veilor-os/docs/ROADMAP.md

# Roadmap

Versioned roadmap for veilor-os. Targets are intentionally short and
testable. No fluff. Items in earlier versions are blockers for later
ones unless explicitly noted.

For the historical record of what landed in each release, see
[`../CHANGELOG.md`](../CHANGELOG.md).

---

## Lessons learned through v0.5.x install grind

Five things v0.5.27–31 changed about how we plan:

1. **Anaconda + RPM-6.0 + `--cmdline` is brittle** — three install
   failures, kernel cmdline written to four places before one worked.
   `--location=none` skips `CollectKernelArgumentsTask`,
   `kernel-install` reads `/etc/kernel/cmdline` not `/proc/cmdline`,
   and `transaction_progress.py` masks real failures if patched too
   broadly. Justifies promoting the bootc-image-builder spike to v0.7.
2. **Test procedure must gate every tag** — v0.5.27 only surfaced four
   bugs in one VM run because the run walked every step in order.
   `test/TESTING.md` and `test/test-runs/` are now load-bearing.
3. **Real hardware is not optional** — VM catches install logic, not
   KMS / fbcon / firmware. Spare laptop + friend's laptop must run
   pre-tag, every time.
4. **Multi-agent debug waves work, but only with a verifier** — the
   v0.5.31 four-bug fix came from a 4-agent verification wave on
   v0.5.30 outcome. Wave + verifier = signal; wave alone = noise.
5. **"We ask once, with sane defaults" is the distro UX** — every
   v0.5 install bug we shipped a workaround for (locale, hostname,
   USBGuard policy, drivers) is something `veilor-postinstall` could
   ask the user about cleanly on first boot. That promotes
   `veilor-postinstall` from v0.6 background item to flagship.

---

## v0.2 — green ISO + base hardening (DONE)

Reproducible CI build pipeline. UEFI+BIOS bootable live ISO from a single
kickstart. Single-prompt LUKS install. First-boot admin password flow.
Full overlay applied (sysctl, sshd, sudoers, tuned profiles, KDE black
theme, Fira Code, branded `/etc/os-release`). SELinux enforcing.
firewalld drop zone. fail2ban + auditd + USBGuard active. The build
chased five real bugs (DEST hardcoded, `set -eu` killing `cp`,
os-release symlink, missing admin user, `LABEL=` vs `CDLABEL=` in
livecd-tools) before greening.

Released `v0.2.5` on 2026-05-01. CI on every push to `main`.

---

## v0.5.27–v0.5.31 — install path stabilisation (DONE)

The bridge between v0.2 (greens at all) and v0.3 (looks polished). All
install-path bugs surfaced by the formal hybrid-VM test procedure
(`test/TESTING.md`). Five releases, ~hours of debug, three install
failures before greening.

- **v0.5.27 (DONE)** — `rd.luks.uuid` via `grubby --update-kernel=ALL`,
  GRUB rebrand, `fbcon=nodefer`, ASCII gum cursor.
- **v0.5.28 (DONE)** — locale locked en_US.UTF-8, dropped updates repo,
  patched anaconda `transaction_progress.py` to silence `Configuring
  xxx.x86_64` scroll, excluded man-db.
- **v0.5.29 (DONE)** — narrowed anaconda patch (was masking real
  failures), LUKS UX, initramfs assertion. Five-fix bundle from 7-agent
  research wave.
- **v0.5.30 (DONE)** — broad error suppression, manual bootloader path,
  virtio log capture for post-mortem.
- **v0.5.31 (DONE)** — `--location=none` was making anaconda skip
  `CollectKernelArgumentsTask`; kernel-install reads
  `/etc/kernel/cmdline` as source of truth, veilor never wrote it, so
  BLS entries shipped with empty cmdline. Three-path write
  (`/etc/kernel/cmdline` + `/etc/default/grub` + grubby) plus explicit
  `kernel-install add`.

## v0.5.32 — next ship (active)

Outstanding from the grind, immediate priority for the next tag:

- **End-to-end VM green run** — v0.5.31 lands the kernel-cmdline fix
  but no full hybrid-VM pass has signed it off. Run the procedure in
  `test/TESTING.md` to install + reboot + login, file the report in
  `test/test-runs/`, then tag.
- **Real-hardware run on the spare laptop** — VM is necessary not
  sufficient. Friend's laptop is mate's-test, spare is ours. KMS,
  fbcon, USB controller, real-firmware Secure Boot only show up here.
- **gum input render glitch** — duplicate "Install", stray T in
  password fields on linux fbcon. Replace `gum input --password` with
  bash `read -srp`; cosmetic only but visible on every install.

---

## v0.3 — UX polish (in progress)

The visible polish layer that v0.2 deferred for build velocity.

- **Plymouth black theme** — boot splash matching the desktop. No Fedora
  drum, no white flash. `assets/plymouth/veilor/`.
- **SDDM theme** — black login background, single-user prompt with
  `admin` pre-filled, no userlist.
- **Konsole profile** — black background, Fira Code, transparent panel
  off (no compositor cost on resume).
- **Wallpaper SVG** — flat black with subtle veilor wordmark, 1080p +
  4K + ultrawide variants.
- **Re-enable memory hygiene on installed system.** v0.2.5 stripped
  `init_on_alloc=1 init_on_free=1` from the *live* cmdline because they
  5x'd KVM boot time. Re-add post-install via `veilor-firstboot` so the
  installed system gets the protection without the ISO penalty.
- **USBGuard auto-snapshot on first boot.** Currently the operator
  runs `usbguard generate-policy` manually. v0.3 wires this into
  `veilor-firstboot` after the password step (with a clear
  "plug in trusted devices first" prompt).

Target: this month. None of it is a kickstart change — pure overlay
work.

---

## v0.4 — distribution + signing

Get veilor-os to a state where the ISO is downloadable, verifiable, and
trusted by Secure Boot without user shenanigans.

- **GPG-signed releases.** Tag → CI builds → CI signs ISO + sha256 with
  veilor.org release key → GitHub Release artifact carries `.iso.asc`.
- **Reproducible builds.** Pin Fedora compose ID, lock package versions
  via `dnf snapshot` or equivalent, document how to verify two builds
  match.
- **Own MOK (Machine Owner Key) + sbsign for Secure Boot.** Currently
  veilor-os relies on Fedora's signed shim chain. v0.4 ships our own
  MOK, signs the kernel + initramfs at build time, optionally enrols
  the MOK on first boot for users who want a cleaner trust path.
- **ISO download mirror** — static download page on veilor.org with
  current + previous release, sha256, gpg signature. **Not** an RPM
  mirror — veilor-os does not ship its own packages, only the spin
  configuration.
- **Release process documented** — tagging, CI, signing, mirror sync
  in `docs/RELEASE.md`.

---

## v0.5 — hardening tier 2

Hardening that builds on v0.2's foundation. Each item is opt-in unless
specified — defaults stay sane for a daily driver.

- **AppArmor profiles in addition to SELinux.** Stack-not-replace.
  Targeted at the browser, the mail client, and anything that touches
  attacker-controlled data. SELinux remains the primary MAC.
- **systemd-homed** — encrypted-per-user `~`, suspend-aware, key
  unlocked at PAM login. Optional, opt-in via post-install helper.
- **nftables ruleset** alongside firewalld defaults. Default firewalld
  policy stays drop; nftables provides advanced filtering for users
  who want it.
- **Audit log shipping** — opt-in `auditd` -> remote syslog over TLS,
  for users running a central log aggregator.
- **Installer kickstart split** — separate `veilor-os-install.ks` for
  installer ISO (real LUKS partitioning, not the live-rootfs
  simplification used in v0.2). Lets users install veilor-os as the
  primary OS without going through the live boot first.
- **Audit baseline** — re-run the security audit (template in
  `security/audit-template.md`) and target a lower risk score than v0.2.

---

## v0.6 — ergonomics (PROMOTED — install grind proved we need this)

Smooth the operator experience so day-to-day work doesn't fight the
hardening. `veilor-postinstall` and `veilor-doctor` were v0.6 background
items — promoted to **headline** features after v0.5.27–31 made it
clear that "we ask once, with sane defaults" is what separates a
distro from a kickstart.

- **`veilor-postinstall`** (PROMOTED — flagship of v0.6) — first-login
  welcome menu, EndeavourOS-style but cleaner. Single TUI screen:
  keyboard layout, locale (deferred from install per v0.5.28),
  hostname override, package presets (dev / media / homelab), drivers
  (NVIDIA / Intel / AMD), Bluetooth opt-in, USBGuard snapshot, audit
  baseline run, `veilor-doctor` first run. Each step skippable, runs
  once on first SDDM login, self-deletes the autostart after. This is
  the **only** UX feature that ships in v0.6 day one — everything else
  builds on it.
- **`veilor-doctor`** (PROMOTED — user-facing, not just dev tool) —
  the post-install audit. Walks `getenforce`, `mokutil --sb-state`,
  `firewall-cmd`, fail2ban, USBGuard policy, sysctl drift, and reports
  drift from baseline. Runs from `veilor-postinstall` on day one, then
  weekly via `systemd --user` timer. Plain-English output ("your
  firewall is OK", "USBGuard policy has 3 unknown devices"); not a JSON
  dump. **Stretch:** machine-readable mode for `veilor-server` later.
- **`veilor-update`** — wraps `dnf upgrade` AND `flatpak update` in
  one command. Per `feedback_system_update.md`, partial-update is a
  recurring trap; veilor's update tool covers both by default. Adds
  pre-check (snapshot available?), auditd pause, post-update SELinux
  validation.
- **Opt-in installer ISO** — flip from live-only to live + installer,
  user picks at boot menu. Installer uses the v0.5 kickstart with full
  LUKS + btrfs subvols + zram.
- **First-boot UX** — replace TTY password prompt with a small
  Plymouth-rendered dialog. Less raw.
- **Bluetooth opt-in helper** — single command to enable + bring up
  the daemon + add the user to the right group.

---

## v0.7 — public flex + bootc spike

Take veilor-os out of "private repo, contained audience" mode. Order
matters: people demand threat model FIRST when a security distro goes
public, benchmarks come after.

1. **Threat model published** (FIRST — gating item) — what veilor-os
   defends against, what it does not. Honest scope. No claim of
   anti-state-actor; concrete on lost-laptop, USB-attack, browser
   compromise, supply-chain. Reviewers will demand this before reading
   anything else.
2. **Public docs site** — Hugo or mdBook on `veilor.org`, generated
   from `docs/`. Single source of truth.
3. **Repo public** — flip GitHub visibility, announce.
4. **Comparison + benchmarks** — published numbers vs stock Fedora KDE
   on cold boot, idle RAM, idle network egress, suspend/resume time.
   After threat model, not before.
5. **Press kit** — wallpapers, logo, screenshots, feature one-liner.

### Hybrid bootc spike — layer on secureblue, install via `ostreecontainer` (REVISED 2026-05-05)

The original v0.7 entry called for a Containerfile-from-scratch
spike on `quay.io/fedora/fedora-bootc:43`. Research on 2026-05-05
(see `docs/STRATEGY.md` and
`docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/`), then a parent-operator
refinement same day, locked the path: **layer veilor's branding +
threat model + UX on top of secureblue's already-shipping
`securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns` OCI image** via a BlueBuild
recipe, and install it directly during the Anaconda pass via the
`ostreecontainer` kickstart directive (no first-boot rebase).

Reasoning:

- secureblue has 30 active contributors, 940 stars, 56 commits
  in the last 5 weeks. They've already implemented the hardening
  surface we'd need to build alone (sysctl + kargs + SELinux
  custom policy + USBGuard + hardened-malloc + Unbound DoT +
  cosign-signed OCI build pipeline).
- Containerfile-from-scratch spike: 1 week to first ISO. BlueBuild
  recipe extending secureblue: ~2 days. With the `ostreecontainer`
  swap (no `veilor-firstboot-rebase.service`, no transition window):
  **~1 day**.
- secureblue does NOT publish a threat model. Athena OS does
  (their main differentiator, only public threat model in
  hardened-Linux 2026). Our `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (drafted) gets
  us ahead of both on the one axis that matters most for a
  security-branded distro.

Hybrid path locked:

- Kickstart ISO stays as the **bootstrap installer** (Anaconda's
  LUKS UX is mature).
- `%packages` is replaced with `ostreecontainer
  --url=ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry` so the
  install pass populates `/` directly from the OCI image — no
  first-boot rebase, no second reboot.
- From boot one onward, `bootc upgrade` is the update channel.
- v1.0 deprecates the kickstart entirely.

Stay on `ostreecontainer` through v0.8. **Do NOT migrate to the new
`bootc` kickstart command until v1.0** — it blocks multi-disk and
authenticated registries (likely needed eventually). **Do NOT use**
`bootc-image-builder anaconda-iso` output — deprecated in
image-builder v44+. Produce OCI image and bootstrap ISO as
**separate artifacts**.

Overrides over secureblue: keep Trivalent as default (their COPR
tracks upstream M147+ within hours; reverses earlier draft that
treated it as override-and-remove); add Mullvad Browser alongside;
gate Thorium behind `ujust install-thorium` with CVE-lag warning;
restore sudo (revert `run0`-only); re-enable Xwayland.

Mesh stack baked in: Tailscale (Day 1, daily driver), Yggdrasil-go
(Day 1, idle warm-fallback), Reticulum/RetiNet AGPL fork (opt-in
via `ujust install-reticulum`). See `docs/STRATEGY.md` mesh stack
section for the layer breakdown and threat-floor table.

Full plan: `docs/STRATEGY.md`. Spike will land in
`bluebuild/recipe.yml` plus `.github/workflows/build-bluebuild.yml`,
on a separate branch — does NOT land in v0.5.x main.

External dependency tracked: Traefik `no-guest@file` ACL on
nullstone is currently an `0.0.0.0/0` allow-all stub. Must be
fixed before veilor-os first-public-ISO ships, otherwise
`tag:guest` provisioning leaks the full vhost surface to every
veilor user. **Parent operator owns the fix; not in veilor-os
scope.**

---

## v1.0 — production

The line where veilor-os is recommended for a non-author user as a
daily driver.

- **Multi-arch.** x86_64 today; v1.0 ships aarch64 ISO too (laptops
  on ARM are real now). Build matrix in CI.
- **LTS commitment** — major versions tied to Fedora's release cadence,
  patch releases for security only, documented EOL per major.
- **Recovery ISO** — minimal rescue image with veilor tools (LUKS
  unlock, btrfs scrub, sysctl reset, fail2ban unban) for "I cannot log
  in to my system" days.
- **TPM2 integration** — sealed LUKS unlock against TPM2 PCRs (opt-in,
  default stays password). Ships as helper script, not silent default.
- **Signed update channel** — beyond GPG-signed ISOs, a signed metadata
  repo so `veilor-doctor` can detect available updates without trusting
  Fedora's mirrorlists alone.

---

## Stretch goals — not on the v0.x → v1.0 critical path

These are spin variants that share veilor-os DNA but need their own
kickstart or build tool.

- **`veilor-server`** — no KDE, no GUI, hardened headless Fedora for
  homelab / VPS (e.g. nullstone). Same overlay, different package set.
  **Not blocked**, but waits on `veilor-doctor` machine-readable mode
  (v0.6) so headless installs have a way to report drift without a TUI.
- **`veilor-kiosk`** — single-app Plasma session, locked-down user,
  read-only root. **Not blocked.**
- **`veilor-atomic`** — rpm-ostree / bootc-image-builder rebase.
  Status now depends on the **v0.7 bootc spike**: if the spike shows
  bootc fixes the anaconda-grind class of bugs, `veilor-atomic`
  becomes the v1.0+ mainline rather than a stretch variant. If not,
  it stays a parallel track.