend/resume time.
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After threat model, not before.
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5. **Press kit** — wallpapers, logo, screenshots, feature one-liner.
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### Hybrid bootc spike — layer on secureblue (REVISED 2026-05-05)
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The original v0.7 entry called for a Containerfile-from-scratch
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spike on `quay.io/fedora/fedora-bootc:43`. Research on 2026-05-05
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(see `docs/STRATEGY.md` and
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`docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/`) found a faster path:
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**layer veilor's branding + threat model + UX on top of
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secureblue's already-shipping `securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns`
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OCI image** via a BlueBuild recipe.
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Reasoning:
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- secureblue has 30 active contributors, 940 stars, 56 commits
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in the last 5 weeks. They've already implemented the hardening
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surface we'd need to build alone (sysctl + kargs + SELinux
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custom policy + USBGuard + hardened-malloc + Unbound DoT +
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cosign-signed OCI build pipeline).
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- Containerfile-from-scratch spike: 1 week to first ISO.
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BlueBuild recipe extending secureblue: ~2 days, ~200 lines
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YAML. The hardening review is inherited.
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- secureblue does NOT publish a threat model. Athena OS does
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(their main differentiator, only public threat model in
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hardened-Linux 2026). Our `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (drafted) gets
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us ahead of both on the one axis that matters most for a
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security-branded distro.
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Hybrid path locked: kickstart ISO stays as the **bootstrap
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installer** (Anaconda's LUKS UX is mature). On first boot, a
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one-shot `veilor-firstboot-rebase` service runs `bootc rebase
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ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43`. From then on, `bootc upgrade` is
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the update channel. v1.0 deprecates the kickstart entirely.
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Overrides we apply over secureblue: replace Trivalent (their
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single-maintainer browser fork) with Brave or Mullvad-Browser;
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keep sudo (revert `run0`-only); re-enable Xwayland.
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Full plan: `docs/STRATEGY.md`. Spike will land in
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`bluebuild/recipe.yml` plus `.github/workflows/build-bluebuild.yml`.
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---
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## v1.0 — production
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The line where veilor-os is recommended for a non-author user as a
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daily driver.
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- **Multi-arch.** x86_64 today; v1.0 ships aarch64 ISO too (laptops
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on ARM are real now). Build matrix in CI.
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- **LTS commitment** — major versions tied to Fedora's release cadence,
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patch releases for security only, documented EOL per major.
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- **Recovery ISO** — minimal rescue image with veilor tools (LUKS
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unlock, btrfs scrub, sysctl reset, fail2ban unban) for "I cannot log
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in to my system" days.
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- **TPM2 integration** — sealed LUKS unlock against TPM2 PCRs (opt-in,
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default stays password). Ships as helper script, not silent default.
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- **Signed update channel** — beyond GPG-signed ISOs, a signed metadata
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repo so `veilor-doctor` can detect available updates without trusting
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Fedora's mirrorlists alone.
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---
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## Stretch goals — not on the v0.x → v1.0 critical path
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These are spin variants that share veilor-os DNA but need their own
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kickstart or build tool.
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- **`veilor-server`** — no KDE, no GUI, hardened headless Fedora for
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homelab / VPS (e.g. nullstone). Same overlay, different package set.
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**Not blocked**, but waits on `veilor-doctor` machine-readable mode
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(v0.6) so headless installs have a way to report drift without a TUI.
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- **`veilor-kiosk`** — single-app Plasma session, locked-down user,
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read-only root. **Not blocked.**
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- **`veilor-atomic`** — rpm-ostree / bootc-image-builder rebase.
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Status now depends on the **v0.7 bootc spike**: if the spike shows
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bootc fixes the anaconda-grind class of bugs, `veilor-atomic`
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becomes the v1.0+ mainline rather than a stretch variant. If not,
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it stays a parallel track.
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