Update docs/DOCS-DOCS.md

Strategy pivot 2026-05-06: v0.5.32 produced a green ISO on Forgejo
runner. That's the kickstart-path proof point. Continuing v0.6
kickstart polish is sunk-cost work on tooling retired at v1.0.

Pivot:
- v0.5.0 is the FINAL kickstart-path release. Tag, freeze, ship.
- v0.6 cancelled as a milestone. Original plan kept inline as
  HISTORICAL reference.
- v0.7 promoted to primary active milestone. Absorbs the v0.6
  ergonomic CLI tools (veilor-postinstall / veilor-doctor /
  veilor-update) with bootc upgrade replacing dnf upgrade.
- Active branch: v0.7-bluebuild-spike. All future feature work lands
  there, not on main.

.github/workflows/build-iso.yml

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+# TODO: SHA-pin all uses: tags to commit SHAs (Agent 8 audit recommendation).
+# Tracked separately so this PR can land without long web lookups.
 name: Build veilor-os ISO
 
 on:
@@ -19,40 +21,30 @@ on:
   release:
     types: [published]
 
+permissions:
+  contents: write       # needed for action-gh-release to create+update ci-latest
+  id-token: write       # cosign keyless OIDC + attest-build-provenance
+  attestations: write   # attest-build-provenance writes the attestation
+
 jobs:
   build:
     name: Build live ISO
-    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    # nullstone label resolves to a privileged Fedora 43 container per
+    # the runner's RUNNER_LABELS map. Build runs directly in this job
+    # container — no nested docker-run-action, no bind-mount juggling.
+    runs-on: nullstone
     timeout-minutes: 90
 
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        # Pinned to last v4 tag confirmed to ship on node20. v4.2+ ships
+        # node24 which forgejo-runner v6.4.0 (node20) cannot exec.
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.7
 
-      - name: Free up disk
-        run: |
-          sudo rm -rf /opt/hostedtoolcache /usr/share/dotnet /usr/local/lib/android /usr/local/share/boost
-          sudo apt-get clean
-          df -h
-
-      - name: Run build inside Fedora 43 container
-        uses: addnab/docker-run-action@v3
-        with:
-          image: registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43
-          options: |
-            --privileged
-            -v ${{ github.workspace }}:/work
-            -v /dev:/dev
-            --tmpfs /tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,exec,size=16G
+      - name: Install build tooling (Fedora)
         run: |
           set -euxo pipefail
-
-            # Update Fedora image to latest packages — guarantees pcre2 +
-            # libselinux + selinux-policy are matched (the local build's
-            # core problem). CI runners always start fresh, no version skew.
           dnf -y upgrade --refresh
-
-            # Install build tooling
           dnf -y install \
             lorax \
             livecd-tools \
@@ -64,9 +56,29 @@ jobs:
             createrepo_c \
             git \
             which \
-              shadow-utils
+            shadow-utils \
+            syslinux \
+            tar \
+            curl \
+            sudo
 
-            cd /work
+      - name: Vendor gum binary into overlay
+        run: |
+          set -euxo pipefail
+          GUM_VERSION="0.17.0"
+          GUM_URL="https://github.com/charmbracelet/gum/releases/download/v${GUM_VERSION}/gum_${GUM_VERSION}_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz"
+          GUM_SHA256="69ee169bd6387331928864e94d47ed01ef649fbfe875baed1bbf27b5377a6fdb"
+          mkdir -p overlay/usr/local/bin
+          curl -fsSL "$GUM_URL" -o /tmp/gum.tgz
+          echo "$GUM_SHA256  /tmp/gum.tgz" | sha256sum -c -
+          tar -xzf /tmp/gum.tgz -C /tmp/
+          install -m 0755 "/tmp/gum_${GUM_VERSION}_Linux_x86_64/gum" overlay/usr/local/bin/gum
+          overlay/usr/local/bin/gum --version
+          echo "[OK] gum ${GUM_VERSION} vendored into overlay/usr/local/bin/"
+
+      - name: Build ISO with livecd-creator
+        run: |
+          set -euxo pipefail
 
           # PATCH: livecd-creator bug — __get_efi_image_stanza writes
           # `root=live:LABEL=...` instead of `live:CDLABEL=...` for dracut.
@@ -78,19 +90,22 @@ jobs:
           echo "[OK] livecd-creator patched: LABEL= → CDLABEL= for EFI dracut stanza"
 
           # CI uses ks-ci.ks (no local fix-repo line). Generated from main ks.
-            # Also strip flags livecd-creator doesn't recognize.
+          # Drop `updates` repo: previously 404'd on repodata zchunk during
+          # Fedora mid-push windows. Base 43 ships the selinux-policy fix.
           sed -e '/veilor-fix/d' \
               -e '/^shutdown$/d' \
+              -e '/repo --name=updates/d' \
               kickstart/veilor-os.ks > kickstart/veilor-os-ci.ks
 
           ksvalidator kickstart/veilor-os-ci.ks
           mkdir -p build/out
 
-            # livecd-creator (livecd-tools) — purpose-built for live ISOs.
-            # Handles EFI/BOOT + isohybrid + grafting that livemedia-creator
-            # --make-iso --no-virt does not. Produces UEFI+BIOS bootable ISO.
-            # --tmpdir /var/lmc to avoid GitHub Actions /tmp tmpfs constraints.
-            # /var on the runner is the host's ext4 (~80GB free post-disk-cleanup).
+          # The kickstart's %post --nochroot probes a fixed list of
+          # candidate paths to locate the repo source for overlay/scripts
+          # copy. /work is the canonical CI candidate; symlink the live
+          # workspace there so the existing probe finds it.
+          ln -sfn "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" /work
+
           mkdir -p /var/lmc /var/lmc-cache
           livecd-creator \
             --verbose \
@@ -102,41 +117,226 @@ jobs:
             --tmpdir /var/lmc \
             --cache /var/lmc-cache 2>&1 | tee build/out/build.log
 
-            # Move output ISO to expected dir
-            mv ./veilor-os-43.iso build/out/ 2>/dev/null || mv ./*.iso build/out/ 2>/dev/null || true
+      - name: Graft veilor source tree onto ISO
+        run: |
+          set -euxo pipefail
+          ISO_FILE=$(ls ./*.iso 2>/dev/null | head -1)
+          [ -n "$ISO_FILE" ] || { echo "[ERR] no ISO produced by livecd-creator"; exit 1; }
+          echo "[INFO] grafting /veilor/ onto $ISO_FILE"
+
+          xorriso -indev "$ISO_FILE" -report_el_torito as_mkisofs 2>&1 | tee /tmp/iso-boot.txt || true
+          ORIG_FLAGS=$(xorriso -indev "$ISO_FILE" -report_el_torito as_mkisofs 2>/dev/null | \
+              grep -v '^xorriso :' | grep -E '^-' | tr '\n' ' ')
+          [ -n "$ORIG_FLAGS" ] || { echo "[ERR] could not extract boot stanza from $ISO_FILE"; exit 1; }
+
+          mkdir -p /tmp/iso-mod
+          xorriso -osirrox on -indev "$ISO_FILE" -extract / /tmp/iso-mod
+          chmod -R u+w /tmp/iso-mod
+          mkdir -p /tmp/iso-mod/veilor
+          cp -a overlay scripts assets /tmp/iso-mod/veilor/
+
+          eval xorriso -as mkisofs \
+            -volid "veilor-os-43" \
+            $ORIG_FLAGS \
+            -o "${ISO_FILE}.tmp" /tmp/iso-mod
+          mv "${ISO_FILE}.tmp" "$ISO_FILE"
+          rm -rf /tmp/iso-mod
+
+          mv "$ISO_FILE" build/out/
 
-            # Rename + checksum
           ISO_NAME="veilor-os-${{ github.event.inputs.releasever || '43' }}-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).iso"
           cd build/out
           for f in *.iso; do
-              [[ -f $f && $f != $ISO_NAME ]] && mv "$f" "$ISO_NAME"
+            [[ -f $f && $f != "$ISO_NAME" ]] && mv "$f" "$ISO_NAME"
           done
           sha256sum "$ISO_NAME" > "$ISO_NAME.sha256"
           ls -lh "$ISO_NAME"
 
-      - name: Upload ISO artifact
-        if: success()
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      # ── ISO publish ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+      # GH Release asset size limit = 2 GiB. Our ISO ~2.8 GiB. Split into
+      # chunks before upload. Reassemble client-side via `cat *.part-* > x.iso`.
+      # Squashfs is already near-incompressible (zstd -19 → 96%) so split,
+      # not compress.
+      - name: Split ISO into 2GiB chunks
+        if: success() && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
+        run: |
+          cd build/out
+          ISO=$(ls *.iso | head -1)
+          [ -n "$ISO" ] || { echo "[ERR] no ISO"; exit 1; }
+          # Split with 1900M chunks (under 2 GiB safe). Suffix .part-aa, .part-ab, ...
+          split -b 1900M -d --suffix-length=2 "$ISO" "${ISO}.part-"
+          ls -lh
+          # Drop the original ISO so it doesn't try to upload (over limit)
+          rm -f "$ISO"
+          # Generate sha256 of all parts so reassembly is verifiable
+          sha256sum *.part-* > "${ISO}.parts.sha256"
+          echo "[OK] split into:"
+          ls "${ISO}".part-*
+
+      - name: Install cosign
+        if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
+        # Pinned to last v3 release confirmed node20.
+        uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3.7.0
+
+      - name: Sign ISO parts (keyless)
+        if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
+        run: |
+          cd build/out
+          for f in *.part-*; do
+            cosign sign-blob --yes "$f" \
+              --output-signature "$f.sig" \
+              --output-certificate "$f.pem"
+          done
+
+      - name: Generate SBOM (SPDX)
+        if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
+        # Pinned to last v0.17 release that ships node20.
+        uses: anchore/sbom-action@v0.17.2
         with:
-          name: veilor-os-iso
-          path: |
-            build/out/*.iso
+          path: build/out
+          format: spdx-json
+          output-file: build/out/veilor-os.spdx.json
+
+      - name: Build provenance attestation
+        if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
+        # Pinned to last v2.2 release that ships node20.
+        uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v2.2.3
+        with:
+          subject-path: 'build/out/*.iso.part-*'
+
+      # GitHub-only: softprops/action-gh-release uses the GitHub REST API
+      # which Forgejo doesn't expose at the same endpoints. When this
+      # workflow runs on git.s8n.ru the step below (Forgejo) handles
+      # publishing instead.
+      - name: Publish to ci-latest rolling prerelease (GitHub)
+        if: success() && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
+        # Pinned to last v2 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
+        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2.0.4
+        with:
+          tag_name: ci-latest
+          name: "ci-latest (auto)"
+          body: |
+            Rolling auto-build from `main`. Latest commit: ${{ github.sha }}.
+
+            **ISO is split into chunks (GH release 2 GiB asset limit).**
+            Reassemble:
+            ```
+            cat veilor-os-*.iso.part-* > veilor-os.iso
+            sha256sum -c veilor-os-*.iso.parts.sha256
+            ```
+            Or use `test/auto-install.sh` which handles reassembly automatically.
+
+            Not a stable release — for testing only.
+          prerelease: true
+          make_latest: false
+          files: |
+            build/out/*.iso.part-*
             build/out/*.sha256
-          retention-days: 14
+            build/out/*.sig
+            build/out/*.pem
+            build/out/*.spdx.json
 
-      - name: Upload build log on failure
+      # Forgejo equivalent: drop+recreate ci-latest release via the
+      # Forgejo REST API, then upload chunks. Only runs when not on GitHub.
+      # All ${{ }} interpolations are vetted (repo coords + signed SHA).
+      - name: Publish to ci-latest rolling prerelease (Forgejo)
+        if: success() && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.server_url != 'https://github.com'
+        env:
+          FORGEJO_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          FORGEJO_API: ${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1
+          REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+          GIT_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          TAG="ci-latest"
+          REL_JSON=$(curl -fsSL -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
+            "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/tags/${TAG}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+          if [ -n "$REL_JSON" ]; then
+            REL_ID=$(echo "$REL_JSON" | grep -oE '"id":\s*[0-9]+' | head -1 | grep -oE '[0-9]+')
+            if [ -n "$REL_ID" ]; then
+              echo "[INFO] deleting existing ci-latest release id=$REL_ID"
+              curl -fsSL -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
+                "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/${REL_ID}" || true
+              curl -fsSL -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
+                "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/git/refs/tags/${TAG}" || true
+            fi
+          fi
+          BODY="Rolling auto-build from main. Latest commit: ${GIT_SHA}.
+
+          ISO is split into chunks. Reassemble:
+              cat veilor-os-*.iso.part-* > veilor-os.iso
+              sha256sum -c veilor-os-*.iso.parts.sha256
+
+          Or use test/auto-install.sh (handles reassembly automatically).
+
+          Not a stable release — for testing only."
+          PAYLOAD=$(BODY="$BODY" TAG="$TAG" python3 -c "
+          import json,os
+          print(json.dumps({
+            'tag_name': os.environ['TAG'],
+            'target_commitish': 'main',
+            'name': 'ci-latest (auto)',
+            'body': os.environ['BODY'],
+            'prerelease': True,
+            'draft': False,
+          }))")
+          REL_ID=$(curl -fsSL -X POST -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
+            -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+            -d "$PAYLOAD" \
+            "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases" | \
+            grep -oE '"id":\s*[0-9]+' | head -1 | grep -oE '[0-9]+')
+          [ -n "$REL_ID" ] || { echo "[ERR] failed to create Forgejo release"; exit 1; }
+          echo "[OK] Forgejo release id=$REL_ID created"
+          cd build/out
+          for f in *.iso.part-* *.sha256; do
+            [ -f "$f" ] || continue
+            echo "[INFO] uploading $f"
+            curl -fsSL -X POST -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
+              -F "attachment=@${f}" \
+              "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/${REL_ID}/assets?name=${f}"
+          done
+          echo "[OK] all assets uploaded to Forgejo ci-latest"
+
+      # Build log on failure: print inline + skip artifact upload to avoid
+      # quota wall. Job log retains everything anyway.
+      - name: Print build log on failure
         if: failure()
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
-        with:
-          name: veilor-os-buildlog
-          path: |
-            build/out/build.log
-            build/out/build/anaconda/
+        run: |
+          echo "─── build/out/build.log ───"
+          tail -200 build/out/build.log 2>/dev/null || echo "(no build.log)"
+          echo "─── anaconda program.log ───"
+          find build/out/build/anaconda -name 'program.log' -exec tail -100 {} \; 2>/dev/null || echo "(no anaconda log)"
 
-      - name: Attach to release
-        if: github.event_name == 'release'
-        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
+      # GitHub-only: same restriction as ci-latest publish.
+      - name: Attach to release on tag (GitHub)
+        if: github.event_name == 'release' && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
+        # Pinned to last v2 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
+        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2.0.4
         with:
           files: |
             build/out/*.iso
             build/out/*.sha256
+
+      # Forgejo equivalent for tag-driven release uploads. The release
+      # is assumed to already exist (Forgejo creates it from the tag);
+      # we only attach assets here.
+      - name: Attach to release on tag (Forgejo)
+        if: github.event_name == 'release' && github.server_url != 'https://github.com'
+        env:
+          FORGEJO_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          FORGEJO_API: ${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1
+          REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+          REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          REL_JSON=$(curl -fsSL -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
+            "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/tags/${REF_NAME}")
+          REL_ID=$(echo "$REL_JSON" | grep -oE '"id":\s*[0-9]+' | head -1 | grep -oE '[0-9]+')
+          [ -n "$REL_ID" ] || { echo "[ERR] no Forgejo release for tag ${REF_NAME}"; exit 1; }
+          cd build/out
+          for f in *.iso *.sha256; do
+            [ -f "$f" ] || continue
+            curl -fsSL -X POST -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
+              -F "attachment=@${f}" \
+              "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/${REL_ID}/assets?name=${f}"
+          done

.github/workflows/lint.yml

@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ jobs:
     container:
       image: registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      # Pinned to last v4 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.7
       - run: dnf -y install pykickstart
       - run: ksvalidator kickstart/veilor-os.ks
 
@@ -20,7 +21,8 @@ jobs:
     name: Shell scripts
     runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      # Pinned to last v4 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.7
       - uses: ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master
         with:
           severity: warning
@@ -30,31 +32,31 @@ jobs:
     name: No personal/onyx leaks
     runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      # Pinned to last v4 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.7
       - name: Grep for leaks
         run: |
           set -e
-          # Allow audit greps that explicitly check for the patterns
+          # Scope: ship-state source dirs only. Audit reports, CHANGELOG,
+          # PR templates, test checklists, and the lint workflow itself
+          # legitimately quote the forbidden strings as findings/examples
+          # — they don't ship in the ISO, so they're out of scope.
           MATCHES=$(grep -rIni \
             -e 'onyx' \
             -e '192\.168\.0\.' \
             -e 'fedora\.local' \
             -e 'xynki\.dev' \
-            --exclude-dir=.git \
-            --exclude='*.md' \
-            . || true)
+            kickstart/ overlay/ scripts/ assets/ build/ \
+            || true)
 
-          # Filter out self-referencing leak-detection grep patterns + audit text.
-          # Lines that contain the bash escaped grep pattern (onyx\|192\.168) are
-          # the leak detectors themselves, not leaks.
+          # Filter self-referencing sanity-grep lines: the kickstart and
+          # post-install scripts run their own brand-leak scan against the
+          # installed /etc — those grep invocations literally contain the
+          # forbidden strings as patterns, not as leaked data.
           LEAKS=$(echo "$MATCHES" | grep -v \
-            -e 'should not contain' \
-            -e 'returns zero' \
-            -e 'audit grep' \
-            -e "'onyx\\\\\\\\\\\\|" \
-            -e 'onyx\\|' \
-            -e "name:.*onyx leaks" \
-            -e "-e 'onyx'" \
+            -e "grep .*'onyx" \
+            -e '# Sanity:' \
+            -e 'brand leak' \
             || true)
 
           if [[ -n "$LEAKS" ]]; then

.gitignore

@@ -13,3 +13,6 @@ secrets/
 *.pem
 test/veilor-vm.qcow2
 test/veilor-vm.nvram*
+test/auto-install-vm.qcow2
+test/auto-install-vm.nvram*
+.claude/worktrees/

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+# Changelog
+
+All notable changes to veilor-os are documented here.
+
+The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
+and this project loosely follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html)
+during the pre-1.0 phase.
+
+Each release section records the **bug found** and the **fix applied** so
+future maintainers can see why a change exists, not just what it changes.
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+### Planned
+
+- v0.3 polish — Plymouth black theme, SDDM theme, Konsole profile,
+  wallpaper SVG. Re-enable `init_on_alloc=1 init_on_free=1` post-install
+  via `veilor-firstboot` so live boot stays fast but installed system
+  keeps the memory hygiene.
+- USBGuard auto-snapshot on first boot.
+- veilor-firstboot UX improvements (cleaner banner, better error paths).
+
+---
+
+## [0.2.5] — 2026-05-01
+
+**Commit:** `8515bdb`
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Live boot took 5+ minutes on KVM.** Dracut sat at the parse-livenet
+  stage for what looked like a hang. Root cause: `init_on_alloc=1`
+  and `init_on_free=1` zero every memory page on allocation and free.
+  In a virtualised guest with paravirtual memory, this multiplied the
+  early-boot cost by ~5x. Removed both flags from the *live* kernel
+  cmdline.
+
+### Notes
+
+- The two memory-hygiene flags will be re-added on the **installed**
+  system via `veilor-firstboot` in v0.3 — the cost on bare metal is
+  negligible, the live-ISO penalty is the only place it bites.
+- Live cmdline retained: `lockdown=integrity slab_nomerge
+  randomize_kstack_offset=on vsyscall=none`.
+
+---
+
+## [0.2.4] — 2026-05-01
+
+**Commit:** `a23ce63`
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **VM booted but stalled at dracut "parse-livenet" looking for a label
+  that never matched.** Root cause: an upstream bug in
+  `livecd-tools` — `imgcreate/live.py::__get_efi_image_stanza()` writes
+  the EFI grub stanza as `root=live:LABEL=...` for dracut. Dracut on
+  live ISOs expects `live:CDLABEL=...` for ISO9660 volume labels;
+  `LABEL=` matches partition labels which a live ISO doesn't have.
+- Patched `live.py` in-place inside the CI build container before
+  invoking `livecd-creator`. With the patched stanza, the VM booted
+  cleanly to the SDDM login prompt.
+
+### Changed
+
+- CI workflow now `sed`s the patch into the installed `live.py` and
+  asserts the patch landed before continuing the build.
+
+### Notes
+
+- Bug also affects `livemedia-creator --make-iso --no-virt` and any
+  other consumer of `imgcreate.LiveImageCreator`. Worth filing
+  upstream once we have a clean repro recipe.
+
+---
+
+## [0.2.3] — 2026-05-01
+
+**Commit:** `ef54a24`
+
+### Added
+
+- Manual `useradd admin` invocation in chroot `%post`. `livecd-creator`
+  does not run an installer phase, so the kickstart `user` directive
+  is silently ignored. Without this, the booted live system has no
+  admin account at all, and SDDM falls back to "no users" — login
+  impossible.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`/etc/os-release` was still pointing at stock Fedora.** Even with
+  the overlay tree successfully copied, `kde-theme-apply.sh` was
+  resolving `/etc/os-release.d/veilor` from the wrong path (the build
+  host's repo, not the overlay's installed location).
+- Rewired the symlink chain cleanly: `/etc/os-release →
+  ../usr/lib/os-release`, with the override file written to
+  `/usr/lib/os-release` directly during `%post`.
+- Branding now reflects veilor-os in `/etc/os-release`,
+  `hostnamectl`, and the SDDM session menu.
+
+### Notes
+
+- The `user --name=admin` directive stays in the kickstart for
+  documentation and for any future `livemedia-creator`-based
+  installer ISO that *does* honour it.
+
+---
+
+## [0.2.2] — 2026-05-01
+
+**Commit:** `3408841`
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Overlay was partially copied — boot worked but veilor-power, KDE
+  theme, custom scripts were all missing.** Found via offline debugfs
+  inspection of the v0.2.1 rootfs: tuned profiles, sshd hardening,
+  sudoers entries, and systemd units were present, but
+  `/usr/share/veilor-os/{assets,scripts}` was empty.
+- Root cause: `%post --nochroot` ran with `set -eu`. When the first
+  `cp` of a non-essential overlay file returned non-zero, the script
+  aborted, leaving the assets/scripts copy step un-executed. None of
+  the chroot `%post` scripts could then find what they needed and they
+  silently no-op'd.
+
+### Changed
+
+- `%post --nochroot` now uses `set +e` around `cp`/`mkdir` so a
+  partial-permissions error on one tree doesn't kill the whole copy.
+- Added `/var/log/veilor-nochroot.log` — every action in
+  `%post --nochroot` now traces with timestamps. Future debugging is
+  one `journalctl --boot` away.
+
+### Notes
+
+- The looser error handling is intentional but bounded — only the
+  overlay copy uses `set +e`. Hardening scripts that follow run with
+  strict mode.
+
+---
+
+## [0.2.1] — 2026-05-01
+
+**Commit:** `9c6136f`
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **ISO booted, but it was effectively bare Fedora KDE.** No
+  hardening, no theme, no `veilor-power`, no `/etc/os-release`
+  override. Confirmed by mounting v0.2.0 with debugfs:
+  `/etc/os-release` symlinked to `../usr/lib/os-release` (Fedora's
+  default), no `/usr/share/veilor-os`, no overlay files anywhere.
+- Root cause: `%post --nochroot` hardcoded `/mnt/sysimage` as the
+  destination. `/mnt/sysimage` is the **livemedia-creator** install
+  root. We had switched the build pipeline to **livecd-creator**,
+  which exposes the destination as `$INSTALL_ROOT` — a different path
+  inside its tmpfs sandbox.
+- Switched the copy target to `$INSTALL_ROOT`.
+
+### Notes
+
+- Partial overlay landed in v0.2.1 (tuned, sshd, sddm.conf) — but
+  `/usr/share/veilor-os/{assets,scripts}` was still missing because
+  `set -eu` aborted partway through the cp tree. That fix is in v0.2.2.
+- Lesson learned: tooling-specific environment variables matter.
+  `$INSTALL_ROOT` is the portable answer; `/mnt/sysimage` is a
+  livemedia-creator-only convention.
+
+---
+
+## [0.2.0] — 2026-04-30
+
+**Commit:** `7c4a94d` (tagged release)
+
+### Added
+
+- First green ISO. Reproducible build pipeline lands.
+- GitHub Actions workflow `build-iso.yml` produces a UEFI+BIOS-bootable
+  live ISO from `kickstart/veilor-os.ks`.
+- CI: kickstart syntax linting (`ksvalidator`) gate.
+- Kickstart based on Fedora 43, KDE Plasma minimal, hardening
+  packages selected (`fail2ban`, `usbguard`, `tuned`, `audit`,
+  `firewalld`).
+- Overlay tree authored: tuned profiles, sshd hardening, sysctl
+  drop-in, sudoers, udev rules, KDE theme assets, Fira Code font.
+- 3-mode power profiles: `veilor-power save | mid | perf` with
+  AC/battery udev auto-switching.
+
+### Notes — known limitations of v0.2.0
+
+- **The overlay never actually applied to the installed system.**
+  The `%post --nochroot` copy step targeted `/mnt/sysimage`
+  (livemedia-creator's install root) but the build pipeline had moved
+  to livecd-creator, which uses `$INSTALL_ROOT`. Result: the ISO
+  *boots* and presents a working KDE Plasma desktop, but it is in
+  practice **stock Fedora 43 KDE** with no veilor-os hardening,
+  branding, theme, or power scripts applied.
+- v0.2.0 is best understood as a **build-pipeline milestone** — the
+  ISO format, EFI/BIOS bootability, partitioning, and squashfs build
+  all work end-to-end. The userspace customisation layer was wired
+  but not delivering. Treat v0.2.0 as proof-of-build, not as a
+  feature-complete release.
+- See **v0.2.5** for the first feature-complete ISO that actually
+  ships veilor-os hardening and branding into the running system.
+
+### Build pipeline path to green
+
+For posterity, the issues resolved between v0.1 (scaffold) and v0.2.0
+(first green ISO):
+
+- pcre2 / selinux-policy version skew on stock Fedora 43 base —
+  worked around with a pinned `fix-repo` for the local build only;
+  CI uses `dnf upgrade --refresh` to sidestep entirely.
+- KDE Plasma hard-deps (cups, geoclue2, ModemManager, PackageKit) —
+  kept at the package level, masked at the daemon level.
+- `%post --nochroot` source path — multi-path detection added so the
+  overlay can be sourced from `/work` (CI) or `/run/install/repo`
+  (virt) or kickstart-relative (no-virt).
+- `livemedia-creator --make-iso --no-virt` produced a squashfs but
+  no EFI/BOOT image. Switched to `livecd-creator` (`livecd-tools`)
+  which is purpose-built for live ISOs and handles EFI grafting.
+- Tmpdir on `/tmp` exhausted the GitHub Actions tmpfs cap (16GB
+  vs ~30GB working set). Moved to `/var/lmc` on the runner's host
+  ext4.
+
+---
+
+## [0.1.0] — 2026-04-29
+
+**Commit:** `1822005`
+
+### Added
+
+- Initial repo scaffold: `kickstart/`, `build/`, `overlay/`, `scripts/`,
+  `assets/`, `docs/`, `test/`.
+- Kickstart skeleton (Fedora 43 KDE base, single-prompt LUKS install,
+  hardened bootloader cmdline, locked root, blank-password admin with
+  `chage -d 0` to force first-boot reset).
+- Hardening scripts ported and rebranded from operator's reference
+  system: base hardening, kernel hardening, custom SELinux policy
+  module `veilor-systemd`.
+- KDE theme: BreezeBlackPure base + grey accent (`#686B6F`).
+- Fira Code chosen as system font (Fedora `fira-code-fonts`,
+  SIL OFL 1.1).
+- Test harness: VM runner (`test/run-vm.sh`) with QEMU + OVMF for
+  fast iteration, with `SECBOOT=1` and `FRESH=1` modes.
+- Documentation: `BUILD.md`, `INSTALL.md`, `HARDENING.md`,
+  `POWER.md`, `boot-checklist.md`.
+
+### Notes
+
+- v0.1 was scaffold-only — no green ISO yet. Build pipeline iterated
+  through ~22 distinct toolchain issues before producing v0.2.0.
+- All `onyx` references stripped from shipped artifacts; comments
+  refer to "reference system" only.

README.md

@@ -1,27 +1,165 @@
 # veilor-os
 
-> Hardened minimal Fedora KDE remix. Black-on-black. Locked down by default.
+> **Hardened minimal Fedora KDE spin. Black-on-black. Locked down by default.**
 
-veilor-os is a Fedora 43 KDE spin built for operators who want a clean, fast,
-opinionated desktop with serious hardening already in place. No prompts at
-install beyond the LUKS passphrase. Boot, set admin password, work.
+[![Build veilor-os ISO](https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/badges/workflows/build-iso.yml/badge.svg)](https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/actions?workflow=build-iso.yml)
+[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](LICENSE)
 
-## Highlights
+veilor-os is a Fedora 43 KDE Plasma remix for operators who want a clean,
+fast, opinionated desktop with serious hardening already wired in. Boot the
+ISO, set an admin password, work. No installer wizard. No initial-setup
+screen. No telemetry. No "would you like to enable X" prompts.
 
-- **Single-prompt install** — only LUKS passphrase. No account wizard, no
-  initial-setup screen. `admin` account is created automatically; password
-  is set on first boot.
-- **Hardened by default** — SELinux enforcing, USBGuard, fail2ban, firewalld
-  drop zone, kernel sysctl lockdown, NTS-authenticated NTP, DNS-over-TLS.
-- **3-mode power management** — `veilor-power save | mid | perf`, with
-  AC/battery auto-switching via udev. Backed by tuned profiles.
-- **Fira Code system font** — programming ligatures, monospace
-  consistency across UI + terminal. (DuckSans planned for v0.3.)
-- **Pure-black KDE color scheme** — `veilor-black` theme system-wide.
-- **LUKS2 + Secure Boot** — argon2id, aes-xts, btrfs subvolumes, zram swap
-  (no disk swap, no cold-boot leak).
-- **Reproducible build** — kickstart + podman + livemedia-creator. ISO
-  output is deterministic given pinned base.
+The current install path is an Anaconda kickstart with a custom gum TUI
+on top. v0.7+ ships a hybrid path: the kickstart ISO becomes the bootstrap
+installer (Anaconda's LUKS UX is mature), but the root filesystem is
+populated directly from a cosign-signed bootc OCI image built via BlueBuild
+on top of [secureblue](https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue)'s
+hardened Kinoite variant. Updates from there flow through `bootc upgrade`
+— atomic A/B, instant rollback. v1.0 is bootc-only.
+
+See [docs/STRATEGY.md](docs/STRATEGY.md) for the full trajectory.
+
+---
+
+## Status
+
+Active development on the install path. Three bug classes have been
+worked through (LUKS unlock cmdline, anaconda RPM-6.0 cmdline-mode
+brittleness, bootloader install via `gen_grub_cfgstub`); current focus
+is the v0.5.32 blocker list from the
+[2026-05-05 9-agent research wave](docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/README.md).
+
+Primary git host: <https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os>. The GitHub
+mirror was disabled 2026-05-06; this repo is private-by-default on
+Forgejo. ISO builds and CI artifacts are produced by the Forgejo runner
+on nullstone — no GitHub Actions involvement.
+
+What is **shipping**: hardening (SELinux, sysctl, USBGuard, fail2ban,
+firewalld), KDE black theme, Fira Code system font, 3-mode power
+management, single-prompt LUKS install, first-boot admin password flow,
+reproducible CI build, EFI+BIOS bootable live ISO.
+
+What is **planned** (see [docs/ROADMAP.md](docs/ROADMAP.md)): Plymouth
++ SDDM polish, signed ISOs (own MOK + GPG, sigstore/cosign on OCI),
+AppArmor + nftables stack, `veilor-update` / `veilor-doctor` /
+`veilor-postinstall` helpers, public docs site, **bootc OCI hybrid
+spike at v0.7**, **bootc-only at v1.0**.
+
+---
+
+## Quick install
+
+```bash
+# 1. Download the ISO from the latest Forgejo release.
+#    https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/releases/tag/ci-latest
+#    (rolling tag; replaced on each successful build-iso.yml run)
+sha256sum -c veilor-os-43-*.iso.sha256
+
+# 2. Flash to USB. Replace /dev/sdX with your USB device — triple-check.
+sudo dd if=veilor-os-43-*.iso of=/dev/sdX bs=4M status=progress conv=fsync
+sync
+
+# 3. Boot from USB, pick "Install veilor-os" from the menu.
+# 4. Set a strong LUKS passphrase — the only prompt during install.
+# 5. Reboot, remove USB.
+# 6. On first boot: TTY prompts for an admin password (≥14 chars, mixed case,
+#    digit, symbol). Once accepted, SDDM starts. Log in as `admin`.
+```
+
+Full install + first-boot walkthrough: [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md).
+
+---
+
+## What veilor-os ships
+
+| Layer | Hardening |
+|-------|-----------|
+| Boot | Secure Boot, `lockdown=integrity`, `slab_nomerge`, `randomize_kstack_offset=on`, `vsyscall=none`. LUKS2 (aes-xts-plain64, argon2id, mem=1GB). zram swap (no disk swap, no cold-boot leak). |
+| Kernel | Locked sysctls: ptrace=2, kptr_restrict=2, dmesg_restrict=1, perf_event_paranoid=3, BPF JIT hardening, full ASLR, no SUID core dumps. |
+| MAC | SELinux **enforcing**, targeted policy + custom `veilor-systemd` module. |
+| Network | firewalld zone = `drop`, ssh only inbound. systemd-resolved with DNS-over-TLS (Cloudflare/Quad9 fallback), LLMNR off. NTS-authenticated chrony time. |
+| SSH | password auth off, root login off, single `admin` user, X11 forwarding off, MaxAuthTries 3. |
+| Auth | root **locked**, single `admin` user with sudo. pwquality minlen=14, 4 character classes. First-boot password forced via `chage -d 0`. |
+| Audit | `auditd` rules covering passwd/shadow/sudoers/ssh/cron/sysctl/kernel modules and all privileged binaries. |
+| IDS | `fail2ban` with sshd + pam-generic jails, journal backend, firewalld rich-rule action. |
+| USB | `USBGuard` daemon, **default-block**, empty allowlist on first boot. |
+| Services off | `abrt*`, `cups`, `geoclue`, `avahi-daemon`, `bluetooth`, `ModemManager`, `gssproxy`, `atd`, `pcscd`, `kdeconnectd`, `PackageKit`. |
+| UX | KDE Plasma minimal, `BreezeBlackPure` colour scheme, Fira Code system font, `veilor-power save \| mid \| perf` with udev AC/battery auto-switch. |
+
+Full reference: [docs/HARDENING.md](docs/HARDENING.md).
+
+---
+
+## 60-second tour — what's different from stock Fedora KDE
+
+- **No Anaconda Initial Setup** wizard after first boot. Single LUKS
+  passphrase prompt is the entire install interaction. Admin user is
+  pre-created; password is set once on TTY1, then SDDM starts.
+- **Root is locked.** `passwd -S root` reports `L`. There is no `su -`
+  to root, ever. Use `sudo`.
+- **No PackageKit, no Flatpak by default.** Updates happen with
+  `sudo dnf upgrade` on your terms, not in the background.
+- **Default firewall zone is `drop`**, not `FedoraWorkstation`. The only
+  thing your machine answers is sshd on its assigned port.
+- **USBGuard blocks every USB device by default.** First-boot procedure:
+  plug in everything you trust, run `usbguard generate-policy`,
+  done.
+- **Black-on-black KDE.** Wallpaper, panel, Konsole all match. No "white
+  flash" anywhere in the session.
+- **`veilor-power save | mid | perf`** swaps the full tuned profile,
+  CPU governor, EPP, battery threshold, and screen-dim policy in one
+  command. Wired to AC/battery udev events too — laptop drops to `save`
+  when unplugged automatically.
+
+---
+
+## How veilor-os compares
+
+| Feature | veilor-os | Stock Fedora KDE | Kicksecure | secureblue |
+|---|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|
+| SELinux enforcing OOTB | yes | yes | yes | yes (custom policy) |
+| AppArmor | deferred (post-v0.6 / v0.7 LSM stack) | no | yes | no |
+| Secure Boot | yes (Fedora keys) | yes (Fedora keys) | configurable | yes (Fedora keys) |
+| LUKS2 with argon2id | default | optional | default | default (Anaconda) |
+| Single-prompt install (LUKS only) | yes | no | no | rebase via Anaconda |
+| Root account locked by default | yes | no | yes | yes |
+| firewalld default zone = drop | yes | no | n/a (nftables) | yes |
+| USBGuard default-block | yes | no | yes | yes |
+| fail2ban + auditd OOTB | yes | no | partial | partial (auditd) |
+| DNS-over-TLS by default | yes | no | yes | yes |
+| NTS-authenticated NTP | yes | no | yes | yes |
+| `init_on_alloc/free` (post-install) | yes (planned re-enable) | no | yes | yes |
+| Telemetry / phone-home | none | minimal | none | none |
+| KDE Plasma branded theme | yes (black) | Breeze | n/a (XFCE) | upstream Kinoite |
+| Power-profile CLI | yes (3-mode) | partial | no | no |
+| Hardened browser (Trivalent / Mullvad) | yes (v0.6+) | no | no | yes (Trivalent shipped) |
+| Atomic OCI image + signed base | v0.7 spike (BlueBuild) | no | no | yes (`bootc`) |
+| Userns-remap default + module sig enforce | yes | no | partial | yes |
+| Base distro | Fedora 43 (KDE) | Fedora 43 | Debian | Fedora atomic (Kinoite/Silverblue) |
+
+veilor-os is **not** trying to compete with Whonix-style anonymity or
+Qubes-style isolation. It is a **hardened daily-driver desktop** — fast,
+clean, locked down, with no manual post-install hardening required.
+
+### Relationship to secureblue
+
+[secureblue](https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue) is an upstream
+hardened atomic Fedora project we benchmark against and plan to **build
+on top of** at v0.7. The v0.7 BlueBuild spike uses their
+`securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns` OCI image as its base — we don't
+ship their source code in this repo, we layer veilor branding,
+theming, the gum installer, and the kickstart bootstrap on top of
+their already-signed image.
+
+Where veilor-os differs is the install path: a kickstart-installed
+flat install for v0.5.x (single-prompt LUKS flow, gum TUI, Anaconda
+underneath), a hybrid kickstart-bootstrap + secureblue-OCI image at
+v0.7, and a fully OCI / `bootc upgrade` path at v1.0. Thanks to the
+secureblue maintainers for the upstream work — we're a friendlier
+install front-end on top of it, not a fork.
+
+---
 
 ## Repo layout
 
@@ -30,20 +168,22 @@ kickstart/   veilor-os.ks                full kickstart definition
 build/       Containerfile + build-iso.sh    reproducible ISO builder
 overlay/     files dropped into installed root via %post
 scripts/     hardening, SELinux policy, theme apply, firstboot
-assets/      fonts, KDE color scheme, branding, plymouth theme
-docs/        HARDENING / POWER / BUILD / INSTALL
-test/        boot-checklist + findings log
+assets/      fonts, KDE colour scheme, branding, plymouth (planned)
+docs/        BUILD / INSTALL / HARDENING / POWER / ROADMAP
+test/        boot-checklist + KVM runner
+.github/     CI workflows + PR template + CODEOWNERS
 ```
 
-See `docs/BUILD.md` for build instructions, `docs/INSTALL.md` for install,
-`docs/HARDENING.md` for what's locked down and why.
+Build instructions: [docs/BUILD.md](docs/BUILD.md).
+Roadmap: [docs/ROADMAP.md](docs/ROADMAP.md).
+Contributing: [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md).
+Changelog: [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md).
 
-## Status
-
-Pre-release. v0.x. Repo private until first green ISO boots clean on test
-hardware.
+---
 
 ## License
 
 MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Fira Code ships from Fedora's
-`fira-code-fonts` package under SIL OFL 1.1.
+`fira-code-fonts` package under SIL OFL 1.1. Fedora packages remain
+under their respective licences. Kickstart, overlay, scripts, and
+docs in this repo are MIT.

assets/branding/veilor-logo.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!--
+  veilor-os branding mark — 1024x256.
+
+  Composition:
+    - left mark : a stacked pair of horizontal bars (wide + narrow) in
+      the grey accent (#686b6f). Reads as a stylised "v" without being
+      a literal letterform; pairs cleanly with the wordmark.
+    - wordmark  : "veilor" in a humanist sans-serif, rendered at the
+      foreground colour (#d8d8d8). 100-weight letter spacing for a
+      restrained, professional feel — never gamer.
+
+  Palette (matches assets/kde/veilor-default.kdeglobals):
+    background   : transparent (use against any #000 surface)
+    accent grey  : #686b6f
+    foreground   : #d8d8d8
+-->
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
+     width="1024" height="256"
+     viewBox="0 0 1024 256"
+     preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid meet"
+     role="img"
+     aria-label="veilor">
+
+  <!-- Mark: two stacked bars suggesting 'v'. Pure geometric, no flourish. -->
+  <g fill="#686b6f">
+    <rect x="64"  y="96"  width="120" height="14" rx="2"/>
+    <rect x="96"  y="142" width="64"  height="14" rx="2"/>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- Wordmark: humanist sans, light weight, generous tracking. -->
+  <text x="232" y="160"
+        font-family="Fira Code, Inter, 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, sans-serif"
+        font-size="120"
+        font-weight="300"
+        letter-spacing="6"
+        fill="#d8d8d8">veilor</text>
+</svg>

assets/installer/banner.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+██    ██ ███████ ██ ██       ██████  ██████       ██████  ███████
+██    ██ ██      ██ ██      ██    ██ ██   ██     ██    ██ ██
+██    ██ █████   ██ ██      ██    ██ ██████      ██    ██ ███████
+ ██  ██  ██      ██ ██      ██    ██ ██   ██     ██    ██      ██
+  ████   ███████ ██ ███████  ██████  ██   ██      ██████  ███████

assets/installer/colors.gum

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# veilor-os installer — gum styling presets
+#
+# Source this file from the installer to apply branded colors to all
+# `gum` (charm.sh/gum) widgets. Pure black bg, white fg, grey accents.
+# Palette taken from the veilor-black KDE color scheme.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   source /usr/share/veilor/installer/colors.gum
+#   gum choose "Install" "Live" "Reboot"
+#   gum input --placeholder "hostname"
+#   gum confirm "Proceed?"
+#
+# Reference: https://github.com/charmbracelet/gum#styling
+# Pattern:   GUM_<COMMAND>_<PROPERTY>
+# Colors are 24-bit hex; gum uses lipgloss internally.
+
+# ── Palette ────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Base colors from assets/kde/veilor-black.colors
+export VEILOR_BG="#000000"      # pure black background
+export VEILOR_FG="#FFFFFF"      # white foreground
+export VEILOR_DIM="#686B6F"     # grey accent (104,107,111 → #686B6F)
+export VEILOR_MUTE="#3D3D3D"    # disabled / muted
+
+# ── gum choose ─────────────────────────────────────────
+# Single- or multi-select menu (used for the main menu, locale, disk).
+export GUM_CHOOSE_CURSOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+export GUM_CHOOSE_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_CHOOSE_ITEM_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_CHOOSE_SELECTED_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_CHOOSE_SELECTED_BACKGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+# Plain ASCII cursor `> ` (was `❯ `). On the linux framebuffer console
+# (fbcon), the default font doesn't render U+276F reliably — it falls
+# back to a fixed-width block glyph that lipgloss then duplicates at
+# col +23, producing the "Install Install" double render we hit on
+# real hardware + virtio-vga. ASCII `> ` renders identically across
+# fbcon, virtio-vga, and X/Wayland gum runs.
+export GUM_CHOOSE_CURSOR="> "
+
+# ── gum input ──────────────────────────────────────────
+# Single-line text entry (hostname).
+export GUM_INPUT_PROMPT_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+export GUM_INPUT_CURSOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_INPUT_PLACEHOLDER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_MUTE"
+export GUM_INPUT_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_INPUT_PROMPT="> "
+
+# ── gum write (multi-line) ─────────────────────────────
+# Reserved for any longer-form prompts; not used in v0.5.1 yet.
+export GUM_WRITE_PROMPT_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+export GUM_WRITE_CURSOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_WRITE_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+
+# ── gum confirm ────────────────────────────────────────
+# Yes/no prompt (final install confirmation).
+export GUM_CONFIRM_PROMPT_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_CONFIRM_SELECTED_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_CONFIRM_SELECTED_BACKGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+export GUM_CONFIRM_UNSELECTED_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+
+# ── gum spin ───────────────────────────────────────────
+# Spinner shown while anaconda runs.
+export GUM_SPIN_SPINNER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_SPIN_TITLE_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+export GUM_SPIN_SPINNER="dot"
+
+# ── gum filter ─────────────────────────────────────────
+# Searchable list (potential disk picker for systems with many disks).
+export GUM_FILTER_PROMPT_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+export GUM_FILTER_INDICATOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_FILTER_SELECTED_INDICATOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_FILTER_MATCH_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_FILTER_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+
+# ── gum style (free-form boxes) ────────────────────────
+# Used to draw the banner card and section dividers.
+export GUM_STYLE_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_STYLE_BACKGROUND="$VEILOR_BG"
+export GUM_STYLE_BORDER="rounded"
+export GUM_STYLE_BORDER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+export GUM_STYLE_PADDING="1 2"
+export GUM_STYLE_MARGIN="0"
+
+# ── gum table ──────────────────────────────────────────
+# Used for the install summary (disk / hostname / locale).
+export GUM_TABLE_BORDER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
+export GUM_TABLE_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_TABLE_CELL_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_TABLE_SELECTED_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
+export GUM_TABLE_SELECTED_BACKGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"

assets/kde/plasma-desktop.conf

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# veilor-os default desktop config — solid black wallpaper (matches reference system).
+# veilor-os default desktop config — solid black wallpaper.
 # Plasma uses `wallpaperplugin=org.kde.color` (not org.kde.image) — pure
-# black solid color rendering, no SVG asset needed.
-# Applied via 30-apply-v03-theme.sh into ~/.config/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc
-# default for new users.
+# black solid color rendering, no image asset required at runtime.
+# Applied via 30-apply-v03-theme.sh into the system kdedefaults so new
+# users inherit a black desktop on first login.
 
 [Containments][Wallpaper]
 wallpaperplugin=org.kde.color

assets/konsole/veilor.profile

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ TerminalCenter=false
 TerminalMargin=4
 
 [Appearance]
-ColorScheme=Linux
+ColorScheme=Veilor
 Font=Fira Code,11,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
 LineSpacing=1
 UseFontLineCharacters=true

assets/wallpapers/veilor-black.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!--
+  veilor-os wallpaper (SVG fallback) — 3840x2160 pure black canvas with a
+  tiny "veilor" wordmark in the lower-right corner. Wordmark renders at
+  #1a1a1a against #000000 — deliberately faint so the desktop reads as
+  pure black at normal viewing distance.
+-->
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
+     width="3840" height="2160"
+     viewBox="0 0 3840 2160"
+     preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid slice">
+  <rect width="3840" height="2160" fill="#000000"/>
+  <text x="3744" y="2064"
+        text-anchor="end"
+        font-family="Fira Code, Consolas, monospace"
+        font-size="36"
+        font-weight="300"
+        letter-spacing="2"
+        fill="#1a1a1a">veilor</text>
+</svg>

docs/CLI.md

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+# veilor-os CLI
+
+User-facing commands shipped at `/usr/local/bin/`. Every veilor-* tool
+is a small bash script — readable, auditable, no compiled bits.
+
+---
+
+## `veilor-update`
+
+Wraps `dnf upgrade --refresh -y` plus `flatpak update -y`. One command
+for "give me everything new". Mirrors the operator habit of always
+patching both DNF and Flatpak — neither is sufficient on its own.
+
+**Usage:**
+
+```sh
+veilor-update
+```
+
+**What it does:**
+
+1. Pings `mirrors.fedoraproject.org`. If unreachable, exits early with
+   a helpful message instead of letting `dnf` spin and time out.
+2. Runs `sudo dnf upgrade --refresh -y` and tees output for live
+   progress.
+3. Counts packages from the `Upgraded:`/`Installed:` lines of dnf
+   output and reports the total.
+4. If `flatpak` is installed, runs `flatpak update -y`.
+5. Compares running kernel to the newest installed kernel and prints
+   a reboot suggestion if they differ.
+
+**Exit codes:**
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| 0    | dnf and flatpak both succeeded |
+| 1    | dnf upgrade failed |
+| 2    | flatpak failed (dnf still ran successfully) |
+| 3    | no network — pre-check failed |
+
+**Example:**
+
+```
+=== veilor-update: refreshing DNF metadata + applying updates ===
+... dnf output ...
+=== veilor-update: updating flatpaks ===
+... flatpak output ...
+=== veilor-update: complete ===
+  Packages updated : 47
+  Running kernel   : 6.19.14-200.fc43.x86_64
+  Newest kernel    : 6.19.16-200.fc43.x86_64 (reboot suggested)
+```
+
+If `gum` is on the system, status banners render with colour and a
+spinner; otherwise plain ASCII output. Either form is identical in
+substance.
+
+---
+
+## `veilor-doctor`
+
+Read-only diagnostic. Walks the v0.2 hardening checklist and reports
+drift. Never modifies system state — fixes are a separate, deliberate
+step.
+
+**Usage:**
+
+```sh
+veilor-doctor              # full coloured table
+veilor-doctor --quiet      # PASS/FAIL summary only
+veilor-doctor --json       # machine-readable JSON
+```
+
+**Sections checked:**
+
+| Section    | Checks |
+|------------|--------|
+| System     | hostname, OS, kernel, uptime |
+| Hardening  | SELinux mode, USBGuard active, fail2ban active, firewalld zone, `kernel.yama.ptrace_scope`, `kernel.kptr_restrict` |
+| Disk       | LUKS device + cipher, btrfs subvolume count, root free space |
+| Network    | NetworkManager state, default route, DNS servers, public IP |
+| Updates    | last `dnf history` entry, pending update count via `dnf check-update` |
+| veilor     | state of `veilor-firstboot.service` + `veilor-modules-lock.service` |
+
+**Exit codes:**
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| 0    | all checks passed |
+| 1    | one or more checks failed |
+| 2    | bad CLI flag |
+
+**Example output:**
+
+```
+── System ──
+  [OK]   hostname             veilor
+  [OK]   os                   veilor-os
+  [OK]   kernel               6.19.14-200.fc43.x86_64
+  [OK]   uptime               up 3 hours, 21 minutes
+
+── Hardening ──
+  [OK]   selinux              Enforcing
+  [OK]   usbguard             active
+  [OK]   fail2ban             active
+  [OK]   firewalld_zone       drop
+  [OK]   ptrace_scope         2
+  [OK]   kptr_restrict        2
+
+── Disk ──
+  [OK]   luks                 dm-0: aes-xts-plain64
+  [OK]   btrfs                4 subvolume(s)
+  [OK]   root_free            72G free / 234G (32% used)
+
+19 checks passed.
+```
+
+`veilor-doctor --json` emits a single-line JSON object with `pass`,
+`fail`, and `checks` keys. Suitable for piping into a monitoring
+agent.
+
+---
+
+## See also
+
+- `veilor-power` — switch tuned profile (save / mid / perf)
+- `veilor-firstboot` — root-owned, runs once on first boot
+- `veilor-installer` — TTY1 TUI installer (live ISO only)

docs/DOCS-DOCS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+# veilor-os — Proof of Work
+
+> **What this file is:** a single document that summarises the depth of
+> work, tooling traversed, and engineering decisions behind veilor-os.
+> Receipts not narrative — every claim links back to a commit, an
+> error, or a config.
+>
+> Author: P M (s8n-ru on Forgejo)  ·  Last updated: 2026-05-06
+
+---
+
+## At a glance
+
+| Metric | Number |
+|---|---|
+| Git commits on `main` | **134+** |
+| Distinct release versions iterated | **32** (v0.1 → v0.5.32) |
+| Pull requests reviewed and merged | **11** |
+| Documented build failure classes hit and fixed | **35+** (live ISO build, Forgejo CI, OCI signing) |
+| Lines of operator-authored kickstart | **400+** (`kickstart/veilor-os.ks`) |
+| Lines of overlay shell hardening scripts | **~1500** across `scripts/*.sh` |
+| Lines of TUI installer (`overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer`) | **~950** bash, gum + whiptail fallback |
+| Self-hosted infra services touched | **28** Docker containers on nullstone |
+| Concurrent dev agents orchestrated in single waves | up to **9** |
+
+---
+
+## Distros / projects studied or layered on
+
+| Project | Role in veilor-os |
+|---|---|
+| Fedora 43 KDE | Base OS for v0.5.x kickstart-installed flat builds |
+| [secureblue](https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue) | Upstream hardened atomic Fedora; v0.7 BlueBuild spike layers our overlay on top of `securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns` |
+| Kicksecure / Whonix | Reference for AppArmor + apt-transport-tor model (we don't ship Tor; we did read their docs) |
+| Bluefin / Bazzite (uBlue) | Reference for BlueBuild recipe shape and OCI publishing pattern |
+| Tails | Reference for live-only install model — explicitly **not** veilor's path |
+| Qubes OS | Reference for hardware partitioning model — explicitly out of scope |
+| Trivalent (secureblue) | Hardened Chromium — adopted at v0.6+ |
+| Mullvad Browser | Tor-Browser-fork without Tor — adopted at v0.6+ |
+
+veilor-os is **not** a fork of any of the above. It's a **composition**:
+Fedora kickstart for v0.5.x, secureblue OCI for v0.7+, with our own
+brand, installer (gum TUI), 3-mode power CLI, and Forgejo CI/release.
+
+---
+
+## Tooling traversed
+
+| Tool / system | Where it lives in the build | Notable issues hit |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Anaconda** (Fedora installer) | drives kickstart install in chroot | RPM-6.0 cmdline-mode scriptlet error propagation regression — patched `transaction_progress.py` in CI |
+| **livecd-creator** (livecd-tools) | builds the live ISO image | EFI dracut stanza bug: `LABEL=` instead of `CDLABEL=` → patched `imgcreate/live.py` in CI run |
+| **livemedia-creator** (lorax) | dropped after 17 attempts (EFI/BOOT not built) | Switched to livecd-creator entirely |
+| **dracut** | builds initramfs in chroot | LUKS module not pulled in by default → `--regenerate-all` in chroot %post |
+| **GRUB2** | bootloader install + cmdline | `gen_grub_cfgstub` failures, manual reinstall `grub2-install + grub2-mkconfig` in install %post |
+| **Plymouth** | boot splash | Disabled (`plymouth.enable=0`) so LUKS prompt is visible; theme `details` for v0.7+ |
+| **SDDM** | KDE display manager | livecd-creator skips the `display-manager.service` symlink — stub fixfiles + setenforce in firstboot |
+| **PAM** | login auth | nullok on SDDM, blank-pw + `chage -d 0` to force password set on first boot |
+| **gum** (charm.sh) | TTY1 TUI installer | bubbletea cursor render glitch on linux fbcon — replaced password input with bash `read -srp` |
+| **whiptail** | TUI fallback when gum missing | one-line fallback path |
+| **systemd** | unit ordering, presets | `system-systemdx2dcryptsetup.slice` doesn't exist — non-fatal preset warning, suppressed |
+| **firewalld** | default-drop zone, ssh allow | kept (PackageKit/avahi/cups runtime-disabled, not depsolve-removed) |
+| **USBGuard** | default-block USB | id-based rules.conf, hash-based broke on dock replug |
+| **fail2ban** + **auditd** | runtime IDS + audit log | full ruleset on passwd/shadow/sudoers/ssh/cron/sysctl/kernel modules |
+| **chrony** | NTS-authenticated NTP | Cloudflare + NETNOD pool |
+| **systemd-resolved** | DNS-over-TLS | Cloudflare + Quad9 fallback, LLMNR off |
+| **SELinux** | targeted policy + custom `veilor-systemd` module | `PCRE2 10.46 vs 10.47` host-vs-chroot regex mismatch — solved with `selinux --permissive` at build, enforcing on first-boot |
+| **AppArmor** | deferred — not in Fedora 43 base | v0.7 secureblue OCI ships its own LSM stack |
+| **zram-generator** | zram swap (no disk swap) | works |
+| **btrfs** | / + /home subvols inside LUKS2 | works |
+| **LUKS2** | aes-xts-plain64 + argon2id | mem=1GB, time=9, threads=4 — manually tuned |
+| **xorriso** | ISO wrap + graft | extract original boot stanza via `-report_el_torito as_mkisofs`, replay flags via `eval` to handle word-splitting |
+| **Sigstore / cosign** | keyless OIDC signing | doesn't work on Forgejo (no Fulcio-trusted issuer) — gated to GitHub-only, key-pair signing planned |
+| **anchore/sbom-action** | SBOM SPDX | pinned to `v0.17.2` (last node20-shipping release) |
+| **actions/attest-build-provenance** | SLSA L3 build provenance | pinned to `v2.2.3` |
+| **BlueBuild** | OCI image build for v0.7 spike | recipe ready, `ostreecontainer` kickstart directive validated |
+| **bootc** | atomic upgrades for v1.0 | target tooling, `bootc upgrade` instead of `dnf upgrade` |
+| **Forgejo** + **act_runner** | self-hosted git + CI | runner inside container with userns-remap host caused 13-step debug chain |
+| **Tailscale** + **Headscale** | private mesh | for friend-PC GPU offload + admin SSH |
+
+---
+
+## Build failure classes encountered (and beaten)
+
+Numbered ledger of every distinct failure mode, in approximate order of
+discovery. Each row is one bug class — many were hit dozens of times in
+permutation before the underlying root cause was understood.
+
+### Phase A — local + livemedia-creator (v0.1 → v0.2.0)
+
+| # | Symptom | Root cause | Fix |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | rootless podman btrfs / loop / sudo cache fights | rootless can't `losetup`; host CAP_SYS_ADMIN gate | Switched to host-native lorax + NOPASSWD wheel |
+| 2 | Kickstart parse: `--title`, `text`, multiline `part`, `--hash` | livemedia-creator + recent pykickstart deprecations | Rewrote ks |
+| 3 | dnf depsolve: KDE hard-deps cups / geoclue2 / ModemManager / PackageKit | KDE Plasma 6 transitively pulls them in | Kept packages, mask daemons at runtime |
+| 4 | Anaconda merges all repos, `cost`/`includepkgs` ignored | upstream Anaconda repo-merge logic | Local fix-repo at `cost=1` to force selection |
+| 5 | scriptlet warning RC=5 (selinux/pcre2 regex skew) | host libselinux 10.46 vs chroot's selinux-policy file_contexts.bin built against 10.47 | fix-repo provides matched 10.47 pair |
+| 6 | dnf transaction RC=5 on non-critical scriptlet | RPM-6.0 cmdline-mode regression | Patched anaconda `transaction_progress.py` in CI |
+| 7 | services config: `services --enabled=veilor-firstboot` before unit installed | Anaconda services runs before %post overlay copy | Move `systemctl enable` into %post |
+| 8 | overlay copy: `%post --nochroot` SRC path wrong | livecd-creator vs livemedia-creator differ on `INSTALL_ROOT` vs `/mnt/sysimage` | Multi-path detection in %post |
+| 9 | ISO wrap: `grub2-mkimage` missing i386-pc | missing `grub2-pc-modules` | Added |
+| 10 | ISO wrap: xorrisofs missing EFI/BOOT | livemedia-creator `--make-iso --no-virt` template gap | **Pivoted to livecd-creator** |
+| 11 | livecd-creator: `Failed to find package 'fontconfig'` | livecd-creator repo-discovery differs | Repaired via direct `baseurl` not mirrorlist |
+| 12 | dracut hangs on `parse-livenet` | livecd-creator EFI stanza writes `live:LABEL=` instead of `live:CDLABEL=` | sed-patch `imgcreate/live.py` in CI |
+
+### Phase B — boot UX + LUKS + theming (v0.2.4 → v0.5.27)
+
+| # | Symptom | Root cause | Fix |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 13 | `init_on_alloc/free` 5x KVM live-boot time | every page zeroed on alloc/free, brutal in vCPU | Drop from live cmdline; firstboot patches GRUB to re-enable for installed system |
+| 14 | LUKS prompt invisible | Plymouth swallows TTY | `plymouth.enable=0` for live; `details` theme for installed |
+| 15 | Plymouth services not maskable in chroot | systemctl mask N/A under chroot | `/dev/null` symlinks |
+| 16 | LUKS dracut module missing | Default dracut config doesn't pull crypt | `--regenerate-all` in chroot post |
+| 17 | rd.luks.uuid not in cmdline | Anaconda doesn't write it for our partition layout | `grubby --update-kernel ALL --args=rd.luks.uuid=...` in chroot post |
+| 18 | Kernel-install on chroot overwrites cmdline | systemd kernel-install writes its own `/etc/kernel/cmdline` | Switch to `--config /etc/kernel/cmdline` flow |
+| 19 | rescue glob in firstboot: `set -e` killed loop | unmatched glob | `shopt -s nullglob` |
+| 20 | fbcon blanks during KMS modeset on real hardware | i915/amdgpu/nvidia driver loads, blanks fb | `fbcon=nodefer i915.modeset=1 amdgpu.modeset=1 nvidia-drm.modeset=1` |
+| 21 | gum cursor render glitch (duplicate-Install + stray-T) | bubbletea cursor-hide vs linux fbcon terminfo | Replace `gum input --password` with `read -srp` |
+| 22 | Generated install ks `updates` repo 404 zchunk | Fedora mid-push window | Strip `repo --name=updates` from generated ks |
+| 23 | Anaconda payload module crash on `LANG` env | unset env in TTY1 service | `export LANG=en_US.UTF-8` before exec |
+| 24 | Anaconda --cmdline + `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` missing | TTY1 has no XDG runtime dir | Create + export pre-exec |
+| 25 | LVM pulled into installer ks unintentionally | default partitioning | Drop LVM, native btrfs-on-LUKS |
+| 26 | sshd `UseDNS yes` 30s banner timeout in NAT/slirp | reverse DNS unreachable in QEMU user-net | `UseDNS no` in sshd_config.d |
+| 27 | os-release branding overrides not visible to login banner | `motd` not regenerated | `update-motd` in firstboot |
+
+### Phase C — Forgejo CI + ISO publishing (v0.5.32, current)
+
+13-step debug chain documented separately: see [docs/CI-PIPELINE-FAILURES.md] (live in conversation log).
+
+Highlights:
+- userns-remap=default on host docker daemon collides with privileged + image perms
+- Forgejo runner inside container creates docker-in-docker workspace bind path mismatch
+- Sigstore Fulcio keyless signing assumes GH OIDC issuer; gated to GH-only
+- cosign / sbom / attest actions floating tags now node24, runner is node20 → all pinned
+
+---
+
+## Key engineering decisions (and why)
+
+### 1. Hybrid kickstart-bootstrap + bootc OCI strategy
+
+Locked at v0.7 spike. Reasons:
+
+- **Kickstart (v0.5.x)** gives a familiar Anaconda LUKS install flow,
+  single-prompt UX, drop-in replacement for stock Fedora KDE installer.
+- **OCI image (v0.7+)** lets us layer on top of secureblue's already-
+  signed hardened base. We don't re-derive AppArmor / Trivalent /
+  custom SELinux — we inherit. Fedora bumps become `image-version: 44`
+  one-line edits, not multi-day debug sprints.
+- **bootc-only (v1.0)** retires kickstart entirely; atomic A/B upgrades,
+  instant rollback, immutable system root.
+
+### 2. Brand-clean from day one
+
+`grep -ri 'onyx\|192\.168\.0\.\|admin@\|fedora\.local\|xynki\.dev' kickstart/ overlay/ scripts/ assets/` returns zero hits. Enforced via `.github/workflows/lint.yml` `brand-leak` job. Every audit run, every CI run, every commit.
+
+### 3. Forgejo over GitHub for primary
+
+Decision date: 2026-05-06. Drivers:
+- GitHub free tier compute caps were hitting on every ISO build
+- Operator wants to work privately by default; GH = always-public
+- Self-hosted Forgejo on nullstone gives unlimited build minutes, no
+  third-party dep on the build path
+- Push-mirror to GH disabled — operator opts in per-repo when wanting
+  public visibility
+
+### 4. ssh tightening
+
+`AllowUsers user`, password auth off, root login locked, X11 forwarding off, `MaxAuthTries 3`. Operator authenticates with ed25519 key only. Documented in `feedback_nullstone_ssh_user.md` memory.
+
+### 5. Defense-in-depth mesh
+
+Tailscale + Headscale (`hs.s8n.ru`) is the SSH on-ramp. Every device joins the tailnet; public SSH is firewalled at the router. Friend GPU node (RTX 4080 in WSL2) reachable via tailnet IP — immune to ISP IP rotation.
+
+---
+
+## What's been built that isn't in the kickstart
+
+The repo carries more than just an ISO recipe:
+
+| Path | What it is |
+|---|---|
+| `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` (400+ lines) | Live ISO ks, hand-authored, fully branded |
+| `overlay/etc/systemd/system/veilor-firstboot.service` | TTY1 oneshot, prompts admin password on first boot |
+| `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer` (~950 lines) | TTY1 TUI installer wrapping Anaconda + gum + whiptail fallback |
+| `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-power` | 3-mode power CLI: `save \| mid \| perf`. Wires tuned profiles + EPP + governor + battery threshold + screen-dim policy in one cmd |
+| `overlay/etc/tuned/profiles/veilor-{powersave,balanced,performance}/` | Custom tuned profiles, not Fedora defaults |
+| `overlay/etc/udev/rules.d/{90-veilor-ac-switch,91-veilor-battery-threshold}.rules` | Auto-switch power profile on AC/battery events |
+| `overlay/etc/usbguard/rules.conf` | id-based default-block USB rules |
+| `overlay/etc/firewalld/zones/trusted.xml` | tailscale0 trust override |
+| `overlay/etc/skel/.config/{kdeglobals,breezerc,kwinrc,konsolerc}` | Pre-applied KDE black theme + Fira Code system font |
+| `scripts/10-harden-base.sh` (~250 lines) | KDE Connect off, DNS-over-TLS, fail2ban + auditd setup |
+| `scripts/20-harden-kernel.sh` (~300 lines) | sysctl, password-quality, NTS chrony, USBGuard, service prune |
+| `scripts/selinux/veilor-systemd.te` | Custom SELinux module (targeted policy gap fixes) |
+| `scripts/30-apply-v03-theme.sh` | Plymouth + SDDM + Konsole + wallpaper apply |
+| `scripts/40-apparmor.sh` (deferred) | AppArmor profile load (complain-mode skeleton, sealed pending Fedora packaging or v0.7 secureblue) |
+| `bluebuild/recipe.yml` | v0.7 OCI recipe (base = secureblue securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns) |
+| `kickstart/install-ostreecontainer.ks` | v0.7 install ks: 10 lines, just `ostreecontainer --url=ghcr.io/veilor-org/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry` |
+| `assets/installer/{banner.txt,colors.gum}` | Pure-block VEILOR OS wordmark + branded gum colour palette |
+| `assets/branding/` | Logo, wallpapers, plymouth theme assets |
+| `docs/STRATEGY.md` (336 lines) | Full hybrid strategy + mesh + browser stack + Forgejo decision |
+| `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (157 lines) | Threat model, in-scope, out-of-scope, mitigations table |
+| `docs/HARDENING.md` (194 lines) | Full hardening reference |
+| `docs/ROADMAP.md` (332 lines) | v0.5.x → v0.7 → v1.0 phased plan |
+| `docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/` | 9-agent research wave findings on v0.5.32 blockers |
+| `test/TESTING.md` + `test/run-vm.sh` + `test/test-runs/` | Standardised hybrid VM test method, codified after v0.5.27 surfaced 4 regressions in one session |
+| `.github/workflows/{build-iso.yml,lint.yml,build-bluebuild.yml}` | CI for v0.5.x flat ISO + v0.7 OCI image + brand-leak / shellcheck / kickstart syntax lint |
+
+---
+
+## CI infrastructure built on nullstone
+
+Self-hosted from scratch on a single Debian 13 server. All running, all
+behind Traefik with LE certs via Gandi LiveDNS DNS-01.
+
+| Service | Role | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| Forgejo (`git.s8n.ru`) | git host + container registry | code 9.0.3 + gitea 1.22 underneath; INSTALL_LOCK=true; admin user `s8n-ru` (NOT `admin` — reserved) |
+| forgejo-runner | act_runner v6.4.0, registered as `nullstone` label | privileged, userns_mode=host, custom Fedora-with-node image (`veilor-build:43`) |
+| Custom build image | `veilor-build:43` = fedora:43 + nodejs + git + sudo + curl | Built locally; act_runner needs node in job container |
+| socket-proxy | Tecnativa docker-socket-proxy | Read-only docker API for monitoring |
+| Traefik 3.x | Reverse proxy + ACME | Gandi DNS-01 cert; `no-guest@file` middleware blocks LAN-only services from public |
+| Authentik | SSO + LDAP (`auth.s8n.ru`) | postgres + redis + worker stack |
+| step-ca | Internal PKI | Used by all-internal mTLS where it lands |
+| Tuwunel (Matrix) `matrix.veilor.uk` | Rust homeserver | Federation off, telemetry off, registration token-gated |
+| Cinny | Matrix web client `cinny.txt.s8n.ru` | Second isolated instance |
+| Misskey | Private Twitter rebrand at `x.veilor` | Custom theme via DB pg_read_file |
+| n8n | Automation runner | Used for CI watchdogs and personal automations |
+| Pi-hole | Local DNS sinkhole | DNS-over-TLS upstream |
+| Headscale | Tailscale control plane | 4 nodes joined incl friend PC |
+| AnythingLLM | Local LLM UI | Layer on Ollama + remote vLLM (friend PC RTX 4080) |
+| filebrowser-mc | Static asset server | racked.ru launcher hosting |
+
+Runtime UID layout: `userns-remap=default` shifted +100000. Backup
+script + ACL on docker.sock + group-add patterns documented in
+`memory/feedback_docker_sudo_bypass.md`.
+
+---
+
+## Receipts
+
+- **Forgejo repo:** <https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os>
+- **GitHub mirror snapshot (frozen 2026-05-06):** <https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os>
+- **ci-latest rolling release (live):** <https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/releases/tag/ci-latest>
+- **First green ISO timestamp:** 2026-05-06 14:30 UTC, sha256 in release sidecar
+- **Per-version commit trail:** `git log --oneline | grep '^[a-f0-9]\{7\} v0\.'` shows every `v0.x.y: <bug>` ship line
+- **Test method evolution:** `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md`
+- **Strategy lock:** [`docs/STRATEGY.md`](STRATEGY.md), 2026-05-05
+- **9-agent research wave findings:** [`docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/`](research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/)
+- **Threat model:** [`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`](THREAT-MODEL.md)
+- **Hardening reference:** [`docs/HARDENING.md`](HARDENING.md)
+- **Roadmap:** [`docs/ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md)
+
+---
+
+## What this took
+
+This is a **single-operator + AI-accelerated** project. No team, no
+funding, no upstream maintainer hat. Most of the work happened across
+~6 weeks of evenings and weekends. AI agents (Claude Opus 4.7, mainly)
+handle the parallel research, log diving, kickstart debug, and
+multi-file refactors; the operator drives strategy, makes the calls,
+runs the VM/hardware tests, owns the brand decisions, and pushes every
+commit.
+
+The result is a hardened Linux distro that **boots, installs cleanly,
+hardens itself, and ships through self-hosted CI** — with a forward
+strategy that retires the legacy Fedora kickstart path in favour of
+a modern atomic OCI image stack, while crediting and building on top
+of the upstream secureblue work rather than forking it.
+
+For comparison, a Fedora spin maintainer working part-time normally
+ships this much in **1–2 weeks of work**. We did it once across a
+longer arc with deeper documentation, more strategy reversals, and
+zero personal/onyx leaks in the final ship state.

docs/HARDENING.md

@@ -41,6 +41,21 @@ kickstart `%post` or the overlay tree shipped in `/etc`.
   `sys_admin` and `perfmon` capabilities required by the modules-lock
   service. Source: `scripts/selinux/veilor-systemd.te`.
 
+### veilor-firstboot SELinux confinement
+
+The first-boot password service is privileged (it has to write
+`/etc/shadow`) but small. Module `veilor-firstboot` carves a tight domain:
+
+- Allowed: read `/etc/passwd`, exec `passwd(1)`, write
+  `/var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done`, write `/etc/sddm.conf.d/`,
+  start `sddm.service`.
+- `neverallow` rules block: network sockets (no phone-home),
+  `home_root_t` / `user_home_t` access, `sys_module`, `sys_ptrace`,
+  `sys_rawio`.
+
+Source: `scripts/selinux/veilor-firstboot.te`. Build & load with
+`scripts/selinux/build-policy.sh` (loads all modules in one pass).
+
 ## Network surface
 
 - **firewalld** default zone = `drop`.
@@ -119,6 +134,57 @@ sudo usbguard allow-device <id>
 `bluetooth`, `ModemManager`, `gssproxy`, `atd`, `pcscd.socket`,
 `pcscd.service`, `kdeconnectd` (removed at package level).
 
+## AppArmor (v0.5)
+
+Fedora 43 ships AppArmor alongside SELinux. veilor-os keeps SELinux as the
+primary MAC layer (enforcing, targeted) but ships AppArmor profile
+skeletons for high-risk userland binaries that benefit from a second,
+binary-scoped policy on top of SELinux's role-based one.
+
+Profiles live in `scripts/apparmor/`:
+
+| Profile | Target | Default mode |
+|---------|--------|--------------|
+| `usr.bin.thorium` | Thorium browser | `complain` |
+| `usr.local.bin.lm-studio` | LM Studio LLM runner | `complain` |
+| `usr.bin.veilor-power` | Power profile switcher | `enforce` |
+
+Profiles are **not** loaded automatically — they are opt-in until v0.5.
+Enable a profile post-install with:
+
+```bash
+sudo dnf install apparmor-utils apparmor-parser
+sudo install -m 0644 scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.thorium /etc/apparmor.d/
+sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium
+sudo aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium      # log only
+sudo aa-enforce  /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium      # block
+```
+
+Refine `complain`-mode profiles with `aa-logprof` after exercising the
+app through normal use; it converts logged denials into rule additions
+interactively.
+
+## Audit log shipping (optional)
+
+Local journald is the default audit sink. For off-device shipping to a
+trusted log collector (Loki / Wazuh / Splunk), veilor-os ships a
+disabled-by-default plugin template:
+
+- `/etc/audit/plugins.d/veilor-remote.conf` — auditd plugin shim
+  (set `active = yes` to enable).
+- `/etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf.disabled` — audisp-remote target
+  config template (rename to `audisp-remote.conf` and edit
+  `remote_server` to enable).
+
+**Warning:** enabling remote audit shipping leaks every privileged syscall,
+file-watch hit, and auth event off-device. Treat the collector as a host
+with the same trust level as root. Only enable if the collector itself is
+hardened and the transport is TLS or kerberized.
+
+Reference integration paths in the template: Loki via promtail/vector
+syslog source, Wazuh via local wazuh-agent (no network shipping needed),
+Splunk via HEC bridge.
+
 ## What's *not* enabled by default
 
 - **Disk swap** — replaced by zram (RAM-only, no key leak risk).

docs/INSTALLER.md

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# veilor-os Installer
+
+Branded TUI installer that runs on `tty1` of the live ISO. Wraps the
+underlying `anaconda` kickstart install with a single-flow user experience
+similar in spirit to `omarchy` and `archinstall`.
+
+> **Status (v0.5.1):** TUI rewritten on top of [`gum`][gum] (charm.sh's
+> Go TUI toolkit). Replaces the v0.5.0 `whiptail` build, which used the
+> Fedora-default colors and looked out of place against the rest of the
+> branded system.
+
+## Screenshots
+
+> _Placeholder — real screenshots to be captured against the v0.5.1 ISO
+> once the gum-based installer ships and boots clean on test hardware._
+
+| Stage          | Path                                  |
+|----------------|---------------------------------------|
+| Banner + menu  | `assets/installer/screenshots/01-menu.png`     _(TBD)_ |
+| Disk picker    | `assets/installer/screenshots/02-disk.png`     _(TBD)_ |
+| Confirm        | `assets/installer/screenshots/03-confirm.png`  _(TBD)_ |
+| Install spin   | `assets/installer/screenshots/04-spin.png`     _(TBD)_ |
+
+## Boot flow
+
+```
+power on
+  └─ UEFI / GRUB
+       └─ live kernel + initramfs
+            └─ systemd → multi-user.target
+                 └─ getty@tty1.service.d/veilor-installer.conf
+                      └─ /usr/local/sbin/veilor-installer
+                           ├─ source assets/installer/colors.gum
+                           ├─ cat   assets/installer/banner.txt
+                           └─ gum choose <main menu>
+```
+
+The override at `overlay/etc/systemd/system/getty@tty1.service.d/veilor-installer.conf`
+replaces the standard login prompt on tty1 with the installer entry point.
+Other ttys (2-6) still get a normal getty for recovery use.
+
+## Main menu
+
+| #  | Option                                      | Action                                     |
+|----|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
+| 1  | Install veilor-os to disk                   | collect answers → generate ks → anaconda   |
+| 2  | Try live — desktop (KDE Plasma)             | `systemctl isolate graphical.target`       |
+| 3  | Try live — shell                            | `exec /bin/bash --login`                   |
+| 4  | Reboot                                      | `systemctl reboot`                         |
+| 5  | Power off                                   | `systemctl poweroff`                       |
+
+## Install path — questions asked
+
+In order, the installer collects:
+
+1. **Target disk** (`gum choose` over `lsblk` output — selected disk is wiped)
+2. **Hostname** (`gum input`, default `veilor`)
+3. **LUKS passphrase** (`gum input --password`, min 8 chars, full-disk encryption)
+4. **Admin password** (`gum input --password`, min 8 chars)
+5. **Locale** (`gum choose` — en_GB, en_US, de_DE, fr_FR)
+6. **Confirmation** (`gum confirm` — summary of choices before destructive step)
+
+Answers are written into `/run/install/veilor-generated.ks` and handed off
+to `anaconda --kickstart=...`. The kickstart inlines the LUKS passphrase
+and the admin password — the file is _never_ committed and lives only in
+the live tmpfs.
+
+## Branding assets
+
+| File                                | Purpose                                |
+|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
+| `assets/installer/banner.txt`       | ASCII banner shown above the menu      |
+| `assets/installer/colors.gum`       | sourceable bash file of GUM_* env vars |
+
+The palette mirrors `assets/kde/veilor-black.colors`:
+black `#000000` background, white `#FFFFFF` foreground, grey `#686B6F`
+accent. No reds, no other colors. Pure monochrome.
+
+## Logs
+
+- `/var/log/veilor-installer.log` — installer stdout/stderr
+- `/tmp/anaconda.log`             — kickstart execution log
+
+Both are tee'd to the screen during the install spin, so a failed install
+leaves visible breadcrumbs without forcing the user to dig.
+
+## Credits & license
+
+- [`gum`][gum] by [Charm](https://charm.sh) — MIT-licensed Go TUI toolkit.
+  We dynamically `exec` gum at runtime; no source vendored. Distributed via
+  the Fedora `gum` package.
+- veilor-installer itself is MIT-licensed (see [LICENSE](../LICENSE)),
+  matching the rest of the repo and the upstream gum project.
+
+[gum]: https://github.com/charmbracelet/gum

docs/ROADMAP.md

@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+# Roadmap
+
+Versioned roadmap for veilor-os. Targets are intentionally short and
+testable. No fluff. Items in earlier versions are blockers for later
+ones unless explicitly noted.
+
+For the historical record of what landed in each release, see
+[`../CHANGELOG.md`](../CHANGELOG.md).
+
+---
+
+## ⚡ STRATEGY PIVOT — 2026-05-06
+
+**Decision: skip v0.6 kickstart polish. Pivot directly to v0.7
+BlueBuild OCI path.**
+
+Reasons:
+- v0.5.32 produced a green ISO (2.7 GB) on the Forgejo runner. Proof
+  point achieved.
+- Continuing to debug `livecd-creator` + `anaconda` quirks for v0.6
+  polish is sunk-cost work on tooling we retire at v1.0 anyway.
+- v0.7 spike already has a working BlueBuild recipe + `ostreecontainer`
+  kickstart directive. Layering veilor branding + installer + power CLI
+  on top of secureblue beats re-deriving the same hardening from
+  scratch.
+- Ergonomic CLI tools (`veilor-postinstall`, `veilor-doctor`,
+  `veilor-update`) translate cleanly to v0.7: `bootc upgrade` replaces
+  `dnf upgrade`. Move them into v0.7 scope.
+
+**v0.5.0 is the final kickstart-path release.** Tag, freeze, ship as
+proof-of-work / portfolio anchor. **v0.6 cancelled as a milestone.**
+
+Active focus: `v0.7-bluebuild-spike` branch.
+
+---
+
+## Lessons learned through v0.5.x install grind
+
+Five things v0.5.27–31 changed about how we plan:
+
+1. **Anaconda + RPM-6.0 + `--cmdline` is brittle** — three install
+   failures, kernel cmdline written to four places before one worked.
+   `--location=none` skips `CollectKernelArgumentsTask`,
+   `kernel-install` reads `/etc/kernel/cmdline` not `/proc/cmdline`,
+   and `transaction_progress.py` masks real failures if patched too
+   broadly. Justifies promoting the bootc-image-builder spike to v0.7.
+2. **Test procedure must gate every tag** — v0.5.27 only surfaced four
+   bugs in one VM run because the run walked every step in order.
+   `test/TESTING.md` and `test/test-runs/` are now load-bearing.
+3. **Real hardware is not optional** — VM catches install logic, not
+   KMS / fbcon / firmware. Spare laptop + friend's laptop must run
+   pre-tag, every time.
+4. **Multi-agent debug waves work, but only with a verifier** — the
+   v0.5.31 four-bug fix came from a 4-agent verification wave on
+   v0.5.30 outcome. Wave + verifier = signal; wave alone = noise.
+5. **"We ask once, with sane defaults" is the distro UX** — every
+   v0.5 install bug we shipped a workaround for (locale, hostname,
+   USBGuard policy, drivers) is something `veilor-postinstall` could
+   ask the user about cleanly on first boot. That promotes
+   `veilor-postinstall` from v0.6 background item to flagship.
+
+---
+
+## v0.2 — green ISO + base hardening (DONE)
+
+Reproducible CI build pipeline. UEFI+BIOS bootable live ISO from a single
+kickstart. Single-prompt LUKS install. First-boot admin password flow.
+Full overlay applied (sysctl, sshd, sudoers, tuned profiles, KDE black
+theme, Fira Code, branded `/etc/os-release`). SELinux enforcing.
+firewalld drop zone. fail2ban + auditd + USBGuard active. The build
+chased five real bugs (DEST hardcoded, `set -eu` killing `cp`,
+os-release symlink, missing admin user, `LABEL=` vs `CDLABEL=` in
+livecd-tools) before greening.
+
+Released `v0.2.5` on 2026-05-01. CI on every push to `main`.
+
+---
+
+## v0.5.27–v0.5.31 — install path stabilisation (DONE)
+
+The bridge between v0.2 (greens at all) and v0.3 (looks polished). All
+install-path bugs surfaced by the formal hybrid-VM test procedure
+(`test/TESTING.md`). Five releases, ~hours of debug, three install
+failures before greening.
+
+- **v0.5.27 (DONE)** — `rd.luks.uuid` via `grubby --update-kernel=ALL`,
+  GRUB rebrand, `fbcon=nodefer`, ASCII gum cursor.
+- **v0.5.28 (DONE)** — locale locked en_US.UTF-8, dropped updates repo,
+  patched anaconda `transaction_progress.py` to silence `Configuring
+  xxx.x86_64` scroll, excluded man-db.
+- **v0.5.29 (DONE)** — narrowed anaconda patch (was masking real
+  failures), LUKS UX, initramfs assertion. Five-fix bundle from 7-agent
+  research wave.
+- **v0.5.30 (DONE)** — broad error suppression, manual bootloader path,
+  virtio log capture for post-mortem.
+- **v0.5.31 (DONE)** — `--location=none` was making anaconda skip
+  `CollectKernelArgumentsTask`; kernel-install reads
+  `/etc/kernel/cmdline` as source of truth, veilor never wrote it, so
+  BLS entries shipped with empty cmdline. Three-path write
+  (`/etc/kernel/cmdline` + `/etc/default/grub` + grubby) plus explicit
+  `kernel-install add`.
+
+## v0.5.32 — next ship (active)
+
+Outstanding from the grind, immediate priority for the next tag:
+
+- **End-to-end VM green run** — v0.5.31 lands the kernel-cmdline fix
+  but no full hybrid-VM pass has signed it off. Run the procedure in
+  `test/TESTING.md` to install + reboot + login, file the report in
+  `test/test-runs/`, then tag.
+- **Real-hardware run on the spare laptop** — VM is necessary not
+  sufficient. Friend's laptop is mate's-test, spare is ours. KMS,
+  fbcon, USB controller, real-firmware Secure Boot only show up here.
+- **gum input render glitch** — duplicate "Install", stray T in
+  password fields on linux fbcon. Replace `gum input --password` with
+  bash `read -srp`; cosmetic only but visible on every install.
+
+---
+
+## v0.3 — UX polish (in progress)
+
+The visible polish layer that v0.2 deferred for build velocity.
+
+- **Plymouth black theme** — boot splash matching the desktop. No Fedora
+  drum, no white flash. `assets/plymouth/veilor/`.
+- **SDDM theme** — black login background, single-user prompt with
+  `admin` pre-filled, no userlist.
+- **Konsole profile** — black background, Fira Code, transparent panel
+  off (no compositor cost on resume).
+- **Wallpaper SVG** — flat black with subtle veilor wordmark, 1080p +
+  4K + ultrawide variants.
+- **Re-enable memory hygiene on installed system.** v0.2.5 stripped
+  `init_on_alloc=1 init_on_free=1` from the *live* cmdline because they
+  5x'd KVM boot time. Re-add post-install via `veilor-firstboot` so the
+  installed system gets the protection without the ISO penalty.
+- **USBGuard auto-snapshot on first boot.** Currently the operator
+  runs `usbguard generate-policy` manually. v0.3 wires this into
+  `veilor-firstboot` after the password step (with a clear
+  "plug in trusted devices first" prompt).
+
+Target: this month. None of it is a kickstart change — pure overlay
+work.
+
+---
+
+## v0.4 — distribution + signing
+
+Get veilor-os to a state where the ISO is downloadable, verifiable, and
+trusted by Secure Boot without user shenanigans.
+
+- **GPG-signed releases.** Tag → CI builds → CI signs ISO + sha256 with
+  veilor.org release key → GitHub Release artifact carries `.iso.asc`.
+- **Reproducible builds.** Pin Fedora compose ID, lock package versions
+  via `dnf snapshot` or equivalent, document how to verify two builds
+  match.
+- **Own MOK (Machine Owner Key) + sbsign for Secure Boot.** Currently
+  veilor-os relies on Fedora's signed shim chain. v0.4 ships our own
+  MOK, signs the kernel + initramfs at build time, optionally enrols
+  the MOK on first boot for users who want a cleaner trust path.
+- **ISO download mirror** — static download page on veilor.org with
+  current + previous release, sha256, gpg signature. **Not** an RPM
+  mirror — veilor-os does not ship its own packages, only the spin
+  configuration.
+- **Release process documented** — tagging, CI, signing, mirror sync
+  in `docs/RELEASE.md`.
+
+---
+
+## v0.5 — hardening tier 2
+
+Hardening that builds on v0.2's foundation. Each item is opt-in unless
+specified — defaults stay sane for a daily driver.
+
+- **AppArmor profiles in addition to SELinux.** Stack-not-replace.
+  Targeted at the browser, the mail client, and anything that touches
+  attacker-controlled data. SELinux remains the primary MAC.
+- **systemd-homed** — encrypted-per-user `~`, suspend-aware, key
+  unlocked at PAM login. Optional, opt-in via post-install helper.
+- **nftables ruleset** alongside firewalld defaults. Default firewalld
+  policy stays drop; nftables provides advanced filtering for users
+  who want it.
+- **Audit log shipping** — opt-in `auditd` -> remote syslog over TLS,
+  for users running a central log aggregator.
+- **Installer kickstart split** — separate `veilor-os-install.ks` for
+  installer ISO (real LUKS partitioning, not the live-rootfs
+  simplification used in v0.2). Lets users install veilor-os as the
+  primary OS without going through the live boot first.
+- **Audit baseline** — re-run the security audit (template in
+  `security/audit-template.md`) and target a lower risk score than v0.2.
+
+---
+
+## v0.6 — CANCELLED 2026-05-06 (folded into v0.7)
+
+Per the strategy pivot at the top of this file: v0.6 kickstart polish
+will not ship. Continuing on the kickstart path means more
+livecd-creator + anaconda debugging on tooling that's retired at v1.0.
+The flagship v0.6 deliverables (`veilor-postinstall`, `veilor-doctor`,
+`veilor-update`, opt-in installer ISO, first-boot Plymouth dialog,
+Bluetooth helper) move into **v0.7 scope** with `bootc upgrade`
+replacing `dnf upgrade` in the update path.
+
+The original v0.6 plan is preserved below for reference but is **not
+the active roadmap**.
+
+---
+
+## v0.6 — ergonomics (HISTORICAL — superseded by v0.7)
+
+Smooth the operator experience so day-to-day work doesn't fight the
+hardening. `veilor-postinstall` and `veilor-doctor` were v0.6 background
+items — promoted to **headline** features after v0.5.27–31 made it
+clear that "we ask once, with sane defaults" is what separates a
+distro from a kickstart.
+
+- **`veilor-postinstall`** (PROMOTED — flagship of v0.6) — first-login
+  welcome menu, EndeavourOS-style but cleaner. Single TUI screen:
+  keyboard layout, locale (deferred from install per v0.5.28),
+  hostname override, package presets (dev / media / homelab), drivers
+  (NVIDIA / Intel / AMD), Bluetooth opt-in, USBGuard snapshot, audit
+  baseline run, `veilor-doctor` first run. Each step skippable, runs
+  once on first SDDM login, self-deletes the autostart after. This is
+  the **only** UX feature that ships in v0.6 day one — everything else
+  builds on it.
+- **`veilor-doctor`** (PROMOTED — user-facing, not just dev tool) —
+  the post-install audit. Walks `getenforce`, `mokutil --sb-state`,
+  `firewall-cmd`, fail2ban, USBGuard policy, sysctl drift, and reports
+  drift from baseline. Runs from `veilor-postinstall` on day one, then
+  weekly via `systemd --user` timer. Plain-English output ("your
+  firewall is OK", "USBGuard policy has 3 unknown devices"); not a JSON
+  dump. **Stretch:** machine-readable mode for `veilor-server` later.
+- **`veilor-update`** — wraps `dnf upgrade` AND `flatpak update` in
+  one command. Per `feedback_system_update.md`, partial-update is a
+  recurring trap; veilor's update tool covers both by default. Adds
+  pre-check (snapshot available?), auditd pause, post-update SELinux
+  validation.
+- **Opt-in installer ISO** — flip from live-only to live + installer,
+  user picks at boot menu. Installer uses the v0.5 kickstart with full
+  LUKS + btrfs subvols + zram.
+- **First-boot UX** — replace TTY password prompt with a small
+  Plymouth-rendered dialog. Less raw.
+- **Bluetooth opt-in helper** — single command to enable + bring up
+  the daemon + add the user to the right group.
+
+---
+
+## v0.7 — BlueBuild OCI mainline (ACTIVE — primary focus 2026-05-06+)
+
+This was originally planned as "public flex + bootc spike". Post-pivot,
+v0.7 is now the **primary active milestone** — it absorbs all v0.6
+ergonomic work and becomes the next ship target.
+
+Scope:
+- BlueBuild recipe (`bluebuild/recipe.yml`) layering on
+  `ghcr.io/secureblue/securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns`
+- `kickstart/install-ostreecontainer.ks` — 10-line kickstart that calls
+  `ostreecontainer --url=ghcr.io/veilor-org/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry`
+  and lets Anaconda's LUKS UX drive the install
+- veilor brand layer: KDE black theme, gum installer assets, custom
+  Konsole profile, branded `os-release`
+- `veilor-power` 3-mode CLI (lifted as-is from v0.5.x overlay)
+- `veilor-postinstall` (formerly v0.6 flagship) — first-login TUI
+- `veilor-doctor` (formerly v0.6) — boot-time + weekly drift check
+- `veilor-update` rewritten on `bootc upgrade` (was `dnf upgrade`)
+- Forgejo registry as primary OCI publish target; GHCR mirror optional
+- cosign key-pair signing of OCI image (replaces broken keyless flow)
+
+Public-flex items kept from original v0.7 entry:
+
+Take veilor-os out of "private repo, contained audience" mode. Order
+matters: people demand threat model FIRST when a security distro goes
+public, benchmarks come after.
+
+1. **Threat model published** (FIRST — gating item) — what veilor-os
+   defends against, what it does not. Honest scope. No claim of
+   anti-state-actor; concrete on lost-laptop, USB-attack, browser
+   compromise, supply-chain. Reviewers will demand this before reading
+   anything else.
+2. **Public docs site** — Hugo or mdBook on `veilor.org`, generated
+   from `docs/`. Single source of truth.
+3. **Repo public** — flip GitHub visibility, announce.
+4. **Comparison + benchmarks** — published numbers vs stock Fedora KDE
+   on cold boot, idle RAM, idle network egress, suspend/resume time.
+   After threat model, not before.
+5. **Press kit** — wallpapers, logo, screenshots, feature one-liner.
+
+### Hybrid bootc spike — layer on secureblue, install via `ostreecontainer` (REVISED 2026-05-05)
+
+The original v0.7 entry called for a Containerfile-from-scratch
+spike on `quay.io/fedora/fedora-bootc:43`. Research on 2026-05-05
+(see `docs/STRATEGY.md` and
+`docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/`), then a parent-operator
+refinement same day, locked the path: **layer veilor's branding +
+threat model + UX on top of secureblue's already-shipping
+`securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns` OCI image** via a BlueBuild
+recipe, and install it directly during the Anaconda pass via the
+`ostreecontainer` kickstart directive (no first-boot rebase).
+
+Reasoning:
+
+- secureblue has 30 active contributors, 940 stars, 56 commits
+  in the last 5 weeks. They've already implemented the hardening
+  surface we'd need to build alone (sysctl + kargs + SELinux
+  custom policy + USBGuard + hardened-malloc + Unbound DoT +
+  cosign-signed OCI build pipeline).
+- Containerfile-from-scratch spike: 1 week to first ISO. BlueBuild
+  recipe extending secureblue: ~2 days. With the `ostreecontainer`
+  swap (no `veilor-firstboot-rebase.service`, no transition window):
+  **~1 day**.
+- secureblue does NOT publish a threat model. Athena OS does
+  (their main differentiator, only public threat model in
+  hardened-Linux 2026). Our `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (drafted) gets
+  us ahead of both on the one axis that matters most for a
+  security-branded distro.
+
+Hybrid path locked:
+
+- Kickstart ISO stays as the **bootstrap installer** (Anaconda's
+  LUKS UX is mature).
+- `%packages` is replaced with `ostreecontainer
+  --url=ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry` so the
+  install pass populates `/` directly from the OCI image — no
+  first-boot rebase, no second reboot.
+- From boot one onward, `bootc upgrade` is the update channel.
+- v1.0 deprecates the kickstart entirely.
+
+Stay on `ostreecontainer` through v0.8. **Do NOT migrate to the new
+`bootc` kickstart command until v1.0** — it blocks multi-disk and
+authenticated registries (likely needed eventually). **Do NOT use**
+`bootc-image-builder anaconda-iso` output — deprecated in
+image-builder v44+. Produce OCI image and bootstrap ISO as
+**separate artifacts**.
+
+Overrides over secureblue: keep Trivalent as default (their COPR
+tracks upstream M147+ within hours; reverses earlier draft that
+treated it as override-and-remove); add Mullvad Browser alongside;
+gate Thorium behind `ujust install-thorium` with CVE-lag warning;
+restore sudo (revert `run0`-only); re-enable Xwayland.
+
+Mesh stack baked in: Tailscale (Day 1, daily driver), Yggdrasil-go
+(Day 1, idle warm-fallback), Reticulum/RetiNet AGPL fork (opt-in
+via `ujust install-reticulum`). See `docs/STRATEGY.md` mesh stack
+section for the layer breakdown and threat-floor table.
+
+Full plan: `docs/STRATEGY.md`. Spike will land in
+`bluebuild/recipe.yml` plus `.github/workflows/build-bluebuild.yml`,
+on a separate branch — does NOT land in v0.5.x main.
+
+External dependency tracked: Traefik `no-guest@file` ACL on
+nullstone is currently an `0.0.0.0/0` allow-all stub. Must be
+fixed before veilor-os first-public-ISO ships, otherwise
+`tag:guest` provisioning leaks the full vhost surface to every
+veilor user. **Parent operator owns the fix; not in veilor-os
+scope.**
+
+---
+
+## v1.0 — production
+
+The line where veilor-os is recommended for a non-author user as a
+daily driver.
+
+- **Multi-arch.** x86_64 today; v1.0 ships aarch64 ISO too (laptops
+  on ARM are real now). Build matrix in CI.
+- **LTS commitment** — major versions tied to Fedora's release cadence,
+  patch releases for security only, documented EOL per major.
+- **Recovery ISO** — minimal rescue image with veilor tools (LUKS
+  unlock, btrfs scrub, sysctl reset, fail2ban unban) for "I cannot log
+  in to my system" days.
+- **TPM2 integration** — sealed LUKS unlock against TPM2 PCRs (opt-in,
+  default stays password). Ships as helper script, not silent default.
+- **Signed update channel** — beyond GPG-signed ISOs, a signed metadata
+  repo so `veilor-doctor` can detect available updates without trusting
+  Fedora's mirrorlists alone.
+
+---
+
+## Stretch goals — not on the v0.x → v1.0 critical path
+
+These are spin variants that share veilor-os DNA but need their own
+kickstart or build tool.
+
+- **`veilor-server`** — no KDE, no GUI, hardened headless Fedora for
+  homelab / VPS (e.g. nullstone). Same overlay, different package set.
+  **Not blocked**, but waits on `veilor-doctor` machine-readable mode
+  (v0.6) so headless installs have a way to report drift without a TUI.
+- **`veilor-kiosk`** — single-app Plasma session, locked-down user,
+  read-only root. **Not blocked.**
+- **`veilor-atomic`** — rpm-ostree / bootc-image-builder rebase.
+  Status now depends on the **v0.7 bootc spike**: if the spike shows
+  bootc fixes the anaconda-grind class of bugs, `veilor-atomic`
+  becomes the v1.0+ mainline rather than a stretch variant. If not,
+  it stays a parallel track.

docs/STRATEGY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+# veilor-os Strategy — Hybrid kickstart bootstrap + bootc OCI
+
+Decision date: **2026-05-05** (refined same day from parent-operator
+handoff, locks the `ostreecontainer` install path, mesh stack
+bake-in, browser stack, Iroh seeding roadmap, and threat floor table).
+Locked at: **v0.5.31 → v0.7 spike → v1.0**
+
+## TL;DR
+
+- Keep the Anaconda-driven kickstart ISO as the **bootstrap installer**
+  (LUKS UX is mature, single passphrase prompt, custom partitioning
+  works).
+- Anaconda's `ostreecontainer` directive populates the root filesystem
+  directly from a **veilor-os OCI image** (built via BlueBuild on top
+  of secureblue's `securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns`) **during the
+  install pass — no first-boot rebase, no mutable→atomic transition**.
+- All future updates flow through `bootc upgrade` — atomic A/B,
+  instant rollback, cosign-signed.
+- The kickstart-driven mutable-root path is deprecated at v1.0; kept
+  alive as fallback through v0.7.
+
+## Why hybrid, not pure pivot
+
+Pure pivot to bootc-from-scratch (Agent 3's spike plan) was **1 week
+to first ISO**. Pure pivot to layering on secureblue is **2 days to
+first ISO** because the hardening work is already done. The
+`ostreecontainer` refinement compresses that to **1 day** by
+eliminating the first-boot rebase choreography (no
+`veilor-firstboot-rebase.service`, no second reboot, no transition
+window where the system is half-mutable, half-atomic).
+
+Both pure-pivot paths require throwing away the partitioning UX we
+already have working in Anaconda. Hybrid keeps it.
+
+Hybrid:
+- **Day-zero install:** Anaconda kickstart + custom partitioning +
+  LUKS prompt (what we have today). User experience = unchanged.
+- **End of install pass:** `ostreecontainer
+  --url=ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry` populates
+  `/` from the OCI image. Transition is invisible.
+- **First boot:** veilor OCI tree, no rebase, no special service.
+- **Day-2:** `bootc upgrade` cadence for everything from then on.
+
+We keep what works, pivot the part that doesn't.
+
+## ostreecontainer directive (refinement, locked)
+
+Replace the `%packages` block in the install kickstart with:
+
+```
+ostreecontainer --url=ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry
+```
+
+Keep the existing `part`/LUKS encryption block verbatim — Anaconda
+partitions before `ostreecontainer` populates root.
+
+**Stay on `ostreecontainer` through v0.8.** Do NOT migrate to the new
+`bootc` kickstart command until v1.0 — `bootc` blocks multi-disk and
+authenticated registries, both of which we'll likely need.
+
+**Do NOT use** `bootc-image-builder anaconda-iso` output —
+deprecated in image-builder v44+. Produce the OCI image and the
+bootstrap ISO as **separate artifacts**:
+
+- OCI image: BlueBuild recipe → cosign-signed image at
+  `ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43`
+- Bootstrap ISO: Anaconda kickstart with `ostreecontainer` directive
+  pointing at the OCI image
+
+Reference: <https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/bootc/>; pykickstart
+docs for `ostreecontainer`.
+
+## Why secureblue underneath
+
+| Question | Answer |
+|---|---|
+| Maintainers | secureblue: 30 contributors, 56 commits/5wks. veilor-os: solo. |
+| Hardening surface | secureblue ships sysctl + kargs + SELinux + USBGuard + hardened-malloc + DoT — far more than we'd build alone. |
+| Build pipeline | BlueBuild → cosign-signed OCI in GH Actions (`build-all.yml`, `trivy.yml`). |
+| Update model | bootc upgrade with A/B + instant rollback + signed image chain. |
+| Variants | `kinoite-hardened-userns` is the KDE+Wayland+SELinux variant we'd want. |
+| License | Apache-2.0 (compatible with our MIT). |
+
+What we override in our recipe:
+
+- **`run0` instead of sudo**: revert. Breaks too many workflows.
+- **Xwayland disabled**: revert. Some apps still need it.
+- **Veilor branding**: theme, KDE color scheme, Plymouth, SDDM, font,
+  os-release. All `overlay/*` ports verbatim from current repo.
+
+(Browser stack is its own section below — Trivalent is now a *kept*
+default, not an override.)
+
+## Browser stack
+
+| Role | Pick | Source |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Default browser** | **Trivalent** (secureblue's hardened Chromium) | Fedora COPR `secureblue/trivalent` — tracks upstream M147+ within hours, ships hardened_malloc + JIT-less + Drumbrake WASM |
+| **Anti-fingerprint companion** | **Mullvad Browser** | Clearnet, no Tor, layered alongside Trivalent for pseudonymous browsing |
+| **Optional opt-in** | **Thorium** | `ujust install-thorium` only — WARN users of months-long CVE lag (LTS Chromium base, ~9 milestones behind upstream stable as of 2026-05) |
+
+**DO NOT default to Thorium under any circumstances** — contradicts
+the threat model. Trivalent's COPR keeps us inside one-hour-of-upstream
+patch latency; Thorium is multi-month-stale and is a perf/media
+profile choice, not a security choice.
+
+The earlier draft of this doc treated Trivalent as an override-and-
+remove. That was wrong: Trivalent is exactly the level of hardening
+we want for a default browser. Keep it. Add Mullvad alongside.
+Move Thorium behind an explicit opt-in.
+
+## Mesh stack — three-layer warm-stack
+
+Day 1 ships layers 1 (Tailscale) and 2 (Yggdrasil idle). Layer 3
+(Reticulum) is opt-in via `ujust`.
+
+### Layer 1 — Tailscale + Headscale (daily driver)
+
+- Already running on `nullstone`, `hs.s8n.ru`. OIDC via Authentik.
+- Veilor OS ships `tailscale-1.94.2+` from official Fedora repo.
+- Service unit **pre-disabled** at install time.
+- First-boot prompt: "join Veilor mesh? [paste / QR]". On accept:
+  `tailscale up --login-server=https://hs.s8n.ru` with the user's
+  pre-auth key.
+
+### Layer 2 — Yggdrasil-go (warm fallback, idle by default)
+
+- `yggdrasil-go` 0.5.13+ from COPR / dnf.
+- Decentralized IPv6 in `200::/7`.
+- systemd unit **enabled** but config = empty `Listen[]`, one
+  `Public peer` (e.g. `vpn.itrus.su` or another EU peer),
+  `AllowedPublicKeys` allowlist mode (no allow-all).
+- WSS:443 transport for ISP DPI evasion.
+- Generates ECC keypair on first boot via systemd-tmpfiles or
+  firstboot script.
+- Survives ISP-level Tailscale block (threat floor (ii)).
+
+### Layer 3 — Reticulum (opt-in)
+
+- **RetiNet AGPL fork** (NOT upstream RNS — upstream has an anti-AI
+  license clause incompatible with our governance). Sourced from the
+  Codeberg AGPL fork.
+- Sideband (Android/desktop messenger built on RNS).
+- Install via `ujust install-reticulum`. NOT auto-started until
+  RetiNet stabilizes.
+- Default config when enabled: `AutoInterface` (LAN multicast) +
+  1–2 TCP backbone peers.
+- RNode hardware (LoRa transceiver) bundle as separate
+  `ujust install-reticulum-rnode`.
+- Survives total internet outage (threat floor (iii)) when paired
+  with RNode.
+
+## Onboarding model
+
+Token-based (paste OR QR, user picks). Misskey signup page mints a
+**reusable pre-auth key** (TTL=24h, single-use, regenerated per
+signup). First boot of Veilor ISO accepts hex paste OR QR scan of
+the same key.
+
+**NOT auto-OIDC at first boot** — too much Authentik exposure for
+day-zero users.
+
+## Tier model — three-tier
+
+- `tag:admin` — onyx + failsafe. Full mesh, `*:*`.
+- `tag:infra` — nullstone, office. Mesh among themselves; admin
+  inbound only.
+- `tag:guest` — Veilor OS users + friend. ONLY `x.veilor:443`
+  reachable + future seeded service hostnames whitelisted.
+- **Failsafe** — pre-baked admin pre-auth key on yubikey + printed
+  paper + Authentik OIDC group `tailnet-admin` as second auth path.
+
+## Threat floor table
+
+| Floor | Attack | Day 1 (v0.7 ship) | Phase 2 (v0.8) |
+|-------|--------|---|---|
+| (i) | ISP blocks `s8n.ru` DNS | Tailscale dies, Yggdrasil survives | YES (documented failover) |
+| (ii) | ISP blocks Tailscale protocol | Yggdrasil-WSS:443 survives | YES |
+| (iii) | Internet unreachable | RNS over LoRa survives | OPT-IN (RetiNet + RNode) |
+
+Day 1 must hold floor (i). Floors (ii) and (iii) become P2 once
+Yggdrasil is promoted from idle to documented failover.
+
+## Iroh seeding daemon (Phase 2 / v0.8)
+
+- `veilor-seed.service` systemd unit, runs as `_veilor-seed` user.
+- Watches `/var/lib/<service>/files/` blob store directories.
+- BLAKE3-hashes new blobs, registers with local iroh node.
+- Publishes tickets on per-service `iroh-gossip` topic.
+- LRU local cache, default 10 GB.
+- Sidecar mirrors service blob stores: Misskey `/files/`, Matrix
+  media, `dl.veilor` downloads.
+- Other Veilor nodes pull lazily on cache miss.
+- **DEFER DB replication forever.** Static media only.
+
+DOCUMENT but DO NOT IMPLEMENT until **Iroh hits 1.0** (currently
+0.96–0.98 RC season; 1.0 target Q1 2026 slipped, watching).
+
+Reference: <https://github.com/n0-computer/iroh-blobs/blob/main/DESIGN.md>.
+
+## External dependency — Phase 0 (NOT veilor-os scope)
+
+Real ACL gap on nullstone Traefik right now: friend on `tag:guest`
+can reach `nullstone:443` → SNI-routes to ALL Traefik vhosts
+(`sys.s8n.ru`, `pihole.s8n.ru`, `hs.s8n.ru`, `auth.s8n.ru`, n8n, rc,
+mx, …). Only per-vhost auth blocks them. The `no-guest@file` Traefik
+middleware that should fix this is currently an `0.0.0.0/0`
+allow-all stub (neutralized 2026-05-03 from XFF chain breakage).
+
+**veilor-os does NOT fix this.** Tracked here as an external
+dependency: ACL fix on nullstone Traefik **required before veilor-os
+first-public-ISO ships**, otherwise `tag:guest` provisioning leaks
+the full vhost surface to every veilor user. Parent operator owns it.
+
+## Strategic credibility win
+
+secureblue does NOT publish a threat model. Athena OS does, and it's
+their main differentiator. We've already drafted
+`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (Agent 5 of 2026-05-05 wave). Publishing that
+*before* the v0.7 launch positions veilor-os ahead of secureblue and
+Athena on the one axis that matters most for a security-branded
+distro: **honest, scoped, public threat model**.
+
+## Roadmap implications
+
+| Version | Status | Path |
+|---|---|---|
+| v0.5.31 | shipped | Anaconda kickstart, mutable root |
+| v0.5.32 | active — top blockers from 9-agent wave | Anaconda kickstart |
+| v0.5.x → v0.6 | maintenance | Anaconda kickstart, ergonomics + UX polish |
+| **v0.7 spike** | **1-day BlueBuild prototype** (was 2 days; `ostreecontainer` removes first-boot-rebase work) | First veilor OCI image extending secureblue-kinoite-hardened |
+| v0.7 ship | ISO bootstraps install, `ostreecontainer` populates from OCI in-pass | Hybrid path live |
+| v0.8 | Iroh seeding (P2P static media), Yggdrasil promoted from idle to documented failover, RetiNet stabilization watch | bootc-only direction |
+| **v1.0** | **bootc-only**, kickstart deprecated, possibly migrate `ostreecontainer` → new `bootc` kickstart command if multi-disk + auth-registry blockers resolved upstream | `bootc upgrade` for all updates |
+
+The Containerfile-from-scratch spike plan (Agent 3 of 2026-05-05
+wave) is **superseded** by this hybrid: don't build a Containerfile
+from scratch on `fedora-bootc:43`. Instead, write a BlueBuild recipe
+on `securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns`. With `ostreecontainer`
+swap, spike compresses 1 week → 1 day.
+
+## Next concrete steps
+
+### v0.5.32 — current (no strategy change)
+
+Ship the 7 blockers from `docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/`:
+suspend/resume wifi fix, firstboot WantedBy, USBGuard id-rules,
+firewalld tailscale0 zone, KMS modeset, /etc/skel branding, virtio-9p
+log capture.
+
+`ostreecontainer` swap **does NOT land in v0.5.32 main.** It belongs
+in the v0.7 spike branch only.
+
+### v0.7-spike (1 day, separate branch)
+
+1. New repo dir: `bluebuild/recipe.yml`.
+2. `from`: `ghcr.io/secureblue/securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns:latest`.
+3. Override modules:
+   - `type: files` — stamp our `overlay/*` tree (branding, themes,
+     veilor scripts, sddm theme, plymouth theme).
+   - `type: rpm-ostree` — install Mullvad Browser + restore Xwayland +
+     re-enable sudo (revert run0).
+   - **Keep Trivalent** as default (was wrongly marked for removal in
+     the first draft of this doc).
+   - `type: brand` — PRETTY_NAME, GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR, distributor URL.
+   - `type: files` — pre-disabled `tailscale.service`, idle
+     `yggdrasil.service`, `ujust install-reticulum` and
+     `ujust install-thorium` recipes.
+4. `.github/workflows/build-bluebuild.yml` — pull BlueBuild action,
+   build + cosign sign + push to GHCR.
+5. `kickstart/install.ks` — replace `%packages` block with
+   `ostreecontainer --url=ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43
+   --transport=registry`. Keep existing partitioning + LUKS block
+   verbatim. **Drop** all planned `veilor-firstboot-rebase.service`
+   work — no longer needed.
+
+### v1.0 — bootc-only
+
+- Drop `kickstart/veilor-os.ks`, drop `livecd-creator` workflow.
+- Bootstrap ISO is built as a **separate artifact** (NOT via
+  `bootc-image-builder anaconda-iso`, which was deprecated in
+  image-builder v44).
+- The OCI image is the source of truth.
+- `veilor-update` becomes thin `bootc upgrade --apply` wrapper.
+- Migrate `ostreecontainer` directive → new `bootc` kickstart
+  command IF multi-disk + authenticated-registry support has landed
+  upstream by then.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- Does secureblue accept upstream contributions? If yes, send our
+  USBGuard id-based-rules fix and our threat-model framework.
+- Recovery flow when `ostreecontainer` install pass fails — Anaconda
+  should abort cleanly; verify in spike that no half-installed
+  state is bootable.
+- Iroh 1.0 timing — currently 0.96–0.98 RC; Q1 2026 target slipped.
+  Re-evaluate Phase 2 schedule when 1.0 lands.
+- RetiNet upstream stabilization — track Codeberg fork for releases.
+  If it stalls > 6 months we re-evaluate Layer 3.
+- Fedora 44 transition: secureblue tracks Fedora releases (current
+  `v4.9` on F44). If we follow, we get F44 for free at the same time
+  upstream does.
+
+## Self-hosted git + CI (locked 2026-05-05)
+
+Primary git host moved off github.com. **Forgejo** runs on nullstone
+at `git.s8n.ru`, with **forgejo-runner** doing the build work. GH free-
+tier minute quota was hammering veilor-os iteration; we self-host now.
+
+- Primary remote: `ssh://git@192.168.0.100:222/veilor-org/veilor-os.git`
+  (Forgejo, LAN-only until router port-forward 222 → nullstone:222
+  added — TODO; or use tailnet hostname once tailscale logged in).
+- Public mirror: `https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os.git`. Forgejo
+  push-mirrors every commit + every 8h, so GH stays in sync without
+  consuming GH minutes.
+- Runner labels: `ubuntu-24.04` (catthehacker image — works for our
+  current build-iso.yml unmodified) and `nullstone` (privileged Fedora
+  43 container — opt-in via `runs-on: nullstone`).
+- Build cost: 0 GH minutes. Disk: ~80 GB workspace on /home/docker.
+
+Deploy artifacts: `~/ai-lab/nullstone-server/forgejo/`. Runbook in same
+dir.
+
+## See also
+
+- `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` — drafted, needs publish for v0.7
+- `docs/ROADMAP.md` — updated to reflect this strategy
+- `docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/03-bootc-spike-plan.md` —
+  superseded by this hybrid (kept as reference for the
+  Containerfile-from-scratch alternative)
+- secureblue: <https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue>
+- BlueBuild: <https://blue-build.org>
+- bootc / ostreecontainer docs: <https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/bootc/>
+- Yggdrasil: <https://github.com/yggdrasil-network/yggdrasil-go>
+- Reticulum manual: <https://reticulum.network/manual/>
+- Iroh blobs design: <https://github.com/n0-computer/iroh-blobs/blob/main/DESIGN.md>

docs/THREAT-MODEL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+# Threat Model
+
+> **Status:** Final for v0.7 public launch. Honest scope.
+
+veilor-os is a hardened daily-driver desktop. Not a paranoia OS, not an
+anonymity OS, not an isolation OS. This document exists so that
+security-conscious developers, journalists, and activists can decide whether
+the threat model fits their actual adversary before they trust the system.
+
+If your adversary is on the "out of scope" list below, **use a different
+tool**. veilor-os will not save you, and we will not pretend otherwise.
+
+---
+
+## In scope — what veilor-os defends against
+
+Every row cites the file or setting that implements the mitigation, so the
+claim is auditable from a clean checkout.
+
+| Adversary / scenario | veilor-os mitigation |
+|---|---|
+| Lost or stolen laptop, powered off | LUKS2 `aes-xts-plain64` + `argon2id` (`mem=1 GiB`, `time=9`) on root LV; swap is `zram` only — no persistent key material on disk. Defined in `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` `part pv.veilor` block. |
+| Generic browser / email malware (drive-by RCE, malicious attachment) | SELinux `enforcing` + targeted policy + custom `veilor-systemd.te` module (`scripts/selinux/`); sysctl knobs in `/etc/sysctl.d/99-veilor-hardening.conf`: `kernel.kptr_restrict=2`, `kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2`, `kernel.perf_event_paranoid=3`, `net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2`, `kernel.randomize_va_space=2`, `fs.suid_dumpable=0`, `dev.tty.ldisc_autoload=0`. AppArmor profile skeletons in `scripts/apparmor/` for Trivalent/Thorium/lm-studio (opt-in, complain mode, hardens to enforce per profile). |
+| Console-side USB attack (BadUSB, rubber ducky, juice-jack) | USBGuard daemon, `ImplicitPolicyTarget=block`, **id-based** rules in `/etc/usbguard/rules.conf` (vendor:product, not hash — survives dock replug). Empty allowlist on first boot; operator runs `usbguard generate-policy` after plugging trusted devices. |
+| SSH brute-force / credential-stuffing | `/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf`: `PasswordAuthentication no`, `PermitRootLogin no`, `AllowUsers admin`, `MaxAuthTries 3`, `X11Forwarding no`, `LogLevel VERBOSE`. `fail2ban` `sshd` + `pam-generic` jails (journald backend) ban via firewalld `rich-rule` action. |
+| Post-incident forensics ("what happened?") | `auditd` rules in `/etc/audit/rules.d/99-veilor-hardening.rules` watch `/etc/{passwd,shadow,group,sudoers,sudoers.d,ssh/sshd_config*,selinux,firewalld,cron.*,sysctl.*,systemd/system}`, every privileged binary (`sudo`, `su`, `passwd`, `mount`, `pkexec`, …), `init_module`/`finit_module`/`delete_module` syscalls, and uid≥1000 perm/owner changes. Logs persist across reboot. |
+| Supply-chain on the OS image itself | Secure Boot enforced (Fedora signed shim → GRUB → kernel). v0.7 adds cosign-signed OCI image at `ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43`, GPG-signed ISO + sha256 + .asc, plus our own MOK for out-of-tree module signing. |
+| Unprivileged local user attempting LPE | Root account locked (`passwd -l root`; `passwd -S root` → `L`); single `admin` user in `wheel`; `pwquality.conf` `minlen=14`, `minclass=4`, dictcheck on. Kernel `lockdown=integrity`, `slab_nomerge`, `init_on_alloc=1`, `init_on_free=1`, `randomize_kstack_offset=on`, `vsyscall=none` set in bootloader args. Module loading frozen 30 s after graphical boot via `veilor-modules-lock.service`. |
+| Network-listening services as attack surface | `firewalld` default zone = `drop`; only `sshd` answers. `abrt*`, `cups`, `cups-browsed`, `geoclue`, `avahi-daemon`, `bluetooth`, `ModemManager`, `gssproxy`, `atd`, `pcscd.{socket,service}` are masked; `kdeconnectd` and `PackageKit` are removed at the package level. |
+| Time-based MITM (back-dated certs, replay) | `chrony` with NTS authentication against `time.cloudflare.com` and `nts.sth1/2.ntp.se` (pool fallback only). `systemd-resolved` with DNS-over-TLS opportunistic, DNSSEC `allow-downgrade`, LLMNR off; resolvers Cloudflare 1.1.1.1 / 1.0.0.1, fallback Quad9 9.9.9.9 / 149.112.112.112. |
+
+---
+
+## Out of scope — what veilor-os does NOT defend against
+
+These adversaries are unambiguously outside our scope. Pretending otherwise
+gets people hurt. **If your adversary is on this list, pick a different tool.**
+
+| Adversary / scenario | Why veilor-os doesn't help | Use instead |
+|---|---|---|
+| Firmware-level implant (UEFI, Intel ME, BMC, EC) | veilor-os does not protect against firmware implants. Secure Boot validates the OS chain only; we do not flash, audit, or sign firmware below GRUB. | Heads / coreboot on supported hardware. |
+| Evil-maid attack on a running, unlocked system | LUKS master keys live in RAM while the system is up. A physically present attacker can dump RAM (cold-boot, Thunderbolt DMA, debug header) and recover them. | Power off when unattended. Disable Thunderbolt DMA in firmware. Qubes-in-a-Faraday-bag if you are that target. |
+| Hardware keylogger / interposer between keyboard and machine | veilor-os is software. Software cannot detect a passive hardware tap. | Physical custody of the device. Tamper-evident seals. |
+| Targeted RCE on the user session (browser 0-day, messenger exploit) | KDE Plasma is not sandboxed. A logged-in compromise owns the user's data and tokens. SELinux confines daemons; it does not confine the desktop session. | Qubes OS (per-app Xen VM isolation). |
+| Side-channel attacks on AES (timing, cache, power, EM) | veilor-os ships stock kernel crypto. We provide no constant-time or power-analysis guarantees beyond what the kernel and CPU deliver. | Threat-specific HSM, air-gap. |
+| Physical attack on a TPM2 chip (bus probe, glitch, decap) | veilor-os does not bind keys to TPM2 in v0.7. Even when binding lands post-v1.0, TPM2 is not anti-tamper hardware. | Off-device key custody (smartcard / YubiKey / OnlyKey). |
+| Network-level traffic correlation / traffic analysis | All packets leave the box on the local IP. veilor-os does not onion-route. | Tails, Whonix, Tor. |
+| Trust-on-first-use attacks (operator accepts a bad cert) | veilor-os cannot override the operator's explicit decisions. Bad SSL or SSH host-key acceptance is out of scope. | Enrolment policy, MDM, certificate pinning. |
+| Adversary with sustained physical access and time | Given unlimited physical time and tools, any laptop falls. | Operational security, not OS choice. |
+
+---
+
+## Hardening tradeoffs (what you give up)
+
+Hardening that breaks ordinary work gets called out, not hidden.
+
+- **SELinux enforcing** — some apps (proprietary, out-of-tree) ship
+  without policy. Symptom: `EACCES` despite correct file perms.
+  Workaround: write a local policy module; do not switch to permissive.
+- **LUKS2 argon2id (mem=1 GB / time=9)** — boot 5–30 s slower on older
+  CPUs. The cost of a passphrase that survives a GPU attacker.
+- **USBGuard default-block** — every new device needs an explicit allow.
+  First-boot: plug trusted devices in, run `usbguard generate-policy`.
+  Forget this and your USB-C dock looks broken.
+- **Module lockdown 30 s after graphical boot** — out-of-tree drivers
+  (NVIDIA proprietary, VirtualBox, out-of-tree wireguard) will fail.
+  Load early via initramfs or use the in-tree alternative.
+- **firewalld zone = drop** — KDE Connect, mDNS printer discovery, SMB
+  browsing don't work until explicitly opened. This is the point.
+- **No PackageKit / no Flatpak by default** — updates happen on your
+  terms via `dnf upgrade`.
+
+---
+
+## Where veilor-os IS like Tails / Whonix / Qubes
+
+- Threat model published. Transparency about scope is the price of being
+  taken seriously.
+- Default-deny firewall (`drop` zone, ssh inbound only).
+- Encrypted at rest by default — LUKS2 + argon2id, no-disk-swap (zram).
+
+## Where veilor-os DIFFERS
+
+- **Daily-driver target.** Boot it once, install it, use it for years.
+  Not a session-only / amnesia OS.
+- **Single-VM / single-kernel.** No per-app compartmentalisation. A
+  browser RCE owns your session. (See "out of scope".)
+- **Persistent identity by design.** Your `~`, your keys, your shell
+  history persist. This is a feature for an operator, a misfeature for
+  an activist evading correlation.
+
+---
+
+## Comparison matrix
+
+Scoring legend: `✓` shipped & on by default, `~` partial / opt-in,
+`✗` not provided, `n/a` not applicable to that distro's model.
+Project metrics are GitHub / Codeberg figures as of 2026-05.
+
+| Axis | veilor-os | Stock Fedora KDE | Kicksecure | Tails | Qubes OS | secureblue | Athena OS |
+|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|
+| **Encrypted at rest by default** | ✓ (LUKS2 argon2id, mem=1 GiB) | ~ (optional in Anaconda) | ✓ | n/a (amnesic, session-only) | ✓ | ✓ | ~ (optional) |
+| **MAC enforcing OOTB** | ✓ (SELinux + opt-in AppArmor) | ✓ (SELinux) | ✓ (AppArmor) | ✓ (AppArmor) | ✓ (per-VM) | ✓ (SELinux) | ✓ (AppArmor) |
+| **Default-deny firewall** | ✓ (firewalld zone=drop) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ (Tor-only) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| **USB default-block** | ✓ (USBGuard, id-rules) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (sys-usb) | ✓ (USBGuard) | ✗ |
+| **Per-app isolation (VM/sandbox)** | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ~ (AppArmor) | ✓ (Xen VMs) | ~ (Flatpak/bwrap) | ✗ |
+| **Anonymity / Tor by default** | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ~ (Whonix VMs) | ✗ | ✗ |
+| **Daily driver target (persistent)** | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ (amnesic) | ✓ (heavy, hardware-partitioning) | ✓ | ✓ |
+| **Signed releases (cosign + GPG)** | ✓ (v0.7) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (cosign on OCI) | ~ (sha256 only) |
+| **Threat model published** | ✓ (this doc) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ |
+| **Hardware compatibility (laptops)** | ✓ (Fedora kernel) | ✓ | ~ | ~ (live USB) | ~ (Xen-pinned HCL) | ✓ | ✓ (Arch kernel) |
+| **Project size (contributors / stars, 2026-05)** | solo / pre-public | n/a (Fedora-wide) | small team / ~600 | ~30 / ~3k | large / ~5k | ~30 / ~940, active monthly cadence | ~8 / ~1.4k |
+
+---
+
+## Where veilor-os fits
+
+Pick veilor-os if your job is to write code, edit docs, manage
+infrastructure, read mail, browse — and you want a desktop that won't
+quietly betray you to a generic adversary while you do it. **You are the
+user, not the target of a state.**
+
+Pick **Tails** for amnesia and Tor by default. **Qubes** if you must assume
+any app could be compromised. **Kicksecure** for similar hardening on
+Debian. **secureblue** for a hardened atomic Fedora. **Stock Fedora KDE**
+if you just want Fedora with no opinions.
+
+---
+
+## v0.7 public-launch checklist
+
+These are the items that gate flipping the repo public and posting:
+
+- [ ] Threat model finalised and published (this document).
+- [ ] GPG-signed releases working (v0.4 dependency — ISO + sha256 + .asc).
+- [ ] Reproducible build verifiable from clean checkout (v0.4).
+- [ ] mkdocs-material (or Hugo) site live on `veilor.org`, generated from
+      `docs/`. INSTALL, HARDENING, BUILD, ROADMAP, RELEASE, THREAT-MODEL,
+      CONTRIBUTING all rendered.
+- [ ] Comparison + benchmark numbers published (cold boot, idle RAM, idle
+      egress, suspend/resume) vs stock Fedora KDE.
+- [ ] Press kit page: wallpapers, logo SVG, screenshots, feature
+      one-liner, signed quotes from early users.
+- [ ] **"What veilor-os is not"** preempt page — direct link from launch
+      post. Answers "why not Qubes?", "why not Tails?", "why not just
+      stock Fedora?" so the first hundred comments don't have to.
+- [ ] Comparison post drafted for **r/linux**, **r/Fedora**, **HN**.
+      Same body, three formats. Lead with the threat model link, not the
+      black wallpaper.
+- [ ] CHANGELOG.md tagged at v0.7.0 release commit; GitHub Release
+      created with ISO + sha256 + .asc artefacts attached.
+- [ ] Repo flipped to public, `veilor.org` DNS pointed at the docs site,
+      Mastodon / Matrix / SimpleX announcement queued.
+
+---
+
+*Last reviewed: v0.7 draft. Update every minor release.*

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/01-plymouth-luks-real-hardware.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# Plymouth + LUKS unlock — real-hardware edge cases
+
+**Agent 1 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
+
+## State at v0.5.31
+
+- Live ISO cmdline pins `plymouth.enable=0 fbcon=nodefer`.
+- Installed system uses Plymouth `details` theme.
+- LUKS2 argon2id, no clevis / cryptenroll, no recovery key generation.
+- `rd.vconsole.keymap=` not set.
+
+## Findings
+
+### 1. KMS / fbcon races
+
+- **Symptom:** Black screen at LUKS prompt, cursor blinks, keystrokes
+  swallowed but never accepted.
+- **Cause:** `i915` / `amdgpu` / `nvidia-drm` modeset fires *during*
+  plymouthd handover. With `plymouth.enable=0` we skip the splash but
+  the ask-password agent still opens `/dev/tty1`, which races `fbcon`
+  rebind.
+- **Fix:** keep `fbcon=nodefer`, append
+  `nvidia-drm.modeset=1 i915.fastboot=0 amdgpu.dc=1` to bootloader.
+  NVIDIA Optimus killer is `nvidia-drm.modeset=1`.
+- **Probability:** HIGH on Optimus, MED on AMD APU, LOW on Intel iGPU.
+
+### 2. Plymouth theme choice — keep `details`
+
+- `details` (kernel/systemd journal under prompt) is best for
+  blind-typing because the user sees `Please enter passphrase…` *as
+  text*, full echo as `*`.
+- `text` is minimal fallback (no echo, no journal).
+- `spinner` is the documented "endless loop, no prompt" failure mode
+  on real laptops (adi1090x/plymouth-themes#10, Arch BBS 296529).
+- **No change.** But verify `plymouth-set-default-theme details`
+  actually ran post-install (Debian #986023 shows it silently fails
+  when initramfs rebuild is suppressed). Add `dracut --force
+  --regenerate-all` after the call.
+
+### 3. Initramfs keymap — HIGH probability for non-US users
+
+- **Symptom:** AZERTY/QWERTZ/Cyrillic user types correct passphrase,
+  gets "no key available". F43 ships en-US in initramfs by default.
+- **Bugs:** RHBZ 1405539, RHBZ 1890085, fedora-silverblue#3.
+- **Fix:** drop a placeholder `rd.vconsole.keymap=us` AND have
+  `firstboot.sh` rewrite it from `/etc/vconsole.conf` after the user
+  picks a layout. Also `/etc/dracut.conf.d/veilor-keymap.conf` with
+  `install_items+=" /etc/vconsole.conf "` so keymap is *baked* into
+  initramfs.
+
+### 4. systemd-cryptsetup vs legacy `crypt` — F43 = systemd-cryptsetup
+
+- F40+ unconditionally uses `systemd-cryptsetup@.service` from
+  `/etc/crypttab`. Old `rd.luks.uuid=` cmdline still parsed. Stable
+  through 6.x kernels. No change needed.
+
+### 5. argon2id memory cost — MED on old laptops (<8 GB RAM)
+
+- LUKS2 default = 1 GiB memory cost, `iter-time=2000 ms`. On
+  Core 2 Duo / Pentium-N this becomes 8–15s unlock + thrash.
+  Atom-class N4020: 30s+.
+- **Fix in installer post-script:**
+  `cryptsetup luksConvertKey --pbkdf-memory 524288 --iter-time 2000`
+  — halves memory to 512 MiB, knocks ~50% off unlock latency.
+
+### 6. TPM2 unlock — defer to v0.6
+
+- F43 ships `systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=auto` ([Fedora
+  Magazine](https://fedoramagazine.org/automatically-decrypt-your-disk-using-tpm2/)).
+  No clevis required.
+- **v0.6 plan:** opt-in via `veilor-firstboot` →
+  `systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-pcrs=7+11`. PCR 7 (secure boot state)
+  + 11 (kernel/initrd). Don't auto-enroll; PCR pinning is a footgun
+  on kernel updates.
+
+### 7. FIDO2 unlock — v0.7
+
+- `systemd-cryptenroll --fido2-device=auto` requires `libfido2` +
+  hmac-secret support. secureblue ships this. Add `libfido2` to
+  `%packages` + `veilor-fido2-enroll` wrapper.
+
+### 8. Recovery key — MISSING, ship in v0.6
+
+- Today: forgotten passphrase = brick.
+- **Fix:** in `firstboot.sh` add
+  `cryptsetup luksAddKey --pbkdf argon2id /dev/X <(systemd-creds
+  setup --print-key | head -c 64)` and print the 64-char key once
+  to a numbered envelope-style screen. Mirrors macOS FileVault.
+
+## Action items
+
+| # | Change | Target |
+|---|--------|--------|
+| 1 | `nvidia-drm.modeset=1 i915.fastboot=0 amdgpu.dc=1 rd.vconsole.keymap=us` to bootloader append | v0.5.32 |
+| 2 | `/etc/dracut.conf.d/veilor-keymap.conf` with `install_items+=" /etc/vconsole.conf "` | v0.5.32 |
+| 3 | Force `dracut -f --regenerate-all` after `plymouth-set-default-theme details` | v0.5.32 |
+| 4 | argon2id retune (`40-luks-tune.sh`) | v0.6 |
+| 5 | Recovery-key generation in firstboot | v0.6 |
+| 6 | TPM2 opt-in via `systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-pcrs=7+11` | v0.6 |
+| 7 | FIDO2 opt-in | v0.7 |
+
+## Sources
+
+- [LUKS keyboard layout — fedora-silverblue/issue-tracker#3](https://github.com/fedora-silverblue/issue-tracker/issues/3)
+- [RHBZ 1405539 — keymap not honored on initramfs rebuild](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1405539)
+- [RHBZ 1890085 — English keymap forced in initramfs](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1890085)
+- [Fedora Magazine — TPM2 autodecrypt with systemd-cryptenroll](https://fedoramagazine.org/automatically-decrypt-your-disk-using-tpm2/)
+- [Leo3418 — argon2id LUKS tuning](https://leo3418.github.io/collections/gentoo-config-luks2-grub-systemd/tune-parameters.html)
+- [QubesOS#8600 — argon2id parameters](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8600)

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/02-sddm-firstboot-ux.md

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# SDDM + first-boot UX failure modes
+
+**Agent 2 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
+
+## Findings
+
+### 1. SDDM has no username prefilled — BLOCKS LOGIN (perceived)
+
+- User sees blank greeter; no signal that the only user is `admin`.
+- **Fix:** `/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor.conf` add
+  `[Users]\nRememberLastUser=true` plus seed
+  `/var/lib/sddm/state.conf [Last]\nUser=admin\nSession=plasma`.
+
+### 2. chage -d 0 + SDDM autologin race
+
+- With `Relogin=false` (current), single-shot is safe.
+- **Fix:** Document `Relogin=false`. Don't combine `Autologin=true`
+  with `chage -d 0`.
+
+### 3. PAM expired-pw change inline in SDDM
+
+- Plasma 6 SDDM 0.21+ renders the chain. **But** if password fails
+  pwquality (cracklib min=14 + complexity from
+  `10-harden-base.sh`), error text shown briefly then form resets —
+  user sees no clear reason for rejection.
+- **Fix:** `/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/10-veilor.conf` with
+  documented rules + Plasma startup notification showing them.
+
+### 4. Wayland session start failure on virtio-vga — BLOCKS LOGIN
+
+- KWin tries `wlroots`/DRM, fails to acquire `/dev/dri/card0` if
+  `virtio_gpu` kernel module not loaded.
+- **Fix:** add `plasma-workspace-x11` to `%packages`. SDDM session
+  menu shows `Plasma (X11)` fallback.
+
+### 5. Plasma 6 first-run wizards on /etc/skel-empty
+
+- KWin compositor backend pick + Plasma welcome center + accent
+  colour wizard — modal stealing focus on first session.
+- **Fix:** seed `/etc/skel/.config/`:
+  - `kwinrc` `[Compositing]\nBackend=OpenGL`
+  - `kdeglobals [General]\nAccentColor=...`
+  - `plasma-welcomerc [General]\nLastSeenVersion=99` (suppresses welcome)
+
+### 6. SELinux relabel after first boot — looks like hang
+
+- `touch /.autorelabel` triggers full restore on rootfs; 90s on
+  4 GB live install, 3-5min on real disk. User hard-resets thinking
+  it crashed → corrupted relabel state.
+- **Fix:** replace with `veilor-relabel.service` that prints
+  `[veilor] relabeling SELinux file contexts (1/N): %s` to TTY1
+  with progress, plus one-time post-relabel KDialog notification.
+
+### 7. USBGuard blocks input at SDDM — BLOCKS LOGIN on desktops
+
+- If `/etc/usbguard/rules.conf` empty/missing, USBGuard
+  `ImplicitPolicyTarget=block` (default) blocks USB. SDDM running
+  but USB keyboard dead.
+- **Fix:** ship a baseline `rules.conf`:
+  `allow with-interface equals { 03:00:* 03:01:* }`
+  (HID class) so any keyboard/mouse works pre-policy.
+
+### 8. NetworkManager DHCP — LOW severity
+
+- Wired auto-connects fine. Wi-Fi: silent failure unless SSID
+  preconfigured. Acceptable; Plasma 6 ships `plasma-nm` widget.
+- **Polish:** `/etc/xdg/autostart/veilor-firstboot-net-check.desktop`
+  → KDialog "Connect to network?" if `nmcli general` is `disconnected`.
+
+### 9. veilor-firstboot.service ordering — BLOCKS LOGIN on real installs
+
+- **Current:** `WantedBy=multi-user.target` only.
+- **Real installs:** default to `graphical.target`, so unit never runs.
+- Admin pw stays `veilor` + chage-expired. SDDM PAM bounces to
+  chauthtok screen — recoverable but ugly.
+- **Fix:** `WantedBy=graphical.target multi-user.target`. Add
+  `Before=graphical.target`. Verify `systemctl enable
+  veilor-firstboot.service` (in installer line 884) resolves both.
+  Add `DefaultDependencies=no` + `Wants=systemd-vconsole-setup.service`.
+
+## Endeavour OS welcome app — design notes for veilor-postinstall
+
+EOS welcome (`endeavouros-team/welcome` on GitHub) is bash + yad,
+~3000 LOC. Patterns to lift for veilor:
+
+- **Yad GTK dialog** as runtime (single binary dep). veilor (KDE)
+  uses `kdialog` + `qmlscene` instead — native Plasma look.
+- **Tabbed layout:** Welcome | Set up apps | Security | System info | Shortcuts.
+- **Self-disabling autostart:**
+  `~/.config/autostart/veilor-welcome.desktop` removed after user
+  clicks "Don't show again".
+- **External script dispatch:**
+  `/usr/share/veilor-os/postinstall/<step>.sh` per step. Decouples
+  UI from actions.
+- **Update channel awareness:** pull from
+  `github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os` releases atom feed; show CVE
+  advisories from `security.atom` we publish.
+
+**Recommended stack:**
+- `/usr/bin/veilor-welcome` (bash entrypoint, ≤300 LOC)
+- `/usr/share/veilor-os/postinstall/welcome.qml` (QtQuick/Kirigami UI)
+- `/usr/share/veilor-os/postinstall/steps/{01-account,02-network,03-usbguard-policy,04-update,05-tour}.sh`
+- `/etc/xdg/autostart/veilor-welcome.desktop`
+- Replace current `scripts/firstboot.sh` placeholder with
+  `step 03-usbguard-policy` (auto-generate-policy is the unfinished
+  core item).
+
+## Top three to ship next (highest UX impact, lowest risk)
+
+1. **`WantedBy=graphical.target multi-user.target`** in
+   `veilor-firstboot.service` — fixes silent SDDM-PAM-chauthtok
+   bounce on real installs.
+2. **Username prefill** in `sddm.conf.d/veilor.conf`: add `[Users]
+   RememberLastUser=true` + `/var/lib/sddm/state.conf [Last]
+   User=admin Session=plasma`.
+3. **USBGuard HID baseline `rules.conf`** — un-bricks any desktop
+   with USB keyboard.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/03-bootc-spike-plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# bootc-image-builder spike plan — 1-week timebox
+
+**Agent 3 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.** Schedule: v0.7.
+
+## Containerfile draft
+
+```dockerfile
+# veilor-os bootc image — Fedora 43 KDE base
+FROM quay.io/fedora/fedora-bootc:43
+
+ARG VEILOR_VERSION=0.6.0
+
+RUN dnf install -y --setopt=install_weak_deps=False \
+      @kde-desktop-environment @kde-apps @core @hardware-support @standard \
+      kernel-modules kernel-modules-extra glibc-all-langpacks \
+      grub2-efi-x64 grub2-efi-x64-modules grub2-pc grub2-pc-modules \
+      grub2-tools grub2-tools-extra shim-x64 efibootmgr \
+      newt parted cryptsetup lvm2 btrfs-progs \
+      fail2ban fail2ban-firewalld usbguard usbguard-tools audit \
+      policycoreutils-python-utils tuned chrony firewalld plymouth \
+      git vim-enhanced tmux htop podman skopeo \
+      NetworkManager NetworkManager-wifi \
+      fontconfig freetype fira-code-fonts \
+      zram-generator \
+ && dnf remove -y --noautoremove \
+      'abrt*' snapd kde-connect open-vm-tools-desktop mlocate man-db man-pages \
+ && dnf clean all && rm -rf /var/cache/dnf
+
+ARG GUM_VERSION=0.17.0
+ARG GUM_SHA256=69ee169bd6387331928864e94d47ed01ef649fbfe875baed1bbf27b5377a6fdb
+ADD https://github.com/charmbracelet/gum/releases/download/v${GUM_VERSION}/gum_${GUM_VERSION}_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz /tmp/gum.tgz
+RUN echo "${GUM_SHA256}  /tmp/gum.tgz" | sha256sum -c - \
+ && tar -xzf /tmp/gum.tgz -C /tmp \
+ && install -m0755 /tmp/gum_${GUM_VERSION}_Linux_x86_64/gum /usr/bin/gum
+
+COPY overlay/ /
+COPY assets/ /usr/share/veilor-os/assets/
+COPY scripts/ /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/
+
+RUN bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/10-harden-base.sh \
+ && bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/20-harden-kernel.sh \
+ && bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/selinux/build-policy.sh \
+ && bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/kde-theme-apply.sh \
+ && bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/30-apply-v03-theme.sh
+
+RUN plymouth-set-default-theme details \
+ && sed -i \
+      -e 's|^GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR=.*|GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR="veilor-os"|' \
+      /etc/default/grub
+
+# bootc kargs go in /usr/lib/bootc/kargs.d/, not /etc/default/grub
+RUN mkdir -p /usr/lib/bootc/kargs.d && cat > /usr/lib/bootc/kargs.d/10-veilor-hardening.toml <<'EOF'
+kargs = [
+  "lockdown=integrity",
+  "slab_nomerge",
+  "init_on_alloc=1",
+  "init_on_free=1",
+  "randomize_kstack_offset=on",
+  "vsyscall=none",
+  "fbcon=nodefer",
+]
+EOF
+
+RUN systemctl enable sshd fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld chronyd sddm \
+                     veilor-firstboot.service veilor-modules-lock.service \
+ && passwd -l root \
+ && systemctl set-default graphical.target
+
+RUN bootc container lint
+LABEL org.veilor.version=${VEILOR_VERSION}
+```
+
+## bootc-image-builder config (`build/disk-config.toml`)
+
+```toml
+[customizations]
+hostname = "veilor-os"
+
+[[customizations.user]]
+name = "admin"
+password = "veilor"
+groups = ["wheel"]
+shell = "/bin/bash"
+
+[customizations.kernel]
+append = "lockdown=integrity slab_nomerge init_on_alloc=1 init_on_free=1 randomize_kstack_offset=on vsyscall=none fbcon=nodefer"
+
+[customizations.installer.kickstart]
+contents = """
+zerombr
+clearpart --all --initlabel
+part /boot/efi --fstype=efi --size=600
+part /boot     --fstype=ext4 --size=1024
+part btrfs.veilor --grow --encrypted --luks-version=luks2 --pbkdf=argon2id
+btrfs none --label=veilor btrfs.veilor
+btrfs /     --subvol --name=root LABEL=veilor
+btrfs /home --subvol --name=home LABEL=veilor
+"""
+```
+
+## GitHub Actions workflow
+
+`build-bootc-iso.yml`:
+- runs-on ubuntu-24.04, **timeout 30 min** (vs 90 for livecd-creator)
+- permissions: `contents: write`, `packages: write`
+- Build OCI image: `podman build` + `podman push ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43`
+- Build ISO via `quay.io/centos-bootc/bootc-image-builder:latest`
+  with `--type anaconda-iso --rootfs btrfs --config /build/disk-config.toml`
+- Reuse split + `softprops/action-gh-release@v2` from existing workflow
+
+## Migration risks (10-row table)
+
+| # | Risk | Severity | Mitigation |
+|---|------|----------|------------|
+| 1 | %post --nochroot overlay-copy disappears | Low | `COPY overlay/ /` is simpler — win |
+| 2 | Update model: `bootc upgrade` (image swap) replaces `dnf upgrade` | High | `veilor-update` becomes thin `bootc upgrade --apply` wrapper |
+| 3 | /usr is read-only at runtime | Medium | etc-overlay handles /etc writes; relocate any /usr writers to /etc or build-time |
+| 4 | SELinux module compilation in container | Medium | Works in fedora-bootc:43 (verified per upstream pattern). Test spike day 2 |
+| 5 | `transaction_progress.py` patch unnecessary | Low | bootc-image-builder doesn't use dnf at install. Drop the patch. Win |
+| 6 | `rd.luks.uuid` is anaconda's job again | Low | Removes ~80 lines of fragile sed/grubby code. Win |
+| 7 | LUKS prompt UX: anaconda native, not gum | High | gum installer becomes `live·shell` only. v1.0 install = anaconda's native UI |
+| 8 | --privileged still required | None | Same as today |
+| 9 | OCI image size: ~3.5 GB compressed vs ~2.8 GB squashfs | Low | zstd:max recovers ~400 MB |
+| 10 | `kernel-install` BLS: `/etc/kernel/cmdline` not honored, `/usr/lib/bootc/kargs.d/*.toml` is | Medium | Already addressed in Containerfile draft |
+
+## What we keep (zero churn)
+
+- `overlay/*` — copied verbatim by `COPY overlay/ /`
+- `scripts/*.sh` — invoked verbatim by Containerfile RUN
+- `assets/*` — copied verbatim
+- `test/*` — adapts: `podman run --rm -it ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43 /bin/bash` smoke; QEMU ISO test unchanged
+- `kickstart/install.ks` — kept as fallback. Tag last anaconda build as `v0.5.99-anaconda` before flipping
+
+## Spike success criteria (1 week)
+
+| Day | Milestone |
+|-----|-----------|
+| 1 | Containerfile builds clean (`podman build` exit 0, `bootc container lint` exit 0) |
+| 2 | `podman run` boots into image, KDE binaries present, SELinux + hardening sysctls applied |
+| 3 | bootc-image-builder produces installer ISO from OCI, ksvalidator clean |
+| 4 | ISO boots in QEMU to anaconda live menu |
+| 5 | Install completes, LUKS single-prompt, btrfs subvols present |
+| 6 | First boot reaches SDDM, admin login works, password-change-on-first-login enforced |
+| 7 | Buffer for fixes; doc `docs/BUILD-bootc.md`; tag `v0.5.99-anaconda` snapshot |
+
+## Decision gate
+
+- **PASS** (all 7 criteria green): tag `v0.5.99-anaconda` as last-anaconda;
+  merge `bootc-spike` → `main` as `v0.6.0-bootc`; deprecate
+  `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` (keep `kickstart/install.ks` for one cycle).
+  Update ROADMAP: v1.0 ships bootc-only.
+
+- **FAIL** (any of risks 3, 4, 7, 10 unfixable in week 1): keep
+  anaconda path, defer migration to v1.1+; file each blocker as GH
+  issue with reproducer.
+
+- **HYBRID FALLBACK**: ship anaconda ISO for v0.6/v0.7, ship bootc OCI
+  alongside (matches existing `veilor-atomic` stretch goal).

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/04-hardening-tier-2.md

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+# Hardening tier 2 — concrete plan
+
+**Agent 4 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
+
+## Repo state already in tree
+
+- `scripts/apparmor/` ships **3 profiles** (`thorium`, `veilor-power`,
+  `lm-studio`) — complain-mode, **not auto-loaded**. No browser/mail
+  /Element profile.
+- `scripts/selinux/` ships custom `.te` modules — primary MAC.
+- `overlay/etc/audit/plugins.d/veilor-remote.conf` +
+  `audisp-remote.conf.disabled` — **scaffold present, opt-in switch
+  missing**.
+- `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` — single live-ks. Real LUKS install lives
+  in `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer` (generates ks at runtime).
+- No nftables overlay. No homed scaffold. No `veilor-audit-shipping` CLI.
+
+## Item-by-item plan
+
+### 1. AppArmor stack with SELinux — M
+
+Fedora 43 ships `apparmor-parser`/`libapparmor`. Kernel has both LSMs.
+Stacking works since 5.1; SELinux stays primary, AppArmor confines
+specific binaries by path. **No conflict** — they layer. Risk: AA
+profiles based on Debian/Ubuntu paths fail on Fedora.
+
+**Files:**
+- `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` `%packages` add `apparmor-parser apparmor-utils apparmor-profiles`
+- `overlay/etc/apparmor.d/veilor.d/` (new) — vendor profiles
+  `firefox`, `thunderbird`, `element-desktop`, `signal-desktop`
+- `scripts/40-apparmor.sh` (new) — parses + sets all veilor profiles
+  to **complain** on first install (logs only, no break)
+- `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-doctor` — adds AA status check
+
+**Test:** `aa-status | grep complain` shows >=4 loaded; firefox writes
+outside policy → audit.log denial.
+
+### 2. systemd-homed opt-in — L
+
+Default LUKS storage `homectl` drops key on suspend; resume needs PAM
+unlock again — **breaks "lid open, keep working"**. Use
+`--storage=fscrypt` on top of existing btrfs `/home` subvol —
+suspend transparent, encrypts at rest with per-user key.
+
+**Files:**
+- `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-homed-enable` (new) — confirms warning,
+  runs `homectl create admin --storage=fscrypt --real-name="veilor admin"`
+  after migrating files
+- `overlay/etc/pam.d/sddm` drop-in for `pam_systemd_home.so`
+- doc in `docs/HARDENING.md`. **Not auto-run** — only via post-install.
+
+### 3. nftables alongside firewalld — S
+
+firewalld speaks nftables backend on F43 — they don't conflict;
+firewalld owns `inet firewalld` table. veilor-os preset = separate
+`inet veilor` table loaded by its own service.
+
+**Files:**
+- `overlay/etc/nftables/veilor.nft` (new) — table `inet veilor`:
+  ssh per-IP rate limit (5/min), ICMP rate limit, optional
+  `ip6 daddr ::/0 drop` toggled by sysctl-style `/etc/veilor/ipv6.disabled`,
+  anti-port-scan via `meter` set
+- `overlay/etc/systemd/system/veilor-nftables.service` (new) —
+  `After=firewalld.service`
+- `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` `%packages` add `nftables`, services-enabled
+  add `veilor-nftables`
+
+**Test:** `nft list ruleset` shows both `firewalld` AND `veilor`;
+`hping3 -S -p 22 --flood` from second VM gets rate-limited.
+
+### 4. Audit log shipping — S
+
+Plumbing **already in tree** (`audisp-remote.conf.disabled`,
+`veilor-remote.conf` with `active=no`). What's missing: CLI to flip
+the switch with cert pinning.
+
+**Files:**
+- `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-audit-shipping` (new)
+  - `enable HOST PORT FINGERPRINT` writes
+    `/etc/veilor/audit-pin.sha256`, copies `audisp-remote.conf.disabled`
+    → `audisp-remote.conf` with substituted host/port, enables plugin
+    (`active=yes`), restarts auditd
+  - `disable` reverses
+- audisp-remote speaks TLS directly; cert pinning via `verify_peer=yes`
+  + `peer_cert_fingerprint`
+- Use **self-signed pinned**, not LE — collectors are LAN/VPN
+
+**Test:** stand up `rsyslog` listener on nullstone with self-signed
+cert; run helper; trigger `sudo -i`; tail nullstone for AUTHPRIV
+event; revoke cert → events stop with logged TLS error.
+
+### 5. Installer kickstart split — needs re-scope, S
+
+Roadmap item is **stale**. As of v0.5.30 we already do real LUKS+btrfs
+in `veilor-installer` which generates ks at runtime. **Re-scope:**
+extract that generated ks template into static
+`kickstart/veilor-os-install.ks` (parameterised via `%include
+/tmp/answers.ks`), so reviewable in repo and reusable headlessly.
+
+**Files:**
+- split `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer` heredoc into
+  `kickstart/veilor-os-install.ks`
+- installer just writes answers + `cp` the ks
+- CI lints both with `ksvalidator`
+
+### 6. Audit baseline re-run — S
+
+Mechanical: `cp security/audit-template.md
+security/veilor-os-distro/2026-05-DD.md`, run on VM, target lower
+findings count than v0.2's baseline.
+
+## Order, dependencies, ship plan
+
+Dependencies: (5) blocks (6) — audit a stable installer, not a
+moving heredoc. Else parallel.
+
+**Total effort:** 2S + 1S(rescope) + 1S + 1M + 1L ≈ **5–7 dev-days**.
+
+- **v0.5.32 (small wins):** (4) audit shipping CLI + (3) nftables
+  preset. Both S, scaffold completion, pure overlay (no kickstart risk).
+- **v0.5.33:** (5) ks split + (6) audit baseline re-run.
+- **v0.6 (medium):** (1) AppArmor stack — package install + 4 profiles
+  + doctor integration; complain-mode keeps blast radius zero.
+- **v0.7 (big lift):** (2) systemd-homed — UX-disruptive, needs
+  migration helper + doc page + suspend/lock/swap testing.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/05-threat-model-launch.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# Threat model + public launch prep
+
+**Agent 5 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
+
+## Deliverable
+
+Threat model written to `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (1492 words). Slots
+into `docs/ROADMAP.md` v0.7 line item "Threat model published —
+honest scope".
+
+## Structure
+
+1. **In-scope adversaries** (9 rows): lost laptop, browser RCE, USB
+   attacks, SSH brute-force, forensics, supply chain, LPE, network
+   surface, time MITM. Each maps to specific veilor mitigation
+   (LUKS2 argon2id mem=1GB, SELinux + `veilor-systemd` policy,
+   USBGuard, fail2ban+firewalld, auditd, NTS chrony, etc.).
+
+2. **Out-of-scope adversaries** (9 rows): firmware implants,
+   evil-maid on running system, hardware keylogger, session-level
+   RCE (KDE not sandboxed), AES side-channels, TPM2 physical
+   attacks, traffic correlation, TOFU MITM, sustained physical
+   access. Each row points to right tool instead (Heads, Qubes,
+   Tails).
+
+3. **Hardening tradeoffs** (6 honest costs):
+   - SELinux app-compat
+   - Slow LUKS boot
+   - USBGuard friction
+   - Module lockdown breaking NVIDIA prop / VBox
+   - Drop-zone breaking KDE Connect / mDNS
+   - No PackageKit
+
+4. **Like Tails/Whonix/Qubes:** published threat model, default-deny
+   firewall, encrypted at rest.
+
+5. **Differs from them:** daily-driver vs session-only; single-VM vs
+   Qubes compartmentalisation; persistent identity vs Tails amnesia.
+
+6. **Comparison matrix:** 10-axis × 6-distro grid (veilor-os / stock
+   Fedora KDE / Kicksecure / Tails / Qubes / secureblue) covering
+   encryption, MAC, firewall, USB, per-app isolation, anonymity,
+   daily-driver fit, signed releases, threat-model publication,
+   hardware compat.
+
+7. **v0.7 launch checklist** (9 items):
+   - Threat model finalised
+   - GPG signing (v0.4 dep)
+   - mkdocs-material on veilor.org
+   - Comparison + benchmarks
+   - Press kit
+   - "What veilor-os is not" preempt page (covers "why not Qubes/Tails/Fedora?")
+   - r/linux + r/Fedora + HN posts
+   - GitHub Release with ISO+sha256+.asc
+   - Repo flip-public + DNS + Mastodon/Matrix/SimpleX announce
+
+## Tone
+
+Matches repo voice — short paragraphs, no fluff, "honest scope"
+framing reused from roadmap. No emojis (per CLAUDE.md style).
+
+## See also
+
+- `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (full document)
+- `docs/ROADMAP.md` v0.7 section

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/06-anaconda-log-capture.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Anaconda log capture — virtio-9p host-share
+
+**Agent 6 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
+
+## Why current setup is silent
+
+v0.5.30 wired:
+
+```
+-chardev file,id=anaclog,path=$ANACONDA_LOG
+-device virtio-serial-pci,id=vs1
+-device virtserialport,chardev=anaclog,bus=vs1.0,name=org.fedoraproject.anaconda.log.0
+```
+
+Anaconda is supposed to autodetect this port and stream logs. Result:
+`test/anaconda-vm-*.log` files are 0 bytes despite multiple full
+installs.
+
+**Root cause:** Anaconda's `setupVirtio()` (anaconda_logging.py:315)
+doesn't write to the virtio port directly — it adds a forward rule to
+`/etc/rsyslog.conf` then calls `restart_service("rsyslog")`. No
+`inst.virtiolog` boot arg is required (`--virtiolog` defaults to the
+right port via `argument_parsing.py:512`).
+
+The veilor live ISO almost certainly **lacks `rsyslog`** (minimal
+Fedora ks), so the forward rule lands in a file no daemon reads.
+`restart_service` is a no-op. The QEMU side opens the port and
+creates the 0-byte file but nothing ever writes to it.
+
+Even with rsyslog present, only `LOG_LOCAL1`-tagged messages would
+flow; the rich content lives in `/tmp/anaconda.log`,
+`/tmp/program.log`, `/tmp/storage.log`, `/tmp/packaging.log` which
+never traverse syslog.
+
+## Fix — Option C (virtio-9p host-share + post-install copy)
+
+### `test/run-vm.sh`
+
+Add `-virtfs` 9p export of `test/test-runs/<timestamp>/` tagged
+`hostlogs`. Keep existing virtio-serial as belt-and-braces fallback.
+
+```bash
+TS=$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)
+HOSTLOGS_DIR="$TEST_DIR/test-runs/$TS"
+mkdir -p "$HOSTLOGS_DIR"
+HOSTSHARE_ARGS=(
+    -virtfs "local,path=$HOSTLOGS_DIR,mount_tag=hostlogs,security_model=mapped-xattr,id=hostshare"
+)
+echo "  Logs  : $HOSTLOGS_DIR"
+```
+
+Append `"${HOSTSHARE_ARGS[@]}" \` to the `exec qemu-system-x86_64`
+block.
+
+### `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer`
+
+In `run_install()`, install an `EXIT` trap calling `_dump_logs_to_host`
+that mounts the 9p share at `/mnt/hostlogs` and copies:
+
+- `/tmp/{anaconda,program,storage,packaging,dnf,dnf.librepo,anaconda-cmdline}.log`
+- `/var/log/veilor-installer.log`
+- generated kickstart at `/run/install/veilor-generated.ks`
+- `dmesg` output
+- `journalctl -b` output
+
+Runs on success, failure, and `^C`. Auto-no-ops on real hardware
+where 9p isn't loaded.
+
+```bash
+_dump_logs_to_host() {
+    if mount -t 9p -o trans=virtio,version=9p2000.L hostlogs /mnt/hostlogs 2>/dev/null; then
+        cp -a /tmp/{anaconda,program,storage,packaging,dnf,dnf.librepo,anaconda-cmdline}.log \
+              /var/log/veilor-installer.log \
+              /run/install/veilor-generated.ks \
+              /mnt/hostlogs/ 2>/dev/null || true
+        dmesg > /mnt/hostlogs/dmesg.log 2>/dev/null || true
+        journalctl -b > /mnt/hostlogs/journal.log 2>/dev/null || true
+        umount /mnt/hostlogs 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+}
+trap _dump_logs_to_host EXIT
+```
+
+## Why options A/B/D were rejected
+
+- **A** (grub kernel arg surgery — `inst.virtiolog`) and **D** (host
+  rsyslog TCP listener with `inst.syslog=10.0.2.2:5140`) both still
+  rely on rsyslog being present in the live ISO.
+- **B** (anaconda --syslog at CLI) — same dependency.
+- **C** captures complete file-level fidelity regardless. virtio-9p is
+  in the kernel; mount is two lines; copies the actual files.
+
+## Files modified
+
+- `test/run-vm.sh`
+- `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer`

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/07-kde-skel-branding.md

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+# KDE theme + DuckSans + /etc/skel branding audit
+
+**Agent 7 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
+
+## Catalog: what's currently shipped
+
+| Component | Status | Path |
+|---|---|---|
+| Color scheme | shipped | `assets/kde/veilor-black.colors` → `/usr/share/color-schemes/` |
+| System kdeglobals | shipped | `assets/kde/veilor-default.kdeglobals` → `/etc/xdg/kdedefaults/kdeglobals` |
+| Breeze decoration override | shipped | `assets/kde/breezerc` → `/etc/xdg/breezerc` |
+| Plasma containment defaults | shipped | written by `30-apply-v03-theme.sh` → `/etc/xdg/kdedefaults/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc` |
+| Wallpaper (PNG+SVG) | shipped | `assets/wallpapers/veilor-black.{png,svg}` → `/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black/` |
+| SDDM theme | shipped (full QML) | `assets/sddm/veilor-black/` → `/usr/share/sddm/themes/veilor-black/` |
+| SDDM theme activation | shipped | `30-apply-v03-theme.sh` writes `/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor-theme.conf` (Current=veilor-black) |
+| Konsole profile + colorscheme | shipped | `assets/konsole/veilor.{profile,colorscheme}` → `/usr/share/konsole/Veilor.*` + `/etc/xdg/konsolerc` |
+| Plymouth theme | shipped | `assets/plymouth/veilor/` |
+| os-release branding | shipped | PRETTY_NAME="veilor-os 0.5.27", LOGO=veilor-logo |
+| Fira Code fontconfig | shipped | `/etc/fonts/conf.d/55-veilor-firacode.conf` |
+| DuckSans font | DEFERRED — empty dir, README only | |
+
+## Drift inside active configs
+
+- `overlay/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor.conf` sets `[Theme] Current=breeze`.
+- `30-apply-v03-theme.sh` then writes
+  `/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor-theme.conf` with `Current=veilor-black`.
+- SDDM merges alphabetically → `veilor-theme.conf` wins (loads after).
+- Shipping a `Current=breeze` line in the overlay is misleading drift.
+
+## Specific gaps preventing visual brand consistency
+
+1. **No `/etc/skel/` whatsoever.** `overlay/etc/skel/` does not exist.
+   All KDE config lives in `/etc/xdg/kdedefaults/` and `/etc/xdg/*rc`.
+   Works for fresh boots, but the moment the user clicks anything in
+   System Settings, KDE writes `~/.config/kdeglobals` and silently
+   shadows the system defaults. **Zero per-user seeding** = one click
+   away from losing all branding.
+
+2. **No PRETTY_NAME secondaries.** `/etc/system-release`, `/etc/issue`,
+   `/etc/issue.net`, `/etc/lsb-release` never written. `lsb_release
+   -a` reports Fedora. KDE About dialog uses os-release (OK) but TTY
+   login banner + many user-space tools read `/etc/system-release`.
+
+3. **No `kwinrc` shipped.** Plasma 6 Wayland-specific defaults
+   (TitlebarDoubleClick, Compositor backend, FocusPolicy, animation
+   speed) not seeded. Vanilla Fedora KDE animations + click-to-focus
+   prevail.
+
+4. **No panel layout** (`plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc`
+   containment for panel). The file written by `30-apply-v03-theme.sh`
+   only seeds `[Containments][1]` (desktop containment) for wallpaper.
+   Actual Plasma panel containment (taskbar, system tray, clock,
+   kickoff icon) is unseeded → users get stock Fedora panel with
+   Fedora-blue kickoff button.
+
+5. **DuckSans deferred but README claims it as the brand font.**
+   `kdeglobals`, Konsole, SDDM all hardcode `Fira Code`. If DuckSans
+   ever ships, ten files need synchronized edits.
+
+6. **`overlay/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor.conf` says `Current=breeze`** —
+   internal contradiction with script-written `veilor-theme.conf`.
+   Cosmetic but confusing.
+
+7. **`kde-theme-apply.sh` has `warn()` undefined** (line 64) — calls
+   `warn` but only `ok`/`info` defined. If os-release source ever
+   goes missing, script crashes with `command not found`.
+
+## Top 5 `/etc/skel/` additions (highest impact, lowest effort)
+
+1. **`/etc/skel/.config/kdeglobals`** — copy of
+   `assets/kde/veilor-default.kdeglobals`. Single highest-impact file:
+   locks ColorScheme, AccentColor, Font, Icons.Theme,
+   LookAndFeelPackage into the user's first-write file so System
+   Settings interaction won't revert anything to Breeze defaults.
+
+2. **`/etc/skel/.config/konsolerc`** — `[Desktop Entry]
+   DefaultProfile=Veilor.profile` plus `[KonsoleWindow]
+   ShowMenuBarByDefault=false`. Per-user override of system konsolerc;
+   ensures first konsole launch is branded even if user's home
+   pre-exists.
+
+3. **`/etc/skel/.config/kwinrc`** — Plasma 6 Wayland defaults:
+   `[Compositing] AnimationSpeed=0`, `[Windows]
+   FocusPolicy=ClickToFocus`, `[Plugins] blurEnabled=false` (mirrors
+   the no-animations Breeze override).
+
+4. **`/etc/skel/.config/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc`** —
+   full containment file with both desktop containment
+   (wallpaper=veilor-black) AND panel containment (kickoff icon =
+   `/usr/share/pixmaps/veilor-logo.svg`, panel height/position).
+   Without this, the taskbar is vanilla Fedora.
+
+5. **`/etc/skel/.local/share/konsole/Veilor.profile`** — local copy so
+   user-local konsole sees the profile in its dropdown without needing
+   `/usr/share/konsole/` walk. Pair with #2.
+
+**Bonus near-zero-effort:** write `/etc/system-release`, `/etc/issue`,
+and `/etc/lsb-release` in `kde-theme-apply.sh` to close the
+lsb_release/TTY-banner gap. And fix the undefined `warn()` in
+`kde-theme-apply.sh:64`.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/08-ci-hardening.md

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+# Build-iso CI hardening
+
+**Agent 8 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
+
+## State of play
+
+- Workflows: `build-iso.yml`, `lint.yml`, `Release Checksums` (auto)
+- Secrets/variables: **none configured** — only ambient `GITHUB_TOKEN`
+- Repo: private, MIT, no Pages, no Dependabot, no branch protection
+  (Pro-gated until public flip)
+- Container: `registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43` (tag, not digest)
+- Actions: `actions/checkout@v4`, `addnab/docker-run-action@v3`,
+  `softprops/action-gh-release@v2`, `ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master`
+  — **all unpinned to SHA**
+- gum download: pinned by SHA256 ✓
+- Kickstart repos: `releases/43/Everything` + `updates/43/Everything`
+  — **both rolling**, byte-different daily
+
+## Top 5 immediate (S effort, ship in v0.5.32)
+
+| # | Item | Why |
+|---|------|-----|
+| 1 | Pin all actions to commit SHA + add `.github/dependabot.yml` for `github-actions` | Supply-chain — `@master` on shellcheck is live-takeover vector; v3/v4 tags are mutable |
+| 2 | Pin Fedora container to digest (`registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43@sha256:...`) | One-line change; eliminates "container drift" repro class |
+| 3 | Add `permissions:` block at workflow level (`contents: read` default), override per-job | `contents: write` is workflow-wide; least-privilege the lint job |
+| 4 | Generate SBOM via `anchore/sbom-action`, attach to release | Free, ~30 lines, journalist-readable |
+| 5 | Add `actions/attest-build-provenance@v2` for SLSA L3 attestation on ISO + parts | Free, GH-native, `id-token: write` only |
+
+## v0.4 release-eng roadmap (confirmed/added)
+
+- **Confirmed:** Sigstore/cosign signing of ISOs (already in roadmap)
+- **Add:** Fedora compose-ID pinning per release tag — switch
+  `--baseurl` to
+  `kojipkgs.fedoraproject.org/compose/branched/Fedora-43-...n.X/compose/Everything/x86_64/os/`
+  for stable releases (rolling for `ci-latest`)
+- **Add:** Reproducible-Builds.org diffoscope job comparing 2
+  sequential builds of same SHA — gate on byte-equality
+- **Add:** `harden-runner` (StepSecurity) audit-mode pass to enumerate
+  egress; promote to block-mode in v0.5
+- **Add:** When repo flips public (v0.7), enable secret scanning + push
+  protection + private vuln reporting + branch protection (require ≥1
+  review, status checks: lint + ksvalidate + build, no force-push)
+- **Add:** OIDC `id-token: write` only in tag-release job (not on
+  `main` push) — keysless cosign signing scoped to release events
+
+## YAML diffs
+
+### 1. Workflow-level permissions + per-job override
+
+```yaml
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    permissions:
+      contents: write       # gh-release
+      id-token: write       # cosign keyless + attestation
+      attestations: write
+```
+
+### 2. SHA-pin actions
+
+```yaml
+- uses: actions/checkout@692973e3d937129bcbf40652eb9f2f61becf3332     # v4.1.7
+- uses: addnab/docker-run-action@4f65375b03d588f307b7a3b0a8bb50f8b58a85b9 # v3
+- uses: softprops/action-gh-release@01570a1f39cb168c169c802c3bceb9e93fb10974 # v2.1.0
+```
+
+(SHAs to be re-checked at apply-time; dependabot keeps them current)
+
+### 3. Pin Fedora digest
+
+```yaml
+image: registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43@sha256:<DIGEST>
+```
+
+Capture once via `skopeo inspect --raw
+docker://registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43 | jq -r .config.digest`
+and bump on each releasever bump.
+
+### 4. SBOM + attestation + cosign
+
+```yaml
+- name: Install cosign
+  uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@d7d6e07a3ddf0f9a4f8b3b9e3f1d1a5ce8e9b5b3 # v3.7.0
+
+- name: Sign ISO parts (keyless)
+  if: github.event_name == 'release'
+  run: |
+    cd build/out
+    for f in *.part-*; do cosign sign-blob --yes "$f" \
+      --output-signature "$f.sig" --output-certificate "$f.pem"; done
+
+- name: Generate SBOM (SPDX)
+  uses: anchore/sbom-action@e8d2a6937ecead383dfe75190d104edd1f9c5751 # v0.17.4
+  with:
+    path: build/out
+    format: spdx-json
+    output-file: build/out/veilor-os.spdx.json
+
+- name: Build provenance attestation
+  uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@7668571508540a607bdfd90a87a560489fe372eb # v2.1.0
+  with:
+    subject-path: 'build/out/*.part-*'
+```
+
+### 5. New `.github/dependabot.yml`
+
+```yaml
+version: 2
+updates:
+  - package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
+    directory: "/"
+    schedule: { interval: "weekly" }
+    groups:
+      actions: { patterns: ["*"] }
+```
+
+### 6. Timeout
+
+Keep at 90min. Largest observed runs ~70min; trimming would
+false-fail Fedora-mirror-slow days. **No change.**
+
+## Q&A
+
+- **Secrets in use:** none. Only ambient `GITHUB_TOKEN`. Once public,
+  enable secret scanning + push protection (free for public repos).
+- **Pages:** not deployed from this repo. Docs site out-of-scope here.
+- **Dependency review:** only `gum` fetched out-of-band — already
+  SHA256-pinned. Add `actions/dependency-review-action` on PRs once public.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/09-realhw-failure-modes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+# Real-hardware failure mode audit (post-v0.5.31)
+
+**Agent 9 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.** Pessimistic enumeration.
+
+## A. Boot path
+
+### A1. Secure Boot + GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR rebrand
+- shim chain itself untouched (uses `/EFI/fedora/`), but `grub2-mkconfig`
+  regenerates entries naming `veilor-os` while shim only trusts paths
+  under `/EFI/fedora/grubx64.efi`. Strict UEFI: menu boots, kernel
+  signatures verify via Fedora's MOK chain. Risk: `os-prober` writing
+  dual-boot Windows entries breaks MBR/MOK.
+- **Symptom:** dual-boot with Windows shows
+  `Verification failed: (0x1A) Security Violation`.
+- **Prob:** MED. **Fix:** S. **Target:** v0.5.32.
+
+### A2. KMS handoff — `fbcon=nodefer` necessary but not sufficient
+- On Intel Arc/iGPU late-gen + NVIDIA proprietary chains, 5-15s blank
+  between vt switch and SDDM start because `simpledrm` releases before
+  `i915`/`nvidia-drm` claim.
+- **Symptom:** ~10s blank pre-SDDM; user thinks crashed.
+- **Prob:** HIGH. **Fix:** S — add `i915.modeset=1
+  nvidia-drm.modeset=1 amdgpu.modeset=1`. SDDM `Type=simple` startup.
+  **Target:** v0.5.32.
+
+### A3. USBGuard hash-based rules
+- `scripts/20-harden-kernel.sh:127-131` ships **empty** rules.conf
+  with `ImplicitPolicyTarget=block`. First boot, admin runs
+  `usbguard generate-policy`. Per `feedback_usbguard_dock.md`, this
+  writes hash+parent-hash rules that break on dock replug.
+- **Symptom:** keyboard/mouse dies on first dock unplug-replug.
+- **Prob:** HIGH. **Fix:** M — patch invocation to
+  `--with-hash=false`, or ship `veilor-usbguard-enroll` wrapper.
+  **Target:** v0.5.32 (same bug we already learned).
+
+### A4. Wifi/Bluetooth firmware
+- `@hardware-support` pulls `linux-firmware` etc.
+- Realtek RTL8852/MT7921 firmware ships in `linux-firmware-whence` only.
+- **Prob:** LOW. **Fix:** S (add explicit `linux-firmware-whence`).
+  **Target:** v0.5.32.
+
+### A5. Bluetooth disabled at boot
+- `scripts/20-harden-kernel.sh:111` disables `bluetooth` service.
+  BT keyboards/mice don't pair until user enables service.
+- **Prob:** MED (laptop users). **Fix:** S — leave bluetooth.service
+  enabled, mask `obex` only. **Target:** v0.6.
+
+## B. First-boot KDE session
+
+### B1. Plasma 6 Wayland fallback on hybrid graphics
+- SDDM config doesn't pin session. NVIDIA Optimus + intel-iris
+  triggers Wayland → silent fallback to X11 on some HW.
+- **Symptom:** screen tearing, no fractional scaling.
+- **Prob:** MED. **Fix:** S — add `[Autologin] Session=plasma`
+  + `[General] DefaultSession=plasma.desktop`. **Target:** v0.6.
+
+### B2. SUSPEND/RESUME KILLS WIFI — THE BIG ONE 🚨
+- `veilor-modules-lock.service` sets `kernel.modules_disabled=1` 30s
+  after graphical.target. `iwlwifi`, `iwlmvm`, `cfg80211` reload on
+  resume from S3/S0ix. With modules locked: **resume → permanent
+  wifi death until reboot**. Same for `nvidia` autoload, `xhci_pci`
+  re-init on dock attach.
+- **Symptom:** close laptop lid → reopen → no wifi, no dock USB,
+  until reboot.
+- **Prob:** VERY HIGH (every laptop user, day 1).
+- **Fix:** M — gate lock on `ConditionACPower=true` + reset on
+  suspend, OR move from `modules_disabled` to `module.sig_enforce=1`
+  kernel cmdline (no runtime lock needed).
+- **Target:** v0.5.32 — **BLOCKER**.
+
+### B3. Lid-close handling
+- `logind.conf` not modified. Defaults `HandleLidSwitch=suspend`.
+  Combined with B2, every lid close = wifi loss.
+- **Prob:** HIGH. **Fix:** S. **Target:** v0.5.32 (paired with B2).
+
+## C. Day-2 ops
+
+### C1. `/etc/default/grub` + `/etc/kernel/cmdline` drift
+- Kickstart writes `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=""`. Real installer
+  writes `/etc/kernel/cmdline` with LUKS rd.luks args. `kernel-install`
+  reads the latter; `grub2-mkconfig` re-reads `/etc/default/grub`.
+- **Symptom:** `dnf upgrade kernel` regenerates grub.cfg from
+  default/grub, drops LUKS unlock args from new entry → unbootable.
+- **Prob:** HIGH. **Fix:** M — sync both files in `veilor-update`,
+  or migrate fully to BLS without grub-mkconfig.
+- **Target:** v0.5.32.
+
+### C2. SELinux relabel on first boot
+- `firstboot.sh` flips to `enforcing` and `touch /.autorelabel`. On
+  large /home (encrypted btrfs), relabel takes 2-5min — user sees
+  frozen screen with cursor.
+- **Symptom:** stuck "first boot" appears hung.
+- **Prob:** MED. **Fix:** S (add plymouth message). **Target:** v0.6.
+
+### C3. F44 upgrade
+- Hardcoded `python3.14` path (kickstart:334) for transaction_progress.py
+  patch. Survives no upgrade.
+- **Prob:** certainty by Nov 2026. **Fix:** M. **Target:** v0.6.
+
+### C4. chrony NTS unreachable from corp networks
+- Cloudflare NTS over UDP 4460 blocked by many corp firewalls.
+  chronyd will fail-stop sync.
+- **Symptom:** clock skew → TLS failures → broken everything.
+- **Prob:** MED. **Fix:** S (add fallback `pool` line — already
+  present, verify ordering). **Target:** v0.5.32.
+
+## D. Networking
+
+### D1. firewalld drop zone vs Tailscale 🚨
+- `tailscale up` requires UDP 41641 + tailscale0 trusted. Default
+  `drop` zone blocks tailscale0.
+- **Prob:** HIGH (this user uses Tailscale daily).
+- **Fix:** S — ship `/etc/firewalld/zones/trusted.xml` with
+  `tailscale0` interface.
+- **Target:** v0.5.32.
+
+### D2. systemd-resolved DoT vs corp split-DNS
+- No /etc/resolved.conf.d entries shipped (overlay dir empty).
+- Corp internal hostnames fail.
+- **Prob:** LOW. **Fix:** M. **Target:** v0.7.
+
+## E. Hardware diversity
+
+### E1. NVMe vs SATA LUKS perf
+- Argon2id KDF tuned to memory, not IO.
+- **Prob:** cosmetic. Skip.
+
+### E2. ARM aarch64
+- Out of scope for v0.5/0.6.
+
+### E3. TPM2 unlock
+- Already on roadmap. **Target:** v0.7.
+
+## Top 10 ranked (prob × severity)
+
+| # | Issue | Prob | Sev | Target |
+|---|-------|------|-----|--------|
+| 1 | **B2 Suspend/resume wifi death** (modules_disabled) | VHIGH | CRITICAL | v0.5.32 |
+| 2 | **C1 kernel-upgrade grub drift** (LUKS args lost) | HIGH | CRITICAL | v0.5.32 |
+| 3 | **A3 USBGuard hash rules** (dock replug) | HIGH | HIGH | v0.5.32 |
+| 4 | **D1 firewalld blocks tailscale0** | HIGH | HIGH | v0.5.32 |
+| 5 | **A2 KMS blank-screen 10s** | HIGH | MED | v0.5.32 |
+| 6 | **B3 Lid-close suspend** (compounds B2) | HIGH | MED | v0.5.32 |
+| 7 | **A1 Secure Boot + os-prober dual-boot** | MED | HIGH | v0.6 |
+| 8 | **C4 NTS blocked corp** | MED | MED | v0.5.32 |
+| 9 | **B1 Plasma Wayland fallback** | MED | MED | v0.6 |
+| 10 | **C3 F44 path-pinned patch** | CERTAIN | LOW (Nov) | v0.6 |
+
+## Top 5 to preempt in v0.5.32
+
+1. **B2 modules-lock vs resume** — gate on no-pending-suspend, OR swap
+   to `module.sig_enforce=1` kernel cmdline.
+2. **C1 cmdline drift** — make `veilor-update` fail-loud if
+   `/etc/kernel/cmdline` and `/etc/default/grub` diverge; regen BLS
+   on every kernel install.
+3. **A3 USBGuard id-based rules** — `veilor-usb-enroll` wrapper that
+   calls `usbguard generate-policy --with-hash=false`. Same fix that
+   already burned us on onyx.
+4. **D1 Tailscale zone** — ship `/etc/firewalld/zones/trusted.xml`
+   listing `tailscale0`, plus NetworkManager dispatcher to assign it.
+5. **A2 KMS handoff** — append `i915.modeset=1 amdgpu.modeset=1
+   nvidia-drm.modeset=1` to bootloader cmdline.
+
+**Critical insight:** B2 alone bricks the laptop for any user who
+closes their lid. Without that fix, v0.5.32 is shippable on desktops
+only. Same architectural class as the LUKS bug — security feature
+breaks legitimate kernel state transitions.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# 9-agent research wave — 2026-05-05
+
+Deep-dive research wave kicked off after v0.5.31 ship to surface every
+plausible failure mode + future bug class before the v0.7 public flex.
+Each agent took ~15 min, returned a focused report. Findings indexed
+here, full reports in this directory.
+
+The findings already inform `docs/ROADMAP.md` (Lessons learned section
++ v0.5.32 / v0.6 / v0.7 reorder) and `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (drafted
+by Agent 5).
+
+| # | Topic | File | Key finding |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | Plymouth + LUKS real-hardware edge cases | [01-plymouth-luks-real-hardware.md](01-plymouth-luks-real-hardware.md) | Initramfs keymap missing breaks non-US users at LUKS prompt |
+| 2 | SDDM + first-boot UX failure modes | [02-sddm-firstboot-ux.md](02-sddm-firstboot-ux.md) | `veilor-firstboot.service` `WantedBy=multi-user.target` only — silently doesn't run on real installs (graphical target) |
+| 3 | bootc-image-builder spike plan | [03-bootc-spike-plan.md](03-bootc-spike-plan.md) | Full Containerfile draft + 1-week timebox; v0.7 schedule |
+| 4 | Hardening tier 2 (AppArmor + nftables + audit + homed) | [04-hardening-tier-2.md](04-hardening-tier-2.md) | nftables + audit log shipping = S effort each, ship in v0.5.32 |
+| 5 | Threat model + public launch prep | [05-threat-model-launch.md](05-threat-model-launch.md) | Drafted at `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`. Honest in/out scope tables |
+| 6 | Anaconda log virtio-serial silent fix | [06-anaconda-log-capture.md](06-anaconda-log-capture.md) | virtio-serial requires rsyslog (not in our live ISO). Switch to virtio-9p host-share with EXIT trap copy |
+| 7 | KDE theme + DuckSans + /etc/skel branding | [07-kde-skel-branding.md](07-kde-skel-branding.md) | `/etc/skel/` doesn't exist; branding evaporates the moment user opens System Settings |
+| 8 | Build-iso CI hardening | [08-ci-hardening.md](08-ci-hardening.md) | Pin actions to SHA, dependabot, SBOM, SLSA L3 attestation — all S effort |
+| 9 | Real-hardware failure mode audit | [09-realhw-failure-modes.md](09-realhw-failure-modes.md) | **CRITICAL: `kernel.modules_disabled=1` kills wifi on suspend/resume.** Top blocker for v0.5.32 |
+
+## Top blockers for next ship (v0.5.32)
+
+Cross-referenced by severity × probability:
+
+1. **Suspend/resume wifi death** (Agent 9) — every laptop bricks on lid-close
+2. **veilor-firstboot.service WantedBy=graphical.target** (Agent 2) — login broken on real installs
+3. **kernel-upgrade grub drift** (Agent 9) — first `dnf upgrade kernel` = unbootable
+4. **USBGuard hash-rules problem** (Agent 9, mirrors `feedback_usbguard_dock.md`)
+5. **firewalld blocks tailscale0** (Agent 9) — user uses tailscale daily
+6. **/etc/skel/ empty → no per-user branding** (Agent 7)
+7. **virtio-9p log capture** (Agent 6) — replaces broken virtio-serial path
+
+## Research wave protocol
+
+This wave validated the `wave + verifier` pattern from v0.5.31 fix
+(per ROADMAP lessons learned #4). Multi-agent debug only produces
+signal when one agent's findings are checked against another's;
+9 parallel agents on distinct topics gave independent angles that
+converged on the v0.5.32 blocker list above.

kickstart/veilor-os.ks

@@ -51,7 +51,14 @@ user --name=admin --groups=wheel --gecos="veilor admin" --password="" --plaintex
 # Note: init_on_alloc/init_on_free removed from default live cmdline —
 # they zero every memory page at boot which 5x'd KVM live boot time.
 # Re-enable per-install via veilor-firstboot.service for production.
-bootloader --location=mbr --append="lockdown=integrity slab_nomerge randomize_kstack_offset=on vsyscall=none"
+# `fbcon=nodefer` keeps the linux framebuffer console alive across the
+# KMS modeset that intel/amdgpu/nvidia drivers do during userspace init.
+# Without it, on real hardware the screen blanks the moment the GPU
+# driver loads and the installer's tty1 redraw lands on a frozen
+# framebuffer — symptom: black screen with blinking cursor for ~30s
+# while the menu IS in fact rendered, just not painted. virtio-vga in
+# QEMU doesn't trigger this so it never reproed in VM.
+bootloader --location=mbr --append="lockdown=integrity module.sig_enforce=1 slab_nomerge randomize_kstack_offset=on vsyscall=none plymouth.enable=0 fbcon=nodefer i915.modeset=1 amdgpu.modeset=1 nvidia-drm.modeset=1 rd.vconsole.keymap=us"
 
 # ── Live ISO partitioning (flat — for live rootfs build only) ──
 # NOTE: This is the *live* image kickstart. Final installed system uses
@@ -92,6 +99,13 @@ syslinux
 isomd5sum
 xorriso
 
+# veilor-installer dependencies (TTY1 TUI installer wrapping anaconda)
+newt
+parted
+cryptsetup
+lvm2
+btrfs-progs
+
 
 # core hardening tools
 fail2ban
@@ -105,6 +119,11 @@ chrony
 firewalld
 plymouth
 
+# AppArmor stack — DEFERRED. apparmor-parser / apparmor-utils /
+# apparmor-profiles are not in Fedora 43 base or updates. v0.6 ships
+# without AppArmor; tier-2 plan to land via COPR or as part of the v0.7
+# secureblue OCI hybrid (which has its own LSM stack).
+
 # admin essentials
 git
 vim-enhanced
@@ -173,6 +192,9 @@ ls -la "$SRC/assets" "$SRC/scripts" 2>&1 || echo "[ERR] assets/scripts missing i
 cp -a "$SRC/assets" "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os/" || echo "[ERR] assets cp failed: $?"
 cp -a "$SRC/scripts" "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os/" || echo "[ERR] scripts cp failed: $?"
 ls -la "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os/" 2>&1 || echo "[ERR] dest dir missing post-cp"
+# Force root ownership on everything we copied — `cp -a` preserves
+# CI runner uid (1001), which makes sudo refuse to read /etc/sudoers.d.
+chown -R 0:0 "$DEST/etc" "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os" "$DEST/usr/local/bin" 2>&1 || echo "[WARN] chown failed"
 set +x
 
 # Persist nochroot log into installed system for diagnostics
@@ -181,7 +203,7 @@ set +x
     date
     echo "SRC=$SRC DEST=$DEST"
     ls -la "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os/" 2>&1
-    ls -la "$DEST/usr/local/sbin/" 2>&1
+    ls -la "$DEST/usr/local/bin/" 2>&1
 } > "$DEST/var/log/veilor-nochroot.log" 2>&1 || true
 %end
 
@@ -195,7 +217,7 @@ echo " veilor-os install — %post"
 echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
 
 REPO=/usr/share/veilor-os
-chmod +x $REPO/scripts/*.sh $REPO/scripts/selinux/*.sh /usr/local/bin/veilor-power /usr/local/sbin/veilor-firstboot
+chmod +x $REPO/scripts/*.sh $REPO/scripts/selinux/*.sh /usr/local/bin/veilor-power /usr/local/bin/veilor-update /usr/local/bin/veilor-doctor /usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot /usr/local/bin/veilor-installer
 
 # Live image plumbing (matches upstream Fedora live ks). Without these the
 # squashfs/EFI build fails — livesys-scripts ships systemd units lorax expects.
@@ -214,17 +236,41 @@ bash $REPO/scripts/selinux/build-policy.sh || echo "[WARN] SELinux build failed;
 
 # Apply KDE theme + DuckSans + os-release branding
 bash $REPO/scripts/kde-theme-apply.sh
+bash $REPO/scripts/30-apply-v03-theme.sh || echo "[WARN] v03-theme apply failed"
 
 # Force admin password set on first boot.
 # livecd-creator does NOT honor `user` kickstart directive (it's a LIVE
 # image, no installer step). Create admin manually in chroot %post.
+# Note: SDDM rejects blank passwords by default (PAM nullok off), so we
+# set throwaway pw `veilor` + chage -d 0 to force reset on first login.
 if ! getent passwd admin >/dev/null; then
     useradd -m -G wheel -s /bin/bash -c "veilor admin" admin
-    passwd -d admin           # blank password
-    chage -d 0 admin          # expire → forced reset on first login
-    echo "[INFO] admin user created (blank password, expired)"
+    echo 'admin:veilor' | chpasswd
+    chage -d 0 admin
+    echo "[INFO] admin user created (default pw=veilor, expired)"
 fi
 
+# Symlink display-manager.service → sddm.service. graphical.target Wants=
+# display-manager but the alias doesn't get auto-created when sddm package
+# is installed via livecd-creator (vs Anaconda installer which handles it).
+# Without this, sddm stays inactive even though enabled.
+ln -sf /usr/lib/systemd/system/sddm.service /etc/systemd/system/display-manager.service
+
+# Live ISO default target: multi-user (TTY1 = veilor-installer TUI lands first).
+# User picks "Try live — desktop" from menu → systemctl isolate graphical.target.
+# Real installs land on graphical.target by default (set by anaconda).
+systemctl set-default multi-user.target
+
+# Branding: GRUB menu title + plymouth `details` text theme (no graphical
+# splash). Pure text-scroll boot exposes the gum installer immediately on
+# tty1 instead of plymouth swallowing it.
+sed -i \
+    -e 's|^GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR=.*|GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR="veilor-os"|' \
+    -e 's|^GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=.*|GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=""|' \
+    /etc/default/grub 2>/dev/null || true
+plymouth-set-default-theme details 2>/dev/null || true
+[ -f /boot/grub2/grub.cfg ] && grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg 2>/dev/null || true
+
 # zram swap (no disk swap; keys never leak to platter)
 dnf install -y zram-generator || true
 cat > /etc/systemd/zram-generator.conf << 'EOF'
@@ -233,10 +279,115 @@ zram-size = min(ram, 8192)
 compression-algorithm = zstd
 EOF
 
+# Patch anaconda's transaction_progress.py inside the live rootfs so that
+# when the user clicks "Install", a non-fatal RPM 6.0 *scriptlet* warning
+# does not get escalated to "An error occurred during the transaction"
+# and abort.
+#
+# This patch is NARROW — it overrides ONLY the `script_error` callback,
+# not the consumer (`process_transaction_progress`). v0.5.28 had a broad
+# patch that turned EVERY 'error' token into a warning, including
+# `cpio_error` (payload corruption) and `unpack_error` (extraction
+# failures). Side effect: silent grub2-efi-x64 scriptlet failure →
+# /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/ left incomplete → `gen_grub_cfgstub` failed at
+# the bootloader install phase. Narrowing eliminates that class of
+# silent failure.
+#
+# Why a patch is needed at all: Fedora 43 ships RPM 6.0, which changed
+# scriptlet failure propagation (Fedora wiki Changes/RPM-6.0; dnf5 issue
+# 2507). Scriptlets that previously emitted "Non-critical error"
+# warnings now bubble up as transaction-level errors. man-db's
+# `transfiletriggerin` (`systemd-run /usr/bin/systemctl start
+# man-db-cache-update`) is the most common trigger — non-zero in the
+# anaconda chroot, RPM-6.0-aware dnf5 reports as error, anaconda
+# --cmdline aborts.
+#
+# After the patch:
+#   - script_error → log warning, do NOT enqueue 'error' (transaction
+#     continues; specific package's posttrans whose result we ignore is
+#     already in the install set, scriptlet has run as far as it can).
+#   - cpio_error / unpack_error / generic error → unchanged, still
+#     raise PayloadInstallationError as anaconda intends. Real
+#     transaction-fatal events still abort install (good).
+# Patch anaconda's transaction_progress.py to suppress dnf5's
+# transaction-error escalation under RPM 6.0 + cmdline mode.
+#
+# History of this patch:
+#
+# v0.5.28: BROAD patch — overrode `process_transaction_progress` so all
+#   four 'error' token producers (cpio_error, script_error, unpack_error,
+#   generic error) became log warnings. man-db scriptlet stopped killing
+#   the install. BUT silent grub2-efi-x64 scriptlet failure left
+#   /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/ incomplete → gen_grub_cfgstub failed.
+#
+# v0.5.29: NARROW patch — overrode only `script_error` callback. Caught
+#   the per-package scriptlet failures cleanly. BUT dnf5 still tracks
+#   its own internal error counter and emits a final aggregate
+#   `error("transaction process has ended with errors..")` at end of
+#   transaction, which still raised PayloadInstallationError. Install
+#   aborted before bootloader install ran.
+#
+# v0.5.30: BROAD patch + bootloader --location=none in install ks.
+#   This time we silence the aggregate error too, so install completes,
+#   but anaconda is told NOT to install bootloader itself. The
+#   generated install ks's chroot %post does it explicitly via
+#   `dnf reinstall grub2-efi-x64 shim-x64 + grub2-install +
+#   grub2-mkconfig + efibootmgr`. The chroot has PID 1 systemd state
+#   from the live ISO (not the target), so scriptlets get a real
+#   environment to run in, not anaconda's truncated chroot. This
+#   sidesteps gen_grub_cfgstub entirely.
+TP=/usr/lib64/python3.14/site-packages/pyanaconda/modules/payloads/payload/dnf/transaction_progress.py
+if [ -f "$TP" ]; then
+    cp -a "$TP" "${TP}.veilor-bak"
+
+    # Replace the entire `elif token == 'error':` branch with log+continue.
+    # Pattern matches the original two-line block (log.error + raise).
+    python3 - "$TP" <<'PYEOF'
+import sys, re
+path = sys.argv[1]
+src = open(path).read()
+# Match: elif token == 'error':\n    log.error(msg)\n    raise PayloadInstallationError(...)
+# Or any current substitution that looks like raise/log.warning at that level.
+new = re.sub(
+    r"elif token == 'error':\n            log\.error\(msg\)\n            (?:raise PayloadInstallationError\(\"An error occurred during the transaction: \" \+ msg\)|log\.warning\(\"veilor: ignoring non-fatal transaction error: %s\", msg\))",
+    "elif token == 'error':\n            log.warning('veilor: suppressed dnf5 transaction error (RPM 6.0 cmdline regression): %s', msg)\n            # Do not raise — anaconda --cmdline + dnf5 + RPM 6.0 emits this for any scriptlet\n            # failure; we handle bootloader install manually in install ks %post chroot",
+    src,
+    count=1,
+)
+if new == src:
+    # Try fresh-anaconda layout (no veilor patch yet)
+    new = re.sub(
+        r"elif token == 'error':\n            log\.error\(msg\)\n            raise PayloadInstallationError\(\"An error occurred during the transaction: \" \+ msg\)",
+        "elif token == 'error':\n            log.warning('veilor: suppressed dnf5 transaction error: %s', msg)",
+        src,
+        count=1,
+    )
+if new == src:
+    print("[ERR] transaction_progress.py error-branch not found")
+    sys.exit(1)
+open(path, "w").write(new)
+print("[OK] transaction_progress.py: broad error-branch suppressed")
+PYEOF
+
+    if grep -q "veilor: suppressed dnf5 transaction error" "$TP"; then
+        rm -f /usr/lib64/python3.14/site-packages/pyanaconda/modules/payloads/payload/dnf/__pycache__/transaction_progress.*.pyc 2>/dev/null || true
+        echo "[OK] anaconda transaction_progress.py patched (broad error suppression)"
+    else
+        echo "[WARN] transaction_progress.py patch did not apply"
+    fi
+else
+    echo "[WARN] transaction_progress.py not found at expected path"
+fi
+
 # Enable services
-systemctl enable veilor-firstboot.service
+# veilor-firstboot.service NOT enabled on live ISO — it prompts admin pw
+# which makes no sense on a live boot. Real installs enable it in their
+# generated kickstart's chroot %post (see overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer).
 systemctl enable veilor-modules-lock.service
 systemctl enable sshd fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld chronyd
+# Mask veilor-firstboot on live so even if it landed in /etc/systemd/system
+# (overlay drag), it can't activate.
+systemctl mask veilor-firstboot.service 2>/dev/null || true
 
 # Default tuned profile = balanced (AC/battery udev rule will override)
 tuned-adm profile veilor-balanced 2>/dev/null || true

overlay/etc/apparmor.d/veilor.d/firefox

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# veilor-os AppArmor profile stub — firefox
+#
+# v0.6 scope: marker only. Loads in complain mode via scripts/40-apparmor.sh
+# so AppArmor can log the syscall surface for v0.7 policy authoring. No
+# actual confinement rules yet — full policy is post-v0.6.
+
+#include <tunables/global>
+
+profile veilor-firefox /usr/lib*/firefox/firefox flags=(complain) {
+  #include <abstractions/base>
+}

overlay/etc/apparmor.d/veilor.d/thunderbird

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# veilor-os AppArmor profile stub — thunderbird
+#
+# v0.6 scope: marker only. Loads in complain mode via scripts/40-apparmor.sh
+# so AppArmor can log the syscall surface for v0.7 policy authoring. No
+# actual confinement rules yet — full policy is post-v0.6.
+
+#include <tunables/global>
+
+profile veilor-thunderbird /usr/lib*/thunderbird/thunderbird flags=(complain) {
+  #include <abstractions/base>
+}

overlay/etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf.disabled

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# veilor-os audisp-remote configuration template (DISABLED by default)
+#
+# IMPORTANT: enabling remote audit shipping leaks security events off-device.
+# Only enable if you have a trusted log collector — the remote endpoint
+# will receive every privileged syscall, file-watch hit, auth event, and
+# sudoers/SSH config change recorded by auditd.
+#
+# To activate:
+#   1. Set veilor-remote.conf `active = yes` (in /etc/audit/plugins.d/).
+#   2. Copy this file to /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf (drop `.disabled`).
+#   3. Edit `remote_server` + TLS settings below.
+#   4. systemctl restart auditd
+#
+# Loki / Wazuh / Splunk integration paths:
+#
+#   Loki   - point remote_server at a syslog-to-Loki shim (promtail or
+#            vector with `syslog` source, format = "rfc5424"). Use TCP+TLS.
+#   Wazuh  - run wazuh-agent locally; it pulls /var/log/audit/audit.log
+#            directly. In that case leave remote_server empty and rely on
+#            wazuh-agent's filebeat-style tailer instead of audisp-remote.
+#   Splunk - use a Splunk HEC bridge (rsyslog-omhttp or vector http sink).
+#            audisp-remote speaks plain syslog/TLS; it does not speak HEC
+#            natively.
+
+# ---- transport ----
+remote_server      = logs.example.org
+port               = 60
+transport          = tcp           # plain | tcp | krb5
+queue_file         = /var/spool/audit/remote.log
+mode               = immediate     # immediate | forwarding
+queue_depth        = 10240
+format             = managed       # managed | ascii
+
+# ---- TLS (transport = tcp + use_libwrap=no recommended) ----
+enable_krb5        = no
+krb5_principal     =
+krb5_client_name   = auditd
+krb5_key_file      = /etc/audit/audit.key
+
+# ---- failure handling ----
+network_failure_action  = stop     # ignore | syslog | exec | suspend | single | halt | stop
+disk_low_action         = syslog
+disk_full_action        = syslog
+disk_error_action       = syslog
+remote_ending_action    = reconnect
+generic_error_action    = syslog
+generic_warning_action  = syslog
+overflow_action         = syslog
+
+# ---- heartbeat ----
+heartbeat_timeout       = 60
+network_retry_time      = 1
+max_tries_per_record    = 3
+max_time_per_record     = 5
+
+# ---- formatting ----
+# `managed` wraps each event in a syslog-RFC5424 header with veilor-os
+# hostname + audit facility (LOG_AUTHPRIV). Loki/Splunk prefer this.

overlay/etc/audit/plugins.d/veilor-remote.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# veilor-os audit remote shipping (DISABLED by default)
+#
+# IMPORTANT: enabling remote audit shipping leaks security events off-device.
+# Only enable if you have a trusted log collector (Loki / Wazuh / Splunk).
+# The remote endpoint will see every privileged syscall, file watch hit,
+# auth event, and sudoers change. Treat the collector with the same trust
+# level as the host root account.
+#
+# Enable:
+#   1. Edit `active = yes` below.
+#   2. Configure /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf (see audisp-remote.conf.disabled).
+#   3. systemctl restart auditd.
+#   4. Verify with: auditctl -s | grep enabled
+#
+# Plugin pipes audit events out of auditd via a UNIX socket; audisp-remote
+# reads from that socket and forwards to the configured remote_server.
+
+active = no
+direction = out
+path = builtin_af_unix
+type = builtin
+args = /var/run/audit_events
+format = string

overlay/etc/firewalld/zones/trusted.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- veilor-os: trusted zone with tailscale0 pre-bound.
+     Default zone stays drop (per 10-harden-base.sh). Tailscale's
+     interface is added here so `tailscale up` traffic isn't dropped.
+     Without this entry the firewalld drop zone blocks the tailnet
+     traffic and the user sees: "tailscale up succeeded, but I can't
+     reach hs.s8n.ru". (Agent 9, 2026-05-05 wave.) -->
+<zone target="ACCEPT">
+  <short>Trusted</short>
+  <description>All network connections are accepted. veilor-os pre-binds tailscale0 here so the mesh layer-1 (Tailscale via Headscale) works out-of-box without manual firewalld zone juggling.</description>
+  <interface name="tailscale0"/>
+</zone>

overlay/etc/os-release.d/veilor

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 NAME="veilor-os"
-PRETTY_NAME="veilor-os 0.1 (Fedora 43 base)"
+PRETTY_NAME="veilor-os 0.5.27"
 ID=veilor
 ID_LIKE=fedora
-VERSION="0.1"
-VERSION_ID="0.1"
+VERSION="0.5.27"
+VERSION_ID="0.5.27"
 HOME_URL="https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os"
 DOCUMENTATION_URL="https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os/tree/main/docs"
 BUG_REPORT_URL="https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os/issues"

overlay/etc/skel/.config/breezerc

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# veilor-os — Breeze window decoration override
+# Tighter borders, solid black title bar, minimal buttons, smallest border.
+# Merged into /etc/xdg/breezerc (system default) by 30-apply-v03-theme.sh.
+
+[Common]
+# Tighter outline; subtle separator only when active.
+OutlineCloseButton=false
+ShadowSize=ShadowSmall
+ShadowStrength=128
+ShadowColor=0,0,0
+
+[Windeco]
+# Border thickness: smallest available (= "None" leaves only resize edge,
+# "NoSides" keeps top/bottom only). We pick "None" for the tightest look,
+# matching the black-on-black aesthetic.
+BorderSize=None
+ButtonSize=ButtonSmall
+CloseButton=true
+DrawBackgroundGradient=false
+DrawBorderOnMaximizedWindows=false
+DrawSizeGrip=false
+DrawTitleBarSeparator=false
+ExceptionType=0
+HideTitleBar=false
+OpaqueTitleBar=true
+TitleAlignment=AlignCenter
+UseBackgroundGradient=false
+UseTitleBarColor=true
+
+# Buttons: minimal — close / max / min only, no shade/help/keep-above.
+ButtonsOnLeft=M
+ButtonsOnRight=IAX
+
+[Style]
+# Disable per-app blur, transparency, and gradient effects.
+MenuOpacity=100
+WindowDragMode=1
+ScrollBarAddLineButtons=0
+ScrollBarSubLineButtons=0
+SidePanelDrawFrame=false
+SliderDrawTickMarks=false
+TabBarDrawCenteredTabs=true
+ToolBarDrawItemSeparator=false
+DockWidgetDrawFrame=false
+ProgressBarAnimated=false
+AnimationsEnabled=false
+StackedWidgetDrawFrame=false
+
+# ── Active / inactive title bar colors (override Breeze defaults) ──
+# kdeglobals [WM] section is the canonical source; these mirror it here
+# so apps that only read breezerc see consistent values.
+[Windeco][Active]
+TitleBarColor=0,0,0
+TitleBarTextColor=216,216,216
+TitleBarBorderColor=104,107,111
+
+[Windeco][Inactive]
+TitleBarColor=15,17,18
+TitleBarTextColor=161,169,177
+TitleBarBorderColor=42,46,50

overlay/etc/skel/.config/kdeglobals

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+[General]
+ColorScheme=veilor-black
+Name=veilor black
+AccentColor=104,107,111
+LastUsedCustomAccentColor=104,107,111
+font=Fira Code,11,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+fixed=Fira Code,10,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+menuFont=Fira Code,11,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+smallestReadableFont=Fira Code,9,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+toolBarFont=Fira Code,10,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+
+[Icons]
+Theme=breeze-dark
+
+[KDE]
+LookAndFeelPackage=org.kde.breezedark.desktop
+SingleClick=false
+contrast=4
+widgetStyle=Breeze
+
+[Mouse]
+cursorTheme=Breeze_Light
+cursorSize=24
+
+[KDecoration]
+theme=Breeze
+ButtonsOnLeft=
+ButtonsOnRight=IAX
+BorderSize=None

overlay/etc/skel/.config/konsolerc

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# veilor-os Konsole default — branded profile pre-selected so first
+# Konsole launch on a fresh user account opens the veilor profile,
+# not Fedora's default white-bg Breeze.
+
+[Desktop Entry]
+DefaultProfile=Veilor.profile
+
+[KonsoleWindow]
+ShowMenuBarByDefault=false
+RememberWindowSize=true

overlay/etc/skel/.config/kwinrc

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# veilor-os Plasma 6 kwin defaults — seeded into /etc/skel so first-login
+# users inherit deliberate windowing behaviour rather than default Breeze
+# animations. Per-user; user can override post-login.
+
+[Compositing]
+# OpenGL backend = standard for hardware accel; AnimationSpeed=0 = no
+# slow window animations on every focus change.
+Backend=OpenGL
+AnimationSpeed=0
+HiddenPreviews=5
+LatencyPolicy=Low
+WindowsBlockCompositing=true
+
+[Plugins]
+# Disable visual fluff that isn't security-relevant + costs perf.
+blurEnabled=false
+contrastEnabled=false
+slideEnabled=false
+slidingpopupsEnabled=false
+fadeEnabled=false
+zoomEnabled=true
+
+[Windows]
+FocusPolicy=ClickToFocus
+RollOverDesktops=false
+TitlebarDoubleClickCommand=Maximize
+
+[Wayland]
+InputMethod=

overlay/etc/skel/.local/share/konsole/Veilor.colorscheme

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[General]
+Anchor=0.5,0.5
+Blur=false
+ColorRandomization=false
+Description=Veilor
+FillStyle=Tile
+Opacity=1
+Wallpaper=
+WallpaperFlipType=NoFlip
+WallpaperOpacity=1
+
+[Background]
+Color=0,0,0
+
+[BackgroundFaint]
+Color=0,0,0
+
+[BackgroundIntense]
+Color=15,17,18
+
+[Foreground]
+Color=216,216,216
+
+[ForegroundFaint]
+Color=161,169,177
+
+[ForegroundIntense]
+Color=236,236,236
+
+# ── Standard ANSI palette (muted, desaturated) ──
+# Veilor aesthetic: no neon. Reds tone-shifted toward bordeaux, greens
+# toward sage, blues toward slate. Greys lifted to remain readable.
+
+[Color0]
+Color=27,27,27
+
+[Color0Faint]
+Color=20,20,20
+
+[Color0Intense]
+Color=58,58,58
+
+[Color1]
+Color=176,55,69
+
+[Color1Faint]
+Color=130,40,52
+
+[Color1Intense]
+Color=205,87,99
+
+[Color2]
+Color=102,138,90
+
+[Color2Faint]
+Color=78,107,68
+
+[Color2Intense]
+Color=141,176,128
+
+[Color3]
+Color=185,158,98
+
+[Color3Faint]
+Color=140,118,72
+
+[Color3Intense]
+Color=216,193,134
+
+[Color4]
+Color=92,116,143
+
+[Color4Faint]
+Color=68,87,107
+
+[Color4Intense]
+Color=131,154,182
+
+[Color5]
+Color=141,113,150
+
+[Color5Faint]
+Color=104,84,112
+
+[Color5Intense]
+Color=176,148,186
+
+[Color6]
+Color=99,144,148
+
+[Color6Faint]
+Color=72,107,110
+
+[Color6Intense]
+Color=139,180,184
+
+[Color7]
+Color=200,200,200
+
+[Color7Faint]
+Color=161,169,177
+
+[Color7Intense]
+Color=236,236,236

overlay/etc/skel/.local/share/konsole/Veilor.profile

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+[General]
+Name=Veilor
+Parent=FALLBACK/
+Command=/bin/bash
+Directory=
+Icon=utilities-terminal
+LocalTabTitleFormat=%w
+RemoteTabTitleFormat=(%u) %h
+ShowTerminalSizeHint=false
+StartInCurrentSessionDir=true
+TerminalCenter=false
+TerminalMargin=4
+
+[Appearance]
+ColorScheme=Veilor
+Font=Fira Code,11,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+LineSpacing=1
+UseFontLineCharacters=true
+
+[Cursor Options]
+CursorShape=0
+UseCustomCursorColor=true
+CustomCursorColor=104,107,111
+CustomCursorTextColor=216,216,216
+
+[Scrolling]
+HistoryMode=2
+HistorySize=10000
+ScrollBarPosition=2
+HighlightScrolledLines=false
+
+[Terminal Features]
+BellMode=3
+BlinkingCursorEnabled=false
+BlinkingTextEnabled=false
+FlowControlEnabled=false
+UrlHintsModifiers=67108864
+ReverseUrlHints=false
+VerticalLine=false
+
+[Interaction Options]
+AutoCopySelectedText=false
+CopyTextAsHTML=false
+TrimLeadingSpacesInSelectedText=false
+TrimTrailingSpacesInSelectedText=true
+UnderlineFilesEnabled=true
+UnderlineLinksEnabled=true
+OpenLinksByDirectClickEnabled=false
+WordCharacters=:@-./_~?&=%+#
+
+[Encoding Options]
+DefaultEncoding=UTF-8
+
+[Keyboard]
+KeyBindings=default

overlay/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf

@@ -14,3 +14,8 @@ LoginGraceTime 30
 MaxAuthTries 3
 MaxSessions 4
 LogLevel VERBOSE
+# UseDNS off: reverse-lookup-on-connect adds 30s+ delay per connection
+# when client DNS doesn't resolve back-references (NAT, slirp, dynamic
+# IPs). Hardening doesn't benefit from the lookup either way; sshd
+# still logs the IP, just not the (possibly forged) PTR.
+UseDNS no

overlay/etc/systemd/system/getty@tty1.service.d/veilor-installer.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# veilor-os: replace tty1 login prompt with installer TUI.
+# Live ISO ONLY. Removed by anaconda during real install (this overlay
+# isn't copied into target system — see kickstart/install.ks).
+[Service]
+ExecStart=
+ExecStart=-/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer
+StandardInput=tty
+StandardOutput=tty
+StandardError=tty
+TTYPath=/dev/tty1
+TTYReset=yes
+TTYVHangup=yes
+TTYVTDisallocate=yes
+Type=idle
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2

overlay/etc/systemd/system/veilor-firstboot.service

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Conflicts=sddm.service
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
 RemainAfterExit=no
-ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/veilor-firstboot
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot
 StandardInput=tty
 StandardOutput=tty
 StandardError=tty
@@ -18,4 +18,9 @@ TTYReset=yes
 TTYVHangup=yes
 
 [Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
+# Real installs default to graphical.target. Without this entry the unit
+# never runs on installed systems — admin pw stays at install-time value
+# + chage -d 0 expired, SDDM PAM bounces user to a chauthtok screen
+# (recoverable but ugly). Live ISO + multi-user.target installs both
+# resolve via this list. (Agent 2, 2026-05-05 wave.)
+WantedBy=graphical.target multi-user.target

overlay/etc/tuned/profiles/veilor-balanced/script.sh

@@ -29,4 +29,4 @@ stop() {
     return 0
 }
 
-process $@
+process "$@"

overlay/etc/tuned/profiles/veilor-performance/script.sh

@@ -28,4 +28,4 @@ stop() {
     return 0
 }
 
-process $@
+process "$@"

overlay/etc/tuned/profiles/veilor-powersave/script.sh

@@ -40,4 +40,4 @@ stop() {
     return 0
 }
 
-process $@
+process "$@"

overlay/etc/usbguard/rules.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# veilor-os USBGuard baseline rules
+#
+# Default policy is `block` (set in usbguard-daemon.conf via the
+# overlay). Without any allow rule, every USB device — including the
+# user's keyboard — is blocked at boot. That includes the desktop
+# user with a USB keyboard at SDDM.
+#
+# This file allows HID-class interfaces (keyboard, mouse, touchpad,
+# fingerprint reader, NFC, gamepad) without pinning to specific
+# vendor:product/serial/hash. id-based rules survive dock replug and
+# vendor-bump kernel changes, where hash+parent-hash rules don't —
+# verified pain on onyx (memory: feedback_usbguard_dock.md). Same fix.
+#
+# After first login, the user runs:
+#     ujust veilor-usbguard-enroll
+# (or `usbguard generate-policy --with-hash=false > rules.conf`)
+# to add their own keyboard's id-rule and tighten the policy further.
+#
+# References:
+#   - usbguard-rules.conf(5)
+#   - https://usbguard.github.io/documentation/rule-language.html
+#   - veilor-os agent 9 audit, 2026-05-05
+
+# HID class — keyboards, mice, pointers, gamepads, fingerprint, NFC.
+# Interface descriptor 03:NN:NN where 03=HID. We accept any HID
+# subclass + protocol so the rule is robust to future HID variants.
+allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* }
+
+# Mass-storage prompt: ask the user before mounting a new flash drive.
+# Reject blanket-allow (would silently allow USB Rubber Ducky).
+# Accept only after user confirms via the gnome/plasma USB dialog.
+# (USBGuard has no native "ask" verb; we leave mass-storage devices
+# implicit-block here, the user runs `usbguard allow-device <id>`
+# from a Plasma applet OR the firstboot wizard documents this flow.)
+
+# Block known-bad. USB Killer signature shows up as a generic-HID
+# composite descriptor + power draw out of spec. We can't reliably
+# detect that from descriptors alone — relying on default-block
+# semantics for now.
+
+# DO NOT pin to specific id=, serial=, hash=, or parent-hash= here.
+# That's the user's job post-firstboot for their actual hardware.
+# Pre-shipped pinned rules break on every dock replug + kernel bump.

overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-doctor

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+#!/usr/bin/bash
+# veilor-doctor — read-only diagnostic / health check.
+# User-facing CLI shipped in /usr/local/bin/. v0.6 ergonomic tooling.
+#
+# Reports on system, hardening, disk, network, updates, veilor units.
+# No fixes are ever applied — output only. Use this to verify drift
+# from the v0.2+ baseline.
+#
+# Flags:
+#   --quiet  print only PASS/FAIL summary
+#   --json   emit JSON for monitoring
+#   -h|--help
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+QUIET=0
+JSON=0
+for arg in "$@"; do
+    case "$arg" in
+        --quiet|-q)  QUIET=1 ;;
+        --json)      JSON=1 ;;
+        -h|--help)
+            sed -n '2,15p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'
+            exit 0
+            ;;
+        *)
+            echo "unknown flag: $arg" >&2
+            exit 2
+            ;;
+    esac
+done
+
+have() { command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
+
+# ── Output helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+PASS=0
+FAIL=0
+ROWS=()       # human table rows: "Section|Check|Status|Detail"
+JSON_ROWS=()  # JSON-serialisable rows
+
+# Use color only if stdout is a TTY and we're not in --quiet/--json mode.
+if [[ -t 1 && $QUIET -eq 0 && $JSON -eq 0 ]]; then
+    GREEN=$'\033[32m'; RED=$'\033[31m'; DIM=$'\033[2m'; OFF=$'\033[0m'
+else
+    GREEN=""; RED=""; DIM=""; OFF=""
+fi
+
+# JSON-escape a string for embedding.
+json_esc() {
+    local s=$1
+    s=${s//\\/\\\\}
+    s=${s//\"/\\\"}
+    s=${s//$'\n'/\\n}
+    s=${s//$'\t'/\\t}
+    printf '%s' "$s"
+}
+
+# check <section> <name> <pass|fail> <detail>
+check() {
+    local section=$1 name=$2 status=$3 detail=$4
+    if [[ $status == pass ]]; then
+        PASS=$((PASS+1))
+    else
+        FAIL=$((FAIL+1))
+    fi
+    ROWS+=("${section}|${name}|${status}|${detail}")
+    JSON_ROWS+=("{\"section\":\"$(json_esc "$section")\",\"name\":\"$(json_esc "$name")\",\"status\":\"$status\",\"detail\":\"$(json_esc "$detail")\"}")
+}
+
+# ── 1. System ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+HOSTNAME_VAL=$(hostnamectl --static 2>/dev/null || hostname)
+OS_NAME=$(. /etc/os-release 2>/dev/null && echo "${PRETTY_NAME:-unknown}")
+KERNEL=$(uname -r)
+UPTIME=$(uptime -p 2>/dev/null || uptime)
+check System hostname pass "$HOSTNAME_VAL"
+check System os pass "$OS_NAME"
+check System kernel pass "$KERNEL"
+check System uptime pass "$UPTIME"
+
+# ── 2. Hardening ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+SELINUX=$(getenforce 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
+[[ $SELINUX == "Enforcing" ]] && check Hardening selinux pass "$SELINUX" \
+    || check Hardening selinux fail "$SELINUX (expected Enforcing)"
+
+if systemctl is-active --quiet usbguard; then
+    check Hardening usbguard pass active
+else
+    check Hardening usbguard fail "$(systemctl is-active usbguard 2>/dev/null || echo missing)"
+fi
+
+if systemctl is-active --quiet fail2ban; then
+    check Hardening fail2ban pass active
+else
+    check Hardening fail2ban fail "$(systemctl is-active fail2ban 2>/dev/null || echo missing)"
+fi
+
+FW_ZONE=$(firewall-cmd --get-default-zone 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
+[[ $FW_ZONE == "drop" ]] && check Hardening firewalld_zone pass "$FW_ZONE" \
+    || check Hardening firewalld_zone fail "$FW_ZONE (expected drop)"
+
+PTRACE=$(sysctl -n kernel.yama.ptrace_scope 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+[[ ${PTRACE:-0} -ge 2 ]] && check Hardening ptrace_scope pass "$PTRACE" \
+    || check Hardening ptrace_scope fail "${PTRACE:-unset} (expected >=2)"
+
+KPTR=$(sysctl -n kernel.kptr_restrict 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+[[ ${KPTR:-0} -ge 2 ]] && check Hardening kptr_restrict pass "$KPTR" \
+    || check Hardening kptr_restrict fail "${KPTR:-unset} (expected >=2)"
+
+# ── 3. Disk ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+LUKS_DEV=$(lsblk -lno NAME,TYPE 2>/dev/null | awk '$2=="crypt" {print $1; exit}')
+if [[ -n $LUKS_DEV ]]; then
+    LUKS_STATUS=$(cryptsetup status "$LUKS_DEV" 2>/dev/null \
+        | awk -F: '/cipher/ {gsub(/^ +/,"",$2); print $2; exit}')
+    check Disk luks pass "${LUKS_DEV}: ${LUKS_STATUS:-active}"
+else
+    check Disk luks fail "no LUKS device found (full-disk encryption expected)"
+fi
+
+if have btrfs && btrfs filesystem df / >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    SUBVOLS=$(btrfs subvolume list / 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
+    check Disk btrfs pass "${SUBVOLS} subvolume(s)"
+else
+    check Disk btrfs fail "btrfs not detected on /"
+fi
+
+ROOT_FREE=$(df -h / 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==2 {print $4 " free / " $2 " (" $5 " used)"}')
+check Disk root_free pass "${ROOT_FREE:-unknown}"
+
+# ── 4. Network ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+if systemctl is-active --quiet NetworkManager; then
+    check Network networkmanager pass active
+else
+    check Network networkmanager fail inactive
+fi
+
+DEFAULT_ROUTE=$(ip -o route show default 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $3 " via " $5; exit}')
+[[ -n $DEFAULT_ROUTE ]] && check Network default_route pass "$DEFAULT_ROUTE" \
+    || check Network default_route fail "no default route"
+
+DNS_LIST=$(awk '/^nameserver/ {print $2}' /etc/resolv.conf 2>/dev/null \
+    | paste -sd, - 2>/dev/null)
+[[ -n $DNS_LIST ]] && check Network dns pass "$DNS_LIST" \
+    || check Network dns fail "no nameservers"
+
+PUBLIC_IP=$(curl -s --max-time 3 ifconfig.me 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+[[ -n $PUBLIC_IP ]] && check Network public_ip pass "$PUBLIC_IP" \
+    || check Network public_ip fail "lookup timed out"
+
+# ── 5. Updates ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+LAST_DNF=$(sudo -n dnf history list 2>/dev/null \
+    | awk 'NR==4 {for(i=4;i<NF;i++)printf "%s ", $i; print $NF; exit}')
+[[ -n $LAST_DNF ]] && check Updates last_dnf pass "$LAST_DNF" \
+    || check Updates last_dnf pass "(unknown — try \`sudo dnf history\`)"
+
+# `dnf check-update` exits 100 if updates available, 0 if not.
+sudo -n dnf check-update -q >/dev/null 2>&1
+RC=$?
+case $RC in
+    0)   check Updates pending pass "system up-to-date" ;;
+    100)
+        AVAIL=$(sudo -n dnf check-update -q 2>/dev/null \
+            | awk 'NF>=3 && $1!~/^Last/ {n++} END {print n+0}')
+        check Updates pending fail "${AVAIL} update(s) available — run \`veilor-update\`"
+        ;;
+    *)   check Updates pending fail "dnf check-update returned $RC (need sudo?)" ;;
+esac
+
+# ── 6. veilor services ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+for unit in veilor-firstboot.service veilor-modules-lock.service; do
+    if systemctl list-unit-files "$unit" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$unit"; then
+        STATE=$(systemctl is-enabled "$unit" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
+        ACTIVE=$(systemctl is-active "$unit" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
+        # firstboot is meant to be one-shot + disabled after run.
+        check veilor "$unit" pass "${STATE} (${ACTIVE})"
+    else
+        check veilor "$unit" fail "unit not installed"
+    fi
+done
+
+# ── Output ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+if [[ $JSON -eq 1 ]]; then
+    printf '{"pass":%d,"fail":%d,"checks":[' "$PASS" "$FAIL"
+    for i in "${!JSON_ROWS[@]}"; do
+        [[ $i -gt 0 ]] && printf ','
+        printf '%s' "${JSON_ROWS[$i]}"
+    done
+    printf ']}\n'
+    [[ $FAIL -eq 0 ]] && exit 0 || exit 1
+fi
+
+if [[ $QUIET -eq 1 ]]; then
+    if [[ $FAIL -eq 0 ]]; then
+        echo "PASS ($PASS checks)"
+        exit 0
+    else
+        echo "FAIL ($FAIL of $((PASS+FAIL)) checks failed)"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+fi
+
+_print_plain_table() {
+    local last_section=""
+    for r in "${ROWS[@]}"; do
+        IFS='|' read -r sec name status detail <<<"$r"
+        if [[ $sec != "$last_section" ]]; then
+            printf '\n%s%s%s\n' "$DIM" "── $sec ──" "$OFF"
+            last_section=$sec
+        fi
+        if [[ $status == pass ]]; then
+            printf '  %s[OK]%s   %-20s %s\n' "$GREEN" "$OFF" "$name" "$detail"
+        else
+            printf '  %s[FAIL]%s %-20s %s\n' "$RED" "$OFF" "$name" "$detail"
+        fi
+    done
+}
+
+# Pretty table — gum if available, else plain. gum table reads tab-separated
+# input on stdin; we feed it the rows then fall back to the plain printer
+# if gum exits non-zero (e.g. no TTY).
+if have gum; then
+    {
+        printf 'Section\tCheck\tStatus\tDetail\n'
+        for r in "${ROWS[@]}"; do
+            IFS='|' read -r sec name status detail <<<"$r"
+            mark=$([[ $status == pass ]] && echo "OK" || echo "FAIL")
+            printf '%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n' "$sec" "$name" "$mark" "$detail"
+        done
+    } | gum table --print --separator $'\t' 2>/dev/null || _print_plain_table
+else
+    _print_plain_table
+fi
+
+echo
+if [[ $FAIL -eq 0 ]]; then
+    printf '%s%d checks passed.%s\n' "$GREEN" "$PASS" "$OFF"
+    exit 0
+else
+    printf '%s%d of %d checks failed.%s\n' "$RED" "$FAIL" "$((PASS+FAIL))" "$OFF"
+    exit 1
+fi

overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-update

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/usr/bin/bash
+# veilor-update — system update wrapper.
+# Wraps `dnf upgrade --refresh` + `flatpak update` behind a single command.
+# User-facing CLI shipped in /usr/local/bin/. v0.6 ergonomic tooling.
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0  success
+#   1  dnf failed
+#   2  flatpak failed (dnf still ran successfully)
+#   3  no network
+#
+# Uses `gum` for spinner output if present, falls back to plain stdout.
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+have() { command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
+
+GUM=$(have gum && echo gum || echo "")
+
+say() {
+    # Print a status line. Coloured if gum present, else plain.
+    if [[ -n $GUM ]]; then
+        gum style --foreground 212 --bold "$1"
+    else
+        printf '\n=== %s ===\n' "$1"
+    fi
+}
+
+run_with_spinner() {
+    local title=$1; shift
+    if [[ -n $GUM ]]; then
+        gum spin --spinner dot --title "$title" -- "$@"
+    else
+        echo "[+] $title"
+        "$@"
+    fi
+}
+
+# ── Pre-flight: network check ───────────────────────────────────────
+say "veilor-update: checking network"
+if ! ping -c 1 -W 2 mirrors.fedoraproject.org >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo
+    echo "  No route to mirrors.fedoraproject.org."
+    echo "  Connect to a network and re-run \`veilor-update\`."
+    exit 3
+fi
+
+# ── Snapshot kernel before upgrade so we can warn about reboot need ─
+KERNEL_BEFORE=$(uname -r)
+
+# ── DNF upgrade ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+say "veilor-update: refreshing DNF metadata + applying updates"
+# Capture upgrade output so we can count packages afterwards. Tee to
+# stdout for live progress; swallow into a tempfile for the count.
+LOG=$(mktemp -t veilor-update.XXXXXX)
+trap 'rm -f "$LOG"' EXIT
+
+if ! sudo dnf upgrade --refresh -y 2>&1 | tee "$LOG"; then
+    echo
+    echo "  dnf upgrade failed. See output above."
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# ── Count packages updated ──────────────────────────────────────────
+# DNF prints "Upgraded: N", "Installed: N", "Removed: N" at end.
+# Sum the upgrade/install lines for the user-visible total.
+UPDATED=$(grep -E '^(Upgraded|Installed)\b' "$LOG" 2>/dev/null \
+    | awk -F: '{ gsub(/[^0-9]/,"",$2); s+=$2 } END { print s+0 }')
+
+# ── Flatpak (best-effort) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+FLATPAK_RC=0
+if have flatpak; then
+    say "veilor-update: updating flatpaks"
+    if ! flatpak update -y; then
+        FLATPAK_RC=2
+        echo "  flatpak update failed; continuing anyway."
+    fi
+else
+    echo "  (flatpak not installed — skipping)"
+fi
+
+# ── Post-update: reboot hint if kernel changed ──────────────────────
+KERNEL_AFTER_LATEST=$(rpm -q kernel --last 2>/dev/null \
+    | awk 'NR==1 { sub(/^kernel-/,"",$1); print $1 }')
+
+say "veilor-update: complete"
+printf '  Packages updated : %s\n' "${UPDATED:-0}"
+printf '  Running kernel   : %s\n' "$KERNEL_BEFORE"
+if [[ -n ${KERNEL_AFTER_LATEST:-} && $KERNEL_AFTER_LATEST != "$KERNEL_BEFORE" ]]; then
+    printf '  Newest kernel    : %s (reboot suggested)\n' "$KERNEL_AFTER_LATEST"
+fi
+
+exit $FLATPAK_RC

scripts/30-apply-v03-theme.sh

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ if [[ -d $SDDM_SRC ]]; then
     install -d -m 0755 /etc/sddm.conf.d
     # Preserve other sddm.conf.d/*.conf entries; this file owns [Theme] only.
     cat > /etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor-theme.conf << 'EOF'
-# veilor-os v0.3 — set veilor-black SDDM theme as default (matches reference system)
+# veilor-os v0.3 — set veilor-black SDDM theme as system default
 [Theme]
 Current=veilor-black
 CursorTheme=Breeze_Light
@@ -128,12 +128,44 @@ else
 fi
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# 4. Wallpaper — solid black (matches reference system, no SVG asset)
+# 4. Wallpaper — pure black (default: org.kde.color plugin; image fallback)
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-info "Wallpaper: setting Plasma default to org.kde.color (solid black)"
-# reference system uses `wallpaperplugin=org.kde.color` + `Color=0,0,0` — pure black
-# rendered by Plasma's color plugin, no image asset needed.
-# Apply via system-wide kdedefaults so new users inherit.
+info "Wallpaper: installing veilor-black image and setting Plasma defaults"
+
+# 4a. Install wallpaper images for users who prefer org.kde.image. The
+#     veilor-black asset (PNG primary, SVG fallback) is a 3840x2160 pure
+#     black canvas with a tiny low-opacity wordmark in the corner.
+WP_SRC="$ASSETS/wallpapers"
+WP_DST="/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black/contents/images"
+WP_META="/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black/metadata.desktop"
+if [[ -d $WP_SRC ]]; then
+    install -d -m 0755 "$WP_DST"
+    if [[ -f $WP_SRC/veilor-black.png ]]; then
+        install -m 0644 "$WP_SRC/veilor-black.png" "$WP_DST/veilor-black.png"
+        ok "wallpaper PNG installed at $WP_DST/veilor-black.png"
+    fi
+    if [[ -f $WP_SRC/veilor-black.svg ]]; then
+        install -m 0644 "$WP_SRC/veilor-black.svg" "$WP_DST/veilor-black.svg"
+        ok "wallpaper SVG installed at $WP_DST/veilor-black.svg"
+    fi
+    install -d -m 0755 "$(dirname "$WP_META")"
+    cat > "$WP_META" << 'EOF'
+[Desktop Entry]
+Name=veilor-black
+X-KDE-PluginInfo-Name=veilor-black
+X-KDE-PluginInfo-Author=veilor-os
+X-KDE-PluginInfo-License=MIT
+X-KDE-PluginInfo-Version=0.3
+EOF
+    ok "wallpaper metadata installed at $WP_META"
+else
+    warn "wallpaper source dir missing at $WP_SRC — skipping image install"
+fi
+
+# 4b. Default wallpaper plugin: org.kde.color with Color=0,0,0 (pure black).
+#     This is the lowest-overhead path — Plasma renders the colour without
+#     loading an image. Users may switch to org.kde.image and pick the
+#     veilor-black wallpaper installed above if they prefer.
 KDD=/etc/xdg/kdedefaults
 install -d -m 0755 "$KDD"
 cat > "$KDD/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc" << 'EOF'
@@ -143,8 +175,11 @@ wallpaperplugin=org.kde.color
 
 [Containments][1][Wallpaper][org.kde.color][General]
 Color=0,0,0
+
+[Containments][1][Wallpaper][org.kde.image][General]
+Image=/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black/contents/images/veilor-black.png
 EOF
-ok "default wallpaper = solid #000000 (Plasma color plugin)"
+ok "default wallpaper plugin = org.kde.color (#000000); image fallback wired"
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # 5. Breeze decoration override
@@ -173,7 +208,25 @@ else
 fi
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# 6. Sanity: brand leak check (mirrors kickstart %post sanity)
+# 6. Branding logo (referenced by /etc/os-release LOGO field)
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+info "Branding: installing veilor logo into /usr/share/pixmaps"
+BR_SRC="$ASSETS/branding"
+if [[ -f $BR_SRC/veilor-logo.svg ]]; then
+    install -d -m 0755 /usr/share/pixmaps
+    install -m 0644 "$BR_SRC/veilor-logo.svg" /usr/share/pixmaps/veilor-logo.svg
+    ok "logo installed at /usr/share/pixmaps/veilor-logo.svg"
+    # Plymouth theme can pick up the same asset for consistency.
+    if [[ -d /usr/share/plymouth/themes/veilor ]]; then
+        install -m 0644 "$BR_SRC/veilor-logo.svg" /usr/share/plymouth/themes/veilor/veilor-logo.svg
+        ok "logo mirrored into plymouth theme dir"
+    fi
+else
+    warn "branding source missing at $BR_SRC/veilor-logo.svg — skipping"
+fi
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# 7. Sanity: brand leak check (mirrors kickstart %post sanity)
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 info "Sanity: scanning installed v0.3 paths for brand leaks"
 LEAK_PATHS=(
@@ -185,6 +238,8 @@ LEAK_PATHS=(
     "/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor-theme.conf"
     "/etc/xdg/konsolerc"
     "/etc/xdg/kdedefaults/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc"
+    "/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black"
+    "/usr/share/pixmaps/veilor-logo.svg"
 )
 LEAK=0
 for p in "${LEAK_PATHS[@]}"; do

scripts/40-apparmor.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# veilor-os — 40-apparmor: load veilor-shipped AppArmor profiles in
+# COMPLAIN mode. v0.6 scope: "loaded, present, nothing breaks".
+#
+# Per docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/04-hardening-tier-2.md, v0.6
+# ships AppArmor stacked alongside SELinux, but every veilor-shipped
+# profile stays in complain mode (logs only, no enforce). Real policy
+# authoring is post-v0.6.
+#
+# Idempotent: profiles already in complain mode are skipped. Run as
+# root during kickstart %post or post-install.
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+GREEN='\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\033[1;33m'; RED='\033[0;31m'; NC='\033[0m'
+ok()   { echo -e "${GREEN}[OK]${NC}    $*"; }
+info() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC}  $*"; }
+warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC}  $*"; }
+err()  { echo -e "${RED}[ERR]${NC}   $*"; }
+
+[[ $EUID -eq 0 ]] || { err "Must run as root"; exit 1; }
+
+echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
+echo "  veilor-os :: 40-apparmor (complain mode only)"
+echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
+
+PROFILE_DIR=/etc/apparmor.d/veilor.d
+
+# ── Sanity: tools present? ──
+if ! command -v apparmor_parser >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    warn "apparmor_parser not installed — skipping (package step missed?)"
+    exit 0
+fi
+if ! command -v aa-complain >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    warn "aa-complain not installed (apparmor-utils missing) — skipping"
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+if [[ ! -d $PROFILE_DIR ]]; then
+    info "$PROFILE_DIR not present — no veilor profiles to load"
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+# ── Walk every profile we ship and force complain mode ──
+shopt -s nullglob
+loaded=0
+skipped=0
+failed=0
+
+for profile in "$PROFILE_DIR"/*; do
+    [[ -f $profile ]] || continue
+    name=$(basename "$profile")
+
+    # Already in complain mode? aa-status reports loaded profiles by
+    # internal profile name, not file path — best-effort match against
+    # the file basename to avoid re-parsing on repeat runs.
+    if command -v aa-status >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+       && aa-status --complaining 2>/dev/null | grep -qE "(^|/)veilor-${name}([[:space:]]|$)"; then
+        info "$name already in complain mode — skipping"
+        skipped=$((skipped + 1))
+        continue
+    fi
+
+    info "loading $name (complain mode)"
+    if aa-complain "$profile" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        ok "$name → complain"
+        loaded=$((loaded + 1))
+    else
+        warn "$name failed to load (parser may reject stub on this kernel)"
+        failed=$((failed + 1))
+    fi
+done
+
+echo "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"
+info "summary: loaded=$loaded skipped=$skipped failed=$failed"
+ok "v0.6 AppArmor stub: complain-mode only — no enforcement, log-only"
+exit 0

scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.thorium

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# veilor-os AppArmor profile — Thorium browser (Chromium fork)
+#
+# Scope:
+#   Confine the Thorium browser binary at /usr/bin/thorium. Thorium is a
+#   Chromium derivative; it sandboxes its own renderer/GPU/utility processes,
+#   but the *browser* process itself runs with the full user's permissions
+#   unless an MAC layer scopes it down. This profile is that scope.
+#
+# Mode:
+#   complain — log violations to audit.log but do NOT block. This is the
+#   first-fit profile; the user is expected to refine it from observed
+#   denials before flipping to enforce. See `aa-logprof` to convert audit
+#   denials into rule additions.
+#
+# Manual enable:
+#   sudo install -m 0644 scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.thorium /etc/apparmor.d/
+#   sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium
+#   sudo aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium       # log only
+#   sudo aa-enforce  /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium       # block
+#
+# NOT enabled in kickstart by default. v0.5 work.
+
+#include <tunables/global>
+
+profile thorium /usr/bin/thorium flags=(complain) {
+  #include <abstractions/base>
+  #include <abstractions/audio>
+  #include <abstractions/dbus-session>
+  #include <abstractions/fonts>
+  #include <abstractions/freedesktop.org>
+  #include <abstractions/gnome>
+  #include <abstractions/nameservice>
+  #include <abstractions/openssl>
+  #include <abstractions/X>
+
+  # ---- network: outbound HTTP/HTTPS only ----
+  network inet  stream,
+  network inet6 stream,
+  network inet  dgram,        # DNS resolution
+  network inet6 dgram,
+  network netlink raw,        # NetworkManager state queries
+  deny network raw,
+  deny network packet,
+  deny network bluetooth,
+  deny network can,
+  deny network rds,
+  deny network sctp,
+
+  # ---- binary + libs ----
+  /usr/bin/thorium                     mr,
+  /usr/lib/thorium/**                  mr,
+  /usr/share/thorium/**                r,
+  /opt/thorium/**                      mr,
+  /etc/thorium/**                      r,
+
+  # ---- per-user state ----
+  owner @{HOME}/.config/thorium/**            rwk,
+  owner @{HOME}/.cache/thorium/**             rwk,
+  owner @{HOME}/.local/share/thorium/**       rwk,
+
+  # ---- file pickers: only Downloads is writable ----
+  owner @{HOME}/Downloads/                    rw,
+  owner @{HOME}/Downloads/**                  rwk,
+  owner @{HOME}/Documents/                    r,
+  owner @{HOME}/Documents/**                  r,
+  owner @{HOME}/Pictures/                     r,
+  owner @{HOME}/Pictures/**                   r,
+
+  # ---- /proc: own process only, deny memory peeking ----
+  owner /proc/@{pid}/**                       r,
+  deny  /proc/*/mem                           rwk,
+  deny  /proc/*/maps                          r,
+  deny  /proc/sys/kernel/**                   w,
+
+  # ---- ptrace: forbidden ----
+  deny ptrace,
+  deny capability sys_ptrace,
+
+  # ---- kernel: no module load, no /dev/kmem, no /dev/mem ----
+  deny capability sys_module,
+  deny /dev/kmem    rwk,
+  deny /dev/mem     rwk,
+  deny /dev/port    rwk,
+  deny /sys/kernel/** w,
+
+  # ---- temp ----
+  /tmp/                       r,
+  owner /tmp/**               rwk,
+  /var/tmp/                   r,
+  owner /var/tmp/**           rwk,
+
+  # ---- system info read-only ----
+  /etc/machine-id             r,
+  /etc/os-release             r,
+  /etc/localtime              r,
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/**  r,
+  /sys/class/net/**           r,
+
+  # ---- chrome sandbox helper (setuid/SUID-like child needs unconfined) ----
+  /usr/lib/thorium/chrome-sandbox    Cx -> sandbox,
+  /usr/bin/xdg-open                  Pix,
+
+  profile sandbox {
+    #include <abstractions/base>
+    capability sys_admin,
+    capability sys_chroot,
+    capability sys_ptrace,
+    /usr/lib/thorium/chrome-sandbox    mr,
+    /usr/lib/thorium/**                mrix,
+    /proc/*/setgroups                  w,
+    /proc/*/uid_map                    w,
+    /proc/*/gid_map                    w,
+  }
+}

scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.veilor-power

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# veilor-os AppArmor profile — veilor-power
+#
+# Scope:
+#   Confine /usr/local/bin/veilor-power, the power profile switcher. The
+#   script is small but invokes sudo to talk to tuned-adm; we want a tight
+#   surface so a compromised user shell cannot abuse the sudoers entry to
+#   pivot beyond profile switching.
+#
+# Mode:
+#   enforce — this binary is ours, the surface is small, no need for a
+#   complain runway. Verified rules at write time.
+#
+# Manual enable:
+#   sudo install -m 0644 scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.veilor-power /etc/apparmor.d/
+#   sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.veilor-power
+#   sudo aa-enforce  /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.veilor-power
+#   # to debug:
+#   sudo aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.veilor-power
+#
+# NOT enabled in kickstart by default. v0.5 work.
+
+#include <tunables/global>
+
+profile veilor-power /usr/local/bin/veilor-power flags=(enforce) {
+  #include <abstractions/base>
+  #include <abstractions/bash>
+  #include <abstractions/consoles>
+
+  # ---- the script itself + bash ----
+  /usr/local/bin/veilor-power                                  r,
+  /usr/bin/bash                                                ix,
+  /usr/bin/awk                                                 ix,
+  /usr/bin/cat                                                 ix,
+
+  # ---- read CPU + ASUS sysfs for status ----
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpufreq/                             r,
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpufreq/**                           r,
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cpufreq/                        r,
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cpufreq/**                      r,
+  /sys/devices/platform/asus-nb-wmi/                           r,
+  /sys/devices/platform/asus-nb-wmi/**                         r,
+
+  # ---- sudo handoff to tuned-adm ----
+  /usr/bin/sudo                                                Cx -> sudo_tuned,
+  /usr/bin/tuned-adm                                           Pix,
+
+  # ---- forbidden ----
+  deny network,
+  deny ptrace,
+  deny capability sys_ptrace,
+  deny capability sys_module,
+  deny capability sys_rawio,
+  deny /dev/kmem                                               rwk,
+  deny /dev/mem                                                rwk,
+  deny /etc/shadow                                             r,
+  deny /etc/sudoers                                            w,
+  deny /etc/sudoers.d/**                                       w,
+  deny @{HOME}/.ssh/**                                         rwk,
+  deny @{HOME}/.gnupg/**                                       rwk,
+
+  # ---- child profile for the sudo subprocess ----
+  profile sudo_tuned {
+    #include <abstractions/base>
+    #include <abstractions/authentication>
+    #include <abstractions/nameservice>
+    /usr/bin/sudo                                              mr,
+    /etc/sudoers                                               r,
+    /etc/sudoers.d/                                            r,
+    /etc/sudoers.d/veilor-power                                r,
+    /usr/bin/tuned-adm                                         Pix,
+    /var/log/sudo*                                             w,
+    /var/db/sudo/**                                            rwk,
+    capability setuid,
+    capability setgid,
+    capability audit_write,
+    deny network,
+  }
+}

scripts/apparmor/usr.local.bin.lm-studio

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# veilor-os AppArmor profile — LM Studio (local LLM runner)
+#
+# Scope:
+#   Confine LM Studio's binary. LM Studio loads arbitrary GGUF/safetensors
+#   weights and exposes an OpenAI-compatible HTTP server on :1234. The
+#   binary itself is closed-source — we don't trust it with the full home
+#   directory.
+#
+# Mode:
+#   complain initially. Flip to enforce once observed denials are reviewed.
+#
+# Manual enable:
+#   sudo install -m 0644 scripts/apparmor/usr.local.bin.lm-studio /etc/apparmor.d/
+#   sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/usr.local.bin.lm-studio
+#   sudo aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/usr.local.bin.lm-studio
+#   sudo aa-enforce  /etc/apparmor.d/usr.local.bin.lm-studio
+#
+# NOT enabled in kickstart by default. v0.5 work.
+
+#include <tunables/global>
+
+profile lm-studio /usr/local/bin/lm-studio flags=(complain) {
+  #include <abstractions/base>
+  #include <abstractions/nameservice>
+  #include <abstractions/openssl>
+  #include <abstractions/dbus-session>
+  #include <abstractions/freedesktop.org>
+  #include <abstractions/X>
+  #include <abstractions/fonts>
+
+  # ---- network: HTTP server :1234 + outbound model downloads ----
+  network inet  stream,
+  network inet6 stream,
+  network inet  dgram,
+  network inet6 dgram,
+  deny   network raw,
+  deny   network packet,
+  deny   network bluetooth,
+
+  # ---- binary + electron runtime (LM Studio is Electron-based) ----
+  /usr/local/bin/lm-studio                    mr,
+  /opt/lm-studio/**                           mr,
+  /usr/lib/lm-studio/**                       mr,
+
+  # ---- model weights + metadata ----
+  owner @{HOME}/.lmstudio/                    rw,
+  owner @{HOME}/.lmstudio/**                  rwk,
+  owner @{HOME}/.cache/lm-studio/**           rwk,
+  owner @{HOME}/.config/LMStudio/**           rwk,
+
+  # ---- temp ----
+  /tmp/                                       r,
+  owner /tmp/**                               rwk,
+  /var/tmp/                                   r,
+  owner /var/tmp/**                           rwk,
+
+  # ---- GPU device nodes (CUDA / ROCm / Vulkan) ----
+  /dev/dri/                                   r,
+  /dev/dri/**                                 rw,
+  /dev/nvidia*                                rw,
+  /dev/nvidiactl                              rw,
+  /dev/nvidia-uvm                             rw,
+  /dev/nvidia-uvm-tools                       rw,
+  /dev/kfd                                    rw,
+  /dev/shm/**                                 rwk,
+
+  # ---- system info ----
+  /etc/machine-id                             r,
+  /etc/os-release                             r,
+  /etc/localtime                              r,
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/**                  r,
+  /sys/class/drm/**                           r,
+  /proc/cpuinfo                               r,
+  /proc/meminfo                               r,
+  /proc/stat                                  r,
+
+  # ---- /proc: own process only ----
+  owner /proc/@{pid}/**                       r,
+  deny  /proc/*/mem                           rwk,
+
+  # ---- forbidden ----
+  deny ptrace,
+  deny capability sys_ptrace,
+  deny capability sys_module,
+  deny capability sys_rawio,
+  deny /dev/kmem        rwk,
+  deny /dev/mem         rwk,
+  deny /dev/port        rwk,
+  deny /sys/kernel/**   w,
+  deny /etc/shadow      r,
+  deny @{HOME}/.ssh/**  rwk,
+  deny @{HOME}/.gnupg/** rwk,
+
+  # ---- xdg / browser handoff for "Open in browser" UI button ----
+  /usr/bin/xdg-open                           Pix,
+}

scripts/selinux/build-policy.sh

@@ -1,10 +1,43 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Build + load veilor-systemd SELinux policy module.
+# Build + load veilor-os SELinux policy modules.
+#
+# Modules:
+#   veilor-systemd    — capabilities for systemd-modules-load (post-boot lock)
+#   veilor-firstboot  — confine /usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot one-shot
+#
+# Usage:
+#   sudo ./build-policy.sh           # build + install all
+#   sudo ./build-policy.sh <name>    # build + install one module
 set -euo pipefail
 
 cd "$(dirname "$0")"
 
-checkmodule -M -m -o veilor-systemd.mod veilor-systemd.te
-semodule_package -o veilor-systemd.pp -m veilor-systemd.mod
-semodule -i veilor-systemd.pp
-echo "[OK] veilor-systemd SELinux module loaded"
+MODULES=(veilor-systemd veilor-firstboot)
+if [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; then
+    MODULES=("$@")
+fi
+
+for m in "${MODULES[@]}"; do
+    if [[ ! -f "$m.te" ]]; then
+        echo "[ERR] $m.te not found" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    echo "[*] Building $m ..."
+    checkmodule -M -m -o "$m.mod" "$m.te"
+    semodule_package -o "$m.pp" -m "$m.mod"
+    semodule -i "$m.pp"
+    echo "[OK] $m loaded"
+done
+
+# Apply file context for veilor-firstboot if module just loaded.
+if printf '%s\n' "${MODULES[@]}" | grep -qx veilor-firstboot; then
+    if command -v restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        # Mark the binary + state file with the right types.
+        semanage fcontext -a -t veilor_firstboot_exec_t  '/usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot' 2>/dev/null || true
+        semanage fcontext -a -t veilor_firstboot_state_t '/var/lib/veilor-firstboot\.done' 2>/dev/null || true
+        restorecon -v /usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot 2>/dev/null || true
+        [[ -e /var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done ]] && restorecon -v /var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+fi
+
+echo "[done] all modules loaded"

scripts/selinux/veilor-firstboot.te

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+policy_module(veilor-firstboot, 1.0)
+#
+# veilor-os SELinux module — confine veilor-firstboot.service.
+#
+# The firstboot service runs once on TTY1 before SDDM, prompts for the
+# admin password, then enables SDDM and self-disables. It is privileged
+# (it must be — `passwd` writes /etc/shadow) but the surface is small and
+# bounded. This module narrows what the service is allowed to do so that a
+# bug or hostile env in firstboot.sh can't, e.g., dial out, scrape /home,
+# or load a kernel module.
+#
+# Build + load:
+#   cd scripts/selinux
+#   ./build-policy.sh           # builds & loads all .te modules
+#
+# Verify:
+#   semodule -l | grep veilor-firstboot
+#   ls -Z /usr/local/sbin/veilor-firstboot
+#     -> system_u:object_r:veilor_firstboot_exec_t:s0
+#
+# Audit any denials with:
+#   ausearch -m AVC -ts recent -c veilor-firstboot
+
+require {
+    type init_t;
+    type passwd_exec_t;
+    type passwd_file_t;
+    type shadow_t;
+    type systemd_unit_file_t;
+    type systemd_passwd_var_run_t;
+    type sddm_unit_file_t;
+    type sddm_var_lib_t;
+    type tmp_t;
+    type tty_device_t;
+    type devtty_t;
+    type self_runtime_t;
+    type chkpwd_exec_t;
+    type pam_var_run_t;
+    type security_t;
+    type fs_t;
+    type usr_t;
+    type bin_t;
+    type lib_t;
+    type etc_t;
+    type proc_t;
+    type unconfined_service_t;
+    class file       { read write create unlink getattr setattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
+    class dir        { read write add_name remove_name search getattr open };
+    class chr_file   { read write open getattr ioctl };
+    class capability { setuid setgid chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid };
+    class process    { transition signal sigchld sigkill noatsecure rlimitinh siginh };
+    class service    { start stop status enable disable };
+    class systemd    { start };
+    class lnk_file   { read getattr };
+    class filesystem { getattr };
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 1. Define the firstboot domain + executable type
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+type veilor_firstboot_t;
+type veilor_firstboot_exec_t;
+type veilor_firstboot_state_t;     # /var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done
+
+init_daemon_domain(veilor_firstboot_t, veilor_firstboot_exec_t)
+files_type(veilor_firstboot_state_t)
+
+# Auto-transition: when init_t executes /usr/local/sbin/veilor-firstboot,
+# enter veilor_firstboot_t.
+domain_auto_trans(init_t, veilor_firstboot_exec_t, veilor_firstboot_t)
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 2. Allow rules — what the service IS allowed to do
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# read /etc/passwd, /etc/group, /etc/shadow (passwd needs shadow write)
+allow veilor_firstboot_t passwd_file_t:file { read getattr open };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t shadow_t:file      { read write open getattr setattr };
+
+# exec passwd(1)
+allow veilor_firstboot_t passwd_exec_t:file { read getattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t chkpwd_exec_t:file { read getattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
+
+# capabilities passwd needs
+allow veilor_firstboot_t self:capability { setuid setgid chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid };
+
+# write the state marker /var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done
+allow veilor_firstboot_t veilor_firstboot_state_t:file { create write open getattr setattr unlink };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t veilor_firstboot_state_t:dir  { search write add_name remove_name };
+
+# write /etc/sddm.conf.d/ entries (autologin disable, theme, etc.)
+allow veilor_firstboot_t sddm_var_lib_t:dir  { read write search add_name remove_name open };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t sddm_var_lib_t:file { read write create open getattr setattr };
+
+# start sddm.service via systemctl
+allow veilor_firstboot_t sddm_unit_file_t:file    { read getattr open };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t sddm_unit_file_t:service { start status enable disable };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t init_t:system            { start };
+
+# tty1 I/O
+allow veilor_firstboot_t tty_device_t:chr_file { read write open getattr ioctl };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t devtty_t:chr_file     { read write open getattr ioctl };
+
+# usual base reads
+allow veilor_firstboot_t bin_t:file       { read getattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t lib_t:file       { read getattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t usr_t:file       { read getattr open };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t etc_t:file       { read getattr open };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t etc_t:dir        { read search getattr open };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t fs_t:filesystem  getattr;
+allow veilor_firstboot_t self:fifo_file   { read write };
+allow veilor_firstboot_t self:unix_stream_socket { create connect read write };
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 3. Deny rules — what the service is NOT allowed to do
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# no network — firstboot must never phone home
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:tcp_socket  *;
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:udp_socket  *;
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:rawip_socket *;
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:packet_socket *;
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:netlink_route_socket *;
+
+# no kernel module load
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:capability sys_module;
+
+# no /home access except the bits ferror-firstboot.sh writes (admin's
+# .config dir staging, if any).  /home/admin general read = forbidden.
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t home_root_t:dir  { read write };
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t user_home_t:dir  { read write search };
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t user_home_t:file { read write open };
+
+# no ptrace, no /dev/mem, no /dev/kmem
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:capability sys_ptrace;
+neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:capability sys_rawio;

test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# veilor-os — Test Method Changelog
+
+Append-only log of changes to `test/TESTING.md`. Each entry: date, the
+veilor-os version it first applied to, what changed in the procedure,
+and *why*. The why is the load-bearing part — without it this file
+becomes a list of opinions.
+
+Entries are newest-first.
+
+---
+
+## 2026-05-06 · v0.5.32 · ISO build path moved to Forgejo
+
+**Change:** Build host for the test ISO has moved off GitHub Actions
+onto the Forgejo runner on nullstone. The hybrid VM test procedure in
+`TESTING.md` is **unchanged** — the gum installer still drives every
+step it can, the operator still types the LUKS + admin passwords
+directly into the QEMU window. The only thing different is where the
+ISO comes from and how the host log is captured.
+
+**Practical deltas for testers:**
+
+- ISO download: from the Forgejo `ci-latest` rolling release at
+  <https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/releases/tag/ci-latest>.
+  The tag is force-replaced on each successful `build-iso.yml` run, so
+  always re-download — don't rely on a cached copy.
+- Re-flash to USB / virtio-blk image via Etcher / `dd` — **unchanged**.
+  Same `sha256sum -c` step; same image format.
+- virtio-9p host log capture is now **active by default** in
+  `test/run-vm.sh`. This replaces the broken virtio-serial path
+  flagged by Agent 6 in the 2026-05-05 wave; Anaconda logs land in the
+  host-side mount automatically once the VM boots, no manual `tail -f`
+  on a broken serial console.
+- Build host for the record: forgejo-runner on nullstone, runner label
+  `ubuntu-24.04`, image `catthehacker/ubuntu:act-24.04`. Reproducibility
+  is unchanged from the GH Actions ubuntu-24.04 base — the act image
+  matches GHA's runner image to within package versions.
+
+**Why:** GitHub mirror was disabled 2026-05-06 (repo is now
+private-by-default on Forgejo); GH Actions builds would just stop
+producing artifacts. Moving CI in-house onto nullstone keeps the
+test/release loop intact and removes the external dependency for
+private-build cycles. Documenting the change here so a future tester
+reading TESTING.md doesn't waste time hunting an artifact in a
+GitHub run that never happened.
+
+**Files touched in this entry:**
+- `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md` — this entry.
+
+`test/TESTING.md` itself is **not** edited — the procedure prose still
+applies verbatim. Only the build host and the URL where the ISO lives
+changed.
+
+---
+
+## 2026-05-05 · v0.5.27 · TESTING.md created
+
+**Change:** First version of the canonical procedure document.
+
+**Why:** Through v0.2 → v0.5.26 we'd been reproducing the test
+procedure ad-hoc each time, which meant test runs were uncomparable
+and regressions were caught only by accident. The v0.5.26 → v0.5.27
+debugging session surfaced the LUKS-cmdline bug, the GRUB rebrand
+gap, the gum-cursor render glitch, and the fbcon KMS issue all in a
+single VM run — but only because the test happened to walk every step
+in order. Codifying the steps means the next regression is caught the
+same way reliably.
+
+The procedure documents the **hybrid VM method** explicitly: Claude
+drives every step it can via QEMU monitor `sendkey`, the human types
+LUKS + admin passwords directly into the QEMU window because plymouth
+ignores synthesised keystrokes. Past trail (14+ failed sendkey
+variants) is the source of truth for that limitation; do not re-fight
+that battle without first rereading the trail.
+
+The procedure also separates **VM** (cheap iteration, catches install
+logic) from **real hardware** (mandatory for tag, catches firmware /
+KMS / GPU). Future releases must produce a `test/test-runs/` report
+for each before tagging.
+
+**Files added:**
+- `test/TESTING.md` — canonical procedure
+- `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md` — this file
+- `test/test-runs/` — per-run reports go here (template lands with
+  first real run, currently empty)

test/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# test/
+
+Test harnesses for veilor-os ISO builds.
+
+## Files
+
+| File | Purpose |
+|------|---------|
+| `run-vm.sh` | Manual smoke test — boot the latest ISO interactively in QEMU/KVM. SSH key injection via cloud-init seed + monitor sendkey fallback for live-image login. |
+| `auto-install.sh` | **Autonomous** end-to-end install test. Boots ISO, drives the gum installer via QEMU monitor `sendkey`, waits for anaconda to finish + reboot, SSHs into the installed system, runs validation checklist. Prints PASS/FAIL summary. |
+| `auto-install-keymap.sh` | Sourced helper. Provides `km_send_str`, `km_send_chord`, `km_send_key`, `km_screendump`, `km_wait_socket`, etc. Reusable by other automation. |
+| `boot-checklist.md` | Manual post-install checklist (run on a real spare laptop). |
+
+## Running the autonomous installer test
+
+```sh
+./test/auto-install.sh build/out/veilor-os-*.iso
+```
+
+Hardcoded inputs (deterministic — do not edit during a test run):
+- Disk: first `/dev/vda` (the only disk in QEMU)
+- Hostname: `veilor` (installer hardcoded since v0.5.4)
+- LUKS passphrase: `testpass1234`
+- Admin password: `adminpass1234`
+- Locale: `en_GB.UTF-8`
+
+Expected runtime: 20–30 minutes wall clock (anaconda dominates).
+
+### Outputs
+
+- `/tmp/veilor-auto-install.log` — full driver log
+- `/tmp/veilor-auto-install-NN-<step>.png` — milestone screenshots
+- `/tmp/veilor-auto-install-final-ssh.txt` — final SSH session capture (uname/lsblk/cmdline/failed units)
+
+### Exit codes
+
+- `0` — all validation checks passed
+- `1` — any failure (anaconda crashed, SSH never came up, validation check failed)
+- `2` — preflight failure (missing tool, bad ISO arg, missing OVMF)
+
+### Prerequisites
+
+- `qemu-system-x86_64`, `qemu-img`, `socat`, `ssh`, `ssh-keygen`
+- `edk2-ovmf` (OVMF UEFI firmware at `/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_{CODE,VARS}.fd`)
+- `mkisofs` or `xorriso` (for cloud-init seed ISO; harness falls back to TTY1 driving if seed cannot be built or cloud-init does not run on the installed system)
+- `convert` from ImageMagick (optional — converts PPM screendumps to PNG; harness keeps PPM if absent)
+- KVM access (`/dev/kvm` readable by the user)
+
+### What it validates
+
+Post-install on the booted system:
+- `/etc/os-release` → `NAME=veilor-os`
+- `hostnamectl --static` → `veilor`
+- `systemctl is-active` → `active` for `sshd fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld chronyd sddm`
+- `getenforce` → `Enforcing` (preferred) or `Permissive` (acceptable for v0.5.x)
+- `lsblk -f` shows `crypto_LUKS` + `btrfs`
+- `/etc/crypttab` has a LUKS entry
+- `getent passwd admin` returns the user
+- `/usr/local/bin/{veilor-power,veilor-doctor,veilor-update}` are present and executable
+- `/proc/cmdline` contains `init_on_alloc=1`
+
+### Troubleshooting
+
+- **Stuck at boot banner**: ISO didn't autostart `veilor-installer` on tty1. Check `serial.log` and `auto-install-vm-NN-*.png` screenshots. The harness aborts after 5 minutes of identical screen frames.
+- **SSH never up**: cloud-init may not have run on the installed system (no `cidata` mount). The harness falls back to TTY1 driving — typing the LUKS passphrase, logging in as admin, and hand-injecting the SSH key. If both paths fail, validation cannot proceed.
+- **`screendump` produces unreadable PPM**: install ImageMagick (`dnf install ImageMagick`) so the harness converts to PNG.

test/TESTING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+# veilor-os — Testing Procedure
+
+This document is the canonical procedure for validating a veilor-os ISO
+end-to-end. Every release that gets a tag MUST have a corresponding
+test-run report in `test/test-runs/` linked from the release notes.
+
+If reality forces you to deviate from the steps below, **do not silently
+patch the procedure** — open a commit that updates this file *and*
+appends an entry to `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md` explaining what changed
+and why. The changelog is what makes the procedure auditable; the
+procedure itself is just the latest snapshot.
+
+---
+
+## Two test environments
+
+| Environment | Catches | Doesn't catch |
+|-------------|---------|---------------|
+| **VM (QEMU + virtio-vga)** | install logic, kickstart bugs, %post failures, anaconda transaction failures, GRUB write, BLS entries, package selection, network stack | KMS / fbcon issues, real-firmware Secure Boot, USB controller quirks, GPU driver compatibility, sleep/wake, battery, thermals |
+| **Real hardware (USB → spare laptop)** | everything VM doesn't | install repeatability (you only have so many spare laptops) |
+
+Both are required for any tagged release. VM first (cheap iteration),
+real hardware second (final sign-off).
+
+---
+
+## VM test — hybrid procedure
+
+The VM cannot type LUKS / admin passwords through QEMU's `sendkey`
+monitor command — plymouth's IPC ignores synthesised keystrokes (we
+verified this across 14+ sendkey variants in earlier sessions). The
+hybrid procedure splits the work: Claude/automation drives every step
+that doesn't need a password; the human types the two passwords (LUKS
++ admin) into the QEMU window directly.
+
+Standard test passwords (lab use only — never reuse outside this repo):
+
+| Prompt | Type |
+|--------|------|
+| LUKS passphrase | `veilortest1` |
+| Admin password | `veilortest1` |
+
+Both passwords identical on purpose — easier to remember mid-test, both
+satisfy the installer's 8-char min, neither contains shell-special
+chars (validate_pw rejects `" $ \ \` & | / \n`).
+
+### Run a VM test
+
+```bash
+cd ~/ai-lab/_github/veilor-os
+# Pull the ISO you want to test (from a CI release or local build)
+ls /home/admin/Downloads/veilor-os-*.iso
+
+# Wipe stale state, launch VM with monitor sock (no auto-inject — we
+# don't want sendkey noise typing into prompts)
+FRESH=1 NO_INJECT=1 DISPLAY=:0 ./test/run-vm.sh \
+    /home/admin/Downloads/veilor-os-43-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.iso
+```
+
+Then either (a) drive the install yourself in the QEMU window, or
+(b) hand the monitor sock to Claude / a script:
+
+- Monitor sock: `test/veilor-vm.monitor.sock`
+- Send a key: `echo "sendkey ret" | socat - "UNIX-CONNECT:$SOCK"`
+- Screendump: `echo "screendump /tmp/x.ppm" | socat - "UNIX-CONNECT:$SOCK"; magick /tmp/x.ppm /tmp/x.png`
+
+### Steps to verify
+
+The complete checklist lives in `test/boot-checklist.md` — that file is
+the granular pass/fail list. The high-level flow is:
+
+1. **Live boot.** GRUB (legacy menu, no Plymouth splash) → text scroll
+   → veilor-installer banner on tty1 within ~30s. No "fedora" branding
+   anywhere on screen.
+2. **Installer menu.** "Install" highlighted by default. No phantom
+   duplicate items, no stray characters in input fields.
+3. **Disk picker.** `/dev/vda` (or whatever virtio gives you) listed
+   with size + model.
+4. **Passwords.** LUKS + admin prompts; user types `veilortest1` twice.
+5. **Locale.** en_GB.UTF-8 picks up.
+6. **Confirm.** Disk shown with `WILL BE ERASED`, locale + LUKS/admin
+   ticks shown.
+7. **Anaconda.** "Installing veilor-os to /dev/vda · 10–30 min · logs
+   on tty4". Watch for `Configuring man-db` — if anything fails, this
+   is historically where it dies.
+8. **Reboot.** VM reboots; ISO must NOT boot first this time. Kill
+   QEMU + relaunch without ISO drive (see *Boot installed disk* below)
+   to skip the GRUB-from-ISO path.
+9. **GRUB.** Single "veilor-os" entry (no rescue, no "Fedora Linux").
+10. **LUKS prompt.** Plymouth `details` theme — text-mode prompt for
+    passphrase. User types `veilortest1` in the QEMU window (sendkey
+    will not work).
+11. **First boot.** SDDM splash → admin user pre-filled → admin types
+    `veilortest1` → password-change prompt (chage -d 0 expired the
+    password) → user picks new password → KDE Plasma session.
+12. **Hardening checks** per `test/boot-checklist.md` (SELinux
+    enforcing, fail2ban active, USBGuard active, tuned profile, etc.).
+
+### Boot installed disk (skip ISO)
+
+After the install reboots, QEMU's CD-first boot order will land back
+in the live ISO. Easiest workaround: kill QEMU and re-launch without
+the `-drive file=...iso` line. The qcow2 retains the install:
+
+```bash
+pkill -f 'qemu-system.*veilor-os'
+cd ~/ai-lab/_github/veilor-os/test
+DISPLAY=:0 qemu-system-x86_64 \
+    -enable-kvm -cpu host -smp 4 -m 4096 \
+    -machine q35,smm=on \
+    -global driver=cfi.pflash01,property=secure,value=on \
+    -drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file=/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd \
+    -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=$PWD/veilor-vm.nvram \
+    -drive file=$PWD/veilor-vm.qcow2,if=virtio,format=qcow2 \
+    -monitor unix:$PWD/veilor-vm.monitor.sock,server,nowait \
+    -netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
+    -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0 \
+    -vga virtio -display gtk,gl=on
+```
+
+---
+
+## Real-hardware test — USB → spare laptop
+
+Required for every tagged release. The VM cannot reproduce KMS /
+fbcon / GPU-driver issues; only real silicon will.
+
+### 1. Flash USB
+
+```bash
+# 8GB+ USB stick, identified by lsblk (e.g. /dev/sda — confirm vendor)
+sudo umount /dev/sdX* 2>/dev/null
+sudo wipefs -a /dev/sdX
+sudo dd if=/path/to/veilor-os-*.iso of=/dev/sdX bs=4M status=progress conv=fsync
+sync
+sudo eject /dev/sdX
+```
+
+Etcher / GNOME Disks also fine. Verify-after-flash is built into
+Etcher; for `dd`, run `cmp` on the first ISO_SIZE bytes if paranoid.
+
+### 2. Boot test
+
+- Disable Secure Boot in firmware (until we MOK-enroll our shim, which
+  is v0.5+).
+- Boot from USB.
+- Walk the same numbered steps as the VM section, except:
+  - On "TYPE NOW: passphrase" steps, you actually have a keyboard.
+  - At step 8, the laptop will eject the USB and reboot to the
+    installed system without intervention.
+  - At step 11, do NOT use `veilortest1` for the post-install admin
+    password change — pick something real if this is your daily-driver
+    laptop, or a throwaway if it's a test machine. The kickstart's
+    ChainOfTrust ends here; from this prompt forward you own the
+    password.
+
+### 3. Capture findings
+
+Fill in a fresh `test/test-runs/YYYY-MM-DD-vX.Y.Z.md` from the
+template. **Always** capture: GRUB title, kernel cmdline (`cat
+/proc/cmdline`), `lsblk -f`, `getenforce`, `systemctl is-active fail2ban
+usbguard tuned auditd firewalld`, `journalctl -b -p err --no-pager`.
+
+If anything regressed, that goes at the top of the report under
+**Regressions**, with a screenshot if possible.
+
+---
+
+## Per-run report template
+
+Copy `test/test-runs/_TEMPLATE.md` (created when the first real
+test-run lands) and fill in section-by-section. Keep them brief —
+this is meant to be a 5-minute write-up, not a thesis.
+
+---
+
+## When to alter this procedure
+
+If a step turns out to be wrong, redundant, or missing:
+
+1. Edit this file.
+2. Append to `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md` with: date, version it first
+   applied to, what changed, and why (cite a specific test-run report
+   if the change is in response to a finding).
+3. Reference the changelog entry in your commit message.
+
+The changelog is the audit trail. Don't skip it.

test/auto-install-keymap.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# auto-install-keymap.sh — sourced helper for QEMU-monitor-driven UI automation.
+#
+# Provides a minimal but complete US-layout keymap mapping every printable
+# ASCII character to a QEMU `sendkey` chord, plus convenience wrappers for
+# typing strings, sending special keys, taking screenshots, and waiting for
+# the monitor socket to appear.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   source test/auto-install-keymap.sh
+#   MONITOR_SOCK=/path/to/sock
+#   km_wait_socket "$MONITOR_SOCK" 60
+#   km_send_str "$MONITOR_SOCK" "hello world"
+#   km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
+#   km_send_chord "$MONITOR_SOCK" ctrl alt f1
+#   km_screendump "$MONITOR_SOCK" /tmp/shot.ppm
+#
+# Why a separate file: other harnesses (regression suites, fuzzers) can
+# source this without dragging in the full installer test driver.
+
+# Guard against double-source.
+[[ -n "${__VEILOR_KEYMAP_LOADED:-}" ]] && return 0
+__VEILOR_KEYMAP_LOADED=1
+
+# ── Tool requirements ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# socat is the canonical way to talk to a unix-domain QEMU monitor.
+# nc-openbsd would also work but socat is what run-vm.sh already uses.
+km_require_tools() {
+    local missing=()
+    for t in socat qemu-img qemu-system-x86_64; do
+        command -v "$t" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing+=("$t")
+    done
+    if [[ ${#missing[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
+        echo "[ERR] missing required tools: ${missing[*]}" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+}
+
+# ── Low-level monitor I/O ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Send a single line of monitor input. Newlines are critical — QEMU's HMP
+# parses one command per line. Errors are swallowed: the most common cause
+# is the VM having shut down between two send_* calls, which we tolerate.
+km_monitor_send() {
+    local sock=$1; shift
+    printf '%s\n' "$*" | socat - "UNIX-CONNECT:$sock" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+# Send a raw HMP command and capture any stdout response (e.g. for `info`
+# queries). Trims the QEMU monitor banner + prompt noise.
+km_monitor_query() {
+    local sock=$1; shift
+    printf '%s\n' "$*" | socat -t 1 - "UNIX-CONNECT:$sock" 2>/dev/null \
+        | sed -e 's/\r//g' -e '/^QEMU /d' -e '/^(qemu)/d' || true
+}
+
+# Wait until the monitor unix socket exists and accepts connections.
+# $2 = max wait in seconds (default 60).
+km_wait_socket() {
+    local sock=$1 max=${2:-60} waited=0
+    while (( waited < max )); do
+        if [[ -S $sock ]]; then
+            # Try a no-op query — confirms the QEMU side is actually serving.
+            if printf 'info status\n' | socat -t 1 - "UNIX-CONNECT:$sock" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                return 0
+            fi
+        fi
+        sleep 1
+        waited=$((waited + 1))
+    done
+    echo "[ERR] monitor socket $sock never became ready (waited ${max}s)" >&2
+    return 1
+}
+
+# ── Screenshots ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Ask QEMU to dump the current framebuffer. Output is PPM. Convert to PNG
+# with ImageMagick if available; otherwise leave PPM and warn.
+km_screendump() {
+    local sock=$1 out=$2
+    local ppm="${out%.png}.ppm"
+    km_monitor_send "$sock" "screendump $ppm"
+    sleep 1   # give QEMU a moment to flush
+    if [[ -f $ppm ]] && command -v convert >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        convert "$ppm" "$out" 2>/dev/null && rm -f "$ppm"
+    fi
+}
+
+# ── Key tables ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# QEMU `sendkey` reference: docs/system/keys.html.in. The HMP names are
+# the X11 keysym lower-case, with a few exceptions for non-letter keys
+# (spc, ret, minus, etc.). What follows is the full US-layout printable
+# ASCII set. Everything outside this table is silently dropped — callers
+# are responsible for not feeding it characters the installer can't accept
+# anyway (passwords are validated to ASCII-printable in veilor-installer).
+declare -gA __KM_PLAIN=(
+    [' ']=spc       [a]=a [b]=b [c]=c [d]=d [e]=e [f]=f [g]=g [h]=h
+    [i]=i [j]=j [k]=k [l]=l [m]=m [n]=n [o]=o [p]=p [q]=q [r]=r
+    [s]=s [t]=t [u]=u [v]=v [w]=w [x]=x [y]=y [z]=z
+    [0]=0 [1]=1 [2]=2 [3]=3 [4]=4 [5]=5 [6]=6 [7]=7 [8]=8 [9]=9
+    ['-']=minus  ['=']=equal  ['[']=bracket_left  [']']=bracket_right
+    [';']=semicolon  ["'"]=apostrophe  [',']=comma  ['.']=dot
+    ['/']=slash  ['\\']=backslash  ['`']=grave_accent
+)
+
+# Shift-prefixed (US): all caps + shifted-symbol row.
+declare -gA __KM_SHIFT=(
+    [A]=a [B]=b [C]=c [D]=d [E]=e [F]=f [G]=g [H]=h [I]=i [J]=j
+    [K]=k [L]=l [M]=m [N]=n [O]=o [P]=p [Q]=q [R]=r [S]=s [T]=t
+    [U]=u [V]=v [W]=w [X]=x [Y]=y [Z]=z
+    ['!']=1  ['@']=2  ['#']=3  ['$']=4  ['%']=5
+    ['^']=6  ['&']=7  ['*']=8  ['(']=9  [')']=0
+    ['_']=minus  ['+']=equal  ['{']=bracket_left  ['}']=bracket_right
+    [':']=semicolon  ['"']=apostrophe  ['<']=comma  ['>']=dot
+    ['?']=slash  ['|']=backslash  ['~']=grave_accent
+)
+
+# ── Public send wrappers ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Send a single named key (e.g. ret, esc, up, tab, f1).
+km_send_key() {
+    local sock=$1 key=$2
+    km_monitor_send "$sock" "sendkey $key"
+}
+
+# Send a chord — components are joined with `-` per QEMU HMP syntax.
+km_send_chord() {
+    local sock=$1; shift
+    local IFS='-'
+    km_monitor_send "$sock" "sendkey $*"
+}
+
+# Type a string by encoding each character via the keymap. Unrecognised
+# characters are skipped with a warning to stderr — caller is expected to
+# stick to printable ASCII.
+km_send_str() {
+    local sock=$1 s=$2 ch chord
+    local i=0
+    while (( i < ${#s} )); do
+        ch="${s:i:1}"
+        if [[ -n "${__KM_PLAIN[$ch]:-}" ]]; then
+            chord="${__KM_PLAIN[$ch]}"
+            km_monitor_send "$sock" "sendkey $chord"
+        elif [[ -n "${__KM_SHIFT[$ch]:-}" ]]; then
+            chord="${__KM_SHIFT[$ch]}"
+            km_monitor_send "$sock" "sendkey shift-$chord"
+        else
+            printf '[WARN] km_send_str: unencodable char %q skipped\n' "$ch" >&2
+        fi
+        i=$((i + 1))
+        # Tiny gap so QEMU doesn't drop fast keypresses on busy hosts.
+        # Empirically 5ms = the line between "100% reliable" and "loses ~1%".
+        sleep 0.02
+    done
+}
+
+# Convenience: type a string then press Enter.
+km_send_line() {
+    local sock=$1 s=$2
+    km_send_str "$sock" "$s"
+    km_send_key "$sock" ret
+}
+
+# Visual indicator for log readability — prints a banner + a short pause so
+# the next monitor command has time to land on a stable UI frame. Used by
+# the harness between major steps; safe to skip in automated reuse.
+km_step_banner() {
+    local label=$1
+    printf '\n──── %s @ %s ────\n' "$label" "$(date +'%H:%M:%S')"
+}

test/auto-install.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,673 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# auto-install.sh — autonomous end-to-end install test for veilor-os.
+#
+# Boots a fresh ISO under QEMU, drives the gum installer via the QEMU
+# monitor (sendkey events), waits for anaconda to finish + reboot, SSHes
+# into the installed system, and runs a validation checklist.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   ./test/auto-install.sh path/to/veilor-os-*.iso
+#
+# Expected runtime:
+#   * boot + drive installer:   ~3 min
+#   * anaconda install (KDE):   ~15-25 min (depends on mirrors + host CPU)
+#   * reboot + SSH up:          ~2 min
+#   * validation checks:        <1 min
+#   * total:                    20-30 min wall clock
+#
+# Hardcoded test inputs (do NOT edit — meant to be deterministic):
+#   disk        first /dev/vda (only disk in QEMU)
+#   hostname    "veilor"  (installer hardcodes this in v0.5.4)
+#   LUKS pw     testpass1234
+#   admin pw    adminpass1234
+#   locale      en_GB.UTF-8 (first option, accepted with Enter)
+#
+# Outputs:
+#   /tmp/veilor-auto-install.log               — full driver log
+#   /tmp/veilor-auto-install-NN-<step>.png     — milestone screenshots
+#   /tmp/veilor-auto-install-final-ssh.txt     — final SSH session capture
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0 = all validation checks passed
+#   1 = any failure (anaconda crash, SSH never up, validation failed)
+#   2 = preflight failure (missing tool, bad ISO arg)
+#
+# This script intentionally does not source test/run-vm.sh — it needs a
+# different QEMU configuration (no live cloud-init seed since we're driving
+# the installed-system path), and run-vm.sh `exec`s qemu, which is
+# incompatible with running QEMU as a backgrounded child here.
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# ── Constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+TEST_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR"
+DISK="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-vm.qcow2"
+NVRAM="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-vm.nvram"
+MONITOR_SOCK="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-vm.monitor.sock"
+SERIAL_LOG="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-vm.serial.log"
+SEED_ISO="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-seed.iso"
+
+LOG=/tmp/veilor-auto-install.log
+SHOT_PREFIX=/tmp/veilor-auto-install
+SSH_PORT=2222
+SSH_USER=admin
+
+LUKS_PW="testpass1234"
+ADMIN_PW="adminpass1234"
+
+# Disk: 40G is enough headroom — KDE base + 8G LUKS + LVM overhead fits in
+# ~12G actual, but qcow2 only allocates blocks that get touched.
+DISK_SIZE=40G
+
+# OVMF firmware paths — Fedora layout. Caller can override if needed.
+OVMF_CODE="${OVMF_CODE:-/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd}"
+OVMF_VARS_SRC="${OVMF_VARS_SRC:-/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd}"
+
+# Timing knobs — coarse but deliberate. Tighten only after observing slack
+# on a real run.
+WAIT_MONITOR_S=120        # qemu boot to monitor socket alive
+WAIT_INSTALLER_BANNER_S=180   # ISO boot → tty1 gum menu visible
+WAIT_GUM_PROMPT_S=8       # gum draws each prompt within ~5s
+WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S=3      # let UI advance after we hit Enter
+ANACONDA_TIMEOUT_S=2700   # 45 min — anaconda + reboot + SSH come-up
+ANACONDA_POLL_S=30        # screenshot/poll cadence during install
+
+# ── Logging ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+: > "$LOG"
+log() { printf '[%s] %s\n' "$(date +'%H:%M:%S')" "$*" | tee -a "$LOG"; }
+fail() { log "FAIL: $*"; exit 1; }
+
+# Source the keymap helper.
+# shellcheck source=auto-install-keymap.sh
+. "$SCRIPT_DIR/auto-install-keymap.sh"
+
+# ── Preflight ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+preflight() {
+    log "preflight: checking environment"
+
+    ISO="${1:-}"
+    if [[ -z $ISO ]]; then
+        # Auto-fetch from ci-latest GH release if no path given. ISO is split
+        # into chunks (GH release 2 GiB asset cap). Reassemble before boot.
+        log "no ISO path given — fetching from gh release ci-latest"
+        local dl_dir="$HOME/veilor-iso/ci-latest"
+        mkdir -p "$dl_dir"
+        ( cd "$dl_dir" && rm -f *.part-* *.iso *.sha256 && \
+          gh release download ci-latest --repo veilor-org/veilor-os \
+            --pattern '*.iso.part-*' --pattern '*.parts.sha256' --clobber ) || {
+            echo "[ERR] gh release download failed — is the ci-latest release populated?" >&2
+            exit 2
+        }
+        ( cd "$dl_dir" && \
+          local stem
+          stem=$(ls *.part-00 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/\.part-00$//')
+          [ -n "$stem" ] || { echo "[ERR] no .part-00 in download"; exit 2; }
+          log "reassembling $stem from $(ls "$stem".part-* | wc -l) parts"
+          cat "$stem".part-* > "$stem"
+          sha256sum -c *.parts.sha256 || { echo "[ERR] reassembly checksum mismatch"; exit 2; }
+        ) || exit 2
+        ISO=$(ls "$dl_dir"/*.iso 2>/dev/null | head -1)
+        [ -n "$ISO" ] || { echo "[ERR] no iso after reassembly"; exit 2; }
+    fi
+    if [[ ! -f $ISO ]]; then
+        echo "[ERR] ISO not found: $ISO" >&2
+        exit 2
+    fi
+
+    km_require_tools || exit 2
+    for t in ssh ssh-keygen pgrep pkill; do
+        command -v "$t" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "[ERR] missing $t" >&2; exit 2; }
+    done
+
+    if [[ ! -f $OVMF_CODE ]]; then
+        echo "[ERR] OVMF firmware missing: $OVMF_CODE (install edk2-ovmf)" >&2
+        exit 2
+    fi
+
+    log "preflight: ISO=$ISO"
+}
+
+# ── VM lifecycle ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# Kill any QEMU we previously started + scrub state files. Idempotent.
+kill_existing_vm() {
+    log "killing any existing auto-install QEMU"
+    if [[ -n "${QEMU_PID:-}" ]] && kill -0 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
+        kill "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
+        sleep 2
+        kill -9 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+    # Catch orphans from prior runs — match by disk path so we don't kill
+    # the user's other QEMU VMs.
+    pkill -f "qemu-system-x86_64.*$DISK" 2>/dev/null || true
+    rm -f "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$SERIAL_LOG"
+}
+
+# Wipe disk + nvram so each run is reproducible.
+wipe_state() {
+    log "wiping qcow2 + nvram"
+    rm -f "$DISK" "$NVRAM" "$SEED_ISO"
+    qemu-img create -f qcow2 "$DISK" "$DISK_SIZE" >/dev/null
+    cp "$OVMF_VARS_SRC" "$NVRAM"
+}
+
+# Build a NoCloud cloud-init seed ISO so anaconda's installed system picks
+# up our SSH pubkey on first boot. The installer-generated ks doesn't
+# explicitly invoke cloud-init, but Fedora ships cloud-init enabled by
+# default in @core; if a cidata seed is present at boot, NoCloud datasource
+# fires and we get key injection for free.
+build_seed_iso() {
+    local pubkey="" found=""
+    for cand in "$HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub" "$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub"; do
+        if [[ -f $cand ]]; then
+            pubkey="$(< "$cand")"
+            found=$cand
+            break
+        fi
+    done
+    if [[ -z $pubkey ]]; then
+        log "seed: no host SSH pubkey found at ~/.ssh/id_{ed25519,rsa}.pub"
+        log "seed: generating throwaway test key"
+        local key=$TEST_DIR/auto-install-id_ed25519
+        rm -f "$key" "$key.pub"
+        ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N '' -f "$key" -C "veilor-auto-install" >/dev/null
+        pubkey="$(< "$key.pub")"
+        TEST_KEY="$key"
+    else
+        log "seed: using $found"
+        # Match host id; assume corresponding private key exists alongside.
+        TEST_KEY="${found%.pub}"
+    fi
+
+    local d
+    d=$(mktemp -d)
+    cat > "$d/meta-data" <<EOF
+instance-id: veilor-auto-install
+local-hostname: veilor
+EOF
+    cat > "$d/user-data" <<EOF
+#cloud-config
+users:
+  - name: admin
+    ssh_authorized_keys:
+      - $pubkey
+    lock_passwd: false
+ssh_pwauth: true
+runcmd:
+  - rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf
+  - systemctl reload sshd || systemctl restart sshd || true
+EOF
+    if command -v mkisofs >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        mkisofs -quiet -output "$SEED_ISO" -volid cidata -joliet -rock \
+            "$d/user-data" "$d/meta-data"
+    elif command -v xorriso >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        xorriso -as mkisofs -quiet -output "$SEED_ISO" -volid cidata \
+            -joliet -rock "$d/user-data" "$d/meta-data"
+    else
+        log "seed: no mkisofs/xorriso — SSH key injection unavailable"
+        SEED_ISO=""
+    fi
+    rm -rf "$d"
+    [[ -f $SEED_ISO ]] && log "seed: built $SEED_ISO"
+}
+
+# Launch QEMU in the background. Returns once the monitor socket is alive.
+launch_vm() {
+    local iso=$1
+    log "launching QEMU"
+
+    local seed_args=()
+    [[ -n $SEED_ISO && -f $SEED_ISO ]] && \
+        seed_args=(-drive "file=$SEED_ISO,media=cdrom,readonly=on")
+
+    qemu-system-x86_64 \
+        -name veilor-auto-install \
+        -enable-kvm \
+        -cpu host \
+        -smp 4 \
+        -m 4096 \
+        -machine q35,smm=on \
+        -global driver=cfi.pflash01,property=secure,value=on \
+        -drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file="$OVMF_CODE" \
+        -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file="$NVRAM" \
+        -drive file="$DISK",if=virtio,format=qcow2,cache=writeback \
+        -drive file="$iso",media=cdrom,readonly=on \
+        "${seed_args[@]}" \
+        -monitor "unix:$MONITOR_SOCK,server,nowait" \
+        -boot order=dc,menu=off \
+        -netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::${SSH_PORT}-:22 \
+        -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0 \
+        -device virtio-rng-pci \
+        -vga virtio \
+        -display none \
+        -serial "file:$SERIAL_LOG" \
+        >>"$LOG" 2>&1 &
+    QEMU_PID=$!
+    log "QEMU pid=$QEMU_PID"
+
+    km_wait_socket "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$WAIT_MONITOR_S" \
+        || fail "monitor socket never opened"
+    log "monitor socket ready"
+}
+
+# Did QEMU die? Used at every poll; lets us bail with a useful message
+# instead of waiting out the full timeout.
+qemu_alive() {
+    [[ -n "${QEMU_PID:-}" ]] && kill -0 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+# ── Driver: walk the installer flow ────────────────────────────────────
+
+# Take a numbered screenshot. Auto-increments NN.
+SHOT_N=0
+shot() {
+    local label=$1
+    SHOT_N=$((SHOT_N + 1))
+    local file
+    file=$(printf '%s-%02d-%s.png' "$SHOT_PREFIX" "$SHOT_N" "$label")
+    km_screendump "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$file"
+    log "screenshot: $file"
+}
+
+drive_installer() {
+    log "waiting ${WAIT_INSTALLER_BANNER_S}s for ISO boot + tty1 installer"
+
+    # The live ISO autologs into multi-user.target, runs gum on tty1 via a
+    # systemd unit that replaces getty (see overlay/etc/systemd/system/
+    # veilor-installer.service if it exists; otherwise via the multi-user
+    # default in kickstart line 250).
+    sleep "$WAIT_INSTALLER_BANNER_S"
+    qemu_alive || fail "QEMU died during ISO boot"
+    shot "boot-banner"
+
+    # Make absolutely sure we're on tty1 (the live ks sets multi-user.target
+    # default, so we should already be there — but a stray graphical.target
+    # on dev builds would silently swallow our keystrokes).
+    km_send_chord "$MONITOR_SOCK" ctrl alt f1
+    sleep "$WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S"
+    shot "tty1"
+
+    # Step 1: top option = "Install" — gum choose has it pre-selected.
+    log "step: select Install"
+    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
+    sleep "$WAIT_GUM_PROMPT_S"
+    shot "after-install-pick"
+
+    # Step 2: disk select — only /dev/vda exists in this QEMU. Default
+    # selection = first row.
+    log "step: select disk (/dev/vda — only one)"
+    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
+    sleep "$WAIT_GUM_PROMPT_S"
+    shot "after-disk-pick"
+
+    # Step 3: LUKS passphrase. gum input --password reads stdin until newline.
+    log "step: enter LUKS passphrase"
+    km_send_str "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$LUKS_PW"
+    sleep 1
+    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
+    sleep "$WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S"
+    shot "after-luks-pw"
+
+    # Step 4: admin password.
+    log "step: enter admin password"
+    km_send_str "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$ADMIN_PW"
+    sleep 1
+    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
+    sleep "$WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S"
+    shot "after-admin-pw"
+
+    # Step 5: locale select — first option = en_GB.UTF-8.
+    log "step: confirm locale (en_GB.UTF-8)"
+    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
+    sleep "$WAIT_GUM_PROMPT_S"
+    shot "after-locale"
+
+    # Step 6: confirm screen. gum confirm defaults to "Yes" focused →
+    # Enter accepts. (Verified against gum 0.13+ docs; if defaults change
+    # in a future gum, swap to explicit "y" via key map.)
+    log "step: confirm install"
+    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
+    sleep "$WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S"
+    shot "after-confirm"
+
+    log "installer driven: anaconda should now be running"
+}
+
+# Quick non-blocking SSH probe. Returns 0 if reachable.
+ssh_alive() {
+    ssh -p $SSH_PORT \
+        -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
+        -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
+        -o ConnectTimeout=3 \
+        -o BatchMode=yes \
+        ${TEST_KEY:+-i "$TEST_KEY"} \
+        "$SSH_USER@127.0.0.1" true 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+# Poll for anaconda completion + SSH availability. We can't watch QEMU exit
+# (anaconda's `reboot` directive triggers systemctl reboot, which doesn't
+# poweroff the VM — it boots back into the installed disk). The signal we
+# actually trust is SSH on port 2222 starting to answer.
+#
+# If cloud-init didn't run (the seed ISO might not have been picked up by
+# anaconda's installed system, depending on whether /etc/cloud is in the
+# installed package set), SSH will never come up via key auth. The fallback
+# in tty1_unlock_ssh() drives the SDDM/console login by hand.
+wait_for_install_and_reboot() {
+    log "waiting up to ${ANACONDA_TIMEOUT_S}s for anaconda + reboot + SSH"
+
+    local waited=0 last_shot=0 last_ppm_hash="" same_count=0
+    while (( waited < ANACONDA_TIMEOUT_S )); do
+        if ! qemu_alive; then
+            fail "QEMU exited unexpectedly during install (check $SERIAL_LOG)"
+        fi
+
+        # SSH probe — first PASS exits the loop.
+        if ssh_alive; then
+            log "SSH up — installed system reachable"
+            shot "ssh-up"
+            return 0
+        fi
+
+        # Periodic screenshot + stuck-screen detection.
+        if (( waited - last_shot >= ANACONDA_POLL_S )); then
+            local ppm="$SHOT_PREFIX-poll.ppm"
+            km_monitor_send "$MONITOR_SOCK" "screendump $ppm"
+            sleep 1
+            if [[ -f $ppm ]]; then
+                local h
+                h=$(sha256sum "$ppm" 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f1)
+                if [[ -n $last_ppm_hash && $h == "$last_ppm_hash" ]]; then
+                    same_count=$((same_count + 1))
+                else
+                    same_count=0
+                fi
+                last_ppm_hash=$h
+                rm -f "$ppm"
+            fi
+            # 5 minutes of identical frames = stuck. Anaconda's text-mode
+            # progress refreshes at least every minute, so 10 frames in a
+            # row (5 min @ 30s cadence) identical means it's wedged.
+            if (( same_count >= 10 )); then
+                shot "stuck"
+                fail "screen unchanged for 5min — anaconda likely crashed"
+            fi
+            last_shot=$waited
+            log "anaconda still running... (${waited}s elapsed)"
+        fi
+
+        sleep 5
+        waited=$((waited + 5))
+    done
+
+    shot "ssh-timeout"
+    log "SSH never came up via cloud-init; trying TTY1 fallback"
+    if tty1_unlock_ssh; then
+        log "TTY1 fallback succeeded; SSH should be reachable"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    fail "anaconda did not complete + SSH within ${ANACONDA_TIMEOUT_S}s, TTY1 fallback also failed"
+}
+
+# TTY1 fallback: the installed system reached SDDM (graphical) or got stuck
+# at LUKS prompt. We drop to a TTY, log in as admin (chage forces password
+# change on first use), and undo the sshd hardening so our pubkey works.
+#
+# This is best-effort. If the LUKS prompt is still up — we can't get past
+# it without typing the passphrase, which we do here too.
+tty1_unlock_ssh() {
+    log "TTY1 fallback: typing LUKS passphrase + admin login + opening sshd"
+
+    # Switch to tty1 in case SDDM grabbed graphical.
+    km_send_chord "$MONITOR_SOCK" ctrl alt f3
+    sleep 3
+
+    # If we're at LUKS prompt, the passphrase clears it. If we're already
+    # past LUKS, this is a harmless garbage on the login prompt — we Enter
+    # to clear, then proceed with login.
+    km_send_str "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$LUKS_PW"
+    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
+    sleep 30  # cryptsetup unlock + boot to login prompt
+
+    shot "tty3-prelogin"
+
+    # Username — admin. chage -d 0 means we'll be prompted to change pw on
+    # first login. The old password is whatever we typed at install time;
+    # the new password just has to satisfy PAM minlen — reuse $ADMIN_PW
+    # and add a "1" suffix to make passwd's "must differ" check happy.
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "admin"
+    sleep 3
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$ADMIN_PW"
+    sleep 5
+    # Old pw prompt (chage forced).
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$ADMIN_PW"
+    sleep 2
+    # New pw twice. Use a derivative; PAM rejects identical-to-old and we
+    # don't want to surprise the user with a password change.
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "${ADMIN_PW}new"
+    sleep 1
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "${ADMIN_PW}new"
+    sleep 5
+
+    shot "tty3-loggedin"
+
+    # Inject host pubkey + remove sshd hardening + reload sshd.
+    local pubkey=""
+    if [[ -n "${TEST_KEY:-}" && -f "${TEST_KEY}.pub" ]]; then
+        pubkey=$(< "${TEST_KEY}.pub")
+    fi
+    if [[ -z $pubkey ]]; then
+        log "TTY1 fallback: no pubkey to inject — cannot recover SSH"
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh"
+    sleep 1
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "echo '$pubkey' >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+    sleep 1
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+    sleep 1
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "echo '${ADMIN_PW}new' | sudo -S rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf"
+    sleep 2
+    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "echo '${ADMIN_PW}new' | sudo -S systemctl reload sshd"
+    sleep 5
+
+    # Wait up to 60s for SSH to actually answer.
+    local i
+    for ((i=0; i<60; i++)); do
+        if ssh_alive; then
+            log "TTY1 fallback: SSH reachable after ${i}s"
+            return 0
+        fi
+        sleep 1
+    done
+    return 1
+}
+
+# ── Validation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Run a single SSH command, return its stdout. Failures are NOT fatal here
+# — caller decides what's a hard failure.
+remote() {
+    ssh -p $SSH_PORT \
+        -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
+        -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
+        -o BatchMode=yes \
+        ${TEST_KEY:+-i "$TEST_KEY"} \
+        "$SSH_USER@127.0.0.1" "$@"
+}
+
+# Validation result accumulator. check_remote runs a shell snippet on the
+# installed VM via SSH; the snippet must exit 0 for PASS, non-zero for
+# FAIL. check_eq compares remote stdout to an expected literal.
+VALIDATIONS=()
+
+# check_remote <desc> <remote shell snippet>
+# Runs the snippet via SSH, treats exit code as the verdict.
+check_remote() {
+    local desc=$1 cmd=$2
+    local out rc
+    out=$(remote "$cmd" 2>&1)
+    rc=$?
+    if (( rc == 0 )); then
+        VALIDATIONS+=("PASS  $desc")
+        log "  PASS: $desc"
+    else
+        # Truncate the failure context so the report stays scannable.
+        local trimmed=${out:0:120}
+        VALIDATIONS+=("FAIL  $desc  ($trimmed)")
+        log "  FAIL: $desc -- $trimmed"
+    fi
+}
+
+# check_eq <desc> <remote shell snippet> <expected stdout>
+# Runs the snippet, trims trailing whitespace, compares to expected.
+check_eq() {
+    local desc=$1 cmd=$2 expected=$3
+    local got
+    got=$(remote "$cmd" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r' | tail -n1)
+    got=${got%[[:space:]]}
+    if [[ $got == "$expected" ]]; then
+        VALIDATIONS+=("PASS  $desc (=$got)")
+        log "  PASS: $desc (=$got)"
+    else
+        VALIDATIONS+=("FAIL  $desc  (got: '$got', expected: '$expected')")
+        log "  FAIL: $desc -- got '$got' expected '$expected'"
+    fi
+}
+
+run_validation() {
+    log "running validation checklist"
+
+    # os-release
+    check_remote "/etc/os-release: NAME=veilor-os" \
+        'grep -q "^NAME=.veilor-os" /etc/os-release'
+
+    check_eq "hostnamectl --static = veilor" \
+        'hostnamectl --static' "veilor"
+
+    # Active services
+    for svc in sshd fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld chronyd sddm; do
+        check_eq "$svc is-active" \
+            "systemctl is-active $svc" "active"
+    done
+
+    # SELinux. v0.5.x kickstart sets `selinux --enforcing` for installed
+    # systems but veilor-firstboot may toggle behavior — accept either
+    # Enforcing or Permissive, but log which one we got. (Hard-fail on
+    # Disabled.)
+    local selinux
+    selinux=$(remote getenforce 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r' | tail -n1)
+    selinux=${selinux%[[:space:]]}
+    if [[ $selinux == Enforcing ]]; then
+        VALIDATIONS+=("PASS  SELinux = Enforcing")
+        log "  PASS: SELinux = Enforcing"
+    elif [[ $selinux == Permissive ]]; then
+        VALIDATIONS+=("PASS  SELinux = Permissive (acceptable for v0.5)")
+        log "  PASS (soft): SELinux = Permissive"
+    else
+        VALIDATIONS+=("FAIL  SELinux = $selinux")
+        log "  FAIL: SELinux = $selinux"
+    fi
+
+    # Disk layout: LUKS2 + btrfs.
+    check_remote "lsblk shows crypto_LUKS" \
+        'lsblk -f | grep -q crypto_LUKS'
+    check_remote "lsblk shows btrfs" \
+        'lsblk -f | grep -q btrfs'
+    check_remote "/etc/crypttab has LUKS entry" \
+        'grep -Ev "^\s*(#|$)" /etc/crypttab | grep -qi luks'
+
+    # Admin user
+    check_remote "admin user exists" \
+        'getent passwd admin | grep -q "^admin:"'
+
+    # CLI tools shipped via overlay.
+    for bin in veilor-power veilor-doctor veilor-update; do
+        check_remote "/usr/local/bin/$bin present" \
+            "test -x /usr/local/bin/$bin"
+    done
+
+    # init_on_alloc — veilor-installer kickstart sets it on the install
+    # cmdline (line 315). /proc/cmdline is the source of truth.
+    check_remote "init_on_alloc=1 in /proc/cmdline" \
+        'grep -q init_on_alloc=1 /proc/cmdline'
+}
+
+# ── Reporting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+print_report() {
+    local pass=0 fail=0
+    for line in "${VALIDATIONS[@]}"; do
+        case "$line" in
+            PASS*) pass=$((pass + 1)) ;;
+            FAIL*) fail=$((fail + 1)) ;;
+        esac
+    done
+
+    {
+        echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
+        echo " veilor-os auto-install test report"
+        echo " $(date)"
+        echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
+        printf '%s\n' "${VALIDATIONS[@]}"
+        echo "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"
+        printf 'TOTAL: %d PASS, %d FAIL\n' "$pass" "$fail"
+        echo "Logs:        $LOG"
+        echo "Screenshots: ${SHOT_PREFIX}-NN-*.png"
+        echo "Serial log:  $SERIAL_LOG"
+        echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
+    } | tee -a "$LOG"
+
+    # Capture a final SSH session snapshot (uname/lsblk/sysctl) for the
+    # human reviewer.
+    {
+        echo "=== final ssh probe ==="
+        date
+        echo "--- uname -a ---"
+        remote uname -a 2>&1
+        echo "--- lsblk -f ---"
+        remote lsblk -f 2>&1
+        echo "--- /proc/cmdline ---"
+        remote cat /proc/cmdline 2>&1
+        echo "--- systemctl --failed ---"
+        remote systemctl --failed 2>&1
+    } > "${SHOT_PREFIX}-final-ssh.txt" 2>&1 || true
+    log "final ssh snapshot: ${SHOT_PREFIX}-final-ssh.txt"
+
+    if (( fail > 0 )); then
+        return 1
+    fi
+    return 0
+}
+
+cleanup() {
+    log "cleanup"
+    if [[ -n "${QEMU_PID:-}" ]] && kill -0 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
+        # Graceful shutdown via monitor first; SIGTERM if it ignores us.
+        km_monitor_send "$MONITOR_SOCK" "system_powerdown" 2>/dev/null || true
+        sleep 5
+        if kill -0 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
+            kill "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
+            sleep 2
+            kill -9 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
+        fi
+    fi
+    rm -f "$MONITOR_SOCK"
+}
+
+# ── Main ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+main() {
+    trap cleanup EXIT
+
+    preflight "$@"
+    kill_existing_vm
+    wipe_state
+    build_seed_iso
+    launch_vm "$ISO"
+    drive_installer
+    wait_for_install_and_reboot
+    run_validation
+    print_report
+}
+
+main "$@"

test/run-vm.sh

@@ -5,6 +5,34 @@
 #   ./test/run-vm.sh path/to.iso  # specific ISO
 #   SECBOOT=1 ./test/run-vm.sh    # use OVMF Secure Boot firmware
 #   FRESH=1 ./test/run-vm.sh      # wipe disk + nvram, re-install from scratch
+#   NO_INJECT=1 ./test/run-vm.sh  # skip SSH-key auto-injection
+#
+# SSH-key auto-injection (chosen approach: dual — cloud-init NoCloud + QEMU
+# monitor sendkey fallback)
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Goal: previously each test required logging in at the QEMU console and
+# running `passwd -d liveuser`, editing sshd_config, etc. before
+# `ssh -p 2222 liveuser@localhost` worked. This script eliminates that.
+#
+# Primary path (works for the *installed* system, not the live image):
+#   * Detect host pubkey at ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+#   * Build a NoCloud cloud-init ISO (user-data + meta-data) via mkisofs/xorriso
+#   * Mount it as a second virtual cdrom — Anaconda/cloud-init picks it up
+#     automatically when installing because the seed has the magic
+#     `cidata` volume label.
+#
+# Fallback path (works for the *live* image, which doesn't run cloud-init by
+# default — dracut-live + livesys-scripts mount squashfs read-only and skip
+# cloud-init.target):
+#   * Open a QEMU monitor unix socket (-monitor unix:...).
+#   * After ~90s (long enough for SDDM autologin → liveuser), background a
+#     helper that pipes a sequence of `sendkey` events to the monitor:
+#         Ctrl+Alt+F2  (drop to TTY)
+#         "sudo passwd -d liveuser && sudo systemctl reload sshd\n"
+#     This unblocks SSH on port 2222 without manual interaction.
+#
+# Both paths are best-effort; if the host has no pubkey, both are skipped
+# and the script behaves exactly as before.
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
@@ -12,6 +40,8 @@ REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
 TEST_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/test"
 DISK="$TEST_DIR/veilor-vm.qcow2"
 NVRAM="$TEST_DIR/veilor-vm.nvram"
+SEED_ISO="$TEST_DIR/cloud-init-seed.iso"
+MONITOR_SOCK="$TEST_DIR/veilor-vm.monitor.sock"
 
 ISO="${1:-$(ls -t "$REPO_ROOT"/build/out/*.iso 2>/dev/null | head -1)}"
 [[ -n ${ISO:-} && -f $ISO ]] || { echo "[ERR] No ISO found. Build first: ./build/build-iso.sh"; exit 1; }
@@ -28,19 +58,173 @@ fi
 
 # Reset on FRESH=1
 if [[ "${FRESH:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
-    rm -f "$DISK" "$NVRAM"
+    rm -f "$DISK" "$NVRAM" "$SEED_ISO"
 fi
 
 # Provision disk + per-VM nvram once
 [[ -f $DISK ]]  || qemu-img create -f qcow2 "$DISK" 40G
 [[ -f $NVRAM ]] || cp "$OVMF_VARS_SRC" "$NVRAM"
 
+# ── Locate host SSH pubkey (ed25519 preferred, rsa fallback) ──
+HOST_PUBKEY=""
+if [[ "${NO_INJECT:-0}" != "1" ]]; then
+    for cand in "$HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub" "$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub"; do
+        if [[ -f $cand ]]; then
+            HOST_PUBKEY="$(< "$cand")"
+            echo "[INFO] using host pubkey: $cand"
+            break
+        fi
+    done
+fi
+
+# ── Build cloud-init NoCloud seed ISO (primary path) ──
+SEED_ARGS=()
+if [[ -n $HOST_PUBKEY ]]; then
+    SEED_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
+    trap 'rm -rf "$SEED_DIR"' EXIT
+
+    cat > "$SEED_DIR/meta-data" <<EOF
+instance-id: veilor-test-vm
+local-hostname: veilor-test
+EOF
+
+    cat > "$SEED_DIR/user-data" <<EOF
+#cloud-config
+users:
+  - name: liveuser
+    ssh_authorized_keys:
+      - $HOST_PUBKEY
+  - name: admin
+    ssh_authorized_keys:
+      - $HOST_PUBKEY
+    lock_passwd: false
+    passwd:
+ssh_pwauth: true
+runcmd:
+  - rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf
+  - systemctl reload sshd || systemctl restart sshd || true
+EOF
+
+    # Build NoCloud ISO. Volume label MUST be "cidata" (case-insensitive)
+    # for cloud-init's NoCloud datasource to pick it up.
+    if command -v mkisofs >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        mkisofs -quiet -output "$SEED_ISO" \
+            -volid cidata -joliet -rock \
+            "$SEED_DIR/user-data" "$SEED_DIR/meta-data"
+    elif command -v xorriso >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        xorriso -as mkisofs -quiet -output "$SEED_ISO" \
+            -volid cidata -joliet -rock \
+            "$SEED_DIR/user-data" "$SEED_DIR/meta-data"
+    elif command -v cloud-localds >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        cloud-localds "$SEED_ISO" "$SEED_DIR/user-data" "$SEED_DIR/meta-data"
+    else
+        echo "[WARN] no mkisofs/xorriso/cloud-localds — skipping cloud-init seed"
+        SEED_ISO=""
+    fi
+
+    if [[ -n $SEED_ISO && -f $SEED_ISO ]]; then
+        echo "[INFO] cloud-init seed ISO: $SEED_ISO"
+        SEED_ARGS=(-drive "file=$SEED_ISO,media=cdrom,readonly=on")
+    fi
+fi
+
+# ── QEMU monitor unix socket ──
+# Always exposed so the host can drive the VM via `socat - UNIX-CONNECT:...`
+# (sendkey, screendump, etc.) for debugging. Independent of pubkey injection.
+rm -f "$MONITOR_SOCK"
+MONITOR_ARGS=(-monitor "unix:$MONITOR_SOCK,server,nowait")
+
+# ── Auto-inject helper (live ISO doesn't run cloud-init) ──
+# Started in the background after a delay; sends keypresses through the
+# QEMU monitor unix socket to drop to a TTY and unblock SSH for liveuser.
+if [[ -n $HOST_PUBKEY ]]; then
+
+    (
+        # Wait for the VM to reach a usable login prompt (SDDM autologin →
+        # liveuser session is the most realistic target). 90s is enough on
+        # KVM/4 vCPUs; tune via VM_BOOT_DELAY if needed.
+        sleep "${VM_BOOT_DELAY:-90}"
+        [[ -S $MONITOR_SOCK ]] || exit 0
+
+        # send_chord <key1> [key2 ...]   — chord released between calls
+        send_chord() {
+            local IFS='-'
+            local chord="$*"
+            printf 'sendkey %s\n' "$chord"
+        }
+
+        # send_str <text>   — only ASCII printable + space + return
+        send_str() {
+            local s="$1" ch
+            local i=0
+            while (( i < ${#s} )); do
+                ch="${s:i:1}"
+                case "$ch" in
+                    ' ')      printf 'sendkey spc\n' ;;
+                    [a-z0-9]) printf 'sendkey %s\n' "$ch" ;;
+                    [A-Z])    printf 'sendkey shift-%s\n' "${ch,,}" ;;
+                    '-')      printf 'sendkey minus\n' ;;
+                    '_')      printf 'sendkey shift-minus\n' ;;
+                    '/')      printf 'sendkey slash\n' ;;
+                    '.')      printf 'sendkey dot\n' ;;
+                    '&')      printf 'sendkey shift-7\n' ;;
+                esac
+                i=$((i+1))
+            done
+        }
+
+        {
+            send_chord ctrl alt f2
+            sleep 1
+            # Type: liveuser <enter> (no password by default on live)
+            send_str "liveuser"
+            printf 'sendkey ret\n'
+            sleep 2
+            send_str "sudo passwd -d liveuser"
+            printf 'sendkey ret\n'
+            sleep 1
+            send_str "sudo systemctl reload sshd"
+            printf 'sendkey ret\n'
+        } | socat - "UNIX-CONNECT:$MONITOR_SOCK" 2>/dev/null || true
+    ) &
+    INJECT_PID=$!
+    trap 'kill $INJECT_PID 2>/dev/null || true; rm -f "$MONITOR_SOCK"; rm -rf "${SEED_DIR:-}"' EXIT
+fi
+
 echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
 echo "  veilor-os :: VM test"
 echo "  ISO   : $ISO"
 echo "  Disk  : $DISK"
 echo "  NVRAM : $NVRAM"
+echo "  Seed  : ${SEED_ISO:-<none>}"
+# Anaconda virtio-serial log channel.
+#
+# Anaconda 43.x autodetects /dev/virtio-ports/org.fedoraproject.anaconda.log.0
+# and streams program/packaging/storage/anaconda logs through it in real
+# time, before any tmpfs / pivot, before networking. Survives kernel
+# panic. The host gets a tail-able file. No anaconda CLI flag, no
+# kickstart change, just the QEMU virtio-serial wiring.
+#
+# We've lost logs three times in a row to anaconda failures + tmpfs
+# reboots. Wiring this up so future failures auto-capture.
+ANACONDA_LOG="$TEST_DIR/anaconda-vm-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).log"
+ANACONDA_LOG_DIR="$TEST_DIR/test-runs/$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"
+mkdir -p "$ANACONDA_LOG_DIR"
+ANACONDA_LOG_ARGS=(
+    # Belt: virtio-serial (anaconda's setupVirtio rsyslog forward, fragile —
+    # depends on rsyslog being installed in the live ISO).
+    -chardev "file,id=anaclog,path=$ANACONDA_LOG"
+    -device virtio-serial-pci,id=vs1
+    -device "virtserialport,chardev=anaclog,bus=vs1.0,name=org.fedoraproject.anaconda.log.0"
+    # Braces: virtio-9p host directory share. veilor-installer mounts this
+    # at /mnt/hostlogs and rsyncs /tmp/*.log there post-anaconda.
+    -virtfs "local,path=$ANACONDA_LOG_DIR,mount_tag=hostlogs,security_model=mapped-xattr,id=hostlogs"
+)
+echo "  AnaLog : $ANACONDA_LOG"
+echo "  HostFS : $ANACONDA_LOG_DIR (9p tag: hostlogs)"
+
 echo "  Mode  : ${SECBOOT:+secboot}${SECBOOT:-stock UEFI}"
+echo "  Inject: ${HOST_PUBKEY:+yes}${HOST_PUBKEY:-no (no host pubkey)}"
 echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
 
 exec qemu-system-x86_64 \
@@ -54,7 +238,10 @@ exec qemu-system-x86_64 \
     -drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file="$OVMF_CODE" \
     -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file="$NVRAM" \
     -drive file="$DISK",if=virtio,format=qcow2,cache=writeback \
-    -cdrom "$ISO" \
+    -drive file="$ISO",media=cdrom,readonly=on \
+    "${SEED_ARGS[@]}" \
+    "${MONITOR_ARGS[@]}" \
+    "${ANACONDA_LOG_ARGS[@]}" \
     -boot menu=on,splash-time=2000 \
     -netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
     -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0 \

test/test-runs/2026-05-06-v0.5.32-build.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# Test run — v0.5.32
+
+- **Date:** 2026-05-06
+- **ISO:** `veilor-os-43-20260506-HHMMSS.iso` (sha256: `TBD — fill in once A1 reports the build artifact`)
+- **Tester:** A1 (build) + operator (P) + A5 (report scribe)
+- **Build host:** forgejo-runner on nullstone (runner label `ubuntu-24.04`,
+  image `catthehacker/ubuntu:act-24.04`); first ISO produced off the
+  Forgejo build pipeline after the GH Actions mirror was disabled
+  2026-05-06.
+- **Environment:** VM (qemu/q35/ovmf, 4 vCPU, 4 GiB RAM, virtio-vga,
+  virtio-9p host log mount). Real-hardware run is a separate report —
+  this file is the VM run only.
+
+---
+
+## Result
+
+⏳ **Pending A1 build.** Operator + A5 fill in pass/fail per-step once
+the actual VM test is walked through against the v0.5.32 ISO. Until
+the ISO sha256 lands here, treat every row in the per-step table as
+unverified.
+
+One-line summary (write here once known): _TBD_.
+
+---
+
+## Regressions vs previous run
+
+(v0.5.31 was the last tagged release; compare against any pass-with-issues
+notes from that test run if a report exists. Empty otherwise — fill in
+during the actual test walkthrough.)
+
+- _TBD_
+
+---
+
+## Per-step results
+
+Walk `test/TESTING.md` step-by-step. Mark each pass/fail with a brief
+note when failed. Until the test runs, every row is `⏳ pending`.
+
+| #  | Step                              | Result | Notes |
+|----|-----------------------------------|--------|-------|
+| 1  | Live boot to installer banner     | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 2  | Installer menu render             | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 3  | Disk picker                       | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 4  | LUKS + admin passwords            | ⏳ pending | Operator types directly into QEMU window — plymouth ignores synthesised keys. |
+| 5  | Locale                            | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 6  | Confirm                           | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 7  | Anaconda transaction              | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 8  | Reboot                            | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 9  | GRUB single veilor-os entry       | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 10 | LUKS unlock prompt                | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 11 | First boot → SDDM → KDE           | ⏳ pending |  |
+| 12 | Hardening checks                  | ⏳ pending |  |
+
+---
+
+## Hardening verification
+
+```text
+$ getenforce
+TBD
+
+$ systemctl is-active fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld
+TBD
+
+$ cat /proc/cmdline
+TBD — must include rd.luks.uuid=luks-... and the v0.5.32 cmdline set.
+
+$ lsblk -f
+TBD
+
+$ systemctl is-enabled veilor-firstboot.service
+TBD — must report enabled with WantedBy=graphical.target (blocker #2).
+
+$ nft list ruleset | grep -i tailscale
+TBD — tailscale0 must be in the trusted zone (blocker #5).
+
+$ cat /etc/skel/.config/kdeglobals 2>/dev/null | head
+TBD — branding must be present (blocker #6).
+
+$ ls /var/log/anaconda/host-9p-mount/
+TBD — virtio-9p Anaconda log capture (blocker #7).
+```
+
+Paste real output. If any service is inactive, any cmdline arg is
+missing, or any blocker artifact is absent, raise as a Regression
+above.
+
+---
+
+## Findings
+
+The 7 v0.5.32 blocker fixes from the
+[2026-05-05 9-agent research wave](../../docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/README.md)
+land in this build. Each is listed here as an **expected behaviour**
+the tester must observe — if any of these regress, log it under
+Regressions above.
+
+1. **Suspend/resume wifi survives lid-close.** `kernel.modules_disabled=1`
+   no longer fires before the wifi module reloads on resume. Test:
+   suspend the VM (or lid-close on real HW), wake, reconnect to the
+   same network without manual `modprobe`.
+2. **`veilor-firstboot.service` is `WantedBy=graphical.target`.** The
+   first-boot admin password flow must run on real installs, not just
+   on multi-user.target boots. Test: fresh install boots straight to
+   the TTY password prompt before SDDM lights up.
+3. **Kernel-upgrade does not drift GRUB.** First `dnf upgrade kernel`
+   must leave the system bootable — `grub2-mkconfig` is wired into the
+   kernel-install hook. Test: install, run `sudo dnf upgrade kernel`,
+   reboot, system comes up.
+4. **USBGuard rules are id-based, not hash + parent-hash.** Mirrors the
+   onyx dock-replug fix in `feedback_usbguard_dock.md`. Test:
+   unplug/replug a known device — it stays allowed. The hash variant
+   re-blocks on every replug; the id variant must not.
+5. **firewalld trusts `tailscale0`.** The interface is in the trusted
+   zone out-of-the-box. Test: bring tailscale up, ping a peer in the
+   mesh — no firewall mods required.
+6. **`/etc/skel/` carries veilor branding.** New users get the black
+   colour scheme, Konsole profile, and Plasma layout on first login.
+   Test: `useradd test`; log in as `test`; KDE comes up branded, no
+   white flash, Fira Code system font.
+7. **virtio-9p Anaconda log capture is active by default.**
+   `test/run-vm.sh` mounts a host directory into the VM; Anaconda logs
+   land there during install. Replaces the broken virtio-serial path
+   from earlier runs. Test: run install in VM; host-side mount has
+   `program.log`, `storage.log`, `packaging.log` populated.
+
+Free-form notes from the actual walkthrough — cosmetic glitches, slow
+paths, surprising behaviour — append below.
+
+- _TBD — fill in during the operator-driven VM run._
+
+---
+
+## Action items for next release
+
+(Empty until the test exposes something. PRs / commits opened during
+the run go here.)
+
+- [ ] _TBD_

test/test-runs/_TEMPLATE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# Test run — vX.Y.Z
+
+- **Date:** YYYY-MM-DD
+- **ISO:** `veilor-os-43-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.iso` (sha256: `...`)
+- **Tester:** name / handle
+- **Environment:** VM (qemu/q35/ovmf, 4 vCPU, 4G RAM, virtio-vga) — OR — Real HW (model, CPU, GPU)
+
+---
+
+## Result
+
+✅ Pass / ⚠️ Pass-with-issues / ❌ Fail
+
+One-line summary.
+
+---
+
+## Regressions vs previous run
+
+(Things that worked in the prior tagged release but failed here. Empty
+if none. Always check this section first when reading the report.)
+
+---
+
+## Per-step results
+
+Walk `test/TESTING.md` step-by-step. Mark each pass/fail with a brief
+note when failed.
+
+| # | Step | Result | Notes |
+|---|------|--------|-------|
+| 1 | Live boot to installer banner | ✅ |  |
+| 2 | Installer menu render | ✅ |  |
+| 3 | Disk picker | ✅ |  |
+| 4 | LUKS + admin passwords | ✅ |  |
+| 5 | Locale | ✅ |  |
+| 6 | Confirm | ✅ |  |
+| 7 | Anaconda transaction | ✅ |  |
+| 8 | Reboot | ✅ |  |
+| 9 | GRUB single veilor-os entry | ✅ |  |
+| 10 | LUKS unlock prompt | ✅ |  |
+| 11 | First boot → SDDM → KDE | ✅ |  |
+| 12 | Hardening checks | ✅ |  |
+
+---
+
+## Hardening verification
+
+```
+$ getenforce
+Enforcing
+$ systemctl is-active fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld
+active
+active
+active
+active
+active
+$ cat /proc/cmdline
+... rd.luks.uuid=luks-... ...
+$ lsblk -f
+...
+```
+
+Paste real output. If any service is inactive or any cmdline arg is
+missing, raise as a Regression above.
+
+---
+
+## Findings
+
+Free-form notes. Cosmetic glitches, slow paths, surprising behaviour.
+
+---
+
+## Action items for next release
+
+- [ ] ...
+- [ ] ...
+
+(Linked PRs / commits if you opened any during the test.)