docs: CHANGELOG v0.2.0-v0.2.5, README rewrite, ROADMAP, release notes update

.github/workflows/build-iso.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-# TODO: SHA-pin all uses: tags to commit SHAs (Agent 8 audit recommendation).
-# Tracked separately so this PR can land without long web lookups.
 name: Build veilor-os ISO
 
 on:
@@ -21,322 +19,124 @@ on:
   release:
     types: [published]
 
-permissions:
-  contents: write       # needed for action-gh-release to create+update ci-latest
-  id-token: write       # cosign keyless OIDC + attest-build-provenance
-  attestations: write   # attest-build-provenance writes the attestation
-
 jobs:
   build:
     name: Build live ISO
-    # nullstone label resolves to a privileged Fedora 43 container per
-    # the runner's RUNNER_LABELS map. Build runs directly in this job
-    # container — no nested docker-run-action, no bind-mount juggling.
-    runs-on: nullstone
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
     timeout-minutes: 90
 
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        # Pinned to last v4 tag confirmed to ship on node20. v4.2+ ships
-        # node24 which forgejo-runner v6.4.0 (node20) cannot exec.
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.7
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
-      - name: Install build tooling (Fedora)
+      - name: Free up disk
         run: |
-          set -euxo pipefail
-          dnf -y upgrade --refresh
-          dnf -y install \
-            lorax \
-            livecd-tools \
-            pykickstart \
-            python3-imgcreate \
-            anaconda-tui \
-            squashfs-tools \
-            xorriso \
-            createrepo_c \
-            git \
-            which \
-            shadow-utils \
-            syslinux \
-            tar \
-            curl \
-            sudo
+          sudo rm -rf /opt/hostedtoolcache /usr/share/dotnet /usr/local/lib/android /usr/local/share/boost
+          sudo apt-get clean
+          df -h
 
-      - name: Vendor gum binary into overlay
-        run: |
-          set -euxo pipefail
-          GUM_VERSION="0.17.0"
-          GUM_URL="https://github.com/charmbracelet/gum/releases/download/v${GUM_VERSION}/gum_${GUM_VERSION}_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz"
-          GUM_SHA256="69ee169bd6387331928864e94d47ed01ef649fbfe875baed1bbf27b5377a6fdb"
-          mkdir -p overlay/usr/local/bin
-          curl -fsSL "$GUM_URL" -o /tmp/gum.tgz
-          echo "$GUM_SHA256  /tmp/gum.tgz" | sha256sum -c -
-          tar -xzf /tmp/gum.tgz -C /tmp/
-          install -m 0755 "/tmp/gum_${GUM_VERSION}_Linux_x86_64/gum" overlay/usr/local/bin/gum
-          overlay/usr/local/bin/gum --version
-          echo "[OK] gum ${GUM_VERSION} vendored into overlay/usr/local/bin/"
-
-      - name: Build ISO with livecd-creator
-        run: |
-          set -euxo pipefail
-
-          # PATCH: livecd-creator bug — __get_efi_image_stanza writes
-          # `root=live:LABEL=...` instead of `live:CDLABEL=...` for dracut.
-          # Result: dracut hangs on parse-livenet looking for non-CD label.
-          # Fix in-place before running build.
-          LIVE_PY=$(python3 -c 'import imgcreate, os; print(os.path.dirname(imgcreate.__file__))')/live.py
-          sed -i 's|"live:LABEL=%(fslabel)s"|"live:CDLABEL=%(fslabel)s"|g' "$LIVE_PY"
-          grep -n 'CDLABEL=%(fslabel)s' "$LIVE_PY" || { echo "[ERR] patch failed"; exit 1; }
-          echo "[OK] livecd-creator patched: LABEL= → CDLABEL= for EFI dracut stanza"
-
-          # CI uses ks-ci.ks (no local fix-repo line). Generated from main ks.
-          # Drop `updates` repo: previously 404'd on repodata zchunk during
-          # Fedora mid-push windows. Base 43 ships the selinux-policy fix.
-          sed -e '/veilor-fix/d' \
-              -e '/^shutdown$/d' \
-              -e '/repo --name=updates/d' \
-              kickstart/veilor-os.ks > kickstart/veilor-os-ci.ks
-
-          ksvalidator kickstart/veilor-os-ci.ks
-          mkdir -p build/out
-
-          # The kickstart's %post --nochroot probes a fixed list of
-          # candidate paths to locate the repo source for overlay/scripts
-          # copy. /work is the canonical CI candidate; symlink the live
-          # workspace there so the existing probe finds it.
-          ln -sfn "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" /work
-
-          mkdir -p /var/lmc /var/lmc-cache
-          livecd-creator \
-            --verbose \
-            --config kickstart/veilor-os-ci.ks \
-            --fslabel "veilor-os-43" \
-            --title "veilor-os" \
-            --product "veilor-os" \
-            --releasever "${{ github.event.inputs.releasever || '43' }}" \
-            --tmpdir /var/lmc \
-            --cache /var/lmc-cache 2>&1 | tee build/out/build.log
-
-      - name: Graft veilor source tree onto ISO
-        run: |
-          set -euxo pipefail
-          ISO_FILE=$(ls ./*.iso 2>/dev/null | head -1)
-          [ -n "$ISO_FILE" ] || { echo "[ERR] no ISO produced by livecd-creator"; exit 1; }
-          echo "[INFO] grafting /veilor/ onto $ISO_FILE"
-
-          xorriso -indev "$ISO_FILE" -report_el_torito as_mkisofs 2>&1 | tee /tmp/iso-boot.txt || true
-          ORIG_FLAGS=$(xorriso -indev "$ISO_FILE" -report_el_torito as_mkisofs 2>/dev/null | \
-              grep -v '^xorriso :' | grep -E '^-' | tr '\n' ' ')
-          [ -n "$ORIG_FLAGS" ] || { echo "[ERR] could not extract boot stanza from $ISO_FILE"; exit 1; }
-
-          mkdir -p /tmp/iso-mod
-          xorriso -osirrox on -indev "$ISO_FILE" -extract / /tmp/iso-mod
-          chmod -R u+w /tmp/iso-mod
-          mkdir -p /tmp/iso-mod/veilor
-          cp -a overlay scripts assets /tmp/iso-mod/veilor/
-
-          eval xorriso -as mkisofs \
-            -volid "veilor-os-43" \
-            $ORIG_FLAGS \
-            -o "${ISO_FILE}.tmp" /tmp/iso-mod
-          mv "${ISO_FILE}.tmp" "$ISO_FILE"
-          rm -rf /tmp/iso-mod
-
-          mv "$ISO_FILE" build/out/
-
-          ISO_NAME="veilor-os-${{ github.event.inputs.releasever || '43' }}-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).iso"
-          cd build/out
-          for f in *.iso; do
-            [[ -f $f && $f != "$ISO_NAME" ]] && mv "$f" "$ISO_NAME"
-          done
-          sha256sum "$ISO_NAME" > "$ISO_NAME.sha256"
-          ls -lh "$ISO_NAME"
-
-      # ── ISO publish ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-      # GH Release asset size limit = 2 GiB. Our ISO ~2.8 GiB. Split into
-      # chunks before upload. Reassemble client-side via `cat *.part-* > x.iso`.
-      # Squashfs is already near-incompressible (zstd -19 → 96%) so split,
-      # not compress.
-      - name: Split ISO into 2GiB chunks
-        if: success() && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
-        run: |
-          cd build/out
-          ISO=$(ls *.iso | head -1)
-          [ -n "$ISO" ] || { echo "[ERR] no ISO"; exit 1; }
-          # Split with 1900M chunks (under 2 GiB safe). Suffix .part-aa, .part-ab, ...
-          split -b 1900M -d --suffix-length=2 "$ISO" "${ISO}.part-"
-          ls -lh
-          # Drop the original ISO so it doesn't try to upload (over limit)
-          rm -f "$ISO"
-          # Generate sha256 of all parts so reassembly is verifiable
-          sha256sum *.part-* > "${ISO}.parts.sha256"
-          echo "[OK] split into:"
-          ls "${ISO}".part-*
-
-      - name: Install cosign
-        if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
-        # Pinned to last v3 release confirmed node20.
-        uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3.7.0
-
-      - name: Sign ISO parts (keyless)
-        if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
-        run: |
-          cd build/out
-          for f in *.part-*; do
-            cosign sign-blob --yes "$f" \
-              --output-signature "$f.sig" \
-              --output-certificate "$f.pem"
-          done
-
-      - name: Generate SBOM (SPDX)
-        if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
-        # Pinned to last v0.17 release that ships node20.
-        uses: anchore/sbom-action@v0.17.2
+      - name: Run build inside Fedora 43 container
+        uses: addnab/docker-run-action@v3
         with:
-          path: build/out
-          format: spdx-json
-          output-file: build/out/veilor-os.spdx.json
+          image: registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43
+          options: |
+            --privileged
+            -v ${{ github.workspace }}:/work
+            -v /dev:/dev
+            --tmpfs /tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,exec,size=16G
+          run: |
+            set -euxo pipefail
 
-      - name: Build provenance attestation
-        if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
-        # Pinned to last v2.2 release that ships node20.
-        uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v2.2.3
+            # Update Fedora image to latest packages — guarantees pcre2 +
+            # libselinux + selinux-policy are matched (the local build's
+            # core problem). CI runners always start fresh, no version skew.
+            dnf -y upgrade --refresh
+
+            # Install build tooling
+            dnf -y install \
+              lorax \
+              livecd-tools \
+              pykickstart \
+              python3-imgcreate \
+              anaconda-tui \
+              squashfs-tools \
+              xorriso \
+              createrepo_c \
+              git \
+              which \
+              shadow-utils
+
+            cd /work
+
+            # PATCH: livecd-creator bug — __get_efi_image_stanza writes
+            # `root=live:LABEL=...` instead of `live:CDLABEL=...` for dracut.
+            # Result: dracut hangs on parse-livenet looking for non-CD label.
+            # Fix in-place before running build.
+            LIVE_PY=$(python3 -c 'import imgcreate, os; print(os.path.dirname(imgcreate.__file__))')/live.py
+            sed -i 's|"live:LABEL=%(fslabel)s"|"live:CDLABEL=%(fslabel)s"|g' "$LIVE_PY"
+            grep -n 'CDLABEL=%(fslabel)s' "$LIVE_PY" || { echo "[ERR] patch failed"; exit 1; }
+            echo "[OK] livecd-creator patched: LABEL= → CDLABEL= for EFI dracut stanza"
+
+            # CI uses ks-ci.ks (no local fix-repo line). Generated from main ks.
+            # Also strip flags livecd-creator doesn't recognize.
+            sed -e '/veilor-fix/d' \
+                -e '/^shutdown$/d' \
+                kickstart/veilor-os.ks > kickstart/veilor-os-ci.ks
+
+            ksvalidator kickstart/veilor-os-ci.ks
+            mkdir -p build/out
+
+            # livecd-creator (livecd-tools) — purpose-built for live ISOs.
+            # Handles EFI/BOOT + isohybrid + grafting that livemedia-creator
+            # --make-iso --no-virt does not. Produces UEFI+BIOS bootable ISO.
+            # --tmpdir /var/lmc to avoid GitHub Actions /tmp tmpfs constraints.
+            # /var on the runner is the host's ext4 (~80GB free post-disk-cleanup).
+            mkdir -p /var/lmc /var/lmc-cache
+            livecd-creator \
+              --verbose \
+              --config kickstart/veilor-os-ci.ks \
+              --fslabel "veilor-os-43" \
+              --title "veilor-os" \
+              --product "veilor-os" \
+              --releasever "${{ github.event.inputs.releasever || '43' }}" \
+              --tmpdir /var/lmc \
+              --cache /var/lmc-cache 2>&1 | tee build/out/build.log
+
+            # Move output ISO to expected dir
+            mv ./veilor-os-43.iso build/out/ 2>/dev/null || mv ./*.iso build/out/ 2>/dev/null || true
+
+            # Rename + checksum
+            ISO_NAME="veilor-os-${{ github.event.inputs.releasever || '43' }}-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).iso"
+            cd build/out
+            for f in *.iso; do
+              [[ -f $f && $f != $ISO_NAME ]] && mv "$f" "$ISO_NAME"
+            done
+            sha256sum "$ISO_NAME" > "$ISO_NAME.sha256"
+            ls -lh "$ISO_NAME"
+
+      - name: Upload ISO artifact
+        if: success()
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
         with:
-          subject-path: 'build/out/*.iso.part-*'
-
-      # GitHub-only: softprops/action-gh-release uses the GitHub REST API
-      # which Forgejo doesn't expose at the same endpoints. When this
-      # workflow runs on git.s8n.ru the step below (Forgejo) handles
-      # publishing instead.
-      - name: Publish to ci-latest rolling prerelease (GitHub)
-        if: success() && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
-        # Pinned to last v2 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
-        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2.0.4
-        with:
-          tag_name: ci-latest
-          name: "ci-latest (auto)"
-          body: |
-            Rolling auto-build from `main`. Latest commit: ${{ github.sha }}.
-
-            **ISO is split into chunks (GH release 2 GiB asset limit).**
-            Reassemble:
-            ```
-            cat veilor-os-*.iso.part-* > veilor-os.iso
-            sha256sum -c veilor-os-*.iso.parts.sha256
-            ```
-            Or use `test/auto-install.sh` which handles reassembly automatically.
-
-            Not a stable release — for testing only.
-          prerelease: true
-          make_latest: false
-          files: |
-            build/out/*.iso.part-*
+          name: veilor-os-iso
+          path: |
+            build/out/*.iso
             build/out/*.sha256
-            build/out/*.sig
-            build/out/*.pem
-            build/out/*.spdx.json
+          retention-days: 14
 
-      # Forgejo equivalent: drop+recreate ci-latest release via the
-      # Forgejo REST API, then upload chunks. Only runs when not on GitHub.
-      # All ${{ }} interpolations are vetted (repo coords + signed SHA).
-      - name: Publish to ci-latest rolling prerelease (Forgejo)
-        if: success() && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.server_url != 'https://github.com'
-        env:
-          FORGEJO_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          FORGEJO_API: ${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1
-          REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
-          GIT_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          TAG="ci-latest"
-          REL_JSON=$(curl -fsSL -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
-            "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/tags/${TAG}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-          if [ -n "$REL_JSON" ]; then
-            REL_ID=$(echo "$REL_JSON" | grep -oE '"id":\s*[0-9]+' | head -1 | grep -oE '[0-9]+')
-            if [ -n "$REL_ID" ]; then
-              echo "[INFO] deleting existing ci-latest release id=$REL_ID"
-              curl -fsSL -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
-                "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/${REL_ID}" || true
-              curl -fsSL -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
-                "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/git/refs/tags/${TAG}" || true
-            fi
-          fi
-          BODY="Rolling auto-build from main. Latest commit: ${GIT_SHA}.
-
-          ISO is split into chunks. Reassemble:
-              cat veilor-os-*.iso.part-* > veilor-os.iso
-              sha256sum -c veilor-os-*.iso.parts.sha256
-
-          Or use test/auto-install.sh (handles reassembly automatically).
-
-          Not a stable release — for testing only."
-          PAYLOAD=$(BODY="$BODY" TAG="$TAG" python3 -c "
-          import json,os
-          print(json.dumps({
-            'tag_name': os.environ['TAG'],
-            'target_commitish': 'main',
-            'name': 'ci-latest (auto)',
-            'body': os.environ['BODY'],
-            'prerelease': True,
-            'draft': False,
-          }))")
-          REL_ID=$(curl -fsSL -X POST -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
-            -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-            -d "$PAYLOAD" \
-            "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases" | \
-            grep -oE '"id":\s*[0-9]+' | head -1 | grep -oE '[0-9]+')
-          [ -n "$REL_ID" ] || { echo "[ERR] failed to create Forgejo release"; exit 1; }
-          echo "[OK] Forgejo release id=$REL_ID created"
-          cd build/out
-          for f in *.iso.part-* *.sha256; do
-            [ -f "$f" ] || continue
-            echo "[INFO] uploading $f"
-            curl -fsSL -X POST -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
-              -F "attachment=@${f}" \
-              "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/${REL_ID}/assets?name=${f}"
-          done
-          echo "[OK] all assets uploaded to Forgejo ci-latest"
-
-      # Build log on failure: print inline + skip artifact upload to avoid
-      # quota wall. Job log retains everything anyway.
-      - name: Print build log on failure
+      - name: Upload build log on failure
         if: failure()
-        run: |
-          echo "─── build/out/build.log ───"
-          tail -200 build/out/build.log 2>/dev/null || echo "(no build.log)"
-          echo "─── anaconda program.log ───"
-          find build/out/build/anaconda -name 'program.log' -exec tail -100 {} \; 2>/dev/null || echo "(no anaconda log)"
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: veilor-os-buildlog
+          path: |
+            build/out/build.log
+            build/out/build/anaconda/
 
-      # GitHub-only: same restriction as ci-latest publish.
-      - name: Attach to release on tag (GitHub)
-        if: github.event_name == 'release' && github.server_url == 'https://github.com'
-        # Pinned to last v2 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
-        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2.0.4
+      - name: Attach to release
+        if: github.event_name == 'release'
+        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
         with:
           files: |
             build/out/*.iso
             build/out/*.sha256
-
-      # Forgejo equivalent for tag-driven release uploads. The release
-      # is assumed to already exist (Forgejo creates it from the tag);
-      # we only attach assets here.
-      - name: Attach to release on tag (Forgejo)
-        if: github.event_name == 'release' && github.server_url != 'https://github.com'
-        env:
-          FORGEJO_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          FORGEJO_API: ${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1
-          REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
-          REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          REL_JSON=$(curl -fsSL -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
-            "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/tags/${REF_NAME}")
-          REL_ID=$(echo "$REL_JSON" | grep -oE '"id":\s*[0-9]+' | head -1 | grep -oE '[0-9]+')
-          [ -n "$REL_ID" ] || { echo "[ERR] no Forgejo release for tag ${REF_NAME}"; exit 1; }
-          cd build/out
-          for f in *.iso *.sha256; do
-            [ -f "$f" ] || continue
-            curl -fsSL -X POST -H "Authorization: token ${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" \
-              -F "attachment=@${f}" \
-              "${FORGEJO_API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/${REL_ID}/assets?name=${f}"
-          done

.github/workflows/lint.yml

@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ jobs:
     container:
       image: registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43
     steps:
-      # Pinned to last v4 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.7
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - run: dnf -y install pykickstart
       - run: ksvalidator kickstart/veilor-os.ks
 
@@ -21,8 +20,7 @@ jobs:
     name: Shell scripts
     runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
     steps:
-      # Pinned to last v4 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.7
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master
         with:
           severity: warning
@@ -32,31 +30,31 @@ jobs:
     name: No personal/onyx leaks
     runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
     steps:
-      # Pinned to last v4 tag confirmed to ship on node20.
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.7
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Grep for leaks
         run: |
           set -e
-          # Scope: ship-state source dirs only. Audit reports, CHANGELOG,
-          # PR templates, test checklists, and the lint workflow itself
-          # legitimately quote the forbidden strings as findings/examples
-          # — they don't ship in the ISO, so they're out of scope.
+          # Allow audit greps that explicitly check for the patterns
           MATCHES=$(grep -rIni \
             -e 'onyx' \
             -e '192\.168\.0\.' \
             -e 'fedora\.local' \
             -e 'xynki\.dev' \
-            kickstart/ overlay/ scripts/ assets/ build/ \
-            || true)
+            --exclude-dir=.git \
+            --exclude='*.md' \
+            . || true)
 
-          # Filter self-referencing sanity-grep lines: the kickstart and
-          # post-install scripts run their own brand-leak scan against the
-          # installed /etc — those grep invocations literally contain the
-          # forbidden strings as patterns, not as leaked data.
+          # Filter out self-referencing leak-detection grep patterns + audit text.
+          # Lines that contain the bash escaped grep pattern (onyx\|192\.168) are
+          # the leak detectors themselves, not leaks.
           LEAKS=$(echo "$MATCHES" | grep -v \
-            -e "grep .*'onyx" \
-            -e '# Sanity:' \
-            -e 'brand leak' \
+            -e 'should not contain' \
+            -e 'returns zero' \
+            -e 'audit grep' \
+            -e "'onyx\\\\\\\\\\\\|" \
+            -e 'onyx\\|' \
+            -e "name:.*onyx leaks" \
+            -e "-e 'onyx'" \
             || true)
 
           if [[ -n "$LEAKS" ]]; then

.gitignore

@@ -13,6 +13,3 @@ secrets/
 *.pem
 test/veilor-vm.qcow2
 test/veilor-vm.nvram*
-test/auto-install-vm.qcow2
-test/auto-install-vm.nvram*
-.claude/worktrees/

README.md

@@ -2,58 +2,40 @@
 
 > **Hardened minimal Fedora KDE spin. Black-on-black. Locked down by default.**
 
-[![Build veilor-os ISO](https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/badges/workflows/build-iso.yml/badge.svg)](https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/actions?workflow=build-iso.yml)
+[![Build veilor-os ISO](https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os/actions/workflows/build-iso.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os/actions/workflows/build-iso.yml)
 [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](LICENSE)
+[![Status: pre-release](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-pre--release_v0.2.5-orange)](CHANGELOG.md)
 
 veilor-os is a Fedora 43 KDE Plasma remix for operators who want a clean,
 fast, opinionated desktop with serious hardening already wired in. Boot the
 ISO, set an admin password, work. No installer wizard. No initial-setup
 screen. No telemetry. No "would you like to enable X" prompts.
 
-The current install path is an Anaconda kickstart with a custom gum TUI
-on top. v0.7+ ships a hybrid path: the kickstart ISO becomes the bootstrap
-installer (Anaconda's LUKS UX is mature), but the root filesystem is
-populated directly from a cosign-signed bootc OCI image built via BlueBuild
-on top of [secureblue](https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue)'s
-hardened Kinoite variant. Updates from there flow through `bootc upgrade`
-— atomic A/B, instant rollback. v1.0 is bootc-only.
-
-See [docs/STRATEGY.md](docs/STRATEGY.md) for the full trajectory.
-
 ---
 
 ## Status
 
-Active development on the install path. Three bug classes have been
-worked through (LUKS unlock cmdline, anaconda RPM-6.0 cmdline-mode
-brittleness, bootloader install via `gen_grub_cfgstub`); current focus
-is the v0.5.32 blocker list from the
-[2026-05-05 9-agent research wave](docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/README.md).
+**Pre-release `v0.2.5`** — first feature-complete ISO that actually applies
+the veilor-os overlay to the installed system. The build pipeline is green
+on CI; the live ISO boots to KDE on KVM and bare metal. See
+[CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) for the full v0.2.0 → v0.2.5 story (it is
+worth reading — five real bugs caught and documented).
 
-Primary git host: <https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os>. The GitHub
-mirror was disabled 2026-05-06; this repo is private-by-default on
-Forgejo. ISO builds and CI artifacts are produced by the Forgejo runner
-on nullstone — no GitHub Actions involvement.
-
-What is **shipping**: hardening (SELinux, sysctl, USBGuard, fail2ban,
+What is **done**: hardening (SELinux, sysctl, USBGuard, fail2ban,
 firewalld), KDE black theme, Fira Code system font, 3-mode power
 management, single-prompt LUKS install, first-boot admin password flow,
 reproducible CI build, EFI+BIOS bootable live ISO.
 
 What is **planned** (see [docs/ROADMAP.md](docs/ROADMAP.md)): Plymouth
-+ SDDM polish, signed ISOs (own MOK + GPG, sigstore/cosign on OCI),
-AppArmor + nftables stack, `veilor-update` / `veilor-doctor` /
-`veilor-postinstall` helpers, public docs site, **bootc OCI hybrid
-spike at v0.7**, **bootc-only at v1.0**.
+black theme, SDDM theme, signed ISOs (own MOK + GPG), AppArmor + nftables,
+veilor-update / veilor-doctor helpers, public docs site.
 
 ---
 
 ## Quick install
 
 ```bash
-# 1. Download the ISO from the latest Forgejo release.
-#    https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/releases/tag/ci-latest
-#    (rolling tag; replaced on each successful build-iso.yml run)
+# 1. Download the ISO (after public release; CI artifact for now)
 sha256sum -c veilor-os-43-*.iso.sha256
 
 # 2. Flash to USB. Replace /dev/sdX with your USB device — triple-check.
@@ -116,49 +98,30 @@ Full reference: [docs/HARDENING.md](docs/HARDENING.md).
 
 ## How veilor-os compares
 
-| Feature | veilor-os | Stock Fedora KDE | Kicksecure | secureblue |
-|---|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|
-| SELinux enforcing OOTB | yes | yes | yes | yes (custom policy) |
-| AppArmor | deferred (post-v0.6 / v0.7 LSM stack) | no | yes | no |
-| Secure Boot | yes (Fedora keys) | yes (Fedora keys) | configurable | yes (Fedora keys) |
-| LUKS2 with argon2id | default | optional | default | default (Anaconda) |
-| Single-prompt install (LUKS only) | yes | no | no | rebase via Anaconda |
-| Root account locked by default | yes | no | yes | yes |
-| firewalld default zone = drop | yes | no | n/a (nftables) | yes |
-| USBGuard default-block | yes | no | yes | yes |
-| fail2ban + auditd OOTB | yes | no | partial | partial (auditd) |
-| DNS-over-TLS by default | yes | no | yes | yes |
-| NTS-authenticated NTP | yes | no | yes | yes |
-| `init_on_alloc/free` (post-install) | yes (planned re-enable) | no | yes | yes |
-| Telemetry / phone-home | none | minimal | none | none |
-| KDE Plasma branded theme | yes (black) | Breeze | n/a (XFCE) | upstream Kinoite |
-| Power-profile CLI | yes (3-mode) | partial | no | no |
-| Hardened browser (Trivalent / Mullvad) | yes (v0.6+) | no | no | yes (Trivalent shipped) |
-| Atomic OCI image + signed base | v0.7 spike (BlueBuild) | no | no | yes (`bootc`) |
-| Userns-remap default + module sig enforce | yes | no | partial | yes |
-| Base distro | Fedora 43 (KDE) | Fedora 43 | Debian | Fedora atomic (Kinoite/Silverblue) |
+| Feature | veilor-os | Stock Fedora KDE | Kicksecure |
+|---|:-:|:-:|:-:|
+| SELinux enforcing OOTB | yes | yes | yes |
+| AppArmor | planned (v0.5) | no | yes |
+| Secure Boot | yes (Fedora keys) | yes (Fedora keys) | configurable |
+| LUKS2 with argon2id | default | optional | default |
+| Single-prompt install (LUKS only) | yes | no | no |
+| Root account locked by default | yes | no | yes |
+| firewalld default zone = drop | yes | no | n/a (uses nftables) |
+| USBGuard default-block | yes | no | yes |
+| fail2ban + auditd OOTB | yes | no | partial |
+| DNS-over-TLS by default | yes | no | yes |
+| NTS-authenticated NTP | yes | no | yes |
+| `init_on_alloc/free` (post-install) | yes (planned re-enable) | no | yes |
+| Telemetry / phone-home | none | minimal | none |
+| KDE Plasma branded theme | yes (black) | Breeze | n/a (XFCE) |
+| Power-profile CLI | yes (3-mode) | partial | no |
+| Reproducible kickstart-built ISO | yes | yes | yes (from Debian) |
+| Base distro | Fedora 43 | Fedora 43 | Debian |
 
 veilor-os is **not** trying to compete with Whonix-style anonymity or
 Qubes-style isolation. It is a **hardened daily-driver desktop** — fast,
 clean, locked down, with no manual post-install hardening required.
 
-### Relationship to secureblue
-
-[secureblue](https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue) is an upstream
-hardened atomic Fedora project we benchmark against and plan to **build
-on top of** at v0.7. The v0.7 BlueBuild spike uses their
-`securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns` OCI image as its base — we don't
-ship their source code in this repo, we layer veilor branding,
-theming, the gum installer, and the kickstart bootstrap on top of
-their already-signed image.
-
-Where veilor-os differs is the install path: a kickstart-installed
-flat install for v0.5.x (single-prompt LUKS flow, gum TUI, Anaconda
-underneath), a hybrid kickstart-bootstrap + secureblue-OCI image at
-v0.7, and a fully OCI / `bootc upgrade` path at v1.0. Thanks to the
-secureblue maintainers for the upstream work — we're a friendlier
-install front-end on top of it, not a fork.
-
 ---
 
 ## Repo layout

assets/branding/veilor-logo.svg

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!--
-  veilor-os branding mark — 1024x256.
-
-  Composition:
-    - left mark : a stacked pair of horizontal bars (wide + narrow) in
-      the grey accent (#686b6f). Reads as a stylised "v" without being
-      a literal letterform; pairs cleanly with the wordmark.
-    - wordmark  : "veilor" in a humanist sans-serif, rendered at the
-      foreground colour (#d8d8d8). 100-weight letter spacing for a
-      restrained, professional feel — never gamer.
-
-  Palette (matches assets/kde/veilor-default.kdeglobals):
-    background   : transparent (use against any #000 surface)
-    accent grey  : #686b6f
-    foreground   : #d8d8d8
--->
-<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
-     width="1024" height="256"
-     viewBox="0 0 1024 256"
-     preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid meet"
-     role="img"
-     aria-label="veilor">
-
-  <!-- Mark: two stacked bars suggesting 'v'. Pure geometric, no flourish. -->
-  <g fill="#686b6f">
-    <rect x="64"  y="96"  width="120" height="14" rx="2"/>
-    <rect x="96"  y="142" width="64"  height="14" rx="2"/>
-  </g>
-
-  <!-- Wordmark: humanist sans, light weight, generous tracking. -->
-  <text x="232" y="160"
-        font-family="Fira Code, Inter, 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, sans-serif"
-        font-size="120"
-        font-weight="300"
-        letter-spacing="6"
-        fill="#d8d8d8">veilor</text>
-</svg>

assets/installer/banner.txt

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-██    ██ ███████ ██ ██       ██████  ██████       ██████  ███████
-██    ██ ██      ██ ██      ██    ██ ██   ██     ██    ██ ██
-██    ██ █████   ██ ██      ██    ██ ██████      ██    ██ ███████
- ██  ██  ██      ██ ██      ██    ██ ██   ██     ██    ██      ██
-  ████   ███████ ██ ███████  ██████  ██   ██      ██████  ███████

assets/installer/colors.gum

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os installer — gum styling presets
-#
-# Source this file from the installer to apply branded colors to all
-# `gum` (charm.sh/gum) widgets. Pure black bg, white fg, grey accents.
-# Palette taken from the veilor-black KDE color scheme.
-#
-# Usage:
-#   source /usr/share/veilor/installer/colors.gum
-#   gum choose "Install" "Live" "Reboot"
-#   gum input --placeholder "hostname"
-#   gum confirm "Proceed?"
-#
-# Reference: https://github.com/charmbracelet/gum#styling
-# Pattern:   GUM_<COMMAND>_<PROPERTY>
-# Colors are 24-bit hex; gum uses lipgloss internally.
-
-# ── Palette ────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Base colors from assets/kde/veilor-black.colors
-export VEILOR_BG="#000000"      # pure black background
-export VEILOR_FG="#FFFFFF"      # white foreground
-export VEILOR_DIM="#686B6F"     # grey accent (104,107,111 → #686B6F)
-export VEILOR_MUTE="#3D3D3D"    # disabled / muted
-
-# ── gum choose ─────────────────────────────────────────
-# Single- or multi-select menu (used for the main menu, locale, disk).
-export GUM_CHOOSE_CURSOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-export GUM_CHOOSE_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_CHOOSE_ITEM_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_CHOOSE_SELECTED_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_CHOOSE_SELECTED_BACKGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-# Plain ASCII cursor `> ` (was `❯ `). On the linux framebuffer console
-# (fbcon), the default font doesn't render U+276F reliably — it falls
-# back to a fixed-width block glyph that lipgloss then duplicates at
-# col +23, producing the "Install Install" double render we hit on
-# real hardware + virtio-vga. ASCII `> ` renders identically across
-# fbcon, virtio-vga, and X/Wayland gum runs.
-export GUM_CHOOSE_CURSOR="> "
-
-# ── gum input ──────────────────────────────────────────
-# Single-line text entry (hostname).
-export GUM_INPUT_PROMPT_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-export GUM_INPUT_CURSOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_INPUT_PLACEHOLDER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_MUTE"
-export GUM_INPUT_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_INPUT_PROMPT="> "
-
-# ── gum write (multi-line) ─────────────────────────────
-# Reserved for any longer-form prompts; not used in v0.5.1 yet.
-export GUM_WRITE_PROMPT_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-export GUM_WRITE_CURSOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_WRITE_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-
-# ── gum confirm ────────────────────────────────────────
-# Yes/no prompt (final install confirmation).
-export GUM_CONFIRM_PROMPT_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_CONFIRM_SELECTED_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_CONFIRM_SELECTED_BACKGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-export GUM_CONFIRM_UNSELECTED_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-
-# ── gum spin ───────────────────────────────────────────
-# Spinner shown while anaconda runs.
-export GUM_SPIN_SPINNER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_SPIN_TITLE_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-export GUM_SPIN_SPINNER="dot"
-
-# ── gum filter ─────────────────────────────────────────
-# Searchable list (potential disk picker for systems with many disks).
-export GUM_FILTER_PROMPT_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-export GUM_FILTER_INDICATOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_FILTER_SELECTED_INDICATOR_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_FILTER_MATCH_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_FILTER_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-
-# ── gum style (free-form boxes) ────────────────────────
-# Used to draw the banner card and section dividers.
-export GUM_STYLE_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_STYLE_BACKGROUND="$VEILOR_BG"
-export GUM_STYLE_BORDER="rounded"
-export GUM_STYLE_BORDER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-export GUM_STYLE_PADDING="1 2"
-export GUM_STYLE_MARGIN="0"
-
-# ── gum table ──────────────────────────────────────────
-# Used for the install summary (disk / hostname / locale).
-export GUM_TABLE_BORDER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"
-export GUM_TABLE_HEADER_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_TABLE_CELL_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_TABLE_SELECTED_FOREGROUND="$VEILOR_FG"
-export GUM_TABLE_SELECTED_BACKGROUND="$VEILOR_DIM"

assets/kde/plasma-desktop.conf

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# veilor-os default desktop config — solid black wallpaper.
+# veilor-os default desktop config — solid black wallpaper (matches reference system).
 # Plasma uses `wallpaperplugin=org.kde.color` (not org.kde.image) — pure
-# black solid color rendering, no image asset required at runtime.
-# Applied via 30-apply-v03-theme.sh into the system kdedefaults so new
-# users inherit a black desktop on first login.
+# black solid color rendering, no SVG asset needed.
+# Applied via 30-apply-v03-theme.sh into ~/.config/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc
+# default for new users.
 
 [Containments][Wallpaper]
 wallpaperplugin=org.kde.color

assets/konsole/veilor.profile

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ TerminalCenter=false
 TerminalMargin=4
 
 [Appearance]
-ColorScheme=Veilor
+ColorScheme=Linux
 Font=Fira Code,11,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
 LineSpacing=1
 UseFontLineCharacters=true

assets/wallpapers/veilor-black.svg

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!--
-  veilor-os wallpaper (SVG fallback) — 3840x2160 pure black canvas with a
-  tiny "veilor" wordmark in the lower-right corner. Wordmark renders at
-  #1a1a1a against #000000 — deliberately faint so the desktop reads as
-  pure black at normal viewing distance.
--->
-<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
-     width="3840" height="2160"
-     viewBox="0 0 3840 2160"
-     preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid slice">
-  <rect width="3840" height="2160" fill="#000000"/>
-  <text x="3744" y="2064"
-        text-anchor="end"
-        font-family="Fira Code, Consolas, monospace"
-        font-size="36"
-        font-weight="300"
-        letter-spacing="2"
-        fill="#1a1a1a">veilor</text>
-</svg>

docs/CLI.md

@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os CLI
-
-User-facing commands shipped at `/usr/local/bin/`. Every veilor-* tool
-is a small bash script — readable, auditable, no compiled bits.
-
----
-
-## `veilor-update`
-
-Wraps `dnf upgrade --refresh -y` plus `flatpak update -y`. One command
-for "give me everything new". Mirrors the operator habit of always
-patching both DNF and Flatpak — neither is sufficient on its own.
-
-**Usage:**
-
-```sh
-veilor-update
-```
-
-**What it does:**
-
-1. Pings `mirrors.fedoraproject.org`. If unreachable, exits early with
-   a helpful message instead of letting `dnf` spin and time out.
-2. Runs `sudo dnf upgrade --refresh -y` and tees output for live
-   progress.
-3. Counts packages from the `Upgraded:`/`Installed:` lines of dnf
-   output and reports the total.
-4. If `flatpak` is installed, runs `flatpak update -y`.
-5. Compares running kernel to the newest installed kernel and prints
-   a reboot suggestion if they differ.
-
-**Exit codes:**
-
-| Code | Meaning |
-|------|---------|
-| 0    | dnf and flatpak both succeeded |
-| 1    | dnf upgrade failed |
-| 2    | flatpak failed (dnf still ran successfully) |
-| 3    | no network — pre-check failed |
-
-**Example:**
-
-```
-=== veilor-update: refreshing DNF metadata + applying updates ===
-... dnf output ...
-=== veilor-update: updating flatpaks ===
-... flatpak output ...
-=== veilor-update: complete ===
-  Packages updated : 47
-  Running kernel   : 6.19.14-200.fc43.x86_64
-  Newest kernel    : 6.19.16-200.fc43.x86_64 (reboot suggested)
-```
-
-If `gum` is on the system, status banners render with colour and a
-spinner; otherwise plain ASCII output. Either form is identical in
-substance.
-
----
-
-## `veilor-doctor`
-
-Read-only diagnostic. Walks the v0.2 hardening checklist and reports
-drift. Never modifies system state — fixes are a separate, deliberate
-step.
-
-**Usage:**
-
-```sh
-veilor-doctor              # full coloured table
-veilor-doctor --quiet      # PASS/FAIL summary only
-veilor-doctor --json       # machine-readable JSON
-```
-
-**Sections checked:**
-
-| Section    | Checks |
-|------------|--------|
-| System     | hostname, OS, kernel, uptime |
-| Hardening  | SELinux mode, USBGuard active, fail2ban active, firewalld zone, `kernel.yama.ptrace_scope`, `kernel.kptr_restrict` |
-| Disk       | LUKS device + cipher, btrfs subvolume count, root free space |
-| Network    | NetworkManager state, default route, DNS servers, public IP |
-| Updates    | last `dnf history` entry, pending update count via `dnf check-update` |
-| veilor     | state of `veilor-firstboot.service` + `veilor-modules-lock.service` |
-
-**Exit codes:**
-
-| Code | Meaning |
-|------|---------|
-| 0    | all checks passed |
-| 1    | one or more checks failed |
-| 2    | bad CLI flag |
-
-**Example output:**
-
-```
-── System ──
-  [OK]   hostname             veilor
-  [OK]   os                   veilor-os
-  [OK]   kernel               6.19.14-200.fc43.x86_64
-  [OK]   uptime               up 3 hours, 21 minutes
-
-── Hardening ──
-  [OK]   selinux              Enforcing
-  [OK]   usbguard             active
-  [OK]   fail2ban             active
-  [OK]   firewalld_zone       drop
-  [OK]   ptrace_scope         2
-  [OK]   kptr_restrict        2
-
-── Disk ──
-  [OK]   luks                 dm-0: aes-xts-plain64
-  [OK]   btrfs                4 subvolume(s)
-  [OK]   root_free            72G free / 234G (32% used)
-
-19 checks passed.
-```
-
-`veilor-doctor --json` emits a single-line JSON object with `pass`,
-`fail`, and `checks` keys. Suitable for piping into a monitoring
-agent.
-
----
-
-## See also
-
-- `veilor-power` — switch tuned profile (save / mid / perf)
-- `veilor-firstboot` — root-owned, runs once on first boot
-- `veilor-installer` — TTY1 TUI installer (live ISO only)

docs/DOCS-DOCS.md

@@ -1,275 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os — Proof of Work
-
-> **What this file is:** a single document that summarises the depth of
-> work, tooling traversed, and engineering decisions behind veilor-os.
-> Receipts not narrative — every claim links back to a commit, an
-> error, or a config.
->
-> Author: P M (s8n-ru on Forgejo)  ·  Last updated: 2026-05-06
-
----
-
-## At a glance
-
-| Metric | Number |
-|---|---|
-| Git commits on `main` | **134+** |
-| Distinct release versions iterated | **32** (v0.1 → v0.5.32) |
-| Pull requests reviewed and merged | **11** |
-| Documented build failure classes hit and fixed | **35+** (live ISO build, Forgejo CI, OCI signing) |
-| Lines of operator-authored kickstart | **400+** (`kickstart/veilor-os.ks`) |
-| Lines of overlay shell hardening scripts | **~1500** across `scripts/*.sh` |
-| Lines of TUI installer (`overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer`) | **~950** bash, gum + whiptail fallback |
-| Self-hosted infra services touched | **28** Docker containers on nullstone |
-| Concurrent dev agents orchestrated in single waves | up to **9** |
-
----
-
-## Distros / projects studied or layered on
-
-| Project | Role in veilor-os |
-|---|---|
-| Fedora 43 KDE | Base OS for v0.5.x kickstart-installed flat builds |
-| [secureblue](https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue) | Upstream hardened atomic Fedora; v0.7 BlueBuild spike layers our overlay on top of `securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns` |
-| Kicksecure / Whonix | Reference for AppArmor + apt-transport-tor model (we don't ship Tor; we did read their docs) |
-| Bluefin / Bazzite (uBlue) | Reference for BlueBuild recipe shape and OCI publishing pattern |
-| Tails | Reference for live-only install model — explicitly **not** veilor's path |
-| Qubes OS | Reference for hardware partitioning model — explicitly out of scope |
-| Trivalent (secureblue) | Hardened Chromium — adopted at v0.6+ |
-| Mullvad Browser | Tor-Browser-fork without Tor — adopted at v0.6+ |
-
-veilor-os is **not** a fork of any of the above. It's a **composition**:
-Fedora kickstart for v0.5.x, secureblue OCI for v0.7+, with our own
-brand, installer (gum TUI), 3-mode power CLI, and Forgejo CI/release.
-
----
-
-## Tooling traversed
-
-| Tool / system | Where it lives in the build | Notable issues hit |
-|---|---|---|
-| **Anaconda** (Fedora installer) | drives kickstart install in chroot | RPM-6.0 cmdline-mode scriptlet error propagation regression — patched `transaction_progress.py` in CI |
-| **livecd-creator** (livecd-tools) | builds the live ISO image | EFI dracut stanza bug: `LABEL=` instead of `CDLABEL=` → patched `imgcreate/live.py` in CI run |
-| **livemedia-creator** (lorax) | dropped after 17 attempts (EFI/BOOT not built) | Switched to livecd-creator entirely |
-| **dracut** | builds initramfs in chroot | LUKS module not pulled in by default → `--regenerate-all` in chroot %post |
-| **GRUB2** | bootloader install + cmdline | `gen_grub_cfgstub` failures, manual reinstall `grub2-install + grub2-mkconfig` in install %post |
-| **Plymouth** | boot splash | Disabled (`plymouth.enable=0`) so LUKS prompt is visible; theme `details` for v0.7+ |
-| **SDDM** | KDE display manager | livecd-creator skips the `display-manager.service` symlink — stub fixfiles + setenforce in firstboot |
-| **PAM** | login auth | nullok on SDDM, blank-pw + `chage -d 0` to force password set on first boot |
-| **gum** (charm.sh) | TTY1 TUI installer | bubbletea cursor render glitch on linux fbcon — replaced password input with bash `read -srp` |
-| **whiptail** | TUI fallback when gum missing | one-line fallback path |
-| **systemd** | unit ordering, presets | `system-systemdx2dcryptsetup.slice` doesn't exist — non-fatal preset warning, suppressed |
-| **firewalld** | default-drop zone, ssh allow | kept (PackageKit/avahi/cups runtime-disabled, not depsolve-removed) |
-| **USBGuard** | default-block USB | id-based rules.conf, hash-based broke on dock replug |
-| **fail2ban** + **auditd** | runtime IDS + audit log | full ruleset on passwd/shadow/sudoers/ssh/cron/sysctl/kernel modules |
-| **chrony** | NTS-authenticated NTP | Cloudflare + NETNOD pool |
-| **systemd-resolved** | DNS-over-TLS | Cloudflare + Quad9 fallback, LLMNR off |
-| **SELinux** | targeted policy + custom `veilor-systemd` module | `PCRE2 10.46 vs 10.47` host-vs-chroot regex mismatch — solved with `selinux --permissive` at build, enforcing on first-boot |
-| **AppArmor** | deferred — not in Fedora 43 base | v0.7 secureblue OCI ships its own LSM stack |
-| **zram-generator** | zram swap (no disk swap) | works |
-| **btrfs** | / + /home subvols inside LUKS2 | works |
-| **LUKS2** | aes-xts-plain64 + argon2id | mem=1GB, time=9, threads=4 — manually tuned |
-| **xorriso** | ISO wrap + graft | extract original boot stanza via `-report_el_torito as_mkisofs`, replay flags via `eval` to handle word-splitting |
-| **Sigstore / cosign** | keyless OIDC signing | doesn't work on Forgejo (no Fulcio-trusted issuer) — gated to GitHub-only, key-pair signing planned |
-| **anchore/sbom-action** | SBOM SPDX | pinned to `v0.17.2` (last node20-shipping release) |
-| **actions/attest-build-provenance** | SLSA L3 build provenance | pinned to `v2.2.3` |
-| **BlueBuild** | OCI image build for v0.7 spike | recipe ready, `ostreecontainer` kickstart directive validated |
-| **bootc** | atomic upgrades for v1.0 | target tooling, `bootc upgrade` instead of `dnf upgrade` |
-| **Forgejo** + **act_runner** | self-hosted git + CI | runner inside container with userns-remap host caused 13-step debug chain |
-| **Tailscale** + **Headscale** | private mesh | for friend-PC GPU offload + admin SSH |
-
----
-
-## Build failure classes encountered (and beaten)
-
-Numbered ledger of every distinct failure mode, in approximate order of
-discovery. Each row is one bug class — many were hit dozens of times in
-permutation before the underlying root cause was understood.
-
-### Phase A — local + livemedia-creator (v0.1 → v0.2.0)
-
-| # | Symptom | Root cause | Fix |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| 1 | rootless podman btrfs / loop / sudo cache fights | rootless can't `losetup`; host CAP_SYS_ADMIN gate | Switched to host-native lorax + NOPASSWD wheel |
-| 2 | Kickstart parse: `--title`, `text`, multiline `part`, `--hash` | livemedia-creator + recent pykickstart deprecations | Rewrote ks |
-| 3 | dnf depsolve: KDE hard-deps cups / geoclue2 / ModemManager / PackageKit | KDE Plasma 6 transitively pulls them in | Kept packages, mask daemons at runtime |
-| 4 | Anaconda merges all repos, `cost`/`includepkgs` ignored | upstream Anaconda repo-merge logic | Local fix-repo at `cost=1` to force selection |
-| 5 | scriptlet warning RC=5 (selinux/pcre2 regex skew) | host libselinux 10.46 vs chroot's selinux-policy file_contexts.bin built against 10.47 | fix-repo provides matched 10.47 pair |
-| 6 | dnf transaction RC=5 on non-critical scriptlet | RPM-6.0 cmdline-mode regression | Patched anaconda `transaction_progress.py` in CI |
-| 7 | services config: `services --enabled=veilor-firstboot` before unit installed | Anaconda services runs before %post overlay copy | Move `systemctl enable` into %post |
-| 8 | overlay copy: `%post --nochroot` SRC path wrong | livecd-creator vs livemedia-creator differ on `INSTALL_ROOT` vs `/mnt/sysimage` | Multi-path detection in %post |
-| 9 | ISO wrap: `grub2-mkimage` missing i386-pc | missing `grub2-pc-modules` | Added |
-| 10 | ISO wrap: xorrisofs missing EFI/BOOT | livemedia-creator `--make-iso --no-virt` template gap | **Pivoted to livecd-creator** |
-| 11 | livecd-creator: `Failed to find package 'fontconfig'` | livecd-creator repo-discovery differs | Repaired via direct `baseurl` not mirrorlist |
-| 12 | dracut hangs on `parse-livenet` | livecd-creator EFI stanza writes `live:LABEL=` instead of `live:CDLABEL=` | sed-patch `imgcreate/live.py` in CI |
-
-### Phase B — boot UX + LUKS + theming (v0.2.4 → v0.5.27)
-
-| # | Symptom | Root cause | Fix |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| 13 | `init_on_alloc/free` 5x KVM live-boot time | every page zeroed on alloc/free, brutal in vCPU | Drop from live cmdline; firstboot patches GRUB to re-enable for installed system |
-| 14 | LUKS prompt invisible | Plymouth swallows TTY | `plymouth.enable=0` for live; `details` theme for installed |
-| 15 | Plymouth services not maskable in chroot | systemctl mask N/A under chroot | `/dev/null` symlinks |
-| 16 | LUKS dracut module missing | Default dracut config doesn't pull crypt | `--regenerate-all` in chroot post |
-| 17 | rd.luks.uuid not in cmdline | Anaconda doesn't write it for our partition layout | `grubby --update-kernel ALL --args=rd.luks.uuid=...` in chroot post |
-| 18 | Kernel-install on chroot overwrites cmdline | systemd kernel-install writes its own `/etc/kernel/cmdline` | Switch to `--config /etc/kernel/cmdline` flow |
-| 19 | rescue glob in firstboot: `set -e` killed loop | unmatched glob | `shopt -s nullglob` |
-| 20 | fbcon blanks during KMS modeset on real hardware | i915/amdgpu/nvidia driver loads, blanks fb | `fbcon=nodefer i915.modeset=1 amdgpu.modeset=1 nvidia-drm.modeset=1` |
-| 21 | gum cursor render glitch (duplicate-Install + stray-T) | bubbletea cursor-hide vs linux fbcon terminfo | Replace `gum input --password` with `read -srp` |
-| 22 | Generated install ks `updates` repo 404 zchunk | Fedora mid-push window | Strip `repo --name=updates` from generated ks |
-| 23 | Anaconda payload module crash on `LANG` env | unset env in TTY1 service | `export LANG=en_US.UTF-8` before exec |
-| 24 | Anaconda --cmdline + `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` missing | TTY1 has no XDG runtime dir | Create + export pre-exec |
-| 25 | LVM pulled into installer ks unintentionally | default partitioning | Drop LVM, native btrfs-on-LUKS |
-| 26 | sshd `UseDNS yes` 30s banner timeout in NAT/slirp | reverse DNS unreachable in QEMU user-net | `UseDNS no` in sshd_config.d |
-| 27 | os-release branding overrides not visible to login banner | `motd` not regenerated | `update-motd` in firstboot |
-
-### Phase C — Forgejo CI + ISO publishing (v0.5.32, current)
-
-13-step debug chain documented separately: see [docs/CI-PIPELINE-FAILURES.md] (live in conversation log).
-
-Highlights:
-- userns-remap=default on host docker daemon collides with privileged + image perms
-- Forgejo runner inside container creates docker-in-docker workspace bind path mismatch
-- Sigstore Fulcio keyless signing assumes GH OIDC issuer; gated to GH-only
-- cosign / sbom / attest actions floating tags now node24, runner is node20 → all pinned
-
----
-
-## Key engineering decisions (and why)
-
-### 1. Hybrid kickstart-bootstrap + bootc OCI strategy
-
-Locked at v0.7 spike. Reasons:
-
-- **Kickstart (v0.5.x)** gives a familiar Anaconda LUKS install flow,
-  single-prompt UX, drop-in replacement for stock Fedora KDE installer.
-- **OCI image (v0.7+)** lets us layer on top of secureblue's already-
-  signed hardened base. We don't re-derive AppArmor / Trivalent /
-  custom SELinux — we inherit. Fedora bumps become `image-version: 44`
-  one-line edits, not multi-day debug sprints.
-- **bootc-only (v1.0)** retires kickstart entirely; atomic A/B upgrades,
-  instant rollback, immutable system root.
-
-### 2. Brand-clean from day one
-
-`grep -ri 'onyx\|192\.168\.0\.\|admin@\|fedora\.local\|xynki\.dev' kickstart/ overlay/ scripts/ assets/` returns zero hits. Enforced via `.github/workflows/lint.yml` `brand-leak` job. Every audit run, every CI run, every commit.
-
-### 3. Forgejo over GitHub for primary
-
-Decision date: 2026-05-06. Drivers:
-- GitHub free tier compute caps were hitting on every ISO build
-- Operator wants to work privately by default; GH = always-public
-- Self-hosted Forgejo on nullstone gives unlimited build minutes, no
-  third-party dep on the build path
-- Push-mirror to GH disabled — operator opts in per-repo when wanting
-  public visibility
-
-### 4. ssh tightening
-
-`AllowUsers user`, password auth off, root login locked, X11 forwarding off, `MaxAuthTries 3`. Operator authenticates with ed25519 key only. Documented in `feedback_nullstone_ssh_user.md` memory.
-
-### 5. Defense-in-depth mesh
-
-Tailscale + Headscale (`hs.s8n.ru`) is the SSH on-ramp. Every device joins the tailnet; public SSH is firewalled at the router. Friend GPU node (RTX 4080 in WSL2) reachable via tailnet IP — immune to ISP IP rotation.
-
----
-
-## What's been built that isn't in the kickstart
-
-The repo carries more than just an ISO recipe:
-
-| Path | What it is |
-|---|---|
-| `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` (400+ lines) | Live ISO ks, hand-authored, fully branded |
-| `overlay/etc/systemd/system/veilor-firstboot.service` | TTY1 oneshot, prompts admin password on first boot |
-| `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer` (~950 lines) | TTY1 TUI installer wrapping Anaconda + gum + whiptail fallback |
-| `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-power` | 3-mode power CLI: `save \| mid \| perf`. Wires tuned profiles + EPP + governor + battery threshold + screen-dim policy in one cmd |
-| `overlay/etc/tuned/profiles/veilor-{powersave,balanced,performance}/` | Custom tuned profiles, not Fedora defaults |
-| `overlay/etc/udev/rules.d/{90-veilor-ac-switch,91-veilor-battery-threshold}.rules` | Auto-switch power profile on AC/battery events |
-| `overlay/etc/usbguard/rules.conf` | id-based default-block USB rules |
-| `overlay/etc/firewalld/zones/trusted.xml` | tailscale0 trust override |
-| `overlay/etc/skel/.config/{kdeglobals,breezerc,kwinrc,konsolerc}` | Pre-applied KDE black theme + Fira Code system font |
-| `scripts/10-harden-base.sh` (~250 lines) | KDE Connect off, DNS-over-TLS, fail2ban + auditd setup |
-| `scripts/20-harden-kernel.sh` (~300 lines) | sysctl, password-quality, NTS chrony, USBGuard, service prune |
-| `scripts/selinux/veilor-systemd.te` | Custom SELinux module (targeted policy gap fixes) |
-| `scripts/30-apply-v03-theme.sh` | Plymouth + SDDM + Konsole + wallpaper apply |
-| `scripts/40-apparmor.sh` (deferred) | AppArmor profile load (complain-mode skeleton, sealed pending Fedora packaging or v0.7 secureblue) |
-| `bluebuild/recipe.yml` | v0.7 OCI recipe (base = secureblue securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns) |
-| `kickstart/install-ostreecontainer.ks` | v0.7 install ks: 10 lines, just `ostreecontainer --url=ghcr.io/veilor-org/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry` |
-| `assets/installer/{banner.txt,colors.gum}` | Pure-block VEILOR OS wordmark + branded gum colour palette |
-| `assets/branding/` | Logo, wallpapers, plymouth theme assets |
-| `docs/STRATEGY.md` (336 lines) | Full hybrid strategy + mesh + browser stack + Forgejo decision |
-| `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (157 lines) | Threat model, in-scope, out-of-scope, mitigations table |
-| `docs/HARDENING.md` (194 lines) | Full hardening reference |
-| `docs/ROADMAP.md` (332 lines) | v0.5.x → v0.7 → v1.0 phased plan |
-| `docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/` | 9-agent research wave findings on v0.5.32 blockers |
-| `test/TESTING.md` + `test/run-vm.sh` + `test/test-runs/` | Standardised hybrid VM test method, codified after v0.5.27 surfaced 4 regressions in one session |
-| `.github/workflows/{build-iso.yml,lint.yml,build-bluebuild.yml}` | CI for v0.5.x flat ISO + v0.7 OCI image + brand-leak / shellcheck / kickstart syntax lint |
-
----
-
-## CI infrastructure built on nullstone
-
-Self-hosted from scratch on a single Debian 13 server. All running, all
-behind Traefik with LE certs via Gandi LiveDNS DNS-01.
-
-| Service | Role | Notes |
-|---|---|---|
-| Forgejo (`git.s8n.ru`) | git host + container registry | code 9.0.3 + gitea 1.22 underneath; INSTALL_LOCK=true; admin user `s8n-ru` (NOT `admin` — reserved) |
-| forgejo-runner | act_runner v6.4.0, registered as `nullstone` label | privileged, userns_mode=host, custom Fedora-with-node image (`veilor-build:43`) |
-| Custom build image | `veilor-build:43` = fedora:43 + nodejs + git + sudo + curl | Built locally; act_runner needs node in job container |
-| socket-proxy | Tecnativa docker-socket-proxy | Read-only docker API for monitoring |
-| Traefik 3.x | Reverse proxy + ACME | Gandi DNS-01 cert; `no-guest@file` middleware blocks LAN-only services from public |
-| Authentik | SSO + LDAP (`auth.s8n.ru`) | postgres + redis + worker stack |
-| step-ca | Internal PKI | Used by all-internal mTLS where it lands |
-| Tuwunel (Matrix) `matrix.veilor.uk` | Rust homeserver | Federation off, telemetry off, registration token-gated |
-| Cinny | Matrix web client `cinny.txt.s8n.ru` | Second isolated instance |
-| Misskey | Private Twitter rebrand at `x.veilor` | Custom theme via DB pg_read_file |
-| n8n | Automation runner | Used for CI watchdogs and personal automations |
-| Pi-hole | Local DNS sinkhole | DNS-over-TLS upstream |
-| Headscale | Tailscale control plane | 4 nodes joined incl friend PC |
-| AnythingLLM | Local LLM UI | Layer on Ollama + remote vLLM (friend PC RTX 4080) |
-| filebrowser-mc | Static asset server | racked.ru launcher hosting |
-
-Runtime UID layout: `userns-remap=default` shifted +100000. Backup
-script + ACL on docker.sock + group-add patterns documented in
-`memory/feedback_docker_sudo_bypass.md`.
-
----
-
-## Receipts
-
-- **Forgejo repo:** <https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os>
-- **GitHub mirror snapshot (frozen 2026-05-06):** <https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os>
-- **ci-latest rolling release (live):** <https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/releases/tag/ci-latest>
-- **First green ISO timestamp:** 2026-05-06 14:30 UTC, sha256 in release sidecar
-- **Per-version commit trail:** `git log --oneline | grep '^[a-f0-9]\{7\} v0\.'` shows every `v0.x.y: <bug>` ship line
-- **Test method evolution:** `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md`
-- **Strategy lock:** [`docs/STRATEGY.md`](STRATEGY.md), 2026-05-05
-- **9-agent research wave findings:** [`docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/`](research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/)
-- **Threat model:** [`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`](THREAT-MODEL.md)
-- **Hardening reference:** [`docs/HARDENING.md`](HARDENING.md)
-- **Roadmap:** [`docs/ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md)
-
----
-
-## What this took
-
-This is a **single-operator + AI-accelerated** project. No team, no
-funding, no upstream maintainer hat. Most of the work happened across
-~6 weeks of evenings and weekends. AI agents (Claude Opus 4.7, mainly)
-handle the parallel research, log diving, kickstart debug, and
-multi-file refactors; the operator drives strategy, makes the calls,
-runs the VM/hardware tests, owns the brand decisions, and pushes every
-commit.
-
-The result is a hardened Linux distro that **boots, installs cleanly,
-hardens itself, and ships through self-hosted CI** — with a forward
-strategy that retires the legacy Fedora kickstart path in favour of
-a modern atomic OCI image stack, while crediting and building on top
-of the upstream secureblue work rather than forking it.
-
-For comparison, a Fedora spin maintainer working part-time normally
-ships this much in **1–2 weeks of work**. We did it once across a
-longer arc with deeper documentation, more strategy reversals, and
-zero personal/onyx leaks in the final ship state.

docs/HARDENING.md

@@ -41,21 +41,6 @@ kickstart `%post` or the overlay tree shipped in `/etc`.
   `sys_admin` and `perfmon` capabilities required by the modules-lock
   service. Source: `scripts/selinux/veilor-systemd.te`.
 
-### veilor-firstboot SELinux confinement
-
-The first-boot password service is privileged (it has to write
-`/etc/shadow`) but small. Module `veilor-firstboot` carves a tight domain:
-
-- Allowed: read `/etc/passwd`, exec `passwd(1)`, write
-  `/var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done`, write `/etc/sddm.conf.d/`,
-  start `sddm.service`.
-- `neverallow` rules block: network sockets (no phone-home),
-  `home_root_t` / `user_home_t` access, `sys_module`, `sys_ptrace`,
-  `sys_rawio`.
-
-Source: `scripts/selinux/veilor-firstboot.te`. Build & load with
-`scripts/selinux/build-policy.sh` (loads all modules in one pass).
-
 ## Network surface
 
 - **firewalld** default zone = `drop`.
@@ -134,57 +119,6 @@ sudo usbguard allow-device <id>
 `bluetooth`, `ModemManager`, `gssproxy`, `atd`, `pcscd.socket`,
 `pcscd.service`, `kdeconnectd` (removed at package level).
 
-## AppArmor (v0.5)
-
-Fedora 43 ships AppArmor alongside SELinux. veilor-os keeps SELinux as the
-primary MAC layer (enforcing, targeted) but ships AppArmor profile
-skeletons for high-risk userland binaries that benefit from a second,
-binary-scoped policy on top of SELinux's role-based one.
-
-Profiles live in `scripts/apparmor/`:
-
-| Profile | Target | Default mode |
-|---------|--------|--------------|
-| `usr.bin.thorium` | Thorium browser | `complain` |
-| `usr.local.bin.lm-studio` | LM Studio LLM runner | `complain` |
-| `usr.bin.veilor-power` | Power profile switcher | `enforce` |
-
-Profiles are **not** loaded automatically — they are opt-in until v0.5.
-Enable a profile post-install with:
-
-```bash
-sudo dnf install apparmor-utils apparmor-parser
-sudo install -m 0644 scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.thorium /etc/apparmor.d/
-sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium
-sudo aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium      # log only
-sudo aa-enforce  /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium      # block
-```
-
-Refine `complain`-mode profiles with `aa-logprof` after exercising the
-app through normal use; it converts logged denials into rule additions
-interactively.
-
-## Audit log shipping (optional)
-
-Local journald is the default audit sink. For off-device shipping to a
-trusted log collector (Loki / Wazuh / Splunk), veilor-os ships a
-disabled-by-default plugin template:
-
-- `/etc/audit/plugins.d/veilor-remote.conf` — auditd plugin shim
-  (set `active = yes` to enable).
-- `/etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf.disabled` — audisp-remote target
-  config template (rename to `audisp-remote.conf` and edit
-  `remote_server` to enable).
-
-**Warning:** enabling remote audit shipping leaks every privileged syscall,
-file-watch hit, and auth event off-device. Treat the collector as a host
-with the same trust level as root. Only enable if the collector itself is
-hardened and the transport is TLS or kerberized.
-
-Reference integration paths in the template: Loki via promtail/vector
-syslog source, Wazuh via local wazuh-agent (no network shipping needed),
-Splunk via HEC bridge.
-
 ## What's *not* enabled by default
 
 - **Disk swap** — replaced by zram (RAM-only, no key leak risk).

docs/INSTALLER.md

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os Installer
-
-Branded TUI installer that runs on `tty1` of the live ISO. Wraps the
-underlying `anaconda` kickstart install with a single-flow user experience
-similar in spirit to `omarchy` and `archinstall`.
-
-> **Status (v0.5.1):** TUI rewritten on top of [`gum`][gum] (charm.sh's
-> Go TUI toolkit). Replaces the v0.5.0 `whiptail` build, which used the
-> Fedora-default colors and looked out of place against the rest of the
-> branded system.
-
-## Screenshots
-
-> _Placeholder — real screenshots to be captured against the v0.5.1 ISO
-> once the gum-based installer ships and boots clean on test hardware._
-
-| Stage          | Path                                  |
-|----------------|---------------------------------------|
-| Banner + menu  | `assets/installer/screenshots/01-menu.png`     _(TBD)_ |
-| Disk picker    | `assets/installer/screenshots/02-disk.png`     _(TBD)_ |
-| Confirm        | `assets/installer/screenshots/03-confirm.png`  _(TBD)_ |
-| Install spin   | `assets/installer/screenshots/04-spin.png`     _(TBD)_ |
-
-## Boot flow
-
-```
-power on
-  └─ UEFI / GRUB
-       └─ live kernel + initramfs
-            └─ systemd → multi-user.target
-                 └─ getty@tty1.service.d/veilor-installer.conf
-                      └─ /usr/local/sbin/veilor-installer
-                           ├─ source assets/installer/colors.gum
-                           ├─ cat   assets/installer/banner.txt
-                           └─ gum choose <main menu>
-```
-
-The override at `overlay/etc/systemd/system/getty@tty1.service.d/veilor-installer.conf`
-replaces the standard login prompt on tty1 with the installer entry point.
-Other ttys (2-6) still get a normal getty for recovery use.
-
-## Main menu
-
-| #  | Option                                      | Action                                     |
-|----|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
-| 1  | Install veilor-os to disk                   | collect answers → generate ks → anaconda   |
-| 2  | Try live — desktop (KDE Plasma)             | `systemctl isolate graphical.target`       |
-| 3  | Try live — shell                            | `exec /bin/bash --login`                   |
-| 4  | Reboot                                      | `systemctl reboot`                         |
-| 5  | Power off                                   | `systemctl poweroff`                       |
-
-## Install path — questions asked
-
-In order, the installer collects:
-
-1. **Target disk** (`gum choose` over `lsblk` output — selected disk is wiped)
-2. **Hostname** (`gum input`, default `veilor`)
-3. **LUKS passphrase** (`gum input --password`, min 8 chars, full-disk encryption)
-4. **Admin password** (`gum input --password`, min 8 chars)
-5. **Locale** (`gum choose` — en_GB, en_US, de_DE, fr_FR)
-6. **Confirmation** (`gum confirm` — summary of choices before destructive step)
-
-Answers are written into `/run/install/veilor-generated.ks` and handed off
-to `anaconda --kickstart=...`. The kickstart inlines the LUKS passphrase
-and the admin password — the file is _never_ committed and lives only in
-the live tmpfs.
-
-## Branding assets
-
-| File                                | Purpose                                |
-|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
-| `assets/installer/banner.txt`       | ASCII banner shown above the menu      |
-| `assets/installer/colors.gum`       | sourceable bash file of GUM_* env vars |
-
-The palette mirrors `assets/kde/veilor-black.colors`:
-black `#000000` background, white `#FFFFFF` foreground, grey `#686B6F`
-accent. No reds, no other colors. Pure monochrome.
-
-## Logs
-
-- `/var/log/veilor-installer.log` — installer stdout/stderr
-- `/tmp/anaconda.log`             — kickstart execution log
-
-Both are tee'd to the screen during the install spin, so a failed install
-leaves visible breadcrumbs without forcing the user to dig.
-
-## Credits & license
-
-- [`gum`][gum] by [Charm](https://charm.sh) — MIT-licensed Go TUI toolkit.
-  We dynamically `exec` gum at runtime; no source vendored. Distributed via
-  the Fedora `gum` package.
-- veilor-installer itself is MIT-licensed (see [LICENSE](../LICENSE)),
-  matching the rest of the repo and the upstream gum project.
-
-[gum]: https://github.com/charmbracelet/gum

docs/ROADMAP.md

@@ -9,58 +9,6 @@ For the historical record of what landed in each release, see
 
 ---
 
-## ⚡ STRATEGY PIVOT — 2026-05-06
-
-**Decision: skip v0.6 kickstart polish. Pivot directly to v0.7
-BlueBuild OCI path.**
-
-Reasons:
-- v0.5.32 produced a green ISO (2.7 GB) on the Forgejo runner. Proof
-  point achieved.
-- Continuing to debug `livecd-creator` + `anaconda` quirks for v0.6
-  polish is sunk-cost work on tooling we retire at v1.0 anyway.
-- v0.7 spike already has a working BlueBuild recipe + `ostreecontainer`
-  kickstart directive. Layering veilor branding + installer + power CLI
-  on top of secureblue beats re-deriving the same hardening from
-  scratch.
-- Ergonomic CLI tools (`veilor-postinstall`, `veilor-doctor`,
-  `veilor-update`) translate cleanly to v0.7: `bootc upgrade` replaces
-  `dnf upgrade`. Move them into v0.7 scope.
-
-**v0.5.0 is the final kickstart-path release.** Tag, freeze, ship as
-proof-of-work / portfolio anchor. **v0.6 cancelled as a milestone.**
-
-Active focus: `v0.7-bluebuild-spike` branch.
-
----
-
-## Lessons learned through v0.5.x install grind
-
-Five things v0.5.27–31 changed about how we plan:
-
-1. **Anaconda + RPM-6.0 + `--cmdline` is brittle** — three install
-   failures, kernel cmdline written to four places before one worked.
-   `--location=none` skips `CollectKernelArgumentsTask`,
-   `kernel-install` reads `/etc/kernel/cmdline` not `/proc/cmdline`,
-   and `transaction_progress.py` masks real failures if patched too
-   broadly. Justifies promoting the bootc-image-builder spike to v0.7.
-2. **Test procedure must gate every tag** — v0.5.27 only surfaced four
-   bugs in one VM run because the run walked every step in order.
-   `test/TESTING.md` and `test/test-runs/` are now load-bearing.
-3. **Real hardware is not optional** — VM catches install logic, not
-   KMS / fbcon / firmware. Spare laptop + friend's laptop must run
-   pre-tag, every time.
-4. **Multi-agent debug waves work, but only with a verifier** — the
-   v0.5.31 four-bug fix came from a 4-agent verification wave on
-   v0.5.30 outcome. Wave + verifier = signal; wave alone = noise.
-5. **"We ask once, with sane defaults" is the distro UX** — every
-   v0.5 install bug we shipped a workaround for (locale, hostname,
-   USBGuard policy, drivers) is something `veilor-postinstall` could
-   ask the user about cleanly on first boot. That promotes
-   `veilor-postinstall` from v0.6 background item to flagship.
-
----
-
 ## v0.2 — green ISO + base hardening (DONE)
 
 Reproducible CI build pipeline. UEFI+BIOS bootable live ISO from a single
@@ -76,47 +24,6 @@ Released `v0.2.5` on 2026-05-01. CI on every push to `main`.
 
 ---
 
-## v0.5.27–v0.5.31 — install path stabilisation (DONE)
-
-The bridge between v0.2 (greens at all) and v0.3 (looks polished). All
-install-path bugs surfaced by the formal hybrid-VM test procedure
-(`test/TESTING.md`). Five releases, ~hours of debug, three install
-failures before greening.
-
-- **v0.5.27 (DONE)** — `rd.luks.uuid` via `grubby --update-kernel=ALL`,
-  GRUB rebrand, `fbcon=nodefer`, ASCII gum cursor.
-- **v0.5.28 (DONE)** — locale locked en_US.UTF-8, dropped updates repo,
-  patched anaconda `transaction_progress.py` to silence `Configuring
-  xxx.x86_64` scroll, excluded man-db.
-- **v0.5.29 (DONE)** — narrowed anaconda patch (was masking real
-  failures), LUKS UX, initramfs assertion. Five-fix bundle from 7-agent
-  research wave.
-- **v0.5.30 (DONE)** — broad error suppression, manual bootloader path,
-  virtio log capture for post-mortem.
-- **v0.5.31 (DONE)** — `--location=none` was making anaconda skip
-  `CollectKernelArgumentsTask`; kernel-install reads
-  `/etc/kernel/cmdline` as source of truth, veilor never wrote it, so
-  BLS entries shipped with empty cmdline. Three-path write
-  (`/etc/kernel/cmdline` + `/etc/default/grub` + grubby) plus explicit
-  `kernel-install add`.
-
-## v0.5.32 — next ship (active)
-
-Outstanding from the grind, immediate priority for the next tag:
-
-- **End-to-end VM green run** — v0.5.31 lands the kernel-cmdline fix
-  but no full hybrid-VM pass has signed it off. Run the procedure in
-  `test/TESTING.md` to install + reboot + login, file the report in
-  `test/test-runs/`, then tag.
-- **Real-hardware run on the spare laptop** — VM is necessary not
-  sufficient. Friend's laptop is mate's-test, spare is ours. KMS,
-  fbcon, USB controller, real-firmware Secure Boot only show up here.
-- **gum input render glitch** — duplicate "Install", stray T in
-  password fields on linux fbcon. Replace `gum input --password` with
-  bash `read -srp`; cosmetic only but visible on every install.
-
----
-
 ## v0.3 — UX polish (in progress)
 
 The visible polish layer that v0.2 deferred for build velocity.
@@ -190,168 +97,42 @@ specified — defaults stay sane for a daily driver.
 
 ---
 
-## v0.6 — CANCELLED 2026-05-06 (folded into v0.7)
-
-Per the strategy pivot at the top of this file: v0.6 kickstart polish
-will not ship. Continuing on the kickstart path means more
-livecd-creator + anaconda debugging on tooling that's retired at v1.0.
-The flagship v0.6 deliverables (`veilor-postinstall`, `veilor-doctor`,
-`veilor-update`, opt-in installer ISO, first-boot Plymouth dialog,
-Bluetooth helper) move into **v0.7 scope** with `bootc upgrade`
-replacing `dnf upgrade` in the update path.
-
-The original v0.6 plan is preserved below for reference but is **not
-the active roadmap**.
-
----
-
-## v0.6 — ergonomics (HISTORICAL — superseded by v0.7)
+## v0.6 — ergonomics
 
 Smooth the operator experience so day-to-day work doesn't fight the
-hardening. `veilor-postinstall` and `veilor-doctor` were v0.6 background
-items — promoted to **headline** features after v0.5.27–31 made it
-clear that "we ask once, with sane defaults" is what separates a
-distro from a kickstart.
+hardening.
 
-- **`veilor-postinstall`** (PROMOTED — flagship of v0.6) — first-login
-  welcome menu, EndeavourOS-style but cleaner. Single TUI screen:
-  keyboard layout, locale (deferred from install per v0.5.28),
-  hostname override, package presets (dev / media / homelab), drivers
-  (NVIDIA / Intel / AMD), Bluetooth opt-in, USBGuard snapshot, audit
-  baseline run, `veilor-doctor` first run. Each step skippable, runs
-  once on first SDDM login, self-deletes the autostart after. This is
-  the **only** UX feature that ships in v0.6 day one — everything else
-  builds on it.
-- **`veilor-doctor`** (PROMOTED — user-facing, not just dev tool) —
-  the post-install audit. Walks `getenforce`, `mokutil --sb-state`,
-  `firewall-cmd`, fail2ban, USBGuard policy, sysctl drift, and reports
-  drift from baseline. Runs from `veilor-postinstall` on day one, then
-  weekly via `systemd --user` timer. Plain-English output ("your
-  firewall is OK", "USBGuard policy has 3 unknown devices"); not a JSON
-  dump. **Stretch:** machine-readable mode for `veilor-server` later.
-- **`veilor-update`** — wraps `dnf upgrade` AND `flatpak update` in
-  one command. Per `feedback_system_update.md`, partial-update is a
-  recurring trap; veilor's update tool covers both by default. Adds
-  pre-check (snapshot available?), auditd pause, post-update SELinux
-  validation.
+- **`veilor-update`** — wraps `dnf upgrade` with a pre-check (snapshot
+  available?), an auditd pause, and post-update sysctl/SELinux
+  validation. One command, no surprises.
+- **`veilor-doctor`** — diagnostic helper. Walks the audit checklist
+  (`getenforce`, `mokutil --sb-state`, `firewall-cmd --get-default-zone`,
+  fail2ban status, USBGuard policy, sysctl drift) and reports what's
+  drifted from baseline.
 - **Opt-in installer ISO** — flip from live-only to live + installer,
   user picks at boot menu. Installer uses the v0.5 kickstart with full
   LUKS + btrfs subvols + zram.
 - **First-boot UX** — replace TTY password prompt with a small
   Plymouth-rendered dialog. Less raw.
 - **Bluetooth opt-in helper** — single command to enable + bring up
-  the daemon + add the user to the right group.
+  the daemon + add the user to the right group. Currently three
+  commands.
 
 ---
 
-## v0.7 — BlueBuild OCI mainline (ACTIVE — primary focus 2026-05-06+)
+## v0.7 — public flex
 
-This was originally planned as "public flex + bootc spike". Post-pivot,
-v0.7 is now the **primary active milestone** — it absorbs all v0.6
-ergonomic work and becomes the next ship target.
+Take veilor-os out of "private repo, contained audience" mode.
 
-Scope:
-- BlueBuild recipe (`bluebuild/recipe.yml`) layering on
-  `ghcr.io/secureblue/securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns`
-- `kickstart/install-ostreecontainer.ks` — 10-line kickstart that calls
-  `ostreecontainer --url=ghcr.io/veilor-org/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry`
-  and lets Anaconda's LUKS UX drive the install
-- veilor brand layer: KDE black theme, gum installer assets, custom
-  Konsole profile, branded `os-release`
-- `veilor-power` 3-mode CLI (lifted as-is from v0.5.x overlay)
-- `veilor-postinstall` (formerly v0.6 flagship) — first-login TUI
-- `veilor-doctor` (formerly v0.6) — boot-time + weekly drift check
-- `veilor-update` rewritten on `bootc upgrade` (was `dnf upgrade`)
-- Forgejo registry as primary OCI publish target; GHCR mirror optional
-- cosign key-pair signing of OCI image (replaces broken keyless flow)
-
-Public-flex items kept from original v0.7 entry:
-
-Take veilor-os out of "private repo, contained audience" mode. Order
-matters: people demand threat model FIRST when a security distro goes
-public, benchmarks come after.
-
-1. **Threat model published** (FIRST — gating item) — what veilor-os
-   defends against, what it does not. Honest scope. No claim of
-   anti-state-actor; concrete on lost-laptop, USB-attack, browser
-   compromise, supply-chain. Reviewers will demand this before reading
-   anything else.
-2. **Public docs site** — Hugo or mdBook on `veilor.org`, generated
-   from `docs/`. Single source of truth.
-3. **Repo public** — flip GitHub visibility, announce.
-4. **Comparison + benchmarks** — published numbers vs stock Fedora KDE
-   on cold boot, idle RAM, idle network egress, suspend/resume time.
-   After threat model, not before.
-5. **Press kit** — wallpapers, logo, screenshots, feature one-liner.
-
-### Hybrid bootc spike — layer on secureblue, install via `ostreecontainer` (REVISED 2026-05-05)
-
-The original v0.7 entry called for a Containerfile-from-scratch
-spike on `quay.io/fedora/fedora-bootc:43`. Research on 2026-05-05
-(see `docs/STRATEGY.md` and
-`docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/`), then a parent-operator
-refinement same day, locked the path: **layer veilor's branding +
-threat model + UX on top of secureblue's already-shipping
-`securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns` OCI image** via a BlueBuild
-recipe, and install it directly during the Anaconda pass via the
-`ostreecontainer` kickstart directive (no first-boot rebase).
-
-Reasoning:
-
-- secureblue has 30 active contributors, 940 stars, 56 commits
-  in the last 5 weeks. They've already implemented the hardening
-  surface we'd need to build alone (sysctl + kargs + SELinux
-  custom policy + USBGuard + hardened-malloc + Unbound DoT +
-  cosign-signed OCI build pipeline).
-- Containerfile-from-scratch spike: 1 week to first ISO. BlueBuild
-  recipe extending secureblue: ~2 days. With the `ostreecontainer`
-  swap (no `veilor-firstboot-rebase.service`, no transition window):
-  **~1 day**.
-- secureblue does NOT publish a threat model. Athena OS does
-  (their main differentiator, only public threat model in
-  hardened-Linux 2026). Our `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (drafted) gets
-  us ahead of both on the one axis that matters most for a
-  security-branded distro.
-
-Hybrid path locked:
-
-- Kickstart ISO stays as the **bootstrap installer** (Anaconda's
-  LUKS UX is mature).
-- `%packages` is replaced with `ostreecontainer
-  --url=ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry` so the
-  install pass populates `/` directly from the OCI image — no
-  first-boot rebase, no second reboot.
-- From boot one onward, `bootc upgrade` is the update channel.
-- v1.0 deprecates the kickstart entirely.
-
-Stay on `ostreecontainer` through v0.8. **Do NOT migrate to the new
-`bootc` kickstart command until v1.0** — it blocks multi-disk and
-authenticated registries (likely needed eventually). **Do NOT use**
-`bootc-image-builder anaconda-iso` output — deprecated in
-image-builder v44+. Produce OCI image and bootstrap ISO as
-**separate artifacts**.
-
-Overrides over secureblue: keep Trivalent as default (their COPR
-tracks upstream M147+ within hours; reverses earlier draft that
-treated it as override-and-remove); add Mullvad Browser alongside;
-gate Thorium behind `ujust install-thorium` with CVE-lag warning;
-restore sudo (revert `run0`-only); re-enable Xwayland.
-
-Mesh stack baked in: Tailscale (Day 1, daily driver), Yggdrasil-go
-(Day 1, idle warm-fallback), Reticulum/RetiNet AGPL fork (opt-in
-via `ujust install-reticulum`). See `docs/STRATEGY.md` mesh stack
-section for the layer breakdown and threat-floor table.
-
-Full plan: `docs/STRATEGY.md`. Spike will land in
-`bluebuild/recipe.yml` plus `.github/workflows/build-bluebuild.yml`,
-on a separate branch — does NOT land in v0.5.x main.
-
-External dependency tracked: Traefik `no-guest@file` ACL on
-nullstone is currently an `0.0.0.0/0` allow-all stub. Must be
-fixed before veilor-os first-public-ISO ships, otherwise
-`tag:guest` provisioning leaks the full vhost surface to every
-veilor user. **Parent operator owns the fix; not in veilor-os
-scope.**
+- **Public docs site** — Hugo or mdBook on `veilor.org`, generated from
+  `docs/`. Single source of truth for INSTALL, HARDENING, BUILD,
+  ROADMAP, RELEASE, CONTRIBUTING.
+- **Repo public** — flip GitHub visibility, announce.
+- **Comparison + benchmarks** — published numbers vs stock Fedora KDE
+  on cold boot, idle RAM, idle network egress, suspend/resume time.
+- **Threat model published** — what veilor-os defends against, what it
+  does not. Honest scope.
+- **Press kit** — wallpapers, logo, screenshots, feature one-liner.
 
 ---
 
@@ -378,16 +159,15 @@ daily driver.
 ## Stretch goals — not on the v0.x → v1.0 critical path
 
 These are spin variants that share veilor-os DNA but need their own
-kickstart or build tool.
+kickstart or build tool. They live on a separate track and do not
+block v1.0.
 
 - **`veilor-server`** — no KDE, no GUI, hardened headless Fedora for
-  homelab / VPS (e.g. nullstone). Same overlay, different package set.
-  **Not blocked**, but waits on `veilor-doctor` machine-readable mode
-  (v0.6) so headless installs have a way to report drift without a TUI.
+  homelab / VPS. Same overlay, different package set.
 - **`veilor-kiosk`** — single-app Plasma session, locked-down user,
-  read-only root. **Not blocked.**
+  read-only root. For dedicated-purpose machines.
 - **`veilor-atomic`** — rpm-ostree / bootc-image-builder rebase.
-  Status now depends on the **v0.7 bootc spike**: if the spike shows
-  bootc fixes the anaconda-grind class of bugs, `veilor-atomic`
-  becomes the v1.0+ mainline rather than a stretch variant. If not,
-  it stays a parallel track.
+  Immutable root, transactional updates, atomic rollback. Different
+  build tool entirely (likely `bootc-image-builder`); all veilor
+  hardening would translate to a `Containerfile`. Schedule for after
+  v0.5+ once the standard spin is stable.

docs/STRATEGY.md

@@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os Strategy — Hybrid kickstart bootstrap + bootc OCI
-
-Decision date: **2026-05-05** (refined same day from parent-operator
-handoff, locks the `ostreecontainer` install path, mesh stack
-bake-in, browser stack, Iroh seeding roadmap, and threat floor table).
-Locked at: **v0.5.31 → v0.7 spike → v1.0**
-
-## TL;DR
-
-- Keep the Anaconda-driven kickstart ISO as the **bootstrap installer**
-  (LUKS UX is mature, single passphrase prompt, custom partitioning
-  works).
-- Anaconda's `ostreecontainer` directive populates the root filesystem
-  directly from a **veilor-os OCI image** (built via BlueBuild on top
-  of secureblue's `securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns`) **during the
-  install pass — no first-boot rebase, no mutable→atomic transition**.
-- All future updates flow through `bootc upgrade` — atomic A/B,
-  instant rollback, cosign-signed.
-- The kickstart-driven mutable-root path is deprecated at v1.0; kept
-  alive as fallback through v0.7.
-
-## Why hybrid, not pure pivot
-
-Pure pivot to bootc-from-scratch (Agent 3's spike plan) was **1 week
-to first ISO**. Pure pivot to layering on secureblue is **2 days to
-first ISO** because the hardening work is already done. The
-`ostreecontainer` refinement compresses that to **1 day** by
-eliminating the first-boot rebase choreography (no
-`veilor-firstboot-rebase.service`, no second reboot, no transition
-window where the system is half-mutable, half-atomic).
-
-Both pure-pivot paths require throwing away the partitioning UX we
-already have working in Anaconda. Hybrid keeps it.
-
-Hybrid:
-- **Day-zero install:** Anaconda kickstart + custom partitioning +
-  LUKS prompt (what we have today). User experience = unchanged.
-- **End of install pass:** `ostreecontainer
-  --url=ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry` populates
-  `/` from the OCI image. Transition is invisible.
-- **First boot:** veilor OCI tree, no rebase, no special service.
-- **Day-2:** `bootc upgrade` cadence for everything from then on.
-
-We keep what works, pivot the part that doesn't.
-
-## ostreecontainer directive (refinement, locked)
-
-Replace the `%packages` block in the install kickstart with:
-
-```
-ostreecontainer --url=ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43 --transport=registry
-```
-
-Keep the existing `part`/LUKS encryption block verbatim — Anaconda
-partitions before `ostreecontainer` populates root.
-
-**Stay on `ostreecontainer` through v0.8.** Do NOT migrate to the new
-`bootc` kickstart command until v1.0 — `bootc` blocks multi-disk and
-authenticated registries, both of which we'll likely need.
-
-**Do NOT use** `bootc-image-builder anaconda-iso` output —
-deprecated in image-builder v44+. Produce the OCI image and the
-bootstrap ISO as **separate artifacts**:
-
-- OCI image: BlueBuild recipe → cosign-signed image at
-  `ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43`
-- Bootstrap ISO: Anaconda kickstart with `ostreecontainer` directive
-  pointing at the OCI image
-
-Reference: <https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/bootc/>; pykickstart
-docs for `ostreecontainer`.
-
-## Why secureblue underneath
-
-| Question | Answer |
-|---|---|
-| Maintainers | secureblue: 30 contributors, 56 commits/5wks. veilor-os: solo. |
-| Hardening surface | secureblue ships sysctl + kargs + SELinux + USBGuard + hardened-malloc + DoT — far more than we'd build alone. |
-| Build pipeline | BlueBuild → cosign-signed OCI in GH Actions (`build-all.yml`, `trivy.yml`). |
-| Update model | bootc upgrade with A/B + instant rollback + signed image chain. |
-| Variants | `kinoite-hardened-userns` is the KDE+Wayland+SELinux variant we'd want. |
-| License | Apache-2.0 (compatible with our MIT). |
-
-What we override in our recipe:
-
-- **`run0` instead of sudo**: revert. Breaks too many workflows.
-- **Xwayland disabled**: revert. Some apps still need it.
-- **Veilor branding**: theme, KDE color scheme, Plymouth, SDDM, font,
-  os-release. All `overlay/*` ports verbatim from current repo.
-
-(Browser stack is its own section below — Trivalent is now a *kept*
-default, not an override.)
-
-## Browser stack
-
-| Role | Pick | Source |
-|---|---|---|
-| **Default browser** | **Trivalent** (secureblue's hardened Chromium) | Fedora COPR `secureblue/trivalent` — tracks upstream M147+ within hours, ships hardened_malloc + JIT-less + Drumbrake WASM |
-| **Anti-fingerprint companion** | **Mullvad Browser** | Clearnet, no Tor, layered alongside Trivalent for pseudonymous browsing |
-| **Optional opt-in** | **Thorium** | `ujust install-thorium` only — WARN users of months-long CVE lag (LTS Chromium base, ~9 milestones behind upstream stable as of 2026-05) |
-
-**DO NOT default to Thorium under any circumstances** — contradicts
-the threat model. Trivalent's COPR keeps us inside one-hour-of-upstream
-patch latency; Thorium is multi-month-stale and is a perf/media
-profile choice, not a security choice.
-
-The earlier draft of this doc treated Trivalent as an override-and-
-remove. That was wrong: Trivalent is exactly the level of hardening
-we want for a default browser. Keep it. Add Mullvad alongside.
-Move Thorium behind an explicit opt-in.
-
-## Mesh stack — three-layer warm-stack
-
-Day 1 ships layers 1 (Tailscale) and 2 (Yggdrasil idle). Layer 3
-(Reticulum) is opt-in via `ujust`.
-
-### Layer 1 — Tailscale + Headscale (daily driver)
-
-- Already running on `nullstone`, `hs.s8n.ru`. OIDC via Authentik.
-- Veilor OS ships `tailscale-1.94.2+` from official Fedora repo.
-- Service unit **pre-disabled** at install time.
-- First-boot prompt: "join Veilor mesh? [paste / QR]". On accept:
-  `tailscale up --login-server=https://hs.s8n.ru` with the user's
-  pre-auth key.
-
-### Layer 2 — Yggdrasil-go (warm fallback, idle by default)
-
-- `yggdrasil-go` 0.5.13+ from COPR / dnf.
-- Decentralized IPv6 in `200::/7`.
-- systemd unit **enabled** but config = empty `Listen[]`, one
-  `Public peer` (e.g. `vpn.itrus.su` or another EU peer),
-  `AllowedPublicKeys` allowlist mode (no allow-all).
-- WSS:443 transport for ISP DPI evasion.
-- Generates ECC keypair on first boot via systemd-tmpfiles or
-  firstboot script.
-- Survives ISP-level Tailscale block (threat floor (ii)).
-
-### Layer 3 — Reticulum (opt-in)
-
-- **RetiNet AGPL fork** (NOT upstream RNS — upstream has an anti-AI
-  license clause incompatible with our governance). Sourced from the
-  Codeberg AGPL fork.
-- Sideband (Android/desktop messenger built on RNS).
-- Install via `ujust install-reticulum`. NOT auto-started until
-  RetiNet stabilizes.
-- Default config when enabled: `AutoInterface` (LAN multicast) +
-  1–2 TCP backbone peers.
-- RNode hardware (LoRa transceiver) bundle as separate
-  `ujust install-reticulum-rnode`.
-- Survives total internet outage (threat floor (iii)) when paired
-  with RNode.
-
-## Onboarding model
-
-Token-based (paste OR QR, user picks). Misskey signup page mints a
-**reusable pre-auth key** (TTL=24h, single-use, regenerated per
-signup). First boot of Veilor ISO accepts hex paste OR QR scan of
-the same key.
-
-**NOT auto-OIDC at first boot** — too much Authentik exposure for
-day-zero users.
-
-## Tier model — three-tier
-
-- `tag:admin` — onyx + failsafe. Full mesh, `*:*`.
-- `tag:infra` — nullstone, office. Mesh among themselves; admin
-  inbound only.
-- `tag:guest` — Veilor OS users + friend. ONLY `x.veilor:443`
-  reachable + future seeded service hostnames whitelisted.
-- **Failsafe** — pre-baked admin pre-auth key on yubikey + printed
-  paper + Authentik OIDC group `tailnet-admin` as second auth path.
-
-## Threat floor table
-
-| Floor | Attack | Day 1 (v0.7 ship) | Phase 2 (v0.8) |
-|-------|--------|---|---|
-| (i) | ISP blocks `s8n.ru` DNS | Tailscale dies, Yggdrasil survives | YES (documented failover) |
-| (ii) | ISP blocks Tailscale protocol | Yggdrasil-WSS:443 survives | YES |
-| (iii) | Internet unreachable | RNS over LoRa survives | OPT-IN (RetiNet + RNode) |
-
-Day 1 must hold floor (i). Floors (ii) and (iii) become P2 once
-Yggdrasil is promoted from idle to documented failover.
-
-## Iroh seeding daemon (Phase 2 / v0.8)
-
-- `veilor-seed.service` systemd unit, runs as `_veilor-seed` user.
-- Watches `/var/lib/<service>/files/` blob store directories.
-- BLAKE3-hashes new blobs, registers with local iroh node.
-- Publishes tickets on per-service `iroh-gossip` topic.
-- LRU local cache, default 10 GB.
-- Sidecar mirrors service blob stores: Misskey `/files/`, Matrix
-  media, `dl.veilor` downloads.
-- Other Veilor nodes pull lazily on cache miss.
-- **DEFER DB replication forever.** Static media only.
-
-DOCUMENT but DO NOT IMPLEMENT until **Iroh hits 1.0** (currently
-0.96–0.98 RC season; 1.0 target Q1 2026 slipped, watching).
-
-Reference: <https://github.com/n0-computer/iroh-blobs/blob/main/DESIGN.md>.
-
-## External dependency — Phase 0 (NOT veilor-os scope)
-
-Real ACL gap on nullstone Traefik right now: friend on `tag:guest`
-can reach `nullstone:443` → SNI-routes to ALL Traefik vhosts
-(`sys.s8n.ru`, `pihole.s8n.ru`, `hs.s8n.ru`, `auth.s8n.ru`, n8n, rc,
-mx, …). Only per-vhost auth blocks them. The `no-guest@file` Traefik
-middleware that should fix this is currently an `0.0.0.0/0`
-allow-all stub (neutralized 2026-05-03 from XFF chain breakage).
-
-**veilor-os does NOT fix this.** Tracked here as an external
-dependency: ACL fix on nullstone Traefik **required before veilor-os
-first-public-ISO ships**, otherwise `tag:guest` provisioning leaks
-the full vhost surface to every veilor user. Parent operator owns it.
-
-## Strategic credibility win
-
-secureblue does NOT publish a threat model. Athena OS does, and it's
-their main differentiator. We've already drafted
-`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (Agent 5 of 2026-05-05 wave). Publishing that
-*before* the v0.7 launch positions veilor-os ahead of secureblue and
-Athena on the one axis that matters most for a security-branded
-distro: **honest, scoped, public threat model**.
-
-## Roadmap implications
-
-| Version | Status | Path |
-|---|---|---|
-| v0.5.31 | shipped | Anaconda kickstart, mutable root |
-| v0.5.32 | active — top blockers from 9-agent wave | Anaconda kickstart |
-| v0.5.x → v0.6 | maintenance | Anaconda kickstart, ergonomics + UX polish |
-| **v0.7 spike** | **1-day BlueBuild prototype** (was 2 days; `ostreecontainer` removes first-boot-rebase work) | First veilor OCI image extending secureblue-kinoite-hardened |
-| v0.7 ship | ISO bootstraps install, `ostreecontainer` populates from OCI in-pass | Hybrid path live |
-| v0.8 | Iroh seeding (P2P static media), Yggdrasil promoted from idle to documented failover, RetiNet stabilization watch | bootc-only direction |
-| **v1.0** | **bootc-only**, kickstart deprecated, possibly migrate `ostreecontainer` → new `bootc` kickstart command if multi-disk + auth-registry blockers resolved upstream | `bootc upgrade` for all updates |
-
-The Containerfile-from-scratch spike plan (Agent 3 of 2026-05-05
-wave) is **superseded** by this hybrid: don't build a Containerfile
-from scratch on `fedora-bootc:43`. Instead, write a BlueBuild recipe
-on `securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns`. With `ostreecontainer`
-swap, spike compresses 1 week → 1 day.
-
-## Next concrete steps
-
-### v0.5.32 — current (no strategy change)
-
-Ship the 7 blockers from `docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/`:
-suspend/resume wifi fix, firstboot WantedBy, USBGuard id-rules,
-firewalld tailscale0 zone, KMS modeset, /etc/skel branding, virtio-9p
-log capture.
-
-`ostreecontainer` swap **does NOT land in v0.5.32 main.** It belongs
-in the v0.7 spike branch only.
-
-### v0.7-spike (1 day, separate branch)
-
-1. New repo dir: `bluebuild/recipe.yml`.
-2. `from`: `ghcr.io/secureblue/securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns:latest`.
-3. Override modules:
-   - `type: files` — stamp our `overlay/*` tree (branding, themes,
-     veilor scripts, sddm theme, plymouth theme).
-   - `type: rpm-ostree` — install Mullvad Browser + restore Xwayland +
-     re-enable sudo (revert run0).
-   - **Keep Trivalent** as default (was wrongly marked for removal in
-     the first draft of this doc).
-   - `type: brand` — PRETTY_NAME, GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR, distributor URL.
-   - `type: files` — pre-disabled `tailscale.service`, idle
-     `yggdrasil.service`, `ujust install-reticulum` and
-     `ujust install-thorium` recipes.
-4. `.github/workflows/build-bluebuild.yml` — pull BlueBuild action,
-   build + cosign sign + push to GHCR.
-5. `kickstart/install.ks` — replace `%packages` block with
-   `ostreecontainer --url=ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43
-   --transport=registry`. Keep existing partitioning + LUKS block
-   verbatim. **Drop** all planned `veilor-firstboot-rebase.service`
-   work — no longer needed.
-
-### v1.0 — bootc-only
-
-- Drop `kickstart/veilor-os.ks`, drop `livecd-creator` workflow.
-- Bootstrap ISO is built as a **separate artifact** (NOT via
-  `bootc-image-builder anaconda-iso`, which was deprecated in
-  image-builder v44).
-- The OCI image is the source of truth.
-- `veilor-update` becomes thin `bootc upgrade --apply` wrapper.
-- Migrate `ostreecontainer` directive → new `bootc` kickstart
-  command IF multi-disk + authenticated-registry support has landed
-  upstream by then.
-
-## Open questions
-
-- Does secureblue accept upstream contributions? If yes, send our
-  USBGuard id-based-rules fix and our threat-model framework.
-- Recovery flow when `ostreecontainer` install pass fails — Anaconda
-  should abort cleanly; verify in spike that no half-installed
-  state is bootable.
-- Iroh 1.0 timing — currently 0.96–0.98 RC; Q1 2026 target slipped.
-  Re-evaluate Phase 2 schedule when 1.0 lands.
-- RetiNet upstream stabilization — track Codeberg fork for releases.
-  If it stalls > 6 months we re-evaluate Layer 3.
-- Fedora 44 transition: secureblue tracks Fedora releases (current
-  `v4.9` on F44). If we follow, we get F44 for free at the same time
-  upstream does.
-
-## Self-hosted git + CI (locked 2026-05-05)
-
-Primary git host moved off github.com. **Forgejo** runs on nullstone
-at `git.s8n.ru`, with **forgejo-runner** doing the build work. GH free-
-tier minute quota was hammering veilor-os iteration; we self-host now.
-
-- Primary remote: `ssh://git@192.168.0.100:222/veilor-org/veilor-os.git`
-  (Forgejo, LAN-only until router port-forward 222 → nullstone:222
-  added — TODO; or use tailnet hostname once tailscale logged in).
-- Public mirror: `https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os.git`. Forgejo
-  push-mirrors every commit + every 8h, so GH stays in sync without
-  consuming GH minutes.
-- Runner labels: `ubuntu-24.04` (catthehacker image — works for our
-  current build-iso.yml unmodified) and `nullstone` (privileged Fedora
-  43 container — opt-in via `runs-on: nullstone`).
-- Build cost: 0 GH minutes. Disk: ~80 GB workspace on /home/docker.
-
-Deploy artifacts: `~/ai-lab/nullstone-server/forgejo/`. Runbook in same
-dir.
-
-## See also
-
-- `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` — drafted, needs publish for v0.7
-- `docs/ROADMAP.md` — updated to reflect this strategy
-- `docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/03-bootc-spike-plan.md` —
-  superseded by this hybrid (kept as reference for the
-  Containerfile-from-scratch alternative)
-- secureblue: <https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue>
-- BlueBuild: <https://blue-build.org>
-- bootc / ostreecontainer docs: <https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/bootc/>
-- Yggdrasil: <https://github.com/yggdrasil-network/yggdrasil-go>
-- Reticulum manual: <https://reticulum.network/manual/>
-- Iroh blobs design: <https://github.com/n0-computer/iroh-blobs/blob/main/DESIGN.md>

docs/THREAT-MODEL.md

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-# Threat Model
-
-> **Status:** Final for v0.7 public launch. Honest scope.
-
-veilor-os is a hardened daily-driver desktop. Not a paranoia OS, not an
-anonymity OS, not an isolation OS. This document exists so that
-security-conscious developers, journalists, and activists can decide whether
-the threat model fits their actual adversary before they trust the system.
-
-If your adversary is on the "out of scope" list below, **use a different
-tool**. veilor-os will not save you, and we will not pretend otherwise.
-
----
-
-## In scope — what veilor-os defends against
-
-Every row cites the file or setting that implements the mitigation, so the
-claim is auditable from a clean checkout.
-
-| Adversary / scenario | veilor-os mitigation |
-|---|---|
-| Lost or stolen laptop, powered off | LUKS2 `aes-xts-plain64` + `argon2id` (`mem=1 GiB`, `time=9`) on root LV; swap is `zram` only — no persistent key material on disk. Defined in `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` `part pv.veilor` block. |
-| Generic browser / email malware (drive-by RCE, malicious attachment) | SELinux `enforcing` + targeted policy + custom `veilor-systemd.te` module (`scripts/selinux/`); sysctl knobs in `/etc/sysctl.d/99-veilor-hardening.conf`: `kernel.kptr_restrict=2`, `kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2`, `kernel.perf_event_paranoid=3`, `net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2`, `kernel.randomize_va_space=2`, `fs.suid_dumpable=0`, `dev.tty.ldisc_autoload=0`. AppArmor profile skeletons in `scripts/apparmor/` for Trivalent/Thorium/lm-studio (opt-in, complain mode, hardens to enforce per profile). |
-| Console-side USB attack (BadUSB, rubber ducky, juice-jack) | USBGuard daemon, `ImplicitPolicyTarget=block`, **id-based** rules in `/etc/usbguard/rules.conf` (vendor:product, not hash — survives dock replug). Empty allowlist on first boot; operator runs `usbguard generate-policy` after plugging trusted devices. |
-| SSH brute-force / credential-stuffing | `/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf`: `PasswordAuthentication no`, `PermitRootLogin no`, `AllowUsers admin`, `MaxAuthTries 3`, `X11Forwarding no`, `LogLevel VERBOSE`. `fail2ban` `sshd` + `pam-generic` jails (journald backend) ban via firewalld `rich-rule` action. |
-| Post-incident forensics ("what happened?") | `auditd` rules in `/etc/audit/rules.d/99-veilor-hardening.rules` watch `/etc/{passwd,shadow,group,sudoers,sudoers.d,ssh/sshd_config*,selinux,firewalld,cron.*,sysctl.*,systemd/system}`, every privileged binary (`sudo`, `su`, `passwd`, `mount`, `pkexec`, …), `init_module`/`finit_module`/`delete_module` syscalls, and uid≥1000 perm/owner changes. Logs persist across reboot. |
-| Supply-chain on the OS image itself | Secure Boot enforced (Fedora signed shim → GRUB → kernel). v0.7 adds cosign-signed OCI image at `ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43`, GPG-signed ISO + sha256 + .asc, plus our own MOK for out-of-tree module signing. |
-| Unprivileged local user attempting LPE | Root account locked (`passwd -l root`; `passwd -S root` → `L`); single `admin` user in `wheel`; `pwquality.conf` `minlen=14`, `minclass=4`, dictcheck on. Kernel `lockdown=integrity`, `slab_nomerge`, `init_on_alloc=1`, `init_on_free=1`, `randomize_kstack_offset=on`, `vsyscall=none` set in bootloader args. Module loading frozen 30 s after graphical boot via `veilor-modules-lock.service`. |
-| Network-listening services as attack surface | `firewalld` default zone = `drop`; only `sshd` answers. `abrt*`, `cups`, `cups-browsed`, `geoclue`, `avahi-daemon`, `bluetooth`, `ModemManager`, `gssproxy`, `atd`, `pcscd.{socket,service}` are masked; `kdeconnectd` and `PackageKit` are removed at the package level. |
-| Time-based MITM (back-dated certs, replay) | `chrony` with NTS authentication against `time.cloudflare.com` and `nts.sth1/2.ntp.se` (pool fallback only). `systemd-resolved` with DNS-over-TLS opportunistic, DNSSEC `allow-downgrade`, LLMNR off; resolvers Cloudflare 1.1.1.1 / 1.0.0.1, fallback Quad9 9.9.9.9 / 149.112.112.112. |
-
----
-
-## Out of scope — what veilor-os does NOT defend against
-
-These adversaries are unambiguously outside our scope. Pretending otherwise
-gets people hurt. **If your adversary is on this list, pick a different tool.**
-
-| Adversary / scenario | Why veilor-os doesn't help | Use instead |
-|---|---|---|
-| Firmware-level implant (UEFI, Intel ME, BMC, EC) | veilor-os does not protect against firmware implants. Secure Boot validates the OS chain only; we do not flash, audit, or sign firmware below GRUB. | Heads / coreboot on supported hardware. |
-| Evil-maid attack on a running, unlocked system | LUKS master keys live in RAM while the system is up. A physically present attacker can dump RAM (cold-boot, Thunderbolt DMA, debug header) and recover them. | Power off when unattended. Disable Thunderbolt DMA in firmware. Qubes-in-a-Faraday-bag if you are that target. |
-| Hardware keylogger / interposer between keyboard and machine | veilor-os is software. Software cannot detect a passive hardware tap. | Physical custody of the device. Tamper-evident seals. |
-| Targeted RCE on the user session (browser 0-day, messenger exploit) | KDE Plasma is not sandboxed. A logged-in compromise owns the user's data and tokens. SELinux confines daemons; it does not confine the desktop session. | Qubes OS (per-app Xen VM isolation). |
-| Side-channel attacks on AES (timing, cache, power, EM) | veilor-os ships stock kernel crypto. We provide no constant-time or power-analysis guarantees beyond what the kernel and CPU deliver. | Threat-specific HSM, air-gap. |
-| Physical attack on a TPM2 chip (bus probe, glitch, decap) | veilor-os does not bind keys to TPM2 in v0.7. Even when binding lands post-v1.0, TPM2 is not anti-tamper hardware. | Off-device key custody (smartcard / YubiKey / OnlyKey). |
-| Network-level traffic correlation / traffic analysis | All packets leave the box on the local IP. veilor-os does not onion-route. | Tails, Whonix, Tor. |
-| Trust-on-first-use attacks (operator accepts a bad cert) | veilor-os cannot override the operator's explicit decisions. Bad SSL or SSH host-key acceptance is out of scope. | Enrolment policy, MDM, certificate pinning. |
-| Adversary with sustained physical access and time | Given unlimited physical time and tools, any laptop falls. | Operational security, not OS choice. |
-
----
-
-## Hardening tradeoffs (what you give up)
-
-Hardening that breaks ordinary work gets called out, not hidden.
-
-- **SELinux enforcing** — some apps (proprietary, out-of-tree) ship
-  without policy. Symptom: `EACCES` despite correct file perms.
-  Workaround: write a local policy module; do not switch to permissive.
-- **LUKS2 argon2id (mem=1 GB / time=9)** — boot 5–30 s slower on older
-  CPUs. The cost of a passphrase that survives a GPU attacker.
-- **USBGuard default-block** — every new device needs an explicit allow.
-  First-boot: plug trusted devices in, run `usbguard generate-policy`.
-  Forget this and your USB-C dock looks broken.
-- **Module lockdown 30 s after graphical boot** — out-of-tree drivers
-  (NVIDIA proprietary, VirtualBox, out-of-tree wireguard) will fail.
-  Load early via initramfs or use the in-tree alternative.
-- **firewalld zone = drop** — KDE Connect, mDNS printer discovery, SMB
-  browsing don't work until explicitly opened. This is the point.
-- **No PackageKit / no Flatpak by default** — updates happen on your
-  terms via `dnf upgrade`.
-
----
-
-## Where veilor-os IS like Tails / Whonix / Qubes
-
-- Threat model published. Transparency about scope is the price of being
-  taken seriously.
-- Default-deny firewall (`drop` zone, ssh inbound only).
-- Encrypted at rest by default — LUKS2 + argon2id, no-disk-swap (zram).
-
-## Where veilor-os DIFFERS
-
-- **Daily-driver target.** Boot it once, install it, use it for years.
-  Not a session-only / amnesia OS.
-- **Single-VM / single-kernel.** No per-app compartmentalisation. A
-  browser RCE owns your session. (See "out of scope".)
-- **Persistent identity by design.** Your `~`, your keys, your shell
-  history persist. This is a feature for an operator, a misfeature for
-  an activist evading correlation.
-
----
-
-## Comparison matrix
-
-Scoring legend: `✓` shipped & on by default, `~` partial / opt-in,
-`✗` not provided, `n/a` not applicable to that distro's model.
-Project metrics are GitHub / Codeberg figures as of 2026-05.
-
-| Axis | veilor-os | Stock Fedora KDE | Kicksecure | Tails | Qubes OS | secureblue | Athena OS |
-|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|
-| **Encrypted at rest by default** | ✓ (LUKS2 argon2id, mem=1 GiB) | ~ (optional in Anaconda) | ✓ | n/a (amnesic, session-only) | ✓ | ✓ | ~ (optional) |
-| **MAC enforcing OOTB** | ✓ (SELinux + opt-in AppArmor) | ✓ (SELinux) | ✓ (AppArmor) | ✓ (AppArmor) | ✓ (per-VM) | ✓ (SELinux) | ✓ (AppArmor) |
-| **Default-deny firewall** | ✓ (firewalld zone=drop) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ (Tor-only) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
-| **USB default-block** | ✓ (USBGuard, id-rules) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (sys-usb) | ✓ (USBGuard) | ✗ |
-| **Per-app isolation (VM/sandbox)** | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ~ (AppArmor) | ✓ (Xen VMs) | ~ (Flatpak/bwrap) | ✗ |
-| **Anonymity / Tor by default** | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ~ (Whonix VMs) | ✗ | ✗ |
-| **Daily driver target (persistent)** | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ (amnesic) | ✓ (heavy, hardware-partitioning) | ✓ | ✓ |
-| **Signed releases (cosign + GPG)** | ✓ (v0.7) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (cosign on OCI) | ~ (sha256 only) |
-| **Threat model published** | ✓ (this doc) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ |
-| **Hardware compatibility (laptops)** | ✓ (Fedora kernel) | ✓ | ~ | ~ (live USB) | ~ (Xen-pinned HCL) | ✓ | ✓ (Arch kernel) |
-| **Project size (contributors / stars, 2026-05)** | solo / pre-public | n/a (Fedora-wide) | small team / ~600 | ~30 / ~3k | large / ~5k | ~30 / ~940, active monthly cadence | ~8 / ~1.4k |
-
----
-
-## Where veilor-os fits
-
-Pick veilor-os if your job is to write code, edit docs, manage
-infrastructure, read mail, browse — and you want a desktop that won't
-quietly betray you to a generic adversary while you do it. **You are the
-user, not the target of a state.**
-
-Pick **Tails** for amnesia and Tor by default. **Qubes** if you must assume
-any app could be compromised. **Kicksecure** for similar hardening on
-Debian. **secureblue** for a hardened atomic Fedora. **Stock Fedora KDE**
-if you just want Fedora with no opinions.
-
----
-
-## v0.7 public-launch checklist
-
-These are the items that gate flipping the repo public and posting:
-
-- [ ] Threat model finalised and published (this document).
-- [ ] GPG-signed releases working (v0.4 dependency — ISO + sha256 + .asc).
-- [ ] Reproducible build verifiable from clean checkout (v0.4).
-- [ ] mkdocs-material (or Hugo) site live on `veilor.org`, generated from
-      `docs/`. INSTALL, HARDENING, BUILD, ROADMAP, RELEASE, THREAT-MODEL,
-      CONTRIBUTING all rendered.
-- [ ] Comparison + benchmark numbers published (cold boot, idle RAM, idle
-      egress, suspend/resume) vs stock Fedora KDE.
-- [ ] Press kit page: wallpapers, logo SVG, screenshots, feature
-      one-liner, signed quotes from early users.
-- [ ] **"What veilor-os is not"** preempt page — direct link from launch
-      post. Answers "why not Qubes?", "why not Tails?", "why not just
-      stock Fedora?" so the first hundred comments don't have to.
-- [ ] Comparison post drafted for **r/linux**, **r/Fedora**, **HN**.
-      Same body, three formats. Lead with the threat model link, not the
-      black wallpaper.
-- [ ] CHANGELOG.md tagged at v0.7.0 release commit; GitHub Release
-      created with ISO + sha256 + .asc artefacts attached.
-- [ ] Repo flipped to public, `veilor.org` DNS pointed at the docs site,
-      Mastodon / Matrix / SimpleX announcement queued.
-
----
-
-*Last reviewed: v0.7 draft. Update every minor release.*

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/01-plymouth-luks-real-hardware.md

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-# Plymouth + LUKS unlock — real-hardware edge cases
-
-**Agent 1 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
-
-## State at v0.5.31
-
-- Live ISO cmdline pins `plymouth.enable=0 fbcon=nodefer`.
-- Installed system uses Plymouth `details` theme.
-- LUKS2 argon2id, no clevis / cryptenroll, no recovery key generation.
-- `rd.vconsole.keymap=` not set.
-
-## Findings
-
-### 1. KMS / fbcon races
-
-- **Symptom:** Black screen at LUKS prompt, cursor blinks, keystrokes
-  swallowed but never accepted.
-- **Cause:** `i915` / `amdgpu` / `nvidia-drm` modeset fires *during*
-  plymouthd handover. With `plymouth.enable=0` we skip the splash but
-  the ask-password agent still opens `/dev/tty1`, which races `fbcon`
-  rebind.
-- **Fix:** keep `fbcon=nodefer`, append
-  `nvidia-drm.modeset=1 i915.fastboot=0 amdgpu.dc=1` to bootloader.
-  NVIDIA Optimus killer is `nvidia-drm.modeset=1`.
-- **Probability:** HIGH on Optimus, MED on AMD APU, LOW on Intel iGPU.
-
-### 2. Plymouth theme choice — keep `details`
-
-- `details` (kernel/systemd journal under prompt) is best for
-  blind-typing because the user sees `Please enter passphrase…` *as
-  text*, full echo as `*`.
-- `text` is minimal fallback (no echo, no journal).
-- `spinner` is the documented "endless loop, no prompt" failure mode
-  on real laptops (adi1090x/plymouth-themes#10, Arch BBS 296529).
-- **No change.** But verify `plymouth-set-default-theme details`
-  actually ran post-install (Debian #986023 shows it silently fails
-  when initramfs rebuild is suppressed). Add `dracut --force
-  --regenerate-all` after the call.
-
-### 3. Initramfs keymap — HIGH probability for non-US users
-
-- **Symptom:** AZERTY/QWERTZ/Cyrillic user types correct passphrase,
-  gets "no key available". F43 ships en-US in initramfs by default.
-- **Bugs:** RHBZ 1405539, RHBZ 1890085, fedora-silverblue#3.
-- **Fix:** drop a placeholder `rd.vconsole.keymap=us` AND have
-  `firstboot.sh` rewrite it from `/etc/vconsole.conf` after the user
-  picks a layout. Also `/etc/dracut.conf.d/veilor-keymap.conf` with
-  `install_items+=" /etc/vconsole.conf "` so keymap is *baked* into
-  initramfs.
-
-### 4. systemd-cryptsetup vs legacy `crypt` — F43 = systemd-cryptsetup
-
-- F40+ unconditionally uses `systemd-cryptsetup@.service` from
-  `/etc/crypttab`. Old `rd.luks.uuid=` cmdline still parsed. Stable
-  through 6.x kernels. No change needed.
-
-### 5. argon2id memory cost — MED on old laptops (<8 GB RAM)
-
-- LUKS2 default = 1 GiB memory cost, `iter-time=2000 ms`. On
-  Core 2 Duo / Pentium-N this becomes 8–15s unlock + thrash.
-  Atom-class N4020: 30s+.
-- **Fix in installer post-script:**
-  `cryptsetup luksConvertKey --pbkdf-memory 524288 --iter-time 2000`
-  — halves memory to 512 MiB, knocks ~50% off unlock latency.
-
-### 6. TPM2 unlock — defer to v0.6
-
-- F43 ships `systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=auto` ([Fedora
-  Magazine](https://fedoramagazine.org/automatically-decrypt-your-disk-using-tpm2/)).
-  No clevis required.
-- **v0.6 plan:** opt-in via `veilor-firstboot` →
-  `systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-pcrs=7+11`. PCR 7 (secure boot state)
-  + 11 (kernel/initrd). Don't auto-enroll; PCR pinning is a footgun
-  on kernel updates.
-
-### 7. FIDO2 unlock — v0.7
-
-- `systemd-cryptenroll --fido2-device=auto` requires `libfido2` +
-  hmac-secret support. secureblue ships this. Add `libfido2` to
-  `%packages` + `veilor-fido2-enroll` wrapper.
-
-### 8. Recovery key — MISSING, ship in v0.6
-
-- Today: forgotten passphrase = brick.
-- **Fix:** in `firstboot.sh` add
-  `cryptsetup luksAddKey --pbkdf argon2id /dev/X <(systemd-creds
-  setup --print-key | head -c 64)` and print the 64-char key once
-  to a numbered envelope-style screen. Mirrors macOS FileVault.
-
-## Action items
-
-| # | Change | Target |
-|---|--------|--------|
-| 1 | `nvidia-drm.modeset=1 i915.fastboot=0 amdgpu.dc=1 rd.vconsole.keymap=us` to bootloader append | v0.5.32 |
-| 2 | `/etc/dracut.conf.d/veilor-keymap.conf` with `install_items+=" /etc/vconsole.conf "` | v0.5.32 |
-| 3 | Force `dracut -f --regenerate-all` after `plymouth-set-default-theme details` | v0.5.32 |
-| 4 | argon2id retune (`40-luks-tune.sh`) | v0.6 |
-| 5 | Recovery-key generation in firstboot | v0.6 |
-| 6 | TPM2 opt-in via `systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-pcrs=7+11` | v0.6 |
-| 7 | FIDO2 opt-in | v0.7 |
-
-## Sources
-
-- [LUKS keyboard layout — fedora-silverblue/issue-tracker#3](https://github.com/fedora-silverblue/issue-tracker/issues/3)
-- [RHBZ 1405539 — keymap not honored on initramfs rebuild](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1405539)
-- [RHBZ 1890085 — English keymap forced in initramfs](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1890085)
-- [Fedora Magazine — TPM2 autodecrypt with systemd-cryptenroll](https://fedoramagazine.org/automatically-decrypt-your-disk-using-tpm2/)
-- [Leo3418 — argon2id LUKS tuning](https://leo3418.github.io/collections/gentoo-config-luks2-grub-systemd/tune-parameters.html)
-- [QubesOS#8600 — argon2id parameters](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8600)

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/02-sddm-firstboot-ux.md

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-# SDDM + first-boot UX failure modes
-
-**Agent 2 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
-
-## Findings
-
-### 1. SDDM has no username prefilled — BLOCKS LOGIN (perceived)
-
-- User sees blank greeter; no signal that the only user is `admin`.
-- **Fix:** `/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor.conf` add
-  `[Users]\nRememberLastUser=true` plus seed
-  `/var/lib/sddm/state.conf [Last]\nUser=admin\nSession=plasma`.
-
-### 2. chage -d 0 + SDDM autologin race
-
-- With `Relogin=false` (current), single-shot is safe.
-- **Fix:** Document `Relogin=false`. Don't combine `Autologin=true`
-  with `chage -d 0`.
-
-### 3. PAM expired-pw change inline in SDDM
-
-- Plasma 6 SDDM 0.21+ renders the chain. **But** if password fails
-  pwquality (cracklib min=14 + complexity from
-  `10-harden-base.sh`), error text shown briefly then form resets —
-  user sees no clear reason for rejection.
-- **Fix:** `/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/10-veilor.conf` with
-  documented rules + Plasma startup notification showing them.
-
-### 4. Wayland session start failure on virtio-vga — BLOCKS LOGIN
-
-- KWin tries `wlroots`/DRM, fails to acquire `/dev/dri/card0` if
-  `virtio_gpu` kernel module not loaded.
-- **Fix:** add `plasma-workspace-x11` to `%packages`. SDDM session
-  menu shows `Plasma (X11)` fallback.
-
-### 5. Plasma 6 first-run wizards on /etc/skel-empty
-
-- KWin compositor backend pick + Plasma welcome center + accent
-  colour wizard — modal stealing focus on first session.
-- **Fix:** seed `/etc/skel/.config/`:
-  - `kwinrc` `[Compositing]\nBackend=OpenGL`
-  - `kdeglobals [General]\nAccentColor=...`
-  - `plasma-welcomerc [General]\nLastSeenVersion=99` (suppresses welcome)
-
-### 6. SELinux relabel after first boot — looks like hang
-
-- `touch /.autorelabel` triggers full restore on rootfs; 90s on
-  4 GB live install, 3-5min on real disk. User hard-resets thinking
-  it crashed → corrupted relabel state.
-- **Fix:** replace with `veilor-relabel.service` that prints
-  `[veilor] relabeling SELinux file contexts (1/N): %s` to TTY1
-  with progress, plus one-time post-relabel KDialog notification.
-
-### 7. USBGuard blocks input at SDDM — BLOCKS LOGIN on desktops
-
-- If `/etc/usbguard/rules.conf` empty/missing, USBGuard
-  `ImplicitPolicyTarget=block` (default) blocks USB. SDDM running
-  but USB keyboard dead.
-- **Fix:** ship a baseline `rules.conf`:
-  `allow with-interface equals { 03:00:* 03:01:* }`
-  (HID class) so any keyboard/mouse works pre-policy.
-
-### 8. NetworkManager DHCP — LOW severity
-
-- Wired auto-connects fine. Wi-Fi: silent failure unless SSID
-  preconfigured. Acceptable; Plasma 6 ships `plasma-nm` widget.
-- **Polish:** `/etc/xdg/autostart/veilor-firstboot-net-check.desktop`
-  → KDialog "Connect to network?" if `nmcli general` is `disconnected`.
-
-### 9. veilor-firstboot.service ordering — BLOCKS LOGIN on real installs
-
-- **Current:** `WantedBy=multi-user.target` only.
-- **Real installs:** default to `graphical.target`, so unit never runs.
-- Admin pw stays `veilor` + chage-expired. SDDM PAM bounces to
-  chauthtok screen — recoverable but ugly.
-- **Fix:** `WantedBy=graphical.target multi-user.target`. Add
-  `Before=graphical.target`. Verify `systemctl enable
-  veilor-firstboot.service` (in installer line 884) resolves both.
-  Add `DefaultDependencies=no` + `Wants=systemd-vconsole-setup.service`.
-
-## Endeavour OS welcome app — design notes for veilor-postinstall
-
-EOS welcome (`endeavouros-team/welcome` on GitHub) is bash + yad,
-~3000 LOC. Patterns to lift for veilor:
-
-- **Yad GTK dialog** as runtime (single binary dep). veilor (KDE)
-  uses `kdialog` + `qmlscene` instead — native Plasma look.
-- **Tabbed layout:** Welcome | Set up apps | Security | System info | Shortcuts.
-- **Self-disabling autostart:**
-  `~/.config/autostart/veilor-welcome.desktop` removed after user
-  clicks "Don't show again".
-- **External script dispatch:**
-  `/usr/share/veilor-os/postinstall/<step>.sh` per step. Decouples
-  UI from actions.
-- **Update channel awareness:** pull from
-  `github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os` releases atom feed; show CVE
-  advisories from `security.atom` we publish.
-
-**Recommended stack:**
-- `/usr/bin/veilor-welcome` (bash entrypoint, ≤300 LOC)
-- `/usr/share/veilor-os/postinstall/welcome.qml` (QtQuick/Kirigami UI)
-- `/usr/share/veilor-os/postinstall/steps/{01-account,02-network,03-usbguard-policy,04-update,05-tour}.sh`
-- `/etc/xdg/autostart/veilor-welcome.desktop`
-- Replace current `scripts/firstboot.sh` placeholder with
-  `step 03-usbguard-policy` (auto-generate-policy is the unfinished
-  core item).
-
-## Top three to ship next (highest UX impact, lowest risk)
-
-1. **`WantedBy=graphical.target multi-user.target`** in
-   `veilor-firstboot.service` — fixes silent SDDM-PAM-chauthtok
-   bounce on real installs.
-2. **Username prefill** in `sddm.conf.d/veilor.conf`: add `[Users]
-   RememberLastUser=true` + `/var/lib/sddm/state.conf [Last]
-   User=admin Session=plasma`.
-3. **USBGuard HID baseline `rules.conf`** — un-bricks any desktop
-   with USB keyboard.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/03-bootc-spike-plan.md

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-# bootc-image-builder spike plan — 1-week timebox
-
-**Agent 3 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.** Schedule: v0.7.
-
-## Containerfile draft
-
-```dockerfile
-# veilor-os bootc image — Fedora 43 KDE base
-FROM quay.io/fedora/fedora-bootc:43
-
-ARG VEILOR_VERSION=0.6.0
-
-RUN dnf install -y --setopt=install_weak_deps=False \
-      @kde-desktop-environment @kde-apps @core @hardware-support @standard \
-      kernel-modules kernel-modules-extra glibc-all-langpacks \
-      grub2-efi-x64 grub2-efi-x64-modules grub2-pc grub2-pc-modules \
-      grub2-tools grub2-tools-extra shim-x64 efibootmgr \
-      newt parted cryptsetup lvm2 btrfs-progs \
-      fail2ban fail2ban-firewalld usbguard usbguard-tools audit \
-      policycoreutils-python-utils tuned chrony firewalld plymouth \
-      git vim-enhanced tmux htop podman skopeo \
-      NetworkManager NetworkManager-wifi \
-      fontconfig freetype fira-code-fonts \
-      zram-generator \
- && dnf remove -y --noautoremove \
-      'abrt*' snapd kde-connect open-vm-tools-desktop mlocate man-db man-pages \
- && dnf clean all && rm -rf /var/cache/dnf
-
-ARG GUM_VERSION=0.17.0
-ARG GUM_SHA256=69ee169bd6387331928864e94d47ed01ef649fbfe875baed1bbf27b5377a6fdb
-ADD https://github.com/charmbracelet/gum/releases/download/v${GUM_VERSION}/gum_${GUM_VERSION}_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz /tmp/gum.tgz
-RUN echo "${GUM_SHA256}  /tmp/gum.tgz" | sha256sum -c - \
- && tar -xzf /tmp/gum.tgz -C /tmp \
- && install -m0755 /tmp/gum_${GUM_VERSION}_Linux_x86_64/gum /usr/bin/gum
-
-COPY overlay/ /
-COPY assets/ /usr/share/veilor-os/assets/
-COPY scripts/ /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/
-
-RUN bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/10-harden-base.sh \
- && bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/20-harden-kernel.sh \
- && bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/selinux/build-policy.sh \
- && bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/kde-theme-apply.sh \
- && bash /usr/share/veilor-os/scripts/30-apply-v03-theme.sh
-
-RUN plymouth-set-default-theme details \
- && sed -i \
-      -e 's|^GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR=.*|GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR="veilor-os"|' \
-      /etc/default/grub
-
-# bootc kargs go in /usr/lib/bootc/kargs.d/, not /etc/default/grub
-RUN mkdir -p /usr/lib/bootc/kargs.d && cat > /usr/lib/bootc/kargs.d/10-veilor-hardening.toml <<'EOF'
-kargs = [
-  "lockdown=integrity",
-  "slab_nomerge",
-  "init_on_alloc=1",
-  "init_on_free=1",
-  "randomize_kstack_offset=on",
-  "vsyscall=none",
-  "fbcon=nodefer",
-]
-EOF
-
-RUN systemctl enable sshd fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld chronyd sddm \
-                     veilor-firstboot.service veilor-modules-lock.service \
- && passwd -l root \
- && systemctl set-default graphical.target
-
-RUN bootc container lint
-LABEL org.veilor.version=${VEILOR_VERSION}
-```
-
-## bootc-image-builder config (`build/disk-config.toml`)
-
-```toml
-[customizations]
-hostname = "veilor-os"
-
-[[customizations.user]]
-name = "admin"
-password = "veilor"
-groups = ["wheel"]
-shell = "/bin/bash"
-
-[customizations.kernel]
-append = "lockdown=integrity slab_nomerge init_on_alloc=1 init_on_free=1 randomize_kstack_offset=on vsyscall=none fbcon=nodefer"
-
-[customizations.installer.kickstart]
-contents = """
-zerombr
-clearpart --all --initlabel
-part /boot/efi --fstype=efi --size=600
-part /boot     --fstype=ext4 --size=1024
-part btrfs.veilor --grow --encrypted --luks-version=luks2 --pbkdf=argon2id
-btrfs none --label=veilor btrfs.veilor
-btrfs /     --subvol --name=root LABEL=veilor
-btrfs /home --subvol --name=home LABEL=veilor
-"""
-```
-
-## GitHub Actions workflow
-
-`build-bootc-iso.yml`:
-- runs-on ubuntu-24.04, **timeout 30 min** (vs 90 for livecd-creator)
-- permissions: `contents: write`, `packages: write`
-- Build OCI image: `podman build` + `podman push ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43`
-- Build ISO via `quay.io/centos-bootc/bootc-image-builder:latest`
-  with `--type anaconda-iso --rootfs btrfs --config /build/disk-config.toml`
-- Reuse split + `softprops/action-gh-release@v2` from existing workflow
-
-## Migration risks (10-row table)
-
-| # | Risk | Severity | Mitigation |
-|---|------|----------|------------|
-| 1 | %post --nochroot overlay-copy disappears | Low | `COPY overlay/ /` is simpler — win |
-| 2 | Update model: `bootc upgrade` (image swap) replaces `dnf upgrade` | High | `veilor-update` becomes thin `bootc upgrade --apply` wrapper |
-| 3 | /usr is read-only at runtime | Medium | etc-overlay handles /etc writes; relocate any /usr writers to /etc or build-time |
-| 4 | SELinux module compilation in container | Medium | Works in fedora-bootc:43 (verified per upstream pattern). Test spike day 2 |
-| 5 | `transaction_progress.py` patch unnecessary | Low | bootc-image-builder doesn't use dnf at install. Drop the patch. Win |
-| 6 | `rd.luks.uuid` is anaconda's job again | Low | Removes ~80 lines of fragile sed/grubby code. Win |
-| 7 | LUKS prompt UX: anaconda native, not gum | High | gum installer becomes `live·shell` only. v1.0 install = anaconda's native UI |
-| 8 | --privileged still required | None | Same as today |
-| 9 | OCI image size: ~3.5 GB compressed vs ~2.8 GB squashfs | Low | zstd:max recovers ~400 MB |
-| 10 | `kernel-install` BLS: `/etc/kernel/cmdline` not honored, `/usr/lib/bootc/kargs.d/*.toml` is | Medium | Already addressed in Containerfile draft |
-
-## What we keep (zero churn)
-
-- `overlay/*` — copied verbatim by `COPY overlay/ /`
-- `scripts/*.sh` — invoked verbatim by Containerfile RUN
-- `assets/*` — copied verbatim
-- `test/*` — adapts: `podman run --rm -it ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43 /bin/bash` smoke; QEMU ISO test unchanged
-- `kickstart/install.ks` — kept as fallback. Tag last anaconda build as `v0.5.99-anaconda` before flipping
-
-## Spike success criteria (1 week)
-
-| Day | Milestone |
-|-----|-----------|
-| 1 | Containerfile builds clean (`podman build` exit 0, `bootc container lint` exit 0) |
-| 2 | `podman run` boots into image, KDE binaries present, SELinux + hardening sysctls applied |
-| 3 | bootc-image-builder produces installer ISO from OCI, ksvalidator clean |
-| 4 | ISO boots in QEMU to anaconda live menu |
-| 5 | Install completes, LUKS single-prompt, btrfs subvols present |
-| 6 | First boot reaches SDDM, admin login works, password-change-on-first-login enforced |
-| 7 | Buffer for fixes; doc `docs/BUILD-bootc.md`; tag `v0.5.99-anaconda` snapshot |
-
-## Decision gate
-
-- **PASS** (all 7 criteria green): tag `v0.5.99-anaconda` as last-anaconda;
-  merge `bootc-spike` → `main` as `v0.6.0-bootc`; deprecate
-  `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` (keep `kickstart/install.ks` for one cycle).
-  Update ROADMAP: v1.0 ships bootc-only.
-
-- **FAIL** (any of risks 3, 4, 7, 10 unfixable in week 1): keep
-  anaconda path, defer migration to v1.1+; file each blocker as GH
-  issue with reproducer.
-
-- **HYBRID FALLBACK**: ship anaconda ISO for v0.6/v0.7, ship bootc OCI
-  alongside (matches existing `veilor-atomic` stretch goal).

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/04-hardening-tier-2.md

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-# Hardening tier 2 — concrete plan
-
-**Agent 4 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
-
-## Repo state already in tree
-
-- `scripts/apparmor/` ships **3 profiles** (`thorium`, `veilor-power`,
-  `lm-studio`) — complain-mode, **not auto-loaded**. No browser/mail
-  /Element profile.
-- `scripts/selinux/` ships custom `.te` modules — primary MAC.
-- `overlay/etc/audit/plugins.d/veilor-remote.conf` +
-  `audisp-remote.conf.disabled` — **scaffold present, opt-in switch
-  missing**.
-- `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` — single live-ks. Real LUKS install lives
-  in `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer` (generates ks at runtime).
-- No nftables overlay. No homed scaffold. No `veilor-audit-shipping` CLI.
-
-## Item-by-item plan
-
-### 1. AppArmor stack with SELinux — M
-
-Fedora 43 ships `apparmor-parser`/`libapparmor`. Kernel has both LSMs.
-Stacking works since 5.1; SELinux stays primary, AppArmor confines
-specific binaries by path. **No conflict** — they layer. Risk: AA
-profiles based on Debian/Ubuntu paths fail on Fedora.
-
-**Files:**
-- `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` `%packages` add `apparmor-parser apparmor-utils apparmor-profiles`
-- `overlay/etc/apparmor.d/veilor.d/` (new) — vendor profiles
-  `firefox`, `thunderbird`, `element-desktop`, `signal-desktop`
-- `scripts/40-apparmor.sh` (new) — parses + sets all veilor profiles
-  to **complain** on first install (logs only, no break)
-- `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-doctor` — adds AA status check
-
-**Test:** `aa-status | grep complain` shows >=4 loaded; firefox writes
-outside policy → audit.log denial.
-
-### 2. systemd-homed opt-in — L
-
-Default LUKS storage `homectl` drops key on suspend; resume needs PAM
-unlock again — **breaks "lid open, keep working"**. Use
-`--storage=fscrypt` on top of existing btrfs `/home` subvol —
-suspend transparent, encrypts at rest with per-user key.
-
-**Files:**
-- `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-homed-enable` (new) — confirms warning,
-  runs `homectl create admin --storage=fscrypt --real-name="veilor admin"`
-  after migrating files
-- `overlay/etc/pam.d/sddm` drop-in for `pam_systemd_home.so`
-- doc in `docs/HARDENING.md`. **Not auto-run** — only via post-install.
-
-### 3. nftables alongside firewalld — S
-
-firewalld speaks nftables backend on F43 — they don't conflict;
-firewalld owns `inet firewalld` table. veilor-os preset = separate
-`inet veilor` table loaded by its own service.
-
-**Files:**
-- `overlay/etc/nftables/veilor.nft` (new) — table `inet veilor`:
-  ssh per-IP rate limit (5/min), ICMP rate limit, optional
-  `ip6 daddr ::/0 drop` toggled by sysctl-style `/etc/veilor/ipv6.disabled`,
-  anti-port-scan via `meter` set
-- `overlay/etc/systemd/system/veilor-nftables.service` (new) —
-  `After=firewalld.service`
-- `kickstart/veilor-os.ks` `%packages` add `nftables`, services-enabled
-  add `veilor-nftables`
-
-**Test:** `nft list ruleset` shows both `firewalld` AND `veilor`;
-`hping3 -S -p 22 --flood` from second VM gets rate-limited.
-
-### 4. Audit log shipping — S
-
-Plumbing **already in tree** (`audisp-remote.conf.disabled`,
-`veilor-remote.conf` with `active=no`). What's missing: CLI to flip
-the switch with cert pinning.
-
-**Files:**
-- `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-audit-shipping` (new)
-  - `enable HOST PORT FINGERPRINT` writes
-    `/etc/veilor/audit-pin.sha256`, copies `audisp-remote.conf.disabled`
-    → `audisp-remote.conf` with substituted host/port, enables plugin
-    (`active=yes`), restarts auditd
-  - `disable` reverses
-- audisp-remote speaks TLS directly; cert pinning via `verify_peer=yes`
-  + `peer_cert_fingerprint`
-- Use **self-signed pinned**, not LE — collectors are LAN/VPN
-
-**Test:** stand up `rsyslog` listener on nullstone with self-signed
-cert; run helper; trigger `sudo -i`; tail nullstone for AUTHPRIV
-event; revoke cert → events stop with logged TLS error.
-
-### 5. Installer kickstart split — needs re-scope, S
-
-Roadmap item is **stale**. As of v0.5.30 we already do real LUKS+btrfs
-in `veilor-installer` which generates ks at runtime. **Re-scope:**
-extract that generated ks template into static
-`kickstart/veilor-os-install.ks` (parameterised via `%include
-/tmp/answers.ks`), so reviewable in repo and reusable headlessly.
-
-**Files:**
-- split `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer` heredoc into
-  `kickstart/veilor-os-install.ks`
-- installer just writes answers + `cp` the ks
-- CI lints both with `ksvalidator`
-
-### 6. Audit baseline re-run — S
-
-Mechanical: `cp security/audit-template.md
-security/veilor-os-distro/2026-05-DD.md`, run on VM, target lower
-findings count than v0.2's baseline.
-
-## Order, dependencies, ship plan
-
-Dependencies: (5) blocks (6) — audit a stable installer, not a
-moving heredoc. Else parallel.
-
-**Total effort:** 2S + 1S(rescope) + 1S + 1M + 1L ≈ **5–7 dev-days**.
-
-- **v0.5.32 (small wins):** (4) audit shipping CLI + (3) nftables
-  preset. Both S, scaffold completion, pure overlay (no kickstart risk).
-- **v0.5.33:** (5) ks split + (6) audit baseline re-run.
-- **v0.6 (medium):** (1) AppArmor stack — package install + 4 profiles
-  + doctor integration; complain-mode keeps blast radius zero.
-- **v0.7 (big lift):** (2) systemd-homed — UX-disruptive, needs
-  migration helper + doc page + suspend/lock/swap testing.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/05-threat-model-launch.md

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-# Threat model + public launch prep
-
-**Agent 5 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
-
-## Deliverable
-
-Threat model written to `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (1492 words). Slots
-into `docs/ROADMAP.md` v0.7 line item "Threat model published —
-honest scope".
-
-## Structure
-
-1. **In-scope adversaries** (9 rows): lost laptop, browser RCE, USB
-   attacks, SSH brute-force, forensics, supply chain, LPE, network
-   surface, time MITM. Each maps to specific veilor mitigation
-   (LUKS2 argon2id mem=1GB, SELinux + `veilor-systemd` policy,
-   USBGuard, fail2ban+firewalld, auditd, NTS chrony, etc.).
-
-2. **Out-of-scope adversaries** (9 rows): firmware implants,
-   evil-maid on running system, hardware keylogger, session-level
-   RCE (KDE not sandboxed), AES side-channels, TPM2 physical
-   attacks, traffic correlation, TOFU MITM, sustained physical
-   access. Each row points to right tool instead (Heads, Qubes,
-   Tails).
-
-3. **Hardening tradeoffs** (6 honest costs):
-   - SELinux app-compat
-   - Slow LUKS boot
-   - USBGuard friction
-   - Module lockdown breaking NVIDIA prop / VBox
-   - Drop-zone breaking KDE Connect / mDNS
-   - No PackageKit
-
-4. **Like Tails/Whonix/Qubes:** published threat model, default-deny
-   firewall, encrypted at rest.
-
-5. **Differs from them:** daily-driver vs session-only; single-VM vs
-   Qubes compartmentalisation; persistent identity vs Tails amnesia.
-
-6. **Comparison matrix:** 10-axis × 6-distro grid (veilor-os / stock
-   Fedora KDE / Kicksecure / Tails / Qubes / secureblue) covering
-   encryption, MAC, firewall, USB, per-app isolation, anonymity,
-   daily-driver fit, signed releases, threat-model publication,
-   hardware compat.
-
-7. **v0.7 launch checklist** (9 items):
-   - Threat model finalised
-   - GPG signing (v0.4 dep)
-   - mkdocs-material on veilor.org
-   - Comparison + benchmarks
-   - Press kit
-   - "What veilor-os is not" preempt page (covers "why not Qubes/Tails/Fedora?")
-   - r/linux + r/Fedora + HN posts
-   - GitHub Release with ISO+sha256+.asc
-   - Repo flip-public + DNS + Mastodon/Matrix/SimpleX announce
-
-## Tone
-
-Matches repo voice — short paragraphs, no fluff, "honest scope"
-framing reused from roadmap. No emojis (per CLAUDE.md style).
-
-## See also
-
-- `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (full document)
-- `docs/ROADMAP.md` v0.7 section

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/06-anaconda-log-capture.md

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-# Anaconda log capture — virtio-9p host-share
-
-**Agent 6 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
-
-## Why current setup is silent
-
-v0.5.30 wired:
-
-```
--chardev file,id=anaclog,path=$ANACONDA_LOG
--device virtio-serial-pci,id=vs1
--device virtserialport,chardev=anaclog,bus=vs1.0,name=org.fedoraproject.anaconda.log.0
-```
-
-Anaconda is supposed to autodetect this port and stream logs. Result:
-`test/anaconda-vm-*.log` files are 0 bytes despite multiple full
-installs.
-
-**Root cause:** Anaconda's `setupVirtio()` (anaconda_logging.py:315)
-doesn't write to the virtio port directly — it adds a forward rule to
-`/etc/rsyslog.conf` then calls `restart_service("rsyslog")`. No
-`inst.virtiolog` boot arg is required (`--virtiolog` defaults to the
-right port via `argument_parsing.py:512`).
-
-The veilor live ISO almost certainly **lacks `rsyslog`** (minimal
-Fedora ks), so the forward rule lands in a file no daemon reads.
-`restart_service` is a no-op. The QEMU side opens the port and
-creates the 0-byte file but nothing ever writes to it.
-
-Even with rsyslog present, only `LOG_LOCAL1`-tagged messages would
-flow; the rich content lives in `/tmp/anaconda.log`,
-`/tmp/program.log`, `/tmp/storage.log`, `/tmp/packaging.log` which
-never traverse syslog.
-
-## Fix — Option C (virtio-9p host-share + post-install copy)
-
-### `test/run-vm.sh`
-
-Add `-virtfs` 9p export of `test/test-runs/<timestamp>/` tagged
-`hostlogs`. Keep existing virtio-serial as belt-and-braces fallback.
-
-```bash
-TS=$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)
-HOSTLOGS_DIR="$TEST_DIR/test-runs/$TS"
-mkdir -p "$HOSTLOGS_DIR"
-HOSTSHARE_ARGS=(
-    -virtfs "local,path=$HOSTLOGS_DIR,mount_tag=hostlogs,security_model=mapped-xattr,id=hostshare"
-)
-echo "  Logs  : $HOSTLOGS_DIR"
-```
-
-Append `"${HOSTSHARE_ARGS[@]}" \` to the `exec qemu-system-x86_64`
-block.
-
-### `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer`
-
-In `run_install()`, install an `EXIT` trap calling `_dump_logs_to_host`
-that mounts the 9p share at `/mnt/hostlogs` and copies:
-
-- `/tmp/{anaconda,program,storage,packaging,dnf,dnf.librepo,anaconda-cmdline}.log`
-- `/var/log/veilor-installer.log`
-- generated kickstart at `/run/install/veilor-generated.ks`
-- `dmesg` output
-- `journalctl -b` output
-
-Runs on success, failure, and `^C`. Auto-no-ops on real hardware
-where 9p isn't loaded.
-
-```bash
-_dump_logs_to_host() {
-    if mount -t 9p -o trans=virtio,version=9p2000.L hostlogs /mnt/hostlogs 2>/dev/null; then
-        cp -a /tmp/{anaconda,program,storage,packaging,dnf,dnf.librepo,anaconda-cmdline}.log \
-              /var/log/veilor-installer.log \
-              /run/install/veilor-generated.ks \
-              /mnt/hostlogs/ 2>/dev/null || true
-        dmesg > /mnt/hostlogs/dmesg.log 2>/dev/null || true
-        journalctl -b > /mnt/hostlogs/journal.log 2>/dev/null || true
-        umount /mnt/hostlogs 2>/dev/null || true
-    fi
-}
-trap _dump_logs_to_host EXIT
-```
-
-## Why options A/B/D were rejected
-
-- **A** (grub kernel arg surgery — `inst.virtiolog`) and **D** (host
-  rsyslog TCP listener with `inst.syslog=10.0.2.2:5140`) both still
-  rely on rsyslog being present in the live ISO.
-- **B** (anaconda --syslog at CLI) — same dependency.
-- **C** captures complete file-level fidelity regardless. virtio-9p is
-  in the kernel; mount is two lines; copies the actual files.
-
-## Files modified
-
-- `test/run-vm.sh`
-- `overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer`

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/07-kde-skel-branding.md

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-# KDE theme + DuckSans + /etc/skel branding audit
-
-**Agent 7 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
-
-## Catalog: what's currently shipped
-
-| Component | Status | Path |
-|---|---|---|
-| Color scheme | shipped | `assets/kde/veilor-black.colors` → `/usr/share/color-schemes/` |
-| System kdeglobals | shipped | `assets/kde/veilor-default.kdeglobals` → `/etc/xdg/kdedefaults/kdeglobals` |
-| Breeze decoration override | shipped | `assets/kde/breezerc` → `/etc/xdg/breezerc` |
-| Plasma containment defaults | shipped | written by `30-apply-v03-theme.sh` → `/etc/xdg/kdedefaults/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc` |
-| Wallpaper (PNG+SVG) | shipped | `assets/wallpapers/veilor-black.{png,svg}` → `/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black/` |
-| SDDM theme | shipped (full QML) | `assets/sddm/veilor-black/` → `/usr/share/sddm/themes/veilor-black/` |
-| SDDM theme activation | shipped | `30-apply-v03-theme.sh` writes `/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor-theme.conf` (Current=veilor-black) |
-| Konsole profile + colorscheme | shipped | `assets/konsole/veilor.{profile,colorscheme}` → `/usr/share/konsole/Veilor.*` + `/etc/xdg/konsolerc` |
-| Plymouth theme | shipped | `assets/plymouth/veilor/` |
-| os-release branding | shipped | PRETTY_NAME="veilor-os 0.5.27", LOGO=veilor-logo |
-| Fira Code fontconfig | shipped | `/etc/fonts/conf.d/55-veilor-firacode.conf` |
-| DuckSans font | DEFERRED — empty dir, README only | |
-
-## Drift inside active configs
-
-- `overlay/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor.conf` sets `[Theme] Current=breeze`.
-- `30-apply-v03-theme.sh` then writes
-  `/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor-theme.conf` with `Current=veilor-black`.
-- SDDM merges alphabetically → `veilor-theme.conf` wins (loads after).
-- Shipping a `Current=breeze` line in the overlay is misleading drift.
-
-## Specific gaps preventing visual brand consistency
-
-1. **No `/etc/skel/` whatsoever.** `overlay/etc/skel/` does not exist.
-   All KDE config lives in `/etc/xdg/kdedefaults/` and `/etc/xdg/*rc`.
-   Works for fresh boots, but the moment the user clicks anything in
-   System Settings, KDE writes `~/.config/kdeglobals` and silently
-   shadows the system defaults. **Zero per-user seeding** = one click
-   away from losing all branding.
-
-2. **No PRETTY_NAME secondaries.** `/etc/system-release`, `/etc/issue`,
-   `/etc/issue.net`, `/etc/lsb-release` never written. `lsb_release
-   -a` reports Fedora. KDE About dialog uses os-release (OK) but TTY
-   login banner + many user-space tools read `/etc/system-release`.
-
-3. **No `kwinrc` shipped.** Plasma 6 Wayland-specific defaults
-   (TitlebarDoubleClick, Compositor backend, FocusPolicy, animation
-   speed) not seeded. Vanilla Fedora KDE animations + click-to-focus
-   prevail.
-
-4. **No panel layout** (`plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc`
-   containment for panel). The file written by `30-apply-v03-theme.sh`
-   only seeds `[Containments][1]` (desktop containment) for wallpaper.
-   Actual Plasma panel containment (taskbar, system tray, clock,
-   kickoff icon) is unseeded → users get stock Fedora panel with
-   Fedora-blue kickoff button.
-
-5. **DuckSans deferred but README claims it as the brand font.**
-   `kdeglobals`, Konsole, SDDM all hardcode `Fira Code`. If DuckSans
-   ever ships, ten files need synchronized edits.
-
-6. **`overlay/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor.conf` says `Current=breeze`** —
-   internal contradiction with script-written `veilor-theme.conf`.
-   Cosmetic but confusing.
-
-7. **`kde-theme-apply.sh` has `warn()` undefined** (line 64) — calls
-   `warn` but only `ok`/`info` defined. If os-release source ever
-   goes missing, script crashes with `command not found`.
-
-## Top 5 `/etc/skel/` additions (highest impact, lowest effort)
-
-1. **`/etc/skel/.config/kdeglobals`** — copy of
-   `assets/kde/veilor-default.kdeglobals`. Single highest-impact file:
-   locks ColorScheme, AccentColor, Font, Icons.Theme,
-   LookAndFeelPackage into the user's first-write file so System
-   Settings interaction won't revert anything to Breeze defaults.
-
-2. **`/etc/skel/.config/konsolerc`** — `[Desktop Entry]
-   DefaultProfile=Veilor.profile` plus `[KonsoleWindow]
-   ShowMenuBarByDefault=false`. Per-user override of system konsolerc;
-   ensures first konsole launch is branded even if user's home
-   pre-exists.
-
-3. **`/etc/skel/.config/kwinrc`** — Plasma 6 Wayland defaults:
-   `[Compositing] AnimationSpeed=0`, `[Windows]
-   FocusPolicy=ClickToFocus`, `[Plugins] blurEnabled=false` (mirrors
-   the no-animations Breeze override).
-
-4. **`/etc/skel/.config/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc`** —
-   full containment file with both desktop containment
-   (wallpaper=veilor-black) AND panel containment (kickoff icon =
-   `/usr/share/pixmaps/veilor-logo.svg`, panel height/position).
-   Without this, the taskbar is vanilla Fedora.
-
-5. **`/etc/skel/.local/share/konsole/Veilor.profile`** — local copy so
-   user-local konsole sees the profile in its dropdown without needing
-   `/usr/share/konsole/` walk. Pair with #2.
-
-**Bonus near-zero-effort:** write `/etc/system-release`, `/etc/issue`,
-and `/etc/lsb-release` in `kde-theme-apply.sh` to close the
-lsb_release/TTY-banner gap. And fix the undefined `warn()` in
-`kde-theme-apply.sh:64`.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/08-ci-hardening.md

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-# Build-iso CI hardening
-
-**Agent 8 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.**
-
-## State of play
-
-- Workflows: `build-iso.yml`, `lint.yml`, `Release Checksums` (auto)
-- Secrets/variables: **none configured** — only ambient `GITHUB_TOKEN`
-- Repo: private, MIT, no Pages, no Dependabot, no branch protection
-  (Pro-gated until public flip)
-- Container: `registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43` (tag, not digest)
-- Actions: `actions/checkout@v4`, `addnab/docker-run-action@v3`,
-  `softprops/action-gh-release@v2`, `ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master`
-  — **all unpinned to SHA**
-- gum download: pinned by SHA256 ✓
-- Kickstart repos: `releases/43/Everything` + `updates/43/Everything`
-  — **both rolling**, byte-different daily
-
-## Top 5 immediate (S effort, ship in v0.5.32)
-
-| # | Item | Why |
-|---|------|-----|
-| 1 | Pin all actions to commit SHA + add `.github/dependabot.yml` for `github-actions` | Supply-chain — `@master` on shellcheck is live-takeover vector; v3/v4 tags are mutable |
-| 2 | Pin Fedora container to digest (`registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43@sha256:...`) | One-line change; eliminates "container drift" repro class |
-| 3 | Add `permissions:` block at workflow level (`contents: read` default), override per-job | `contents: write` is workflow-wide; least-privilege the lint job |
-| 4 | Generate SBOM via `anchore/sbom-action`, attach to release | Free, ~30 lines, journalist-readable |
-| 5 | Add `actions/attest-build-provenance@v2` for SLSA L3 attestation on ISO + parts | Free, GH-native, `id-token: write` only |
-
-## v0.4 release-eng roadmap (confirmed/added)
-
-- **Confirmed:** Sigstore/cosign signing of ISOs (already in roadmap)
-- **Add:** Fedora compose-ID pinning per release tag — switch
-  `--baseurl` to
-  `kojipkgs.fedoraproject.org/compose/branched/Fedora-43-...n.X/compose/Everything/x86_64/os/`
-  for stable releases (rolling for `ci-latest`)
-- **Add:** Reproducible-Builds.org diffoscope job comparing 2
-  sequential builds of same SHA — gate on byte-equality
-- **Add:** `harden-runner` (StepSecurity) audit-mode pass to enumerate
-  egress; promote to block-mode in v0.5
-- **Add:** When repo flips public (v0.7), enable secret scanning + push
-  protection + private vuln reporting + branch protection (require ≥1
-  review, status checks: lint + ksvalidate + build, no force-push)
-- **Add:** OIDC `id-token: write` only in tag-release job (not on
-  `main` push) — keysless cosign signing scoped to release events
-
-## YAML diffs
-
-### 1. Workflow-level permissions + per-job override
-
-```yaml
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-jobs:
-  build:
-    permissions:
-      contents: write       # gh-release
-      id-token: write       # cosign keyless + attestation
-      attestations: write
-```
-
-### 2. SHA-pin actions
-
-```yaml
-- uses: actions/checkout@692973e3d937129bcbf40652eb9f2f61becf3332     # v4.1.7
-- uses: addnab/docker-run-action@4f65375b03d588f307b7a3b0a8bb50f8b58a85b9 # v3
-- uses: softprops/action-gh-release@01570a1f39cb168c169c802c3bceb9e93fb10974 # v2.1.0
-```
-
-(SHAs to be re-checked at apply-time; dependabot keeps them current)
-
-### 3. Pin Fedora digest
-
-```yaml
-image: registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43@sha256:<DIGEST>
-```
-
-Capture once via `skopeo inspect --raw
-docker://registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora:43 | jq -r .config.digest`
-and bump on each releasever bump.
-
-### 4. SBOM + attestation + cosign
-
-```yaml
-- name: Install cosign
-  uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@d7d6e07a3ddf0f9a4f8b3b9e3f1d1a5ce8e9b5b3 # v3.7.0
-
-- name: Sign ISO parts (keyless)
-  if: github.event_name == 'release'
-  run: |
-    cd build/out
-    for f in *.part-*; do cosign sign-blob --yes "$f" \
-      --output-signature "$f.sig" --output-certificate "$f.pem"; done
-
-- name: Generate SBOM (SPDX)
-  uses: anchore/sbom-action@e8d2a6937ecead383dfe75190d104edd1f9c5751 # v0.17.4
-  with:
-    path: build/out
-    format: spdx-json
-    output-file: build/out/veilor-os.spdx.json
-
-- name: Build provenance attestation
-  uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@7668571508540a607bdfd90a87a560489fe372eb # v2.1.0
-  with:
-    subject-path: 'build/out/*.part-*'
-```
-
-### 5. New `.github/dependabot.yml`
-
-```yaml
-version: 2
-updates:
-  - package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
-    directory: "/"
-    schedule: { interval: "weekly" }
-    groups:
-      actions: { patterns: ["*"] }
-```
-
-### 6. Timeout
-
-Keep at 90min. Largest observed runs ~70min; trimming would
-false-fail Fedora-mirror-slow days. **No change.**
-
-## Q&A
-
-- **Secrets in use:** none. Only ambient `GITHUB_TOKEN`. Once public,
-  enable secret scanning + push protection (free for public repos).
-- **Pages:** not deployed from this repo. Docs site out-of-scope here.
-- **Dependency review:** only `gum` fetched out-of-band — already
-  SHA256-pinned. Add `actions/dependency-review-action` on PRs once public.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/09-realhw-failure-modes.md

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-# Real-hardware failure mode audit (post-v0.5.31)
-
-**Agent 9 of 9-agent wave, 2026-05-05.** Pessimistic enumeration.
-
-## A. Boot path
-
-### A1. Secure Boot + GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR rebrand
-- shim chain itself untouched (uses `/EFI/fedora/`), but `grub2-mkconfig`
-  regenerates entries naming `veilor-os` while shim only trusts paths
-  under `/EFI/fedora/grubx64.efi`. Strict UEFI: menu boots, kernel
-  signatures verify via Fedora's MOK chain. Risk: `os-prober` writing
-  dual-boot Windows entries breaks MBR/MOK.
-- **Symptom:** dual-boot with Windows shows
-  `Verification failed: (0x1A) Security Violation`.
-- **Prob:** MED. **Fix:** S. **Target:** v0.5.32.
-
-### A2. KMS handoff — `fbcon=nodefer` necessary but not sufficient
-- On Intel Arc/iGPU late-gen + NVIDIA proprietary chains, 5-15s blank
-  between vt switch and SDDM start because `simpledrm` releases before
-  `i915`/`nvidia-drm` claim.
-- **Symptom:** ~10s blank pre-SDDM; user thinks crashed.
-- **Prob:** HIGH. **Fix:** S — add `i915.modeset=1
-  nvidia-drm.modeset=1 amdgpu.modeset=1`. SDDM `Type=simple` startup.
-  **Target:** v0.5.32.
-
-### A3. USBGuard hash-based rules
-- `scripts/20-harden-kernel.sh:127-131` ships **empty** rules.conf
-  with `ImplicitPolicyTarget=block`. First boot, admin runs
-  `usbguard generate-policy`. Per `feedback_usbguard_dock.md`, this
-  writes hash+parent-hash rules that break on dock replug.
-- **Symptom:** keyboard/mouse dies on first dock unplug-replug.
-- **Prob:** HIGH. **Fix:** M — patch invocation to
-  `--with-hash=false`, or ship `veilor-usbguard-enroll` wrapper.
-  **Target:** v0.5.32 (same bug we already learned).
-
-### A4. Wifi/Bluetooth firmware
-- `@hardware-support` pulls `linux-firmware` etc.
-- Realtek RTL8852/MT7921 firmware ships in `linux-firmware-whence` only.
-- **Prob:** LOW. **Fix:** S (add explicit `linux-firmware-whence`).
-  **Target:** v0.5.32.
-
-### A5. Bluetooth disabled at boot
-- `scripts/20-harden-kernel.sh:111` disables `bluetooth` service.
-  BT keyboards/mice don't pair until user enables service.
-- **Prob:** MED (laptop users). **Fix:** S — leave bluetooth.service
-  enabled, mask `obex` only. **Target:** v0.6.
-
-## B. First-boot KDE session
-
-### B1. Plasma 6 Wayland fallback on hybrid graphics
-- SDDM config doesn't pin session. NVIDIA Optimus + intel-iris
-  triggers Wayland → silent fallback to X11 on some HW.
-- **Symptom:** screen tearing, no fractional scaling.
-- **Prob:** MED. **Fix:** S — add `[Autologin] Session=plasma`
-  + `[General] DefaultSession=plasma.desktop`. **Target:** v0.6.
-
-### B2. SUSPEND/RESUME KILLS WIFI — THE BIG ONE 🚨
-- `veilor-modules-lock.service` sets `kernel.modules_disabled=1` 30s
-  after graphical.target. `iwlwifi`, `iwlmvm`, `cfg80211` reload on
-  resume from S3/S0ix. With modules locked: **resume → permanent
-  wifi death until reboot**. Same for `nvidia` autoload, `xhci_pci`
-  re-init on dock attach.
-- **Symptom:** close laptop lid → reopen → no wifi, no dock USB,
-  until reboot.
-- **Prob:** VERY HIGH (every laptop user, day 1).
-- **Fix:** M — gate lock on `ConditionACPower=true` + reset on
-  suspend, OR move from `modules_disabled` to `module.sig_enforce=1`
-  kernel cmdline (no runtime lock needed).
-- **Target:** v0.5.32 — **BLOCKER**.
-
-### B3. Lid-close handling
-- `logind.conf` not modified. Defaults `HandleLidSwitch=suspend`.
-  Combined with B2, every lid close = wifi loss.
-- **Prob:** HIGH. **Fix:** S. **Target:** v0.5.32 (paired with B2).
-
-## C. Day-2 ops
-
-### C1. `/etc/default/grub` + `/etc/kernel/cmdline` drift
-- Kickstart writes `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=""`. Real installer
-  writes `/etc/kernel/cmdline` with LUKS rd.luks args. `kernel-install`
-  reads the latter; `grub2-mkconfig` re-reads `/etc/default/grub`.
-- **Symptom:** `dnf upgrade kernel` regenerates grub.cfg from
-  default/grub, drops LUKS unlock args from new entry → unbootable.
-- **Prob:** HIGH. **Fix:** M — sync both files in `veilor-update`,
-  or migrate fully to BLS without grub-mkconfig.
-- **Target:** v0.5.32.
-
-### C2. SELinux relabel on first boot
-- `firstboot.sh` flips to `enforcing` and `touch /.autorelabel`. On
-  large /home (encrypted btrfs), relabel takes 2-5min — user sees
-  frozen screen with cursor.
-- **Symptom:** stuck "first boot" appears hung.
-- **Prob:** MED. **Fix:** S (add plymouth message). **Target:** v0.6.
-
-### C3. F44 upgrade
-- Hardcoded `python3.14` path (kickstart:334) for transaction_progress.py
-  patch. Survives no upgrade.
-- **Prob:** certainty by Nov 2026. **Fix:** M. **Target:** v0.6.
-
-### C4. chrony NTS unreachable from corp networks
-- Cloudflare NTS over UDP 4460 blocked by many corp firewalls.
-  chronyd will fail-stop sync.
-- **Symptom:** clock skew → TLS failures → broken everything.
-- **Prob:** MED. **Fix:** S (add fallback `pool` line — already
-  present, verify ordering). **Target:** v0.5.32.
-
-## D. Networking
-
-### D1. firewalld drop zone vs Tailscale 🚨
-- `tailscale up` requires UDP 41641 + tailscale0 trusted. Default
-  `drop` zone blocks tailscale0.
-- **Prob:** HIGH (this user uses Tailscale daily).
-- **Fix:** S — ship `/etc/firewalld/zones/trusted.xml` with
-  `tailscale0` interface.
-- **Target:** v0.5.32.
-
-### D2. systemd-resolved DoT vs corp split-DNS
-- No /etc/resolved.conf.d entries shipped (overlay dir empty).
-- Corp internal hostnames fail.
-- **Prob:** LOW. **Fix:** M. **Target:** v0.7.
-
-## E. Hardware diversity
-
-### E1. NVMe vs SATA LUKS perf
-- Argon2id KDF tuned to memory, not IO.
-- **Prob:** cosmetic. Skip.
-
-### E2. ARM aarch64
-- Out of scope for v0.5/0.6.
-
-### E3. TPM2 unlock
-- Already on roadmap. **Target:** v0.7.
-
-## Top 10 ranked (prob × severity)
-
-| # | Issue | Prob | Sev | Target |
-|---|-------|------|-----|--------|
-| 1 | **B2 Suspend/resume wifi death** (modules_disabled) | VHIGH | CRITICAL | v0.5.32 |
-| 2 | **C1 kernel-upgrade grub drift** (LUKS args lost) | HIGH | CRITICAL | v0.5.32 |
-| 3 | **A3 USBGuard hash rules** (dock replug) | HIGH | HIGH | v0.5.32 |
-| 4 | **D1 firewalld blocks tailscale0** | HIGH | HIGH | v0.5.32 |
-| 5 | **A2 KMS blank-screen 10s** | HIGH | MED | v0.5.32 |
-| 6 | **B3 Lid-close suspend** (compounds B2) | HIGH | MED | v0.5.32 |
-| 7 | **A1 Secure Boot + os-prober dual-boot** | MED | HIGH | v0.6 |
-| 8 | **C4 NTS blocked corp** | MED | MED | v0.5.32 |
-| 9 | **B1 Plasma Wayland fallback** | MED | MED | v0.6 |
-| 10 | **C3 F44 path-pinned patch** | CERTAIN | LOW (Nov) | v0.6 |
-
-## Top 5 to preempt in v0.5.32
-
-1. **B2 modules-lock vs resume** — gate on no-pending-suspend, OR swap
-   to `module.sig_enforce=1` kernel cmdline.
-2. **C1 cmdline drift** — make `veilor-update` fail-loud if
-   `/etc/kernel/cmdline` and `/etc/default/grub` diverge; regen BLS
-   on every kernel install.
-3. **A3 USBGuard id-based rules** — `veilor-usb-enroll` wrapper that
-   calls `usbguard generate-policy --with-hash=false`. Same fix that
-   already burned us on onyx.
-4. **D1 Tailscale zone** — ship `/etc/firewalld/zones/trusted.xml`
-   listing `tailscale0`, plus NetworkManager dispatcher to assign it.
-5. **A2 KMS handoff** — append `i915.modeset=1 amdgpu.modeset=1
-   nvidia-drm.modeset=1` to bootloader cmdline.
-
-**Critical insight:** B2 alone bricks the laptop for any user who
-closes their lid. Without that fix, v0.5.32 is shippable on desktops
-only. Same architectural class as the LUKS bug — security feature
-breaks legitimate kernel state transitions.

docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/README.md

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# 9-agent research wave — 2026-05-05
-
-Deep-dive research wave kicked off after v0.5.31 ship to surface every
-plausible failure mode + future bug class before the v0.7 public flex.
-Each agent took ~15 min, returned a focused report. Findings indexed
-here, full reports in this directory.
-
-The findings already inform `docs/ROADMAP.md` (Lessons learned section
-+ v0.5.32 / v0.6 / v0.7 reorder) and `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` (drafted
-by Agent 5).
-
-| # | Topic | File | Key finding |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| 1 | Plymouth + LUKS real-hardware edge cases | [01-plymouth-luks-real-hardware.md](01-plymouth-luks-real-hardware.md) | Initramfs keymap missing breaks non-US users at LUKS prompt |
-| 2 | SDDM + first-boot UX failure modes | [02-sddm-firstboot-ux.md](02-sddm-firstboot-ux.md) | `veilor-firstboot.service` `WantedBy=multi-user.target` only — silently doesn't run on real installs (graphical target) |
-| 3 | bootc-image-builder spike plan | [03-bootc-spike-plan.md](03-bootc-spike-plan.md) | Full Containerfile draft + 1-week timebox; v0.7 schedule |
-| 4 | Hardening tier 2 (AppArmor + nftables + audit + homed) | [04-hardening-tier-2.md](04-hardening-tier-2.md) | nftables + audit log shipping = S effort each, ship in v0.5.32 |
-| 5 | Threat model + public launch prep | [05-threat-model-launch.md](05-threat-model-launch.md) | Drafted at `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`. Honest in/out scope tables |
-| 6 | Anaconda log virtio-serial silent fix | [06-anaconda-log-capture.md](06-anaconda-log-capture.md) | virtio-serial requires rsyslog (not in our live ISO). Switch to virtio-9p host-share with EXIT trap copy |
-| 7 | KDE theme + DuckSans + /etc/skel branding | [07-kde-skel-branding.md](07-kde-skel-branding.md) | `/etc/skel/` doesn't exist; branding evaporates the moment user opens System Settings |
-| 8 | Build-iso CI hardening | [08-ci-hardening.md](08-ci-hardening.md) | Pin actions to SHA, dependabot, SBOM, SLSA L3 attestation — all S effort |
-| 9 | Real-hardware failure mode audit | [09-realhw-failure-modes.md](09-realhw-failure-modes.md) | **CRITICAL: `kernel.modules_disabled=1` kills wifi on suspend/resume.** Top blocker for v0.5.32 |
-
-## Top blockers for next ship (v0.5.32)
-
-Cross-referenced by severity × probability:
-
-1. **Suspend/resume wifi death** (Agent 9) — every laptop bricks on lid-close
-2. **veilor-firstboot.service WantedBy=graphical.target** (Agent 2) — login broken on real installs
-3. **kernel-upgrade grub drift** (Agent 9) — first `dnf upgrade kernel` = unbootable
-4. **USBGuard hash-rules problem** (Agent 9, mirrors `feedback_usbguard_dock.md`)
-5. **firewalld blocks tailscale0** (Agent 9) — user uses tailscale daily
-6. **/etc/skel/ empty → no per-user branding** (Agent 7)
-7. **virtio-9p log capture** (Agent 6) — replaces broken virtio-serial path
-
-## Research wave protocol
-
-This wave validated the `wave + verifier` pattern from v0.5.31 fix
-(per ROADMAP lessons learned #4). Multi-agent debug only produces
-signal when one agent's findings are checked against another's;
-9 parallel agents on distinct topics gave independent angles that
-converged on the v0.5.32 blocker list above.

kickstart/veilor-os.ks

@@ -51,14 +51,7 @@ user --name=admin --groups=wheel --gecos="veilor admin" --password="" --plaintex
 # Note: init_on_alloc/init_on_free removed from default live cmdline —
 # they zero every memory page at boot which 5x'd KVM live boot time.
 # Re-enable per-install via veilor-firstboot.service for production.
-# `fbcon=nodefer` keeps the linux framebuffer console alive across the
-# KMS modeset that intel/amdgpu/nvidia drivers do during userspace init.
-# Without it, on real hardware the screen blanks the moment the GPU
-# driver loads and the installer's tty1 redraw lands on a frozen
-# framebuffer — symptom: black screen with blinking cursor for ~30s
-# while the menu IS in fact rendered, just not painted. virtio-vga in
-# QEMU doesn't trigger this so it never reproed in VM.
-bootloader --location=mbr --append="lockdown=integrity module.sig_enforce=1 slab_nomerge randomize_kstack_offset=on vsyscall=none plymouth.enable=0 fbcon=nodefer i915.modeset=1 amdgpu.modeset=1 nvidia-drm.modeset=1 rd.vconsole.keymap=us"
+bootloader --location=mbr --append="lockdown=integrity slab_nomerge randomize_kstack_offset=on vsyscall=none"
 
 # ── Live ISO partitioning (flat — for live rootfs build only) ──
 # NOTE: This is the *live* image kickstart. Final installed system uses
@@ -99,13 +92,6 @@ syslinux
 isomd5sum
 xorriso
 
-# veilor-installer dependencies (TTY1 TUI installer wrapping anaconda)
-newt
-parted
-cryptsetup
-lvm2
-btrfs-progs
-
 
 # core hardening tools
 fail2ban
@@ -119,11 +105,6 @@ chrony
 firewalld
 plymouth
 
-# AppArmor stack — DEFERRED. apparmor-parser / apparmor-utils /
-# apparmor-profiles are not in Fedora 43 base or updates. v0.6 ships
-# without AppArmor; tier-2 plan to land via COPR or as part of the v0.7
-# secureblue OCI hybrid (which has its own LSM stack).
-
 # admin essentials
 git
 vim-enhanced
@@ -192,9 +173,6 @@ ls -la "$SRC/assets" "$SRC/scripts" 2>&1 || echo "[ERR] assets/scripts missing i
 cp -a "$SRC/assets" "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os/" || echo "[ERR] assets cp failed: $?"
 cp -a "$SRC/scripts" "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os/" || echo "[ERR] scripts cp failed: $?"
 ls -la "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os/" 2>&1 || echo "[ERR] dest dir missing post-cp"
-# Force root ownership on everything we copied — `cp -a` preserves
-# CI runner uid (1001), which makes sudo refuse to read /etc/sudoers.d.
-chown -R 0:0 "$DEST/etc" "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os" "$DEST/usr/local/bin" 2>&1 || echo "[WARN] chown failed"
 set +x
 
 # Persist nochroot log into installed system for diagnostics
@@ -203,7 +181,7 @@ set +x
     date
     echo "SRC=$SRC DEST=$DEST"
     ls -la "$DEST/usr/share/veilor-os/" 2>&1
-    ls -la "$DEST/usr/local/bin/" 2>&1
+    ls -la "$DEST/usr/local/sbin/" 2>&1
 } > "$DEST/var/log/veilor-nochroot.log" 2>&1 || true
 %end
 
@@ -217,7 +195,7 @@ echo " veilor-os install — %post"
 echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
 
 REPO=/usr/share/veilor-os
-chmod +x $REPO/scripts/*.sh $REPO/scripts/selinux/*.sh /usr/local/bin/veilor-power /usr/local/bin/veilor-update /usr/local/bin/veilor-doctor /usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot /usr/local/bin/veilor-installer
+chmod +x $REPO/scripts/*.sh $REPO/scripts/selinux/*.sh /usr/local/bin/veilor-power /usr/local/sbin/veilor-firstboot
 
 # Live image plumbing (matches upstream Fedora live ks). Without these the
 # squashfs/EFI build fails — livesys-scripts ships systemd units lorax expects.
@@ -236,41 +214,17 @@ bash $REPO/scripts/selinux/build-policy.sh || echo "[WARN] SELinux build failed;
 
 # Apply KDE theme + DuckSans + os-release branding
 bash $REPO/scripts/kde-theme-apply.sh
-bash $REPO/scripts/30-apply-v03-theme.sh || echo "[WARN] v03-theme apply failed"
 
 # Force admin password set on first boot.
 # livecd-creator does NOT honor `user` kickstart directive (it's a LIVE
 # image, no installer step). Create admin manually in chroot %post.
-# Note: SDDM rejects blank passwords by default (PAM nullok off), so we
-# set throwaway pw `veilor` + chage -d 0 to force reset on first login.
 if ! getent passwd admin >/dev/null; then
     useradd -m -G wheel -s /bin/bash -c "veilor admin" admin
-    echo 'admin:veilor' | chpasswd
-    chage -d 0 admin
-    echo "[INFO] admin user created (default pw=veilor, expired)"
+    passwd -d admin           # blank password
+    chage -d 0 admin          # expire → forced reset on first login
+    echo "[INFO] admin user created (blank password, expired)"
 fi
 
-# Symlink display-manager.service → sddm.service. graphical.target Wants=
-# display-manager but the alias doesn't get auto-created when sddm package
-# is installed via livecd-creator (vs Anaconda installer which handles it).
-# Without this, sddm stays inactive even though enabled.
-ln -sf /usr/lib/systemd/system/sddm.service /etc/systemd/system/display-manager.service
-
-# Live ISO default target: multi-user (TTY1 = veilor-installer TUI lands first).
-# User picks "Try live — desktop" from menu → systemctl isolate graphical.target.
-# Real installs land on graphical.target by default (set by anaconda).
-systemctl set-default multi-user.target
-
-# Branding: GRUB menu title + plymouth `details` text theme (no graphical
-# splash). Pure text-scroll boot exposes the gum installer immediately on
-# tty1 instead of plymouth swallowing it.
-sed -i \
-    -e 's|^GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR=.*|GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR="veilor-os"|' \
-    -e 's|^GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=.*|GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=""|' \
-    /etc/default/grub 2>/dev/null || true
-plymouth-set-default-theme details 2>/dev/null || true
-[ -f /boot/grub2/grub.cfg ] && grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg 2>/dev/null || true
-
 # zram swap (no disk swap; keys never leak to platter)
 dnf install -y zram-generator || true
 cat > /etc/systemd/zram-generator.conf << 'EOF'
@@ -279,115 +233,10 @@ zram-size = min(ram, 8192)
 compression-algorithm = zstd
 EOF
 
-# Patch anaconda's transaction_progress.py inside the live rootfs so that
-# when the user clicks "Install", a non-fatal RPM 6.0 *scriptlet* warning
-# does not get escalated to "An error occurred during the transaction"
-# and abort.
-#
-# This patch is NARROW — it overrides ONLY the `script_error` callback,
-# not the consumer (`process_transaction_progress`). v0.5.28 had a broad
-# patch that turned EVERY 'error' token into a warning, including
-# `cpio_error` (payload corruption) and `unpack_error` (extraction
-# failures). Side effect: silent grub2-efi-x64 scriptlet failure →
-# /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/ left incomplete → `gen_grub_cfgstub` failed at
-# the bootloader install phase. Narrowing eliminates that class of
-# silent failure.
-#
-# Why a patch is needed at all: Fedora 43 ships RPM 6.0, which changed
-# scriptlet failure propagation (Fedora wiki Changes/RPM-6.0; dnf5 issue
-# 2507). Scriptlets that previously emitted "Non-critical error"
-# warnings now bubble up as transaction-level errors. man-db's
-# `transfiletriggerin` (`systemd-run /usr/bin/systemctl start
-# man-db-cache-update`) is the most common trigger — non-zero in the
-# anaconda chroot, RPM-6.0-aware dnf5 reports as error, anaconda
-# --cmdline aborts.
-#
-# After the patch:
-#   - script_error → log warning, do NOT enqueue 'error' (transaction
-#     continues; specific package's posttrans whose result we ignore is
-#     already in the install set, scriptlet has run as far as it can).
-#   - cpio_error / unpack_error / generic error → unchanged, still
-#     raise PayloadInstallationError as anaconda intends. Real
-#     transaction-fatal events still abort install (good).
-# Patch anaconda's transaction_progress.py to suppress dnf5's
-# transaction-error escalation under RPM 6.0 + cmdline mode.
-#
-# History of this patch:
-#
-# v0.5.28: BROAD patch — overrode `process_transaction_progress` so all
-#   four 'error' token producers (cpio_error, script_error, unpack_error,
-#   generic error) became log warnings. man-db scriptlet stopped killing
-#   the install. BUT silent grub2-efi-x64 scriptlet failure left
-#   /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/ incomplete → gen_grub_cfgstub failed.
-#
-# v0.5.29: NARROW patch — overrode only `script_error` callback. Caught
-#   the per-package scriptlet failures cleanly. BUT dnf5 still tracks
-#   its own internal error counter and emits a final aggregate
-#   `error("transaction process has ended with errors..")` at end of
-#   transaction, which still raised PayloadInstallationError. Install
-#   aborted before bootloader install ran.
-#
-# v0.5.30: BROAD patch + bootloader --location=none in install ks.
-#   This time we silence the aggregate error too, so install completes,
-#   but anaconda is told NOT to install bootloader itself. The
-#   generated install ks's chroot %post does it explicitly via
-#   `dnf reinstall grub2-efi-x64 shim-x64 + grub2-install +
-#   grub2-mkconfig + efibootmgr`. The chroot has PID 1 systemd state
-#   from the live ISO (not the target), so scriptlets get a real
-#   environment to run in, not anaconda's truncated chroot. This
-#   sidesteps gen_grub_cfgstub entirely.
-TP=/usr/lib64/python3.14/site-packages/pyanaconda/modules/payloads/payload/dnf/transaction_progress.py
-if [ -f "$TP" ]; then
-    cp -a "$TP" "${TP}.veilor-bak"
-
-    # Replace the entire `elif token == 'error':` branch with log+continue.
-    # Pattern matches the original two-line block (log.error + raise).
-    python3 - "$TP" <<'PYEOF'
-import sys, re
-path = sys.argv[1]
-src = open(path).read()
-# Match: elif token == 'error':\n    log.error(msg)\n    raise PayloadInstallationError(...)
-# Or any current substitution that looks like raise/log.warning at that level.
-new = re.sub(
-    r"elif token == 'error':\n            log\.error\(msg\)\n            (?:raise PayloadInstallationError\(\"An error occurred during the transaction: \" \+ msg\)|log\.warning\(\"veilor: ignoring non-fatal transaction error: %s\", msg\))",
-    "elif token == 'error':\n            log.warning('veilor: suppressed dnf5 transaction error (RPM 6.0 cmdline regression): %s', msg)\n            # Do not raise — anaconda --cmdline + dnf5 + RPM 6.0 emits this for any scriptlet\n            # failure; we handle bootloader install manually in install ks %post chroot",
-    src,
-    count=1,
-)
-if new == src:
-    # Try fresh-anaconda layout (no veilor patch yet)
-    new = re.sub(
-        r"elif token == 'error':\n            log\.error\(msg\)\n            raise PayloadInstallationError\(\"An error occurred during the transaction: \" \+ msg\)",
-        "elif token == 'error':\n            log.warning('veilor: suppressed dnf5 transaction error: %s', msg)",
-        src,
-        count=1,
-    )
-if new == src:
-    print("[ERR] transaction_progress.py error-branch not found")
-    sys.exit(1)
-open(path, "w").write(new)
-print("[OK] transaction_progress.py: broad error-branch suppressed")
-PYEOF
-
-    if grep -q "veilor: suppressed dnf5 transaction error" "$TP"; then
-        rm -f /usr/lib64/python3.14/site-packages/pyanaconda/modules/payloads/payload/dnf/__pycache__/transaction_progress.*.pyc 2>/dev/null || true
-        echo "[OK] anaconda transaction_progress.py patched (broad error suppression)"
-    else
-        echo "[WARN] transaction_progress.py patch did not apply"
-    fi
-else
-    echo "[WARN] transaction_progress.py not found at expected path"
-fi
-
 # Enable services
-# veilor-firstboot.service NOT enabled on live ISO — it prompts admin pw
-# which makes no sense on a live boot. Real installs enable it in their
-# generated kickstart's chroot %post (see overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer).
+systemctl enable veilor-firstboot.service
 systemctl enable veilor-modules-lock.service
 systemctl enable sshd fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld chronyd
-# Mask veilor-firstboot on live so even if it landed in /etc/systemd/system
-# (overlay drag), it can't activate.
-systemctl mask veilor-firstboot.service 2>/dev/null || true
 
 # Default tuned profile = balanced (AC/battery udev rule will override)
 tuned-adm profile veilor-balanced 2>/dev/null || true

overlay/etc/apparmor.d/veilor.d/firefox

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os AppArmor profile stub — firefox
-#
-# v0.6 scope: marker only. Loads in complain mode via scripts/40-apparmor.sh
-# so AppArmor can log the syscall surface for v0.7 policy authoring. No
-# actual confinement rules yet — full policy is post-v0.6.
-
-#include <tunables/global>
-
-profile veilor-firefox /usr/lib*/firefox/firefox flags=(complain) {
-  #include <abstractions/base>
-}

overlay/etc/apparmor.d/veilor.d/thunderbird

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os AppArmor profile stub — thunderbird
-#
-# v0.6 scope: marker only. Loads in complain mode via scripts/40-apparmor.sh
-# so AppArmor can log the syscall surface for v0.7 policy authoring. No
-# actual confinement rules yet — full policy is post-v0.6.
-
-#include <tunables/global>
-
-profile veilor-thunderbird /usr/lib*/thunderbird/thunderbird flags=(complain) {
-  #include <abstractions/base>
-}

overlay/etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf.disabled

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os audisp-remote configuration template (DISABLED by default)
-#
-# IMPORTANT: enabling remote audit shipping leaks security events off-device.
-# Only enable if you have a trusted log collector — the remote endpoint
-# will receive every privileged syscall, file-watch hit, auth event, and
-# sudoers/SSH config change recorded by auditd.
-#
-# To activate:
-#   1. Set veilor-remote.conf `active = yes` (in /etc/audit/plugins.d/).
-#   2. Copy this file to /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf (drop `.disabled`).
-#   3. Edit `remote_server` + TLS settings below.
-#   4. systemctl restart auditd
-#
-# Loki / Wazuh / Splunk integration paths:
-#
-#   Loki   - point remote_server at a syslog-to-Loki shim (promtail or
-#            vector with `syslog` source, format = "rfc5424"). Use TCP+TLS.
-#   Wazuh  - run wazuh-agent locally; it pulls /var/log/audit/audit.log
-#            directly. In that case leave remote_server empty and rely on
-#            wazuh-agent's filebeat-style tailer instead of audisp-remote.
-#   Splunk - use a Splunk HEC bridge (rsyslog-omhttp or vector http sink).
-#            audisp-remote speaks plain syslog/TLS; it does not speak HEC
-#            natively.
-
-# ---- transport ----
-remote_server      = logs.example.org
-port               = 60
-transport          = tcp           # plain | tcp | krb5
-queue_file         = /var/spool/audit/remote.log
-mode               = immediate     # immediate | forwarding
-queue_depth        = 10240
-format             = managed       # managed | ascii
-
-# ---- TLS (transport = tcp + use_libwrap=no recommended) ----
-enable_krb5        = no
-krb5_principal     =
-krb5_client_name   = auditd
-krb5_key_file      = /etc/audit/audit.key
-
-# ---- failure handling ----
-network_failure_action  = stop     # ignore | syslog | exec | suspend | single | halt | stop
-disk_low_action         = syslog
-disk_full_action        = syslog
-disk_error_action       = syslog
-remote_ending_action    = reconnect
-generic_error_action    = syslog
-generic_warning_action  = syslog
-overflow_action         = syslog
-
-# ---- heartbeat ----
-heartbeat_timeout       = 60
-network_retry_time      = 1
-max_tries_per_record    = 3
-max_time_per_record     = 5
-
-# ---- formatting ----
-# `managed` wraps each event in a syslog-RFC5424 header with veilor-os
-# hostname + audit facility (LOG_AUTHPRIV). Loki/Splunk prefer this.

overlay/etc/audit/plugins.d/veilor-remote.conf

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os audit remote shipping (DISABLED by default)
-#
-# IMPORTANT: enabling remote audit shipping leaks security events off-device.
-# Only enable if you have a trusted log collector (Loki / Wazuh / Splunk).
-# The remote endpoint will see every privileged syscall, file watch hit,
-# auth event, and sudoers change. Treat the collector with the same trust
-# level as the host root account.
-#
-# Enable:
-#   1. Edit `active = yes` below.
-#   2. Configure /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf (see audisp-remote.conf.disabled).
-#   3. systemctl restart auditd.
-#   4. Verify with: auditctl -s | grep enabled
-#
-# Plugin pipes audit events out of auditd via a UNIX socket; audisp-remote
-# reads from that socket and forwards to the configured remote_server.
-
-active = no
-direction = out
-path = builtin_af_unix
-type = builtin
-args = /var/run/audit_events
-format = string

overlay/etc/firewalld/zones/trusted.xml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
-<!-- veilor-os: trusted zone with tailscale0 pre-bound.
-     Default zone stays drop (per 10-harden-base.sh). Tailscale's
-     interface is added here so `tailscale up` traffic isn't dropped.
-     Without this entry the firewalld drop zone blocks the tailnet
-     traffic and the user sees: "tailscale up succeeded, but I can't
-     reach hs.s8n.ru". (Agent 9, 2026-05-05 wave.) -->
-<zone target="ACCEPT">
-  <short>Trusted</short>
-  <description>All network connections are accepted. veilor-os pre-binds tailscale0 here so the mesh layer-1 (Tailscale via Headscale) works out-of-box without manual firewalld zone juggling.</description>
-  <interface name="tailscale0"/>
-</zone>

overlay/etc/os-release.d/veilor

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 NAME="veilor-os"
-PRETTY_NAME="veilor-os 0.5.27"
+PRETTY_NAME="veilor-os 0.1 (Fedora 43 base)"
 ID=veilor
 ID_LIKE=fedora
-VERSION="0.5.27"
-VERSION_ID="0.5.27"
+VERSION="0.1"
+VERSION_ID="0.1"
 HOME_URL="https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os"
 DOCUMENTATION_URL="https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os/tree/main/docs"
 BUG_REPORT_URL="https://github.com/veilor-org/veilor-os/issues"

overlay/etc/skel/.config/breezerc

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os — Breeze window decoration override
-# Tighter borders, solid black title bar, minimal buttons, smallest border.
-# Merged into /etc/xdg/breezerc (system default) by 30-apply-v03-theme.sh.
-
-[Common]
-# Tighter outline; subtle separator only when active.
-OutlineCloseButton=false
-ShadowSize=ShadowSmall
-ShadowStrength=128
-ShadowColor=0,0,0
-
-[Windeco]
-# Border thickness: smallest available (= "None" leaves only resize edge,
-# "NoSides" keeps top/bottom only). We pick "None" for the tightest look,
-# matching the black-on-black aesthetic.
-BorderSize=None
-ButtonSize=ButtonSmall
-CloseButton=true
-DrawBackgroundGradient=false
-DrawBorderOnMaximizedWindows=false
-DrawSizeGrip=false
-DrawTitleBarSeparator=false
-ExceptionType=0
-HideTitleBar=false
-OpaqueTitleBar=true
-TitleAlignment=AlignCenter
-UseBackgroundGradient=false
-UseTitleBarColor=true
-
-# Buttons: minimal — close / max / min only, no shade/help/keep-above.
-ButtonsOnLeft=M
-ButtonsOnRight=IAX
-
-[Style]
-# Disable per-app blur, transparency, and gradient effects.
-MenuOpacity=100
-WindowDragMode=1
-ScrollBarAddLineButtons=0
-ScrollBarSubLineButtons=0
-SidePanelDrawFrame=false
-SliderDrawTickMarks=false
-TabBarDrawCenteredTabs=true
-ToolBarDrawItemSeparator=false
-DockWidgetDrawFrame=false
-ProgressBarAnimated=false
-AnimationsEnabled=false
-StackedWidgetDrawFrame=false
-
-# ── Active / inactive title bar colors (override Breeze defaults) ──
-# kdeglobals [WM] section is the canonical source; these mirror it here
-# so apps that only read breezerc see consistent values.
-[Windeco][Active]
-TitleBarColor=0,0,0
-TitleBarTextColor=216,216,216
-TitleBarBorderColor=104,107,111
-
-[Windeco][Inactive]
-TitleBarColor=15,17,18
-TitleBarTextColor=161,169,177
-TitleBarBorderColor=42,46,50

overlay/etc/skel/.config/kdeglobals

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-[General]
-ColorScheme=veilor-black
-Name=veilor black
-AccentColor=104,107,111
-LastUsedCustomAccentColor=104,107,111
-font=Fira Code,11,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
-fixed=Fira Code,10,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
-menuFont=Fira Code,11,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
-smallestReadableFont=Fira Code,9,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
-toolBarFont=Fira Code,10,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
-
-[Icons]
-Theme=breeze-dark
-
-[KDE]
-LookAndFeelPackage=org.kde.breezedark.desktop
-SingleClick=false
-contrast=4
-widgetStyle=Breeze
-
-[Mouse]
-cursorTheme=Breeze_Light
-cursorSize=24
-
-[KDecoration]
-theme=Breeze
-ButtonsOnLeft=
-ButtonsOnRight=IAX
-BorderSize=None

overlay/etc/skel/.config/konsolerc

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os Konsole default — branded profile pre-selected so first
-# Konsole launch on a fresh user account opens the veilor profile,
-# not Fedora's default white-bg Breeze.
-
-[Desktop Entry]
-DefaultProfile=Veilor.profile
-
-[KonsoleWindow]
-ShowMenuBarByDefault=false
-RememberWindowSize=true

overlay/etc/skel/.config/kwinrc

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os Plasma 6 kwin defaults — seeded into /etc/skel so first-login
-# users inherit deliberate windowing behaviour rather than default Breeze
-# animations. Per-user; user can override post-login.
-
-[Compositing]
-# OpenGL backend = standard for hardware accel; AnimationSpeed=0 = no
-# slow window animations on every focus change.
-Backend=OpenGL
-AnimationSpeed=0
-HiddenPreviews=5
-LatencyPolicy=Low
-WindowsBlockCompositing=true
-
-[Plugins]
-# Disable visual fluff that isn't security-relevant + costs perf.
-blurEnabled=false
-contrastEnabled=false
-slideEnabled=false
-slidingpopupsEnabled=false
-fadeEnabled=false
-zoomEnabled=true
-
-[Windows]
-FocusPolicy=ClickToFocus
-RollOverDesktops=false
-TitlebarDoubleClickCommand=Maximize
-
-[Wayland]
-InputMethod=

overlay/etc/skel/.local/share/konsole/Veilor.colorscheme

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-[General]
-Anchor=0.5,0.5
-Blur=false
-ColorRandomization=false
-Description=Veilor
-FillStyle=Tile
-Opacity=1
-Wallpaper=
-WallpaperFlipType=NoFlip
-WallpaperOpacity=1
-
-[Background]
-Color=0,0,0
-
-[BackgroundFaint]
-Color=0,0,0
-
-[BackgroundIntense]
-Color=15,17,18
-
-[Foreground]
-Color=216,216,216
-
-[ForegroundFaint]
-Color=161,169,177
-
-[ForegroundIntense]
-Color=236,236,236
-
-# ── Standard ANSI palette (muted, desaturated) ──
-# Veilor aesthetic: no neon. Reds tone-shifted toward bordeaux, greens
-# toward sage, blues toward slate. Greys lifted to remain readable.
-
-[Color0]
-Color=27,27,27
-
-[Color0Faint]
-Color=20,20,20
-
-[Color0Intense]
-Color=58,58,58
-
-[Color1]
-Color=176,55,69
-
-[Color1Faint]
-Color=130,40,52
-
-[Color1Intense]
-Color=205,87,99
-
-[Color2]
-Color=102,138,90
-
-[Color2Faint]
-Color=78,107,68
-
-[Color2Intense]
-Color=141,176,128
-
-[Color3]
-Color=185,158,98
-
-[Color3Faint]
-Color=140,118,72
-
-[Color3Intense]
-Color=216,193,134
-
-[Color4]
-Color=92,116,143
-
-[Color4Faint]
-Color=68,87,107
-
-[Color4Intense]
-Color=131,154,182
-
-[Color5]
-Color=141,113,150
-
-[Color5Faint]
-Color=104,84,112
-
-[Color5Intense]
-Color=176,148,186
-
-[Color6]
-Color=99,144,148
-
-[Color6Faint]
-Color=72,107,110
-
-[Color6Intense]
-Color=139,180,184
-
-[Color7]
-Color=200,200,200
-
-[Color7Faint]
-Color=161,169,177
-
-[Color7Intense]
-Color=236,236,236

overlay/etc/skel/.local/share/konsole/Veilor.profile

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-[General]
-Name=Veilor
-Parent=FALLBACK/
-Command=/bin/bash
-Directory=
-Icon=utilities-terminal
-LocalTabTitleFormat=%w
-RemoteTabTitleFormat=(%u) %h
-ShowTerminalSizeHint=false
-StartInCurrentSessionDir=true
-TerminalCenter=false
-TerminalMargin=4
-
-[Appearance]
-ColorScheme=Veilor
-Font=Fira Code,11,-1,5,400,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
-LineSpacing=1
-UseFontLineCharacters=true
-
-[Cursor Options]
-CursorShape=0
-UseCustomCursorColor=true
-CustomCursorColor=104,107,111
-CustomCursorTextColor=216,216,216
-
-[Scrolling]
-HistoryMode=2
-HistorySize=10000
-ScrollBarPosition=2
-HighlightScrolledLines=false
-
-[Terminal Features]
-BellMode=3
-BlinkingCursorEnabled=false
-BlinkingTextEnabled=false
-FlowControlEnabled=false
-UrlHintsModifiers=67108864
-ReverseUrlHints=false
-VerticalLine=false
-
-[Interaction Options]
-AutoCopySelectedText=false
-CopyTextAsHTML=false
-TrimLeadingSpacesInSelectedText=false
-TrimTrailingSpacesInSelectedText=true
-UnderlineFilesEnabled=true
-UnderlineLinksEnabled=true
-OpenLinksByDirectClickEnabled=false
-WordCharacters=:@-./_~?&=%+#
-
-[Encoding Options]
-DefaultEncoding=UTF-8
-
-[Keyboard]
-KeyBindings=default

overlay/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf

@@ -14,8 +14,3 @@ LoginGraceTime 30
 MaxAuthTries 3
 MaxSessions 4
 LogLevel VERBOSE
-# UseDNS off: reverse-lookup-on-connect adds 30s+ delay per connection
-# when client DNS doesn't resolve back-references (NAT, slirp, dynamic
-# IPs). Hardening doesn't benefit from the lookup either way; sshd
-# still logs the IP, just not the (possibly forged) PTR.
-UseDNS no

overlay/etc/systemd/system/getty@tty1.service.d/veilor-installer.conf

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os: replace tty1 login prompt with installer TUI.
-# Live ISO ONLY. Removed by anaconda during real install (this overlay
-# isn't copied into target system — see kickstart/install.ks).
-[Service]
-ExecStart=
-ExecStart=-/usr/local/bin/veilor-installer
-StandardInput=tty
-StandardOutput=tty
-StandardError=tty
-TTYPath=/dev/tty1
-TTYReset=yes
-TTYVHangup=yes
-TTYVTDisallocate=yes
-Type=idle
-Restart=always
-RestartSec=2

overlay/etc/systemd/system/veilor-firstboot.service

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Conflicts=sddm.service
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
 RemainAfterExit=no
-ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot
+ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/veilor-firstboot
 StandardInput=tty
 StandardOutput=tty
 StandardError=tty
@@ -18,9 +18,4 @@ TTYReset=yes
 TTYVHangup=yes
 
 [Install]
-# Real installs default to graphical.target. Without this entry the unit
-# never runs on installed systems — admin pw stays at install-time value
-# + chage -d 0 expired, SDDM PAM bounces user to a chauthtok screen
-# (recoverable but ugly). Live ISO + multi-user.target installs both
-# resolve via this list. (Agent 2, 2026-05-05 wave.)
-WantedBy=graphical.target multi-user.target
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

overlay/etc/tuned/profiles/veilor-balanced/script.sh

@@ -29,4 +29,4 @@ stop() {
     return 0
 }
 
-process "$@"
+process $@

overlay/etc/tuned/profiles/veilor-performance/script.sh

@@ -28,4 +28,4 @@ stop() {
     return 0
 }
 
-process "$@"
+process $@

overlay/etc/tuned/profiles/veilor-powersave/script.sh

@@ -40,4 +40,4 @@ stop() {
     return 0
 }
 
-process "$@"
+process $@

overlay/etc/usbguard/rules.conf

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os USBGuard baseline rules
-#
-# Default policy is `block` (set in usbguard-daemon.conf via the
-# overlay). Without any allow rule, every USB device — including the
-# user's keyboard — is blocked at boot. That includes the desktop
-# user with a USB keyboard at SDDM.
-#
-# This file allows HID-class interfaces (keyboard, mouse, touchpad,
-# fingerprint reader, NFC, gamepad) without pinning to specific
-# vendor:product/serial/hash. id-based rules survive dock replug and
-# vendor-bump kernel changes, where hash+parent-hash rules don't —
-# verified pain on onyx (memory: feedback_usbguard_dock.md). Same fix.
-#
-# After first login, the user runs:
-#     ujust veilor-usbguard-enroll
-# (or `usbguard generate-policy --with-hash=false > rules.conf`)
-# to add their own keyboard's id-rule and tighten the policy further.
-#
-# References:
-#   - usbguard-rules.conf(5)
-#   - https://usbguard.github.io/documentation/rule-language.html
-#   - veilor-os agent 9 audit, 2026-05-05
-
-# HID class — keyboards, mice, pointers, gamepads, fingerprint, NFC.
-# Interface descriptor 03:NN:NN where 03=HID. We accept any HID
-# subclass + protocol so the rule is robust to future HID variants.
-allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* }
-
-# Mass-storage prompt: ask the user before mounting a new flash drive.
-# Reject blanket-allow (would silently allow USB Rubber Ducky).
-# Accept only after user confirms via the gnome/plasma USB dialog.
-# (USBGuard has no native "ask" verb; we leave mass-storage devices
-# implicit-block here, the user runs `usbguard allow-device <id>`
-# from a Plasma applet OR the firstboot wizard documents this flow.)
-
-# Block known-bad. USB Killer signature shows up as a generic-HID
-# composite descriptor + power draw out of spec. We can't reliably
-# detect that from descriptors alone — relying on default-block
-# semantics for now.
-
-# DO NOT pin to specific id=, serial=, hash=, or parent-hash= here.
-# That's the user's job post-firstboot for their actual hardware.
-# Pre-shipped pinned rules break on every dock replug + kernel bump.

overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-doctor

@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/bash
-# veilor-doctor — read-only diagnostic / health check.
-# User-facing CLI shipped in /usr/local/bin/. v0.6 ergonomic tooling.
-#
-# Reports on system, hardening, disk, network, updates, veilor units.
-# No fixes are ever applied — output only. Use this to verify drift
-# from the v0.2+ baseline.
-#
-# Flags:
-#   --quiet  print only PASS/FAIL summary
-#   --json   emit JSON for monitoring
-#   -h|--help
-
-set -uo pipefail
-
-QUIET=0
-JSON=0
-for arg in "$@"; do
-    case "$arg" in
-        --quiet|-q)  QUIET=1 ;;
-        --json)      JSON=1 ;;
-        -h|--help)
-            sed -n '2,15p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'
-            exit 0
-            ;;
-        *)
-            echo "unknown flag: $arg" >&2
-            exit 2
-            ;;
-    esac
-done
-
-have() { command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
-
-# ── Output helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-PASS=0
-FAIL=0
-ROWS=()       # human table rows: "Section|Check|Status|Detail"
-JSON_ROWS=()  # JSON-serialisable rows
-
-# Use color only if stdout is a TTY and we're not in --quiet/--json mode.
-if [[ -t 1 && $QUIET -eq 0 && $JSON -eq 0 ]]; then
-    GREEN=$'\033[32m'; RED=$'\033[31m'; DIM=$'\033[2m'; OFF=$'\033[0m'
-else
-    GREEN=""; RED=""; DIM=""; OFF=""
-fi
-
-# JSON-escape a string for embedding.
-json_esc() {
-    local s=$1
-    s=${s//\\/\\\\}
-    s=${s//\"/\\\"}
-    s=${s//$'\n'/\\n}
-    s=${s//$'\t'/\\t}
-    printf '%s' "$s"
-}
-
-# check <section> <name> <pass|fail> <detail>
-check() {
-    local section=$1 name=$2 status=$3 detail=$4
-    if [[ $status == pass ]]; then
-        PASS=$((PASS+1))
-    else
-        FAIL=$((FAIL+1))
-    fi
-    ROWS+=("${section}|${name}|${status}|${detail}")
-    JSON_ROWS+=("{\"section\":\"$(json_esc "$section")\",\"name\":\"$(json_esc "$name")\",\"status\":\"$status\",\"detail\":\"$(json_esc "$detail")\"}")
-}
-
-# ── 1. System ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-HOSTNAME_VAL=$(hostnamectl --static 2>/dev/null || hostname)
-OS_NAME=$(. /etc/os-release 2>/dev/null && echo "${PRETTY_NAME:-unknown}")
-KERNEL=$(uname -r)
-UPTIME=$(uptime -p 2>/dev/null || uptime)
-check System hostname pass "$HOSTNAME_VAL"
-check System os pass "$OS_NAME"
-check System kernel pass "$KERNEL"
-check System uptime pass "$UPTIME"
-
-# ── 2. Hardening ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-SELINUX=$(getenforce 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
-[[ $SELINUX == "Enforcing" ]] && check Hardening selinux pass "$SELINUX" \
-    || check Hardening selinux fail "$SELINUX (expected Enforcing)"
-
-if systemctl is-active --quiet usbguard; then
-    check Hardening usbguard pass active
-else
-    check Hardening usbguard fail "$(systemctl is-active usbguard 2>/dev/null || echo missing)"
-fi
-
-if systemctl is-active --quiet fail2ban; then
-    check Hardening fail2ban pass active
-else
-    check Hardening fail2ban fail "$(systemctl is-active fail2ban 2>/dev/null || echo missing)"
-fi
-
-FW_ZONE=$(firewall-cmd --get-default-zone 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
-[[ $FW_ZONE == "drop" ]] && check Hardening firewalld_zone pass "$FW_ZONE" \
-    || check Hardening firewalld_zone fail "$FW_ZONE (expected drop)"
-
-PTRACE=$(sysctl -n kernel.yama.ptrace_scope 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-[[ ${PTRACE:-0} -ge 2 ]] && check Hardening ptrace_scope pass "$PTRACE" \
-    || check Hardening ptrace_scope fail "${PTRACE:-unset} (expected >=2)"
-
-KPTR=$(sysctl -n kernel.kptr_restrict 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-[[ ${KPTR:-0} -ge 2 ]] && check Hardening kptr_restrict pass "$KPTR" \
-    || check Hardening kptr_restrict fail "${KPTR:-unset} (expected >=2)"
-
-# ── 3. Disk ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-LUKS_DEV=$(lsblk -lno NAME,TYPE 2>/dev/null | awk '$2=="crypt" {print $1; exit}')
-if [[ -n $LUKS_DEV ]]; then
-    LUKS_STATUS=$(cryptsetup status "$LUKS_DEV" 2>/dev/null \
-        | awk -F: '/cipher/ {gsub(/^ +/,"",$2); print $2; exit}')
-    check Disk luks pass "${LUKS_DEV}: ${LUKS_STATUS:-active}"
-else
-    check Disk luks fail "no LUKS device found (full-disk encryption expected)"
-fi
-
-if have btrfs && btrfs filesystem df / >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    SUBVOLS=$(btrfs subvolume list / 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
-    check Disk btrfs pass "${SUBVOLS} subvolume(s)"
-else
-    check Disk btrfs fail "btrfs not detected on /"
-fi
-
-ROOT_FREE=$(df -h / 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==2 {print $4 " free / " $2 " (" $5 " used)"}')
-check Disk root_free pass "${ROOT_FREE:-unknown}"
-
-# ── 4. Network ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-if systemctl is-active --quiet NetworkManager; then
-    check Network networkmanager pass active
-else
-    check Network networkmanager fail inactive
-fi
-
-DEFAULT_ROUTE=$(ip -o route show default 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $3 " via " $5; exit}')
-[[ -n $DEFAULT_ROUTE ]] && check Network default_route pass "$DEFAULT_ROUTE" \
-    || check Network default_route fail "no default route"
-
-DNS_LIST=$(awk '/^nameserver/ {print $2}' /etc/resolv.conf 2>/dev/null \
-    | paste -sd, - 2>/dev/null)
-[[ -n $DNS_LIST ]] && check Network dns pass "$DNS_LIST" \
-    || check Network dns fail "no nameservers"
-
-PUBLIC_IP=$(curl -s --max-time 3 ifconfig.me 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-[[ -n $PUBLIC_IP ]] && check Network public_ip pass "$PUBLIC_IP" \
-    || check Network public_ip fail "lookup timed out"
-
-# ── 5. Updates ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-LAST_DNF=$(sudo -n dnf history list 2>/dev/null \
-    | awk 'NR==4 {for(i=4;i<NF;i++)printf "%s ", $i; print $NF; exit}')
-[[ -n $LAST_DNF ]] && check Updates last_dnf pass "$LAST_DNF" \
-    || check Updates last_dnf pass "(unknown — try \`sudo dnf history\`)"
-
-# `dnf check-update` exits 100 if updates available, 0 if not.
-sudo -n dnf check-update -q >/dev/null 2>&1
-RC=$?
-case $RC in
-    0)   check Updates pending pass "system up-to-date" ;;
-    100)
-        AVAIL=$(sudo -n dnf check-update -q 2>/dev/null \
-            | awk 'NF>=3 && $1!~/^Last/ {n++} END {print n+0}')
-        check Updates pending fail "${AVAIL} update(s) available — run \`veilor-update\`"
-        ;;
-    *)   check Updates pending fail "dnf check-update returned $RC (need sudo?)" ;;
-esac
-
-# ── 6. veilor services ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-for unit in veilor-firstboot.service veilor-modules-lock.service; do
-    if systemctl list-unit-files "$unit" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$unit"; then
-        STATE=$(systemctl is-enabled "$unit" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
-        ACTIVE=$(systemctl is-active "$unit" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
-        # firstboot is meant to be one-shot + disabled after run.
-        check veilor "$unit" pass "${STATE} (${ACTIVE})"
-    else
-        check veilor "$unit" fail "unit not installed"
-    fi
-done
-
-# ── Output ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-if [[ $JSON -eq 1 ]]; then
-    printf '{"pass":%d,"fail":%d,"checks":[' "$PASS" "$FAIL"
-    for i in "${!JSON_ROWS[@]}"; do
-        [[ $i -gt 0 ]] && printf ','
-        printf '%s' "${JSON_ROWS[$i]}"
-    done
-    printf ']}\n'
-    [[ $FAIL -eq 0 ]] && exit 0 || exit 1
-fi
-
-if [[ $QUIET -eq 1 ]]; then
-    if [[ $FAIL -eq 0 ]]; then
-        echo "PASS ($PASS checks)"
-        exit 0
-    else
-        echo "FAIL ($FAIL of $((PASS+FAIL)) checks failed)"
-        exit 1
-    fi
-fi
-
-_print_plain_table() {
-    local last_section=""
-    for r in "${ROWS[@]}"; do
-        IFS='|' read -r sec name status detail <<<"$r"
-        if [[ $sec != "$last_section" ]]; then
-            printf '\n%s%s%s\n' "$DIM" "── $sec ──" "$OFF"
-            last_section=$sec
-        fi
-        if [[ $status == pass ]]; then
-            printf '  %s[OK]%s   %-20s %s\n' "$GREEN" "$OFF" "$name" "$detail"
-        else
-            printf '  %s[FAIL]%s %-20s %s\n' "$RED" "$OFF" "$name" "$detail"
-        fi
-    done
-}
-
-# Pretty table — gum if available, else plain. gum table reads tab-separated
-# input on stdin; we feed it the rows then fall back to the plain printer
-# if gum exits non-zero (e.g. no TTY).
-if have gum; then
-    {
-        printf 'Section\tCheck\tStatus\tDetail\n'
-        for r in "${ROWS[@]}"; do
-            IFS='|' read -r sec name status detail <<<"$r"
-            mark=$([[ $status == pass ]] && echo "OK" || echo "FAIL")
-            printf '%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n' "$sec" "$name" "$mark" "$detail"
-        done
-    } | gum table --print --separator $'\t' 2>/dev/null || _print_plain_table
-else
-    _print_plain_table
-fi
-
-echo
-if [[ $FAIL -eq 0 ]]; then
-    printf '%s%d checks passed.%s\n' "$GREEN" "$PASS" "$OFF"
-    exit 0
-else
-    printf '%s%d of %d checks failed.%s\n' "$RED" "$FAIL" "$((PASS+FAIL))" "$OFF"
-    exit 1
-fi

overlay/usr/local/bin/veilor-update

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/bash
-# veilor-update — system update wrapper.
-# Wraps `dnf upgrade --refresh` + `flatpak update` behind a single command.
-# User-facing CLI shipped in /usr/local/bin/. v0.6 ergonomic tooling.
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success
-#   1  dnf failed
-#   2  flatpak failed (dnf still ran successfully)
-#   3  no network
-#
-# Uses `gum` for spinner output if present, falls back to plain stdout.
-
-set -uo pipefail
-
-# ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-have() { command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
-
-GUM=$(have gum && echo gum || echo "")
-
-say() {
-    # Print a status line. Coloured if gum present, else plain.
-    if [[ -n $GUM ]]; then
-        gum style --foreground 212 --bold "$1"
-    else
-        printf '\n=== %s ===\n' "$1"
-    fi
-}
-
-run_with_spinner() {
-    local title=$1; shift
-    if [[ -n $GUM ]]; then
-        gum spin --spinner dot --title "$title" -- "$@"
-    else
-        echo "[+] $title"
-        "$@"
-    fi
-}
-
-# ── Pre-flight: network check ───────────────────────────────────────
-say "veilor-update: checking network"
-if ! ping -c 1 -W 2 mirrors.fedoraproject.org >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    echo
-    echo "  No route to mirrors.fedoraproject.org."
-    echo "  Connect to a network and re-run \`veilor-update\`."
-    exit 3
-fi
-
-# ── Snapshot kernel before upgrade so we can warn about reboot need ─
-KERNEL_BEFORE=$(uname -r)
-
-# ── DNF upgrade ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-say "veilor-update: refreshing DNF metadata + applying updates"
-# Capture upgrade output so we can count packages afterwards. Tee to
-# stdout for live progress; swallow into a tempfile for the count.
-LOG=$(mktemp -t veilor-update.XXXXXX)
-trap 'rm -f "$LOG"' EXIT
-
-if ! sudo dnf upgrade --refresh -y 2>&1 | tee "$LOG"; then
-    echo
-    echo "  dnf upgrade failed. See output above."
-    exit 1
-fi
-
-# ── Count packages updated ──────────────────────────────────────────
-# DNF prints "Upgraded: N", "Installed: N", "Removed: N" at end.
-# Sum the upgrade/install lines for the user-visible total.
-UPDATED=$(grep -E '^(Upgraded|Installed)\b' "$LOG" 2>/dev/null \
-    | awk -F: '{ gsub(/[^0-9]/,"",$2); s+=$2 } END { print s+0 }')
-
-# ── Flatpak (best-effort) ───────────────────────────────────────────
-FLATPAK_RC=0
-if have flatpak; then
-    say "veilor-update: updating flatpaks"
-    if ! flatpak update -y; then
-        FLATPAK_RC=2
-        echo "  flatpak update failed; continuing anyway."
-    fi
-else
-    echo "  (flatpak not installed — skipping)"
-fi
-
-# ── Post-update: reboot hint if kernel changed ──────────────────────
-KERNEL_AFTER_LATEST=$(rpm -q kernel --last 2>/dev/null \
-    | awk 'NR==1 { sub(/^kernel-/,"",$1); print $1 }')
-
-say "veilor-update: complete"
-printf '  Packages updated : %s\n' "${UPDATED:-0}"
-printf '  Running kernel   : %s\n' "$KERNEL_BEFORE"
-if [[ -n ${KERNEL_AFTER_LATEST:-} && $KERNEL_AFTER_LATEST != "$KERNEL_BEFORE" ]]; then
-    printf '  Newest kernel    : %s (reboot suggested)\n' "$KERNEL_AFTER_LATEST"
-fi
-
-exit $FLATPAK_RC

scripts/30-apply-v03-theme.sh

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ if [[ -d $SDDM_SRC ]]; then
     install -d -m 0755 /etc/sddm.conf.d
     # Preserve other sddm.conf.d/*.conf entries; this file owns [Theme] only.
     cat > /etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor-theme.conf << 'EOF'
-# veilor-os v0.3 — set veilor-black SDDM theme as system default
+# veilor-os v0.3 — set veilor-black SDDM theme as default (matches reference system)
 [Theme]
 Current=veilor-black
 CursorTheme=Breeze_Light
@@ -128,44 +128,12 @@ else
 fi
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# 4. Wallpaper — pure black (default: org.kde.color plugin; image fallback)
+# 4. Wallpaper — solid black (matches reference system, no SVG asset)
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-info "Wallpaper: installing veilor-black image and setting Plasma defaults"
-
-# 4a. Install wallpaper images for users who prefer org.kde.image. The
-#     veilor-black asset (PNG primary, SVG fallback) is a 3840x2160 pure
-#     black canvas with a tiny low-opacity wordmark in the corner.
-WP_SRC="$ASSETS/wallpapers"
-WP_DST="/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black/contents/images"
-WP_META="/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black/metadata.desktop"
-if [[ -d $WP_SRC ]]; then
-    install -d -m 0755 "$WP_DST"
-    if [[ -f $WP_SRC/veilor-black.png ]]; then
-        install -m 0644 "$WP_SRC/veilor-black.png" "$WP_DST/veilor-black.png"
-        ok "wallpaper PNG installed at $WP_DST/veilor-black.png"
-    fi
-    if [[ -f $WP_SRC/veilor-black.svg ]]; then
-        install -m 0644 "$WP_SRC/veilor-black.svg" "$WP_DST/veilor-black.svg"
-        ok "wallpaper SVG installed at $WP_DST/veilor-black.svg"
-    fi
-    install -d -m 0755 "$(dirname "$WP_META")"
-    cat > "$WP_META" << 'EOF'
-[Desktop Entry]
-Name=veilor-black
-X-KDE-PluginInfo-Name=veilor-black
-X-KDE-PluginInfo-Author=veilor-os
-X-KDE-PluginInfo-License=MIT
-X-KDE-PluginInfo-Version=0.3
-EOF
-    ok "wallpaper metadata installed at $WP_META"
-else
-    warn "wallpaper source dir missing at $WP_SRC — skipping image install"
-fi
-
-# 4b. Default wallpaper plugin: org.kde.color with Color=0,0,0 (pure black).
-#     This is the lowest-overhead path — Plasma renders the colour without
-#     loading an image. Users may switch to org.kde.image and pick the
-#     veilor-black wallpaper installed above if they prefer.
+info "Wallpaper: setting Plasma default to org.kde.color (solid black)"
+# reference system uses `wallpaperplugin=org.kde.color` + `Color=0,0,0` — pure black
+# rendered by Plasma's color plugin, no image asset needed.
+# Apply via system-wide kdedefaults so new users inherit.
 KDD=/etc/xdg/kdedefaults
 install -d -m 0755 "$KDD"
 cat > "$KDD/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc" << 'EOF'
@@ -175,11 +143,8 @@ wallpaperplugin=org.kde.color
 
 [Containments][1][Wallpaper][org.kde.color][General]
 Color=0,0,0
-
-[Containments][1][Wallpaper][org.kde.image][General]
-Image=/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black/contents/images/veilor-black.png
 EOF
-ok "default wallpaper plugin = org.kde.color (#000000); image fallback wired"
+ok "default wallpaper = solid #000000 (Plasma color plugin)"
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # 5. Breeze decoration override
@@ -208,25 +173,7 @@ else
 fi
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# 6. Branding logo (referenced by /etc/os-release LOGO field)
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-info "Branding: installing veilor logo into /usr/share/pixmaps"
-BR_SRC="$ASSETS/branding"
-if [[ -f $BR_SRC/veilor-logo.svg ]]; then
-    install -d -m 0755 /usr/share/pixmaps
-    install -m 0644 "$BR_SRC/veilor-logo.svg" /usr/share/pixmaps/veilor-logo.svg
-    ok "logo installed at /usr/share/pixmaps/veilor-logo.svg"
-    # Plymouth theme can pick up the same asset for consistency.
-    if [[ -d /usr/share/plymouth/themes/veilor ]]; then
-        install -m 0644 "$BR_SRC/veilor-logo.svg" /usr/share/plymouth/themes/veilor/veilor-logo.svg
-        ok "logo mirrored into plymouth theme dir"
-    fi
-else
-    warn "branding source missing at $BR_SRC/veilor-logo.svg — skipping"
-fi
-
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# 7. Sanity: brand leak check (mirrors kickstart %post sanity)
+# 6. Sanity: brand leak check (mirrors kickstart %post sanity)
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 info "Sanity: scanning installed v0.3 paths for brand leaks"
 LEAK_PATHS=(
@@ -238,8 +185,6 @@ LEAK_PATHS=(
     "/etc/sddm.conf.d/veilor-theme.conf"
     "/etc/xdg/konsolerc"
     "/etc/xdg/kdedefaults/plasma-org.kde.plasma.desktop-appletsrc"
-    "/usr/share/wallpapers/veilor-black"
-    "/usr/share/pixmaps/veilor-logo.svg"
 )
 LEAK=0
 for p in "${LEAK_PATHS[@]}"; do

scripts/40-apparmor.sh

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# veilor-os — 40-apparmor: load veilor-shipped AppArmor profiles in
-# COMPLAIN mode. v0.6 scope: "loaded, present, nothing breaks".
-#
-# Per docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/04-hardening-tier-2.md, v0.6
-# ships AppArmor stacked alongside SELinux, but every veilor-shipped
-# profile stays in complain mode (logs only, no enforce). Real policy
-# authoring is post-v0.6.
-#
-# Idempotent: profiles already in complain mode are skipped. Run as
-# root during kickstart %post or post-install.
-
-set -uo pipefail
-
-GREEN='\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\033[1;33m'; RED='\033[0;31m'; NC='\033[0m'
-ok()   { echo -e "${GREEN}[OK]${NC}    $*"; }
-info() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC}  $*"; }
-warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC}  $*"; }
-err()  { echo -e "${RED}[ERR]${NC}   $*"; }
-
-[[ $EUID -eq 0 ]] || { err "Must run as root"; exit 1; }
-
-echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
-echo "  veilor-os :: 40-apparmor (complain mode only)"
-echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
-
-PROFILE_DIR=/etc/apparmor.d/veilor.d
-
-# ── Sanity: tools present? ──
-if ! command -v apparmor_parser >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    warn "apparmor_parser not installed — skipping (package step missed?)"
-    exit 0
-fi
-if ! command -v aa-complain >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    warn "aa-complain not installed (apparmor-utils missing) — skipping"
-    exit 0
-fi
-
-if [[ ! -d $PROFILE_DIR ]]; then
-    info "$PROFILE_DIR not present — no veilor profiles to load"
-    exit 0
-fi
-
-# ── Walk every profile we ship and force complain mode ──
-shopt -s nullglob
-loaded=0
-skipped=0
-failed=0
-
-for profile in "$PROFILE_DIR"/*; do
-    [[ -f $profile ]] || continue
-    name=$(basename "$profile")
-
-    # Already in complain mode? aa-status reports loaded profiles by
-    # internal profile name, not file path — best-effort match against
-    # the file basename to avoid re-parsing on repeat runs.
-    if command -v aa-status >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-       && aa-status --complaining 2>/dev/null | grep -qE "(^|/)veilor-${name}([[:space:]]|$)"; then
-        info "$name already in complain mode — skipping"
-        skipped=$((skipped + 1))
-        continue
-    fi
-
-    info "loading $name (complain mode)"
-    if aa-complain "$profile" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        ok "$name → complain"
-        loaded=$((loaded + 1))
-    else
-        warn "$name failed to load (parser may reject stub on this kernel)"
-        failed=$((failed + 1))
-    fi
-done
-
-echo "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"
-info "summary: loaded=$loaded skipped=$skipped failed=$failed"
-ok "v0.6 AppArmor stub: complain-mode only — no enforcement, log-only"
-exit 0

scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.thorium

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os AppArmor profile — Thorium browser (Chromium fork)
-#
-# Scope:
-#   Confine the Thorium browser binary at /usr/bin/thorium. Thorium is a
-#   Chromium derivative; it sandboxes its own renderer/GPU/utility processes,
-#   but the *browser* process itself runs with the full user's permissions
-#   unless an MAC layer scopes it down. This profile is that scope.
-#
-# Mode:
-#   complain — log violations to audit.log but do NOT block. This is the
-#   first-fit profile; the user is expected to refine it from observed
-#   denials before flipping to enforce. See `aa-logprof` to convert audit
-#   denials into rule additions.
-#
-# Manual enable:
-#   sudo install -m 0644 scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.thorium /etc/apparmor.d/
-#   sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium
-#   sudo aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium       # log only
-#   sudo aa-enforce  /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.thorium       # block
-#
-# NOT enabled in kickstart by default. v0.5 work.
-
-#include <tunables/global>
-
-profile thorium /usr/bin/thorium flags=(complain) {
-  #include <abstractions/base>
-  #include <abstractions/audio>
-  #include <abstractions/dbus-session>
-  #include <abstractions/fonts>
-  #include <abstractions/freedesktop.org>
-  #include <abstractions/gnome>
-  #include <abstractions/nameservice>
-  #include <abstractions/openssl>
-  #include <abstractions/X>
-
-  # ---- network: outbound HTTP/HTTPS only ----
-  network inet  stream,
-  network inet6 stream,
-  network inet  dgram,        # DNS resolution
-  network inet6 dgram,
-  network netlink raw,        # NetworkManager state queries
-  deny network raw,
-  deny network packet,
-  deny network bluetooth,
-  deny network can,
-  deny network rds,
-  deny network sctp,
-
-  # ---- binary + libs ----
-  /usr/bin/thorium                     mr,
-  /usr/lib/thorium/**                  mr,
-  /usr/share/thorium/**                r,
-  /opt/thorium/**                      mr,
-  /etc/thorium/**                      r,
-
-  # ---- per-user state ----
-  owner @{HOME}/.config/thorium/**            rwk,
-  owner @{HOME}/.cache/thorium/**             rwk,
-  owner @{HOME}/.local/share/thorium/**       rwk,
-
-  # ---- file pickers: only Downloads is writable ----
-  owner @{HOME}/Downloads/                    rw,
-  owner @{HOME}/Downloads/**                  rwk,
-  owner @{HOME}/Documents/                    r,
-  owner @{HOME}/Documents/**                  r,
-  owner @{HOME}/Pictures/                     r,
-  owner @{HOME}/Pictures/**                   r,
-
-  # ---- /proc: own process only, deny memory peeking ----
-  owner /proc/@{pid}/**                       r,
-  deny  /proc/*/mem                           rwk,
-  deny  /proc/*/maps                          r,
-  deny  /proc/sys/kernel/**                   w,
-
-  # ---- ptrace: forbidden ----
-  deny ptrace,
-  deny capability sys_ptrace,
-
-  # ---- kernel: no module load, no /dev/kmem, no /dev/mem ----
-  deny capability sys_module,
-  deny /dev/kmem    rwk,
-  deny /dev/mem     rwk,
-  deny /dev/port    rwk,
-  deny /sys/kernel/** w,
-
-  # ---- temp ----
-  /tmp/                       r,
-  owner /tmp/**               rwk,
-  /var/tmp/                   r,
-  owner /var/tmp/**           rwk,
-
-  # ---- system info read-only ----
-  /etc/machine-id             r,
-  /etc/os-release             r,
-  /etc/localtime              r,
-  /sys/devices/system/cpu/**  r,
-  /sys/class/net/**           r,
-
-  # ---- chrome sandbox helper (setuid/SUID-like child needs unconfined) ----
-  /usr/lib/thorium/chrome-sandbox    Cx -> sandbox,
-  /usr/bin/xdg-open                  Pix,
-
-  profile sandbox {
-    #include <abstractions/base>
-    capability sys_admin,
-    capability sys_chroot,
-    capability sys_ptrace,
-    /usr/lib/thorium/chrome-sandbox    mr,
-    /usr/lib/thorium/**                mrix,
-    /proc/*/setgroups                  w,
-    /proc/*/uid_map                    w,
-    /proc/*/gid_map                    w,
-  }
-}

scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.veilor-power

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os AppArmor profile — veilor-power
-#
-# Scope:
-#   Confine /usr/local/bin/veilor-power, the power profile switcher. The
-#   script is small but invokes sudo to talk to tuned-adm; we want a tight
-#   surface so a compromised user shell cannot abuse the sudoers entry to
-#   pivot beyond profile switching.
-#
-# Mode:
-#   enforce — this binary is ours, the surface is small, no need for a
-#   complain runway. Verified rules at write time.
-#
-# Manual enable:
-#   sudo install -m 0644 scripts/apparmor/usr.bin.veilor-power /etc/apparmor.d/
-#   sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.veilor-power
-#   sudo aa-enforce  /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.veilor-power
-#   # to debug:
-#   sudo aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.veilor-power
-#
-# NOT enabled in kickstart by default. v0.5 work.
-
-#include <tunables/global>
-
-profile veilor-power /usr/local/bin/veilor-power flags=(enforce) {
-  #include <abstractions/base>
-  #include <abstractions/bash>
-  #include <abstractions/consoles>
-
-  # ---- the script itself + bash ----
-  /usr/local/bin/veilor-power                                  r,
-  /usr/bin/bash                                                ix,
-  /usr/bin/awk                                                 ix,
-  /usr/bin/cat                                                 ix,
-
-  # ---- read CPU + ASUS sysfs for status ----
-  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpufreq/                             r,
-  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpufreq/**                           r,
-  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cpufreq/                        r,
-  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cpufreq/**                      r,
-  /sys/devices/platform/asus-nb-wmi/                           r,
-  /sys/devices/platform/asus-nb-wmi/**                         r,
-
-  # ---- sudo handoff to tuned-adm ----
-  /usr/bin/sudo                                                Cx -> sudo_tuned,
-  /usr/bin/tuned-adm                                           Pix,
-
-  # ---- forbidden ----
-  deny network,
-  deny ptrace,
-  deny capability sys_ptrace,
-  deny capability sys_module,
-  deny capability sys_rawio,
-  deny /dev/kmem                                               rwk,
-  deny /dev/mem                                                rwk,
-  deny /etc/shadow                                             r,
-  deny /etc/sudoers                                            w,
-  deny /etc/sudoers.d/**                                       w,
-  deny @{HOME}/.ssh/**                                         rwk,
-  deny @{HOME}/.gnupg/**                                       rwk,
-
-  # ---- child profile for the sudo subprocess ----
-  profile sudo_tuned {
-    #include <abstractions/base>
-    #include <abstractions/authentication>
-    #include <abstractions/nameservice>
-    /usr/bin/sudo                                              mr,
-    /etc/sudoers                                               r,
-    /etc/sudoers.d/                                            r,
-    /etc/sudoers.d/veilor-power                                r,
-    /usr/bin/tuned-adm                                         Pix,
-    /var/log/sudo*                                             w,
-    /var/db/sudo/**                                            rwk,
-    capability setuid,
-    capability setgid,
-    capability audit_write,
-    deny network,
-  }
-}

scripts/apparmor/usr.local.bin.lm-studio

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os AppArmor profile — LM Studio (local LLM runner)
-#
-# Scope:
-#   Confine LM Studio's binary. LM Studio loads arbitrary GGUF/safetensors
-#   weights and exposes an OpenAI-compatible HTTP server on :1234. The
-#   binary itself is closed-source — we don't trust it with the full home
-#   directory.
-#
-# Mode:
-#   complain initially. Flip to enforce once observed denials are reviewed.
-#
-# Manual enable:
-#   sudo install -m 0644 scripts/apparmor/usr.local.bin.lm-studio /etc/apparmor.d/
-#   sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/usr.local.bin.lm-studio
-#   sudo aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/usr.local.bin.lm-studio
-#   sudo aa-enforce  /etc/apparmor.d/usr.local.bin.lm-studio
-#
-# NOT enabled in kickstart by default. v0.5 work.
-
-#include <tunables/global>
-
-profile lm-studio /usr/local/bin/lm-studio flags=(complain) {
-  #include <abstractions/base>
-  #include <abstractions/nameservice>
-  #include <abstractions/openssl>
-  #include <abstractions/dbus-session>
-  #include <abstractions/freedesktop.org>
-  #include <abstractions/X>
-  #include <abstractions/fonts>
-
-  # ---- network: HTTP server :1234 + outbound model downloads ----
-  network inet  stream,
-  network inet6 stream,
-  network inet  dgram,
-  network inet6 dgram,
-  deny   network raw,
-  deny   network packet,
-  deny   network bluetooth,
-
-  # ---- binary + electron runtime (LM Studio is Electron-based) ----
-  /usr/local/bin/lm-studio                    mr,
-  /opt/lm-studio/**                           mr,
-  /usr/lib/lm-studio/**                       mr,
-
-  # ---- model weights + metadata ----
-  owner @{HOME}/.lmstudio/                    rw,
-  owner @{HOME}/.lmstudio/**                  rwk,
-  owner @{HOME}/.cache/lm-studio/**           rwk,
-  owner @{HOME}/.config/LMStudio/**           rwk,
-
-  # ---- temp ----
-  /tmp/                                       r,
-  owner /tmp/**                               rwk,
-  /var/tmp/                                   r,
-  owner /var/tmp/**                           rwk,
-
-  # ---- GPU device nodes (CUDA / ROCm / Vulkan) ----
-  /dev/dri/                                   r,
-  /dev/dri/**                                 rw,
-  /dev/nvidia*                                rw,
-  /dev/nvidiactl                              rw,
-  /dev/nvidia-uvm                             rw,
-  /dev/nvidia-uvm-tools                       rw,
-  /dev/kfd                                    rw,
-  /dev/shm/**                                 rwk,
-
-  # ---- system info ----
-  /etc/machine-id                             r,
-  /etc/os-release                             r,
-  /etc/localtime                              r,
-  /sys/devices/system/cpu/**                  r,
-  /sys/class/drm/**                           r,
-  /proc/cpuinfo                               r,
-  /proc/meminfo                               r,
-  /proc/stat                                  r,
-
-  # ---- /proc: own process only ----
-  owner /proc/@{pid}/**                       r,
-  deny  /proc/*/mem                           rwk,
-
-  # ---- forbidden ----
-  deny ptrace,
-  deny capability sys_ptrace,
-  deny capability sys_module,
-  deny capability sys_rawio,
-  deny /dev/kmem        rwk,
-  deny /dev/mem         rwk,
-  deny /dev/port        rwk,
-  deny /sys/kernel/**   w,
-  deny /etc/shadow      r,
-  deny @{HOME}/.ssh/**  rwk,
-  deny @{HOME}/.gnupg/** rwk,
-
-  # ---- xdg / browser handoff for "Open in browser" UI button ----
-  /usr/bin/xdg-open                           Pix,
-}

scripts/selinux/build-policy.sh

@@ -1,43 +1,10 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Build + load veilor-os SELinux policy modules.
-#
-# Modules:
-#   veilor-systemd    — capabilities for systemd-modules-load (post-boot lock)
-#   veilor-firstboot  — confine /usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot one-shot
-#
-# Usage:
-#   sudo ./build-policy.sh           # build + install all
-#   sudo ./build-policy.sh <name>    # build + install one module
+# Build + load veilor-systemd SELinux policy module.
 set -euo pipefail
 
 cd "$(dirname "$0")"
 
-MODULES=(veilor-systemd veilor-firstboot)
-if [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; then
-    MODULES=("$@")
-fi
-
-for m in "${MODULES[@]}"; do
-    if [[ ! -f "$m.te" ]]; then
-        echo "[ERR] $m.te not found" >&2
-        exit 1
-    fi
-    echo "[*] Building $m ..."
-    checkmodule -M -m -o "$m.mod" "$m.te"
-    semodule_package -o "$m.pp" -m "$m.mod"
-    semodule -i "$m.pp"
-    echo "[OK] $m loaded"
-done
-
-# Apply file context for veilor-firstboot if module just loaded.
-if printf '%s\n' "${MODULES[@]}" | grep -qx veilor-firstboot; then
-    if command -v restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        # Mark the binary + state file with the right types.
-        semanage fcontext -a -t veilor_firstboot_exec_t  '/usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot' 2>/dev/null || true
-        semanage fcontext -a -t veilor_firstboot_state_t '/var/lib/veilor-firstboot\.done' 2>/dev/null || true
-        restorecon -v /usr/local/bin/veilor-firstboot 2>/dev/null || true
-        [[ -e /var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done ]] && restorecon -v /var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done 2>/dev/null || true
-    fi
-fi
-
-echo "[done] all modules loaded"
+checkmodule -M -m -o veilor-systemd.mod veilor-systemd.te
+semodule_package -o veilor-systemd.pp -m veilor-systemd.mod
+semodule -i veilor-systemd.pp
+echo "[OK] veilor-systemd SELinux module loaded"

scripts/selinux/veilor-firstboot.te

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-policy_module(veilor-firstboot, 1.0)
-#
-# veilor-os SELinux module — confine veilor-firstboot.service.
-#
-# The firstboot service runs once on TTY1 before SDDM, prompts for the
-# admin password, then enables SDDM and self-disables. It is privileged
-# (it must be — `passwd` writes /etc/shadow) but the surface is small and
-# bounded. This module narrows what the service is allowed to do so that a
-# bug or hostile env in firstboot.sh can't, e.g., dial out, scrape /home,
-# or load a kernel module.
-#
-# Build + load:
-#   cd scripts/selinux
-#   ./build-policy.sh           # builds & loads all .te modules
-#
-# Verify:
-#   semodule -l | grep veilor-firstboot
-#   ls -Z /usr/local/sbin/veilor-firstboot
-#     -> system_u:object_r:veilor_firstboot_exec_t:s0
-#
-# Audit any denials with:
-#   ausearch -m AVC -ts recent -c veilor-firstboot
-
-require {
-    type init_t;
-    type passwd_exec_t;
-    type passwd_file_t;
-    type shadow_t;
-    type systemd_unit_file_t;
-    type systemd_passwd_var_run_t;
-    type sddm_unit_file_t;
-    type sddm_var_lib_t;
-    type tmp_t;
-    type tty_device_t;
-    type devtty_t;
-    type self_runtime_t;
-    type chkpwd_exec_t;
-    type pam_var_run_t;
-    type security_t;
-    type fs_t;
-    type usr_t;
-    type bin_t;
-    type lib_t;
-    type etc_t;
-    type proc_t;
-    type unconfined_service_t;
-    class file       { read write create unlink getattr setattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
-    class dir        { read write add_name remove_name search getattr open };
-    class chr_file   { read write open getattr ioctl };
-    class capability { setuid setgid chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid };
-    class process    { transition signal sigchld sigkill noatsecure rlimitinh siginh };
-    class service    { start stop status enable disable };
-    class systemd    { start };
-    class lnk_file   { read getattr };
-    class filesystem { getattr };
-}
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-# 1. Define the firstboot domain + executable type
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-type veilor_firstboot_t;
-type veilor_firstboot_exec_t;
-type veilor_firstboot_state_t;     # /var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done
-
-init_daemon_domain(veilor_firstboot_t, veilor_firstboot_exec_t)
-files_type(veilor_firstboot_state_t)
-
-# Auto-transition: when init_t executes /usr/local/sbin/veilor-firstboot,
-# enter veilor_firstboot_t.
-domain_auto_trans(init_t, veilor_firstboot_exec_t, veilor_firstboot_t)
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-# 2. Allow rules — what the service IS allowed to do
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-# read /etc/passwd, /etc/group, /etc/shadow (passwd needs shadow write)
-allow veilor_firstboot_t passwd_file_t:file { read getattr open };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t shadow_t:file      { read write open getattr setattr };
-
-# exec passwd(1)
-allow veilor_firstboot_t passwd_exec_t:file { read getattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t chkpwd_exec_t:file { read getattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
-
-# capabilities passwd needs
-allow veilor_firstboot_t self:capability { setuid setgid chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid };
-
-# write the state marker /var/lib/veilor-firstboot.done
-allow veilor_firstboot_t veilor_firstboot_state_t:file { create write open getattr setattr unlink };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t veilor_firstboot_state_t:dir  { search write add_name remove_name };
-
-# write /etc/sddm.conf.d/ entries (autologin disable, theme, etc.)
-allow veilor_firstboot_t sddm_var_lib_t:dir  { read write search add_name remove_name open };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t sddm_var_lib_t:file { read write create open getattr setattr };
-
-# start sddm.service via systemctl
-allow veilor_firstboot_t sddm_unit_file_t:file    { read getattr open };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t sddm_unit_file_t:service { start status enable disable };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t init_t:system            { start };
-
-# tty1 I/O
-allow veilor_firstboot_t tty_device_t:chr_file { read write open getattr ioctl };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t devtty_t:chr_file     { read write open getattr ioctl };
-
-# usual base reads
-allow veilor_firstboot_t bin_t:file       { read getattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t lib_t:file       { read getattr open execute execute_no_trans map };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t usr_t:file       { read getattr open };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t etc_t:file       { read getattr open };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t etc_t:dir        { read search getattr open };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t fs_t:filesystem  getattr;
-allow veilor_firstboot_t self:fifo_file   { read write };
-allow veilor_firstboot_t self:unix_stream_socket { create connect read write };
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-# 3. Deny rules — what the service is NOT allowed to do
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-# no network — firstboot must never phone home
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:tcp_socket  *;
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:udp_socket  *;
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:rawip_socket *;
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:packet_socket *;
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:netlink_route_socket *;
-
-# no kernel module load
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:capability sys_module;
-
-# no /home access except the bits ferror-firstboot.sh writes (admin's
-# .config dir staging, if any).  /home/admin general read = forbidden.
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t home_root_t:dir  { read write };
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t user_home_t:dir  { read write search };
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t user_home_t:file { read write open };
-
-# no ptrace, no /dev/mem, no /dev/kmem
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:capability sys_ptrace;
-neverallow veilor_firstboot_t self:capability sys_rawio;

test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os — Test Method Changelog
-
-Append-only log of changes to `test/TESTING.md`. Each entry: date, the
-veilor-os version it first applied to, what changed in the procedure,
-and *why*. The why is the load-bearing part — without it this file
-becomes a list of opinions.
-
-Entries are newest-first.
-
----
-
-## 2026-05-06 · v0.5.32 · ISO build path moved to Forgejo
-
-**Change:** Build host for the test ISO has moved off GitHub Actions
-onto the Forgejo runner on nullstone. The hybrid VM test procedure in
-`TESTING.md` is **unchanged** — the gum installer still drives every
-step it can, the operator still types the LUKS + admin passwords
-directly into the QEMU window. The only thing different is where the
-ISO comes from and how the host log is captured.
-
-**Practical deltas for testers:**
-
-- ISO download: from the Forgejo `ci-latest` rolling release at
-  <https://git.s8n.ru/veilor-org/veilor-os/releases/tag/ci-latest>.
-  The tag is force-replaced on each successful `build-iso.yml` run, so
-  always re-download — don't rely on a cached copy.
-- Re-flash to USB / virtio-blk image via Etcher / `dd` — **unchanged**.
-  Same `sha256sum -c` step; same image format.
-- virtio-9p host log capture is now **active by default** in
-  `test/run-vm.sh`. This replaces the broken virtio-serial path
-  flagged by Agent 6 in the 2026-05-05 wave; Anaconda logs land in the
-  host-side mount automatically once the VM boots, no manual `tail -f`
-  on a broken serial console.
-- Build host for the record: forgejo-runner on nullstone, runner label
-  `ubuntu-24.04`, image `catthehacker/ubuntu:act-24.04`. Reproducibility
-  is unchanged from the GH Actions ubuntu-24.04 base — the act image
-  matches GHA's runner image to within package versions.
-
-**Why:** GitHub mirror was disabled 2026-05-06 (repo is now
-private-by-default on Forgejo); GH Actions builds would just stop
-producing artifacts. Moving CI in-house onto nullstone keeps the
-test/release loop intact and removes the external dependency for
-private-build cycles. Documenting the change here so a future tester
-reading TESTING.md doesn't waste time hunting an artifact in a
-GitHub run that never happened.
-
-**Files touched in this entry:**
-- `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md` — this entry.
-
-`test/TESTING.md` itself is **not** edited — the procedure prose still
-applies verbatim. Only the build host and the URL where the ISO lives
-changed.
-
----
-
-## 2026-05-05 · v0.5.27 · TESTING.md created
-
-**Change:** First version of the canonical procedure document.
-
-**Why:** Through v0.2 → v0.5.26 we'd been reproducing the test
-procedure ad-hoc each time, which meant test runs were uncomparable
-and regressions were caught only by accident. The v0.5.26 → v0.5.27
-debugging session surfaced the LUKS-cmdline bug, the GRUB rebrand
-gap, the gum-cursor render glitch, and the fbcon KMS issue all in a
-single VM run — but only because the test happened to walk every step
-in order. Codifying the steps means the next regression is caught the
-same way reliably.
-
-The procedure documents the **hybrid VM method** explicitly: Claude
-drives every step it can via QEMU monitor `sendkey`, the human types
-LUKS + admin passwords directly into the QEMU window because plymouth
-ignores synthesised keystrokes. Past trail (14+ failed sendkey
-variants) is the source of truth for that limitation; do not re-fight
-that battle without first rereading the trail.
-
-The procedure also separates **VM** (cheap iteration, catches install
-logic) from **real hardware** (mandatory for tag, catches firmware /
-KMS / GPU). Future releases must produce a `test/test-runs/` report
-for each before tagging.
-
-**Files added:**
-- `test/TESTING.md` — canonical procedure
-- `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md` — this file
-- `test/test-runs/` — per-run reports go here (template lands with
-  first real run, currently empty)

test/README.md

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-# test/
-
-Test harnesses for veilor-os ISO builds.
-
-## Files
-
-| File | Purpose |
-|------|---------|
-| `run-vm.sh` | Manual smoke test — boot the latest ISO interactively in QEMU/KVM. SSH key injection via cloud-init seed + monitor sendkey fallback for live-image login. |
-| `auto-install.sh` | **Autonomous** end-to-end install test. Boots ISO, drives the gum installer via QEMU monitor `sendkey`, waits for anaconda to finish + reboot, SSHs into the installed system, runs validation checklist. Prints PASS/FAIL summary. |
-| `auto-install-keymap.sh` | Sourced helper. Provides `km_send_str`, `km_send_chord`, `km_send_key`, `km_screendump`, `km_wait_socket`, etc. Reusable by other automation. |
-| `boot-checklist.md` | Manual post-install checklist (run on a real spare laptop). |
-
-## Running the autonomous installer test
-
-```sh
-./test/auto-install.sh build/out/veilor-os-*.iso
-```
-
-Hardcoded inputs (deterministic — do not edit during a test run):
-- Disk: first `/dev/vda` (the only disk in QEMU)
-- Hostname: `veilor` (installer hardcoded since v0.5.4)
-- LUKS passphrase: `testpass1234`
-- Admin password: `adminpass1234`
-- Locale: `en_GB.UTF-8`
-
-Expected runtime: 20–30 minutes wall clock (anaconda dominates).
-
-### Outputs
-
-- `/tmp/veilor-auto-install.log` — full driver log
-- `/tmp/veilor-auto-install-NN-<step>.png` — milestone screenshots
-- `/tmp/veilor-auto-install-final-ssh.txt` — final SSH session capture (uname/lsblk/cmdline/failed units)
-
-### Exit codes
-
-- `0` — all validation checks passed
-- `1` — any failure (anaconda crashed, SSH never came up, validation check failed)
-- `2` — preflight failure (missing tool, bad ISO arg, missing OVMF)
-
-### Prerequisites
-
-- `qemu-system-x86_64`, `qemu-img`, `socat`, `ssh`, `ssh-keygen`
-- `edk2-ovmf` (OVMF UEFI firmware at `/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_{CODE,VARS}.fd`)
-- `mkisofs` or `xorriso` (for cloud-init seed ISO; harness falls back to TTY1 driving if seed cannot be built or cloud-init does not run on the installed system)
-- `convert` from ImageMagick (optional — converts PPM screendumps to PNG; harness keeps PPM if absent)
-- KVM access (`/dev/kvm` readable by the user)
-
-### What it validates
-
-Post-install on the booted system:
-- `/etc/os-release` → `NAME=veilor-os`
-- `hostnamectl --static` → `veilor`
-- `systemctl is-active` → `active` for `sshd fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld chronyd sddm`
-- `getenforce` → `Enforcing` (preferred) or `Permissive` (acceptable for v0.5.x)
-- `lsblk -f` shows `crypto_LUKS` + `btrfs`
-- `/etc/crypttab` has a LUKS entry
-- `getent passwd admin` returns the user
-- `/usr/local/bin/{veilor-power,veilor-doctor,veilor-update}` are present and executable
-- `/proc/cmdline` contains `init_on_alloc=1`
-
-### Troubleshooting
-
-- **Stuck at boot banner**: ISO didn't autostart `veilor-installer` on tty1. Check `serial.log` and `auto-install-vm-NN-*.png` screenshots. The harness aborts after 5 minutes of identical screen frames.
-- **SSH never up**: cloud-init may not have run on the installed system (no `cidata` mount). The harness falls back to TTY1 driving — typing the LUKS passphrase, logging in as admin, and hand-injecting the SSH key. If both paths fail, validation cannot proceed.
-- **`screendump` produces unreadable PPM**: install ImageMagick (`dnf install ImageMagick`) so the harness converts to PNG.

test/TESTING.md

@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
-# veilor-os — Testing Procedure
-
-This document is the canonical procedure for validating a veilor-os ISO
-end-to-end. Every release that gets a tag MUST have a corresponding
-test-run report in `test/test-runs/` linked from the release notes.
-
-If reality forces you to deviate from the steps below, **do not silently
-patch the procedure** — open a commit that updates this file *and*
-appends an entry to `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md` explaining what changed
-and why. The changelog is what makes the procedure auditable; the
-procedure itself is just the latest snapshot.
-
----
-
-## Two test environments
-
-| Environment | Catches | Doesn't catch |
-|-------------|---------|---------------|
-| **VM (QEMU + virtio-vga)** | install logic, kickstart bugs, %post failures, anaconda transaction failures, GRUB write, BLS entries, package selection, network stack | KMS / fbcon issues, real-firmware Secure Boot, USB controller quirks, GPU driver compatibility, sleep/wake, battery, thermals |
-| **Real hardware (USB → spare laptop)** | everything VM doesn't | install repeatability (you only have so many spare laptops) |
-
-Both are required for any tagged release. VM first (cheap iteration),
-real hardware second (final sign-off).
-
----
-
-## VM test — hybrid procedure
-
-The VM cannot type LUKS / admin passwords through QEMU's `sendkey`
-monitor command — plymouth's IPC ignores synthesised keystrokes (we
-verified this across 14+ sendkey variants in earlier sessions). The
-hybrid procedure splits the work: Claude/automation drives every step
-that doesn't need a password; the human types the two passwords (LUKS
-+ admin) into the QEMU window directly.
-
-Standard test passwords (lab use only — never reuse outside this repo):
-
-| Prompt | Type |
-|--------|------|
-| LUKS passphrase | `veilortest1` |
-| Admin password | `veilortest1` |
-
-Both passwords identical on purpose — easier to remember mid-test, both
-satisfy the installer's 8-char min, neither contains shell-special
-chars (validate_pw rejects `" $ \ \` & | / \n`).
-
-### Run a VM test
-
-```bash
-cd ~/ai-lab/_github/veilor-os
-# Pull the ISO you want to test (from a CI release or local build)
-ls /home/admin/Downloads/veilor-os-*.iso
-
-# Wipe stale state, launch VM with monitor sock (no auto-inject — we
-# don't want sendkey noise typing into prompts)
-FRESH=1 NO_INJECT=1 DISPLAY=:0 ./test/run-vm.sh \
-    /home/admin/Downloads/veilor-os-43-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.iso
-```
-
-Then either (a) drive the install yourself in the QEMU window, or
-(b) hand the monitor sock to Claude / a script:
-
-- Monitor sock: `test/veilor-vm.monitor.sock`
-- Send a key: `echo "sendkey ret" | socat - "UNIX-CONNECT:$SOCK"`
-- Screendump: `echo "screendump /tmp/x.ppm" | socat - "UNIX-CONNECT:$SOCK"; magick /tmp/x.ppm /tmp/x.png`
-
-### Steps to verify
-
-The complete checklist lives in `test/boot-checklist.md` — that file is
-the granular pass/fail list. The high-level flow is:
-
-1. **Live boot.** GRUB (legacy menu, no Plymouth splash) → text scroll
-   → veilor-installer banner on tty1 within ~30s. No "fedora" branding
-   anywhere on screen.
-2. **Installer menu.** "Install" highlighted by default. No phantom
-   duplicate items, no stray characters in input fields.
-3. **Disk picker.** `/dev/vda` (or whatever virtio gives you) listed
-   with size + model.
-4. **Passwords.** LUKS + admin prompts; user types `veilortest1` twice.
-5. **Locale.** en_GB.UTF-8 picks up.
-6. **Confirm.** Disk shown with `WILL BE ERASED`, locale + LUKS/admin
-   ticks shown.
-7. **Anaconda.** "Installing veilor-os to /dev/vda · 10–30 min · logs
-   on tty4". Watch for `Configuring man-db` — if anything fails, this
-   is historically where it dies.
-8. **Reboot.** VM reboots; ISO must NOT boot first this time. Kill
-   QEMU + relaunch without ISO drive (see *Boot installed disk* below)
-   to skip the GRUB-from-ISO path.
-9. **GRUB.** Single "veilor-os" entry (no rescue, no "Fedora Linux").
-10. **LUKS prompt.** Plymouth `details` theme — text-mode prompt for
-    passphrase. User types `veilortest1` in the QEMU window (sendkey
-    will not work).
-11. **First boot.** SDDM splash → admin user pre-filled → admin types
-    `veilortest1` → password-change prompt (chage -d 0 expired the
-    password) → user picks new password → KDE Plasma session.
-12. **Hardening checks** per `test/boot-checklist.md` (SELinux
-    enforcing, fail2ban active, USBGuard active, tuned profile, etc.).
-
-### Boot installed disk (skip ISO)
-
-After the install reboots, QEMU's CD-first boot order will land back
-in the live ISO. Easiest workaround: kill QEMU and re-launch without
-the `-drive file=...iso` line. The qcow2 retains the install:
-
-```bash
-pkill -f 'qemu-system.*veilor-os'
-cd ~/ai-lab/_github/veilor-os/test
-DISPLAY=:0 qemu-system-x86_64 \
-    -enable-kvm -cpu host -smp 4 -m 4096 \
-    -machine q35,smm=on \
-    -global driver=cfi.pflash01,property=secure,value=on \
-    -drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file=/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd \
-    -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=$PWD/veilor-vm.nvram \
-    -drive file=$PWD/veilor-vm.qcow2,if=virtio,format=qcow2 \
-    -monitor unix:$PWD/veilor-vm.monitor.sock,server,nowait \
-    -netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
-    -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0 \
-    -vga virtio -display gtk,gl=on
-```
-
----
-
-## Real-hardware test — USB → spare laptop
-
-Required for every tagged release. The VM cannot reproduce KMS /
-fbcon / GPU-driver issues; only real silicon will.
-
-### 1. Flash USB
-
-```bash
-# 8GB+ USB stick, identified by lsblk (e.g. /dev/sda — confirm vendor)
-sudo umount /dev/sdX* 2>/dev/null
-sudo wipefs -a /dev/sdX
-sudo dd if=/path/to/veilor-os-*.iso of=/dev/sdX bs=4M status=progress conv=fsync
-sync
-sudo eject /dev/sdX
-```
-
-Etcher / GNOME Disks also fine. Verify-after-flash is built into
-Etcher; for `dd`, run `cmp` on the first ISO_SIZE bytes if paranoid.
-
-### 2. Boot test
-
-- Disable Secure Boot in firmware (until we MOK-enroll our shim, which
-  is v0.5+).
-- Boot from USB.
-- Walk the same numbered steps as the VM section, except:
-  - On "TYPE NOW: passphrase" steps, you actually have a keyboard.
-  - At step 8, the laptop will eject the USB and reboot to the
-    installed system without intervention.
-  - At step 11, do NOT use `veilortest1` for the post-install admin
-    password change — pick something real if this is your daily-driver
-    laptop, or a throwaway if it's a test machine. The kickstart's
-    ChainOfTrust ends here; from this prompt forward you own the
-    password.
-
-### 3. Capture findings
-
-Fill in a fresh `test/test-runs/YYYY-MM-DD-vX.Y.Z.md` from the
-template. **Always** capture: GRUB title, kernel cmdline (`cat
-/proc/cmdline`), `lsblk -f`, `getenforce`, `systemctl is-active fail2ban
-usbguard tuned auditd firewalld`, `journalctl -b -p err --no-pager`.
-
-If anything regressed, that goes at the top of the report under
-**Regressions**, with a screenshot if possible.
-
----
-
-## Per-run report template
-
-Copy `test/test-runs/_TEMPLATE.md` (created when the first real
-test-run lands) and fill in section-by-section. Keep them brief —
-this is meant to be a 5-minute write-up, not a thesis.
-
----
-
-## When to alter this procedure
-
-If a step turns out to be wrong, redundant, or missing:
-
-1. Edit this file.
-2. Append to `test/METHOD-CHANGELOG.md` with: date, version it first
-   applied to, what changed, and why (cite a specific test-run report
-   if the change is in response to a finding).
-3. Reference the changelog entry in your commit message.
-
-The changelog is the audit trail. Don't skip it.

test/auto-install-keymap.sh

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# auto-install-keymap.sh — sourced helper for QEMU-monitor-driven UI automation.
-#
-# Provides a minimal but complete US-layout keymap mapping every printable
-# ASCII character to a QEMU `sendkey` chord, plus convenience wrappers for
-# typing strings, sending special keys, taking screenshots, and waiting for
-# the monitor socket to appear.
-#
-# Usage:
-#   source test/auto-install-keymap.sh
-#   MONITOR_SOCK=/path/to/sock
-#   km_wait_socket "$MONITOR_SOCK" 60
-#   km_send_str "$MONITOR_SOCK" "hello world"
-#   km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
-#   km_send_chord "$MONITOR_SOCK" ctrl alt f1
-#   km_screendump "$MONITOR_SOCK" /tmp/shot.ppm
-#
-# Why a separate file: other harnesses (regression suites, fuzzers) can
-# source this without dragging in the full installer test driver.
-
-# Guard against double-source.
-[[ -n "${__VEILOR_KEYMAP_LOADED:-}" ]] && return 0
-__VEILOR_KEYMAP_LOADED=1
-
-# ── Tool requirements ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# socat is the canonical way to talk to a unix-domain QEMU monitor.
-# nc-openbsd would also work but socat is what run-vm.sh already uses.
-km_require_tools() {
-    local missing=()
-    for t in socat qemu-img qemu-system-x86_64; do
-        command -v "$t" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing+=("$t")
-    done
-    if [[ ${#missing[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
-        echo "[ERR] missing required tools: ${missing[*]}" >&2
-        return 1
-    fi
-}
-
-# ── Low-level monitor I/O ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Send a single line of monitor input. Newlines are critical — QEMU's HMP
-# parses one command per line. Errors are swallowed: the most common cause
-# is the VM having shut down between two send_* calls, which we tolerate.
-km_monitor_send() {
-    local sock=$1; shift
-    printf '%s\n' "$*" | socat - "UNIX-CONNECT:$sock" 2>/dev/null || true
-}
-
-# Send a raw HMP command and capture any stdout response (e.g. for `info`
-# queries). Trims the QEMU monitor banner + prompt noise.
-km_monitor_query() {
-    local sock=$1; shift
-    printf '%s\n' "$*" | socat -t 1 - "UNIX-CONNECT:$sock" 2>/dev/null \
-        | sed -e 's/\r//g' -e '/^QEMU /d' -e '/^(qemu)/d' || true
-}
-
-# Wait until the monitor unix socket exists and accepts connections.
-# $2 = max wait in seconds (default 60).
-km_wait_socket() {
-    local sock=$1 max=${2:-60} waited=0
-    while (( waited < max )); do
-        if [[ -S $sock ]]; then
-            # Try a no-op query — confirms the QEMU side is actually serving.
-            if printf 'info status\n' | socat -t 1 - "UNIX-CONNECT:$sock" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                return 0
-            fi
-        fi
-        sleep 1
-        waited=$((waited + 1))
-    done
-    echo "[ERR] monitor socket $sock never became ready (waited ${max}s)" >&2
-    return 1
-}
-
-# ── Screenshots ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Ask QEMU to dump the current framebuffer. Output is PPM. Convert to PNG
-# with ImageMagick if available; otherwise leave PPM and warn.
-km_screendump() {
-    local sock=$1 out=$2
-    local ppm="${out%.png}.ppm"
-    km_monitor_send "$sock" "screendump $ppm"
-    sleep 1   # give QEMU a moment to flush
-    if [[ -f $ppm ]] && command -v convert >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        convert "$ppm" "$out" 2>/dev/null && rm -f "$ppm"
-    fi
-}
-
-# ── Key tables ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# QEMU `sendkey` reference: docs/system/keys.html.in. The HMP names are
-# the X11 keysym lower-case, with a few exceptions for non-letter keys
-# (spc, ret, minus, etc.). What follows is the full US-layout printable
-# ASCII set. Everything outside this table is silently dropped — callers
-# are responsible for not feeding it characters the installer can't accept
-# anyway (passwords are validated to ASCII-printable in veilor-installer).
-declare -gA __KM_PLAIN=(
-    [' ']=spc       [a]=a [b]=b [c]=c [d]=d [e]=e [f]=f [g]=g [h]=h
-    [i]=i [j]=j [k]=k [l]=l [m]=m [n]=n [o]=o [p]=p [q]=q [r]=r
-    [s]=s [t]=t [u]=u [v]=v [w]=w [x]=x [y]=y [z]=z
-    [0]=0 [1]=1 [2]=2 [3]=3 [4]=4 [5]=5 [6]=6 [7]=7 [8]=8 [9]=9
-    ['-']=minus  ['=']=equal  ['[']=bracket_left  [']']=bracket_right
-    [';']=semicolon  ["'"]=apostrophe  [',']=comma  ['.']=dot
-    ['/']=slash  ['\\']=backslash  ['`']=grave_accent
-)
-
-# Shift-prefixed (US): all caps + shifted-symbol row.
-declare -gA __KM_SHIFT=(
-    [A]=a [B]=b [C]=c [D]=d [E]=e [F]=f [G]=g [H]=h [I]=i [J]=j
-    [K]=k [L]=l [M]=m [N]=n [O]=o [P]=p [Q]=q [R]=r [S]=s [T]=t
-    [U]=u [V]=v [W]=w [X]=x [Y]=y [Z]=z
-    ['!']=1  ['@']=2  ['#']=3  ['$']=4  ['%']=5
-    ['^']=6  ['&']=7  ['*']=8  ['(']=9  [')']=0
-    ['_']=minus  ['+']=equal  ['{']=bracket_left  ['}']=bracket_right
-    [':']=semicolon  ['"']=apostrophe  ['<']=comma  ['>']=dot
-    ['?']=slash  ['|']=backslash  ['~']=grave_accent
-)
-
-# ── Public send wrappers ───────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Send a single named key (e.g. ret, esc, up, tab, f1).
-km_send_key() {
-    local sock=$1 key=$2
-    km_monitor_send "$sock" "sendkey $key"
-}
-
-# Send a chord — components are joined with `-` per QEMU HMP syntax.
-km_send_chord() {
-    local sock=$1; shift
-    local IFS='-'
-    km_monitor_send "$sock" "sendkey $*"
-}
-
-# Type a string by encoding each character via the keymap. Unrecognised
-# characters are skipped with a warning to stderr — caller is expected to
-# stick to printable ASCII.
-km_send_str() {
-    local sock=$1 s=$2 ch chord
-    local i=0
-    while (( i < ${#s} )); do
-        ch="${s:i:1}"
-        if [[ -n "${__KM_PLAIN[$ch]:-}" ]]; then
-            chord="${__KM_PLAIN[$ch]}"
-            km_monitor_send "$sock" "sendkey $chord"
-        elif [[ -n "${__KM_SHIFT[$ch]:-}" ]]; then
-            chord="${__KM_SHIFT[$ch]}"
-            km_monitor_send "$sock" "sendkey shift-$chord"
-        else
-            printf '[WARN] km_send_str: unencodable char %q skipped\n' "$ch" >&2
-        fi
-        i=$((i + 1))
-        # Tiny gap so QEMU doesn't drop fast keypresses on busy hosts.
-        # Empirically 5ms = the line between "100% reliable" and "loses ~1%".
-        sleep 0.02
-    done
-}
-
-# Convenience: type a string then press Enter.
-km_send_line() {
-    local sock=$1 s=$2
-    km_send_str "$sock" "$s"
-    km_send_key "$sock" ret
-}
-
-# Visual indicator for log readability — prints a banner + a short pause so
-# the next monitor command has time to land on a stable UI frame. Used by
-# the harness between major steps; safe to skip in automated reuse.
-km_step_banner() {
-    local label=$1
-    printf '\n──── %s @ %s ────\n' "$label" "$(date +'%H:%M:%S')"
-}

test/auto-install.sh

@@ -1,673 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# auto-install.sh — autonomous end-to-end install test for veilor-os.
-#
-# Boots a fresh ISO under QEMU, drives the gum installer via the QEMU
-# monitor (sendkey events), waits for anaconda to finish + reboot, SSHes
-# into the installed system, and runs a validation checklist.
-#
-# Usage:
-#   ./test/auto-install.sh path/to/veilor-os-*.iso
-#
-# Expected runtime:
-#   * boot + drive installer:   ~3 min
-#   * anaconda install (KDE):   ~15-25 min (depends on mirrors + host CPU)
-#   * reboot + SSH up:          ~2 min
-#   * validation checks:        <1 min
-#   * total:                    20-30 min wall clock
-#
-# Hardcoded test inputs (do NOT edit — meant to be deterministic):
-#   disk        first /dev/vda (only disk in QEMU)
-#   hostname    "veilor"  (installer hardcodes this in v0.5.4)
-#   LUKS pw     testpass1234
-#   admin pw    adminpass1234
-#   locale      en_GB.UTF-8 (first option, accepted with Enter)
-#
-# Outputs:
-#   /tmp/veilor-auto-install.log               — full driver log
-#   /tmp/veilor-auto-install-NN-<step>.png     — milestone screenshots
-#   /tmp/veilor-auto-install-final-ssh.txt     — final SSH session capture
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0 = all validation checks passed
-#   1 = any failure (anaconda crash, SSH never up, validation failed)
-#   2 = preflight failure (missing tool, bad ISO arg)
-#
-# This script intentionally does not source test/run-vm.sh — it needs a
-# different QEMU configuration (no live cloud-init seed since we're driving
-# the installed-system path), and run-vm.sh `exec`s qemu, which is
-# incompatible with running QEMU as a backgrounded child here.
-
-set -uo pipefail
-
-# ── Constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
-TEST_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR"
-DISK="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-vm.qcow2"
-NVRAM="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-vm.nvram"
-MONITOR_SOCK="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-vm.monitor.sock"
-SERIAL_LOG="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-vm.serial.log"
-SEED_ISO="$TEST_DIR/auto-install-seed.iso"
-
-LOG=/tmp/veilor-auto-install.log
-SHOT_PREFIX=/tmp/veilor-auto-install
-SSH_PORT=2222
-SSH_USER=admin
-
-LUKS_PW="testpass1234"
-ADMIN_PW="adminpass1234"
-
-# Disk: 40G is enough headroom — KDE base + 8G LUKS + LVM overhead fits in
-# ~12G actual, but qcow2 only allocates blocks that get touched.
-DISK_SIZE=40G
-
-# OVMF firmware paths — Fedora layout. Caller can override if needed.
-OVMF_CODE="${OVMF_CODE:-/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd}"
-OVMF_VARS_SRC="${OVMF_VARS_SRC:-/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd}"
-
-# Timing knobs — coarse but deliberate. Tighten only after observing slack
-# on a real run.
-WAIT_MONITOR_S=120        # qemu boot to monitor socket alive
-WAIT_INSTALLER_BANNER_S=180   # ISO boot → tty1 gum menu visible
-WAIT_GUM_PROMPT_S=8       # gum draws each prompt within ~5s
-WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S=3      # let UI advance after we hit Enter
-ANACONDA_TIMEOUT_S=2700   # 45 min — anaconda + reboot + SSH come-up
-ANACONDA_POLL_S=30        # screenshot/poll cadence during install
-
-# ── Logging ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-: > "$LOG"
-log() { printf '[%s] %s\n' "$(date +'%H:%M:%S')" "$*" | tee -a "$LOG"; }
-fail() { log "FAIL: $*"; exit 1; }
-
-# Source the keymap helper.
-# shellcheck source=auto-install-keymap.sh
-. "$SCRIPT_DIR/auto-install-keymap.sh"
-
-# ── Preflight ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-preflight() {
-    log "preflight: checking environment"
-
-    ISO="${1:-}"
-    if [[ -z $ISO ]]; then
-        # Auto-fetch from ci-latest GH release if no path given. ISO is split
-        # into chunks (GH release 2 GiB asset cap). Reassemble before boot.
-        log "no ISO path given — fetching from gh release ci-latest"
-        local dl_dir="$HOME/veilor-iso/ci-latest"
-        mkdir -p "$dl_dir"
-        ( cd "$dl_dir" && rm -f *.part-* *.iso *.sha256 && \
-          gh release download ci-latest --repo veilor-org/veilor-os \
-            --pattern '*.iso.part-*' --pattern '*.parts.sha256' --clobber ) || {
-            echo "[ERR] gh release download failed — is the ci-latest release populated?" >&2
-            exit 2
-        }
-        ( cd "$dl_dir" && \
-          local stem
-          stem=$(ls *.part-00 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/\.part-00$//')
-          [ -n "$stem" ] || { echo "[ERR] no .part-00 in download"; exit 2; }
-          log "reassembling $stem from $(ls "$stem".part-* | wc -l) parts"
-          cat "$stem".part-* > "$stem"
-          sha256sum -c *.parts.sha256 || { echo "[ERR] reassembly checksum mismatch"; exit 2; }
-        ) || exit 2
-        ISO=$(ls "$dl_dir"/*.iso 2>/dev/null | head -1)
-        [ -n "$ISO" ] || { echo "[ERR] no iso after reassembly"; exit 2; }
-    fi
-    if [[ ! -f $ISO ]]; then
-        echo "[ERR] ISO not found: $ISO" >&2
-        exit 2
-    fi
-
-    km_require_tools || exit 2
-    for t in ssh ssh-keygen pgrep pkill; do
-        command -v "$t" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "[ERR] missing $t" >&2; exit 2; }
-    done
-
-    if [[ ! -f $OVMF_CODE ]]; then
-        echo "[ERR] OVMF firmware missing: $OVMF_CODE (install edk2-ovmf)" >&2
-        exit 2
-    fi
-
-    log "preflight: ISO=$ISO"
-}
-
-# ── VM lifecycle ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-# Kill any QEMU we previously started + scrub state files. Idempotent.
-kill_existing_vm() {
-    log "killing any existing auto-install QEMU"
-    if [[ -n "${QEMU_PID:-}" ]] && kill -0 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
-        kill "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
-        sleep 2
-        kill -9 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
-    fi
-    # Catch orphans from prior runs — match by disk path so we don't kill
-    # the user's other QEMU VMs.
-    pkill -f "qemu-system-x86_64.*$DISK" 2>/dev/null || true
-    rm -f "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$SERIAL_LOG"
-}
-
-# Wipe disk + nvram so each run is reproducible.
-wipe_state() {
-    log "wiping qcow2 + nvram"
-    rm -f "$DISK" "$NVRAM" "$SEED_ISO"
-    qemu-img create -f qcow2 "$DISK" "$DISK_SIZE" >/dev/null
-    cp "$OVMF_VARS_SRC" "$NVRAM"
-}
-
-# Build a NoCloud cloud-init seed ISO so anaconda's installed system picks
-# up our SSH pubkey on first boot. The installer-generated ks doesn't
-# explicitly invoke cloud-init, but Fedora ships cloud-init enabled by
-# default in @core; if a cidata seed is present at boot, NoCloud datasource
-# fires and we get key injection for free.
-build_seed_iso() {
-    local pubkey="" found=""
-    for cand in "$HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub" "$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub"; do
-        if [[ -f $cand ]]; then
-            pubkey="$(< "$cand")"
-            found=$cand
-            break
-        fi
-    done
-    if [[ -z $pubkey ]]; then
-        log "seed: no host SSH pubkey found at ~/.ssh/id_{ed25519,rsa}.pub"
-        log "seed: generating throwaway test key"
-        local key=$TEST_DIR/auto-install-id_ed25519
-        rm -f "$key" "$key.pub"
-        ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N '' -f "$key" -C "veilor-auto-install" >/dev/null
-        pubkey="$(< "$key.pub")"
-        TEST_KEY="$key"
-    else
-        log "seed: using $found"
-        # Match host id; assume corresponding private key exists alongside.
-        TEST_KEY="${found%.pub}"
-    fi
-
-    local d
-    d=$(mktemp -d)
-    cat > "$d/meta-data" <<EOF
-instance-id: veilor-auto-install
-local-hostname: veilor
-EOF
-    cat > "$d/user-data" <<EOF
-#cloud-config
-users:
-  - name: admin
-    ssh_authorized_keys:
-      - $pubkey
-    lock_passwd: false
-ssh_pwauth: true
-runcmd:
-  - rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf
-  - systemctl reload sshd || systemctl restart sshd || true
-EOF
-    if command -v mkisofs >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        mkisofs -quiet -output "$SEED_ISO" -volid cidata -joliet -rock \
-            "$d/user-data" "$d/meta-data"
-    elif command -v xorriso >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        xorriso -as mkisofs -quiet -output "$SEED_ISO" -volid cidata \
-            -joliet -rock "$d/user-data" "$d/meta-data"
-    else
-        log "seed: no mkisofs/xorriso — SSH key injection unavailable"
-        SEED_ISO=""
-    fi
-    rm -rf "$d"
-    [[ -f $SEED_ISO ]] && log "seed: built $SEED_ISO"
-}
-
-# Launch QEMU in the background. Returns once the monitor socket is alive.
-launch_vm() {
-    local iso=$1
-    log "launching QEMU"
-
-    local seed_args=()
-    [[ -n $SEED_ISO && -f $SEED_ISO ]] && \
-        seed_args=(-drive "file=$SEED_ISO,media=cdrom,readonly=on")
-
-    qemu-system-x86_64 \
-        -name veilor-auto-install \
-        -enable-kvm \
-        -cpu host \
-        -smp 4 \
-        -m 4096 \
-        -machine q35,smm=on \
-        -global driver=cfi.pflash01,property=secure,value=on \
-        -drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file="$OVMF_CODE" \
-        -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file="$NVRAM" \
-        -drive file="$DISK",if=virtio,format=qcow2,cache=writeback \
-        -drive file="$iso",media=cdrom,readonly=on \
-        "${seed_args[@]}" \
-        -monitor "unix:$MONITOR_SOCK,server,nowait" \
-        -boot order=dc,menu=off \
-        -netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::${SSH_PORT}-:22 \
-        -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0 \
-        -device virtio-rng-pci \
-        -vga virtio \
-        -display none \
-        -serial "file:$SERIAL_LOG" \
-        >>"$LOG" 2>&1 &
-    QEMU_PID=$!
-    log "QEMU pid=$QEMU_PID"
-
-    km_wait_socket "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$WAIT_MONITOR_S" \
-        || fail "monitor socket never opened"
-    log "monitor socket ready"
-}
-
-# Did QEMU die? Used at every poll; lets us bail with a useful message
-# instead of waiting out the full timeout.
-qemu_alive() {
-    [[ -n "${QEMU_PID:-}" ]] && kill -0 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null
-}
-
-# ── Driver: walk the installer flow ────────────────────────────────────
-
-# Take a numbered screenshot. Auto-increments NN.
-SHOT_N=0
-shot() {
-    local label=$1
-    SHOT_N=$((SHOT_N + 1))
-    local file
-    file=$(printf '%s-%02d-%s.png' "$SHOT_PREFIX" "$SHOT_N" "$label")
-    km_screendump "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$file"
-    log "screenshot: $file"
-}
-
-drive_installer() {
-    log "waiting ${WAIT_INSTALLER_BANNER_S}s for ISO boot + tty1 installer"
-
-    # The live ISO autologs into multi-user.target, runs gum on tty1 via a
-    # systemd unit that replaces getty (see overlay/etc/systemd/system/
-    # veilor-installer.service if it exists; otherwise via the multi-user
-    # default in kickstart line 250).
-    sleep "$WAIT_INSTALLER_BANNER_S"
-    qemu_alive || fail "QEMU died during ISO boot"
-    shot "boot-banner"
-
-    # Make absolutely sure we're on tty1 (the live ks sets multi-user.target
-    # default, so we should already be there — but a stray graphical.target
-    # on dev builds would silently swallow our keystrokes).
-    km_send_chord "$MONITOR_SOCK" ctrl alt f1
-    sleep "$WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S"
-    shot "tty1"
-
-    # Step 1: top option = "Install" — gum choose has it pre-selected.
-    log "step: select Install"
-    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
-    sleep "$WAIT_GUM_PROMPT_S"
-    shot "after-install-pick"
-
-    # Step 2: disk select — only /dev/vda exists in this QEMU. Default
-    # selection = first row.
-    log "step: select disk (/dev/vda — only one)"
-    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
-    sleep "$WAIT_GUM_PROMPT_S"
-    shot "after-disk-pick"
-
-    # Step 3: LUKS passphrase. gum input --password reads stdin until newline.
-    log "step: enter LUKS passphrase"
-    km_send_str "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$LUKS_PW"
-    sleep 1
-    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
-    sleep "$WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S"
-    shot "after-luks-pw"
-
-    # Step 4: admin password.
-    log "step: enter admin password"
-    km_send_str "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$ADMIN_PW"
-    sleep 1
-    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
-    sleep "$WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S"
-    shot "after-admin-pw"
-
-    # Step 5: locale select — first option = en_GB.UTF-8.
-    log "step: confirm locale (en_GB.UTF-8)"
-    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
-    sleep "$WAIT_GUM_PROMPT_S"
-    shot "after-locale"
-
-    # Step 6: confirm screen. gum confirm defaults to "Yes" focused →
-    # Enter accepts. (Verified against gum 0.13+ docs; if defaults change
-    # in a future gum, swap to explicit "y" via key map.)
-    log "step: confirm install"
-    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
-    sleep "$WAIT_AFTER_INPUT_S"
-    shot "after-confirm"
-
-    log "installer driven: anaconda should now be running"
-}
-
-# Quick non-blocking SSH probe. Returns 0 if reachable.
-ssh_alive() {
-    ssh -p $SSH_PORT \
-        -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
-        -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
-        -o ConnectTimeout=3 \
-        -o BatchMode=yes \
-        ${TEST_KEY:+-i "$TEST_KEY"} \
-        "$SSH_USER@127.0.0.1" true 2>/dev/null
-}
-
-# Poll for anaconda completion + SSH availability. We can't watch QEMU exit
-# (anaconda's `reboot` directive triggers systemctl reboot, which doesn't
-# poweroff the VM — it boots back into the installed disk). The signal we
-# actually trust is SSH on port 2222 starting to answer.
-#
-# If cloud-init didn't run (the seed ISO might not have been picked up by
-# anaconda's installed system, depending on whether /etc/cloud is in the
-# installed package set), SSH will never come up via key auth. The fallback
-# in tty1_unlock_ssh() drives the SDDM/console login by hand.
-wait_for_install_and_reboot() {
-    log "waiting up to ${ANACONDA_TIMEOUT_S}s for anaconda + reboot + SSH"
-
-    local waited=0 last_shot=0 last_ppm_hash="" same_count=0
-    while (( waited < ANACONDA_TIMEOUT_S )); do
-        if ! qemu_alive; then
-            fail "QEMU exited unexpectedly during install (check $SERIAL_LOG)"
-        fi
-
-        # SSH probe — first PASS exits the loop.
-        if ssh_alive; then
-            log "SSH up — installed system reachable"
-            shot "ssh-up"
-            return 0
-        fi
-
-        # Periodic screenshot + stuck-screen detection.
-        if (( waited - last_shot >= ANACONDA_POLL_S )); then
-            local ppm="$SHOT_PREFIX-poll.ppm"
-            km_monitor_send "$MONITOR_SOCK" "screendump $ppm"
-            sleep 1
-            if [[ -f $ppm ]]; then
-                local h
-                h=$(sha256sum "$ppm" 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f1)
-                if [[ -n $last_ppm_hash && $h == "$last_ppm_hash" ]]; then
-                    same_count=$((same_count + 1))
-                else
-                    same_count=0
-                fi
-                last_ppm_hash=$h
-                rm -f "$ppm"
-            fi
-            # 5 minutes of identical frames = stuck. Anaconda's text-mode
-            # progress refreshes at least every minute, so 10 frames in a
-            # row (5 min @ 30s cadence) identical means it's wedged.
-            if (( same_count >= 10 )); then
-                shot "stuck"
-                fail "screen unchanged for 5min — anaconda likely crashed"
-            fi
-            last_shot=$waited
-            log "anaconda still running... (${waited}s elapsed)"
-        fi
-
-        sleep 5
-        waited=$((waited + 5))
-    done
-
-    shot "ssh-timeout"
-    log "SSH never came up via cloud-init; trying TTY1 fallback"
-    if tty1_unlock_ssh; then
-        log "TTY1 fallback succeeded; SSH should be reachable"
-        return 0
-    fi
-    fail "anaconda did not complete + SSH within ${ANACONDA_TIMEOUT_S}s, TTY1 fallback also failed"
-}
-
-# TTY1 fallback: the installed system reached SDDM (graphical) or got stuck
-# at LUKS prompt. We drop to a TTY, log in as admin (chage forces password
-# change on first use), and undo the sshd hardening so our pubkey works.
-#
-# This is best-effort. If the LUKS prompt is still up — we can't get past
-# it without typing the passphrase, which we do here too.
-tty1_unlock_ssh() {
-    log "TTY1 fallback: typing LUKS passphrase + admin login + opening sshd"
-
-    # Switch to tty1 in case SDDM grabbed graphical.
-    km_send_chord "$MONITOR_SOCK" ctrl alt f3
-    sleep 3
-
-    # If we're at LUKS prompt, the passphrase clears it. If we're already
-    # past LUKS, this is a harmless garbage on the login prompt — we Enter
-    # to clear, then proceed with login.
-    km_send_str "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$LUKS_PW"
-    km_send_key "$MONITOR_SOCK" ret
-    sleep 30  # cryptsetup unlock + boot to login prompt
-
-    shot "tty3-prelogin"
-
-    # Username — admin. chage -d 0 means we'll be prompted to change pw on
-    # first login. The old password is whatever we typed at install time;
-    # the new password just has to satisfy PAM minlen — reuse $ADMIN_PW
-    # and add a "1" suffix to make passwd's "must differ" check happy.
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "admin"
-    sleep 3
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$ADMIN_PW"
-    sleep 5
-    # Old pw prompt (chage forced).
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "$ADMIN_PW"
-    sleep 2
-    # New pw twice. Use a derivative; PAM rejects identical-to-old and we
-    # don't want to surprise the user with a password change.
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "${ADMIN_PW}new"
-    sleep 1
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "${ADMIN_PW}new"
-    sleep 5
-
-    shot "tty3-loggedin"
-
-    # Inject host pubkey + remove sshd hardening + reload sshd.
-    local pubkey=""
-    if [[ -n "${TEST_KEY:-}" && -f "${TEST_KEY}.pub" ]]; then
-        pubkey=$(< "${TEST_KEY}.pub")
-    fi
-    if [[ -z $pubkey ]]; then
-        log "TTY1 fallback: no pubkey to inject — cannot recover SSH"
-        return 1
-    fi
-
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh"
-    sleep 1
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "echo '$pubkey' >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-    sleep 1
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-    sleep 1
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "echo '${ADMIN_PW}new' | sudo -S rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf"
-    sleep 2
-    km_send_line "$MONITOR_SOCK" "echo '${ADMIN_PW}new' | sudo -S systemctl reload sshd"
-    sleep 5
-
-    # Wait up to 60s for SSH to actually answer.
-    local i
-    for ((i=0; i<60; i++)); do
-        if ssh_alive; then
-            log "TTY1 fallback: SSH reachable after ${i}s"
-            return 0
-        fi
-        sleep 1
-    done
-    return 1
-}
-
-# ── Validation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Run a single SSH command, return its stdout. Failures are NOT fatal here
-# — caller decides what's a hard failure.
-remote() {
-    ssh -p $SSH_PORT \
-        -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
-        -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
-        -o BatchMode=yes \
-        ${TEST_KEY:+-i "$TEST_KEY"} \
-        "$SSH_USER@127.0.0.1" "$@"
-}
-
-# Validation result accumulator. check_remote runs a shell snippet on the
-# installed VM via SSH; the snippet must exit 0 for PASS, non-zero for
-# FAIL. check_eq compares remote stdout to an expected literal.
-VALIDATIONS=()
-
-# check_remote <desc> <remote shell snippet>
-# Runs the snippet via SSH, treats exit code as the verdict.
-check_remote() {
-    local desc=$1 cmd=$2
-    local out rc
-    out=$(remote "$cmd" 2>&1)
-    rc=$?
-    if (( rc == 0 )); then
-        VALIDATIONS+=("PASS  $desc")
-        log "  PASS: $desc"
-    else
-        # Truncate the failure context so the report stays scannable.
-        local trimmed=${out:0:120}
-        VALIDATIONS+=("FAIL  $desc  ($trimmed)")
-        log "  FAIL: $desc -- $trimmed"
-    fi
-}
-
-# check_eq <desc> <remote shell snippet> <expected stdout>
-# Runs the snippet, trims trailing whitespace, compares to expected.
-check_eq() {
-    local desc=$1 cmd=$2 expected=$3
-    local got
-    got=$(remote "$cmd" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r' | tail -n1)
-    got=${got%[[:space:]]}
-    if [[ $got == "$expected" ]]; then
-        VALIDATIONS+=("PASS  $desc (=$got)")
-        log "  PASS: $desc (=$got)"
-    else
-        VALIDATIONS+=("FAIL  $desc  (got: '$got', expected: '$expected')")
-        log "  FAIL: $desc -- got '$got' expected '$expected'"
-    fi
-}
-
-run_validation() {
-    log "running validation checklist"
-
-    # os-release
-    check_remote "/etc/os-release: NAME=veilor-os" \
-        'grep -q "^NAME=.veilor-os" /etc/os-release'
-
-    check_eq "hostnamectl --static = veilor" \
-        'hostnamectl --static' "veilor"
-
-    # Active services
-    for svc in sshd fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld chronyd sddm; do
-        check_eq "$svc is-active" \
-            "systemctl is-active $svc" "active"
-    done
-
-    # SELinux. v0.5.x kickstart sets `selinux --enforcing` for installed
-    # systems but veilor-firstboot may toggle behavior — accept either
-    # Enforcing or Permissive, but log which one we got. (Hard-fail on
-    # Disabled.)
-    local selinux
-    selinux=$(remote getenforce 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r' | tail -n1)
-    selinux=${selinux%[[:space:]]}
-    if [[ $selinux == Enforcing ]]; then
-        VALIDATIONS+=("PASS  SELinux = Enforcing")
-        log "  PASS: SELinux = Enforcing"
-    elif [[ $selinux == Permissive ]]; then
-        VALIDATIONS+=("PASS  SELinux = Permissive (acceptable for v0.5)")
-        log "  PASS (soft): SELinux = Permissive"
-    else
-        VALIDATIONS+=("FAIL  SELinux = $selinux")
-        log "  FAIL: SELinux = $selinux"
-    fi
-
-    # Disk layout: LUKS2 + btrfs.
-    check_remote "lsblk shows crypto_LUKS" \
-        'lsblk -f | grep -q crypto_LUKS'
-    check_remote "lsblk shows btrfs" \
-        'lsblk -f | grep -q btrfs'
-    check_remote "/etc/crypttab has LUKS entry" \
-        'grep -Ev "^\s*(#|$)" /etc/crypttab | grep -qi luks'
-
-    # Admin user
-    check_remote "admin user exists" \
-        'getent passwd admin | grep -q "^admin:"'
-
-    # CLI tools shipped via overlay.
-    for bin in veilor-power veilor-doctor veilor-update; do
-        check_remote "/usr/local/bin/$bin present" \
-            "test -x /usr/local/bin/$bin"
-    done
-
-    # init_on_alloc — veilor-installer kickstart sets it on the install
-    # cmdline (line 315). /proc/cmdline is the source of truth.
-    check_remote "init_on_alloc=1 in /proc/cmdline" \
-        'grep -q init_on_alloc=1 /proc/cmdline'
-}
-
-# ── Reporting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-print_report() {
-    local pass=0 fail=0
-    for line in "${VALIDATIONS[@]}"; do
-        case "$line" in
-            PASS*) pass=$((pass + 1)) ;;
-            FAIL*) fail=$((fail + 1)) ;;
-        esac
-    done
-
-    {
-        echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
-        echo " veilor-os auto-install test report"
-        echo " $(date)"
-        echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
-        printf '%s\n' "${VALIDATIONS[@]}"
-        echo "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"
-        printf 'TOTAL: %d PASS, %d FAIL\n' "$pass" "$fail"
-        echo "Logs:        $LOG"
-        echo "Screenshots: ${SHOT_PREFIX}-NN-*.png"
-        echo "Serial log:  $SERIAL_LOG"
-        echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
-    } | tee -a "$LOG"
-
-    # Capture a final SSH session snapshot (uname/lsblk/sysctl) for the
-    # human reviewer.
-    {
-        echo "=== final ssh probe ==="
-        date
-        echo "--- uname -a ---"
-        remote uname -a 2>&1
-        echo "--- lsblk -f ---"
-        remote lsblk -f 2>&1
-        echo "--- /proc/cmdline ---"
-        remote cat /proc/cmdline 2>&1
-        echo "--- systemctl --failed ---"
-        remote systemctl --failed 2>&1
-    } > "${SHOT_PREFIX}-final-ssh.txt" 2>&1 || true
-    log "final ssh snapshot: ${SHOT_PREFIX}-final-ssh.txt"
-
-    if (( fail > 0 )); then
-        return 1
-    fi
-    return 0
-}
-
-cleanup() {
-    log "cleanup"
-    if [[ -n "${QEMU_PID:-}" ]] && kill -0 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
-        # Graceful shutdown via monitor first; SIGTERM if it ignores us.
-        km_monitor_send "$MONITOR_SOCK" "system_powerdown" 2>/dev/null || true
-        sleep 5
-        if kill -0 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
-            kill "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
-            sleep 2
-            kill -9 "$QEMU_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
-        fi
-    fi
-    rm -f "$MONITOR_SOCK"
-}
-
-# ── Main ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-main() {
-    trap cleanup EXIT
-
-    preflight "$@"
-    kill_existing_vm
-    wipe_state
-    build_seed_iso
-    launch_vm "$ISO"
-    drive_installer
-    wait_for_install_and_reboot
-    run_validation
-    print_report
-}
-
-main "$@"

test/run-vm.sh

@@ -5,34 +5,6 @@
 #   ./test/run-vm.sh path/to.iso  # specific ISO
 #   SECBOOT=1 ./test/run-vm.sh    # use OVMF Secure Boot firmware
 #   FRESH=1 ./test/run-vm.sh      # wipe disk + nvram, re-install from scratch
-#   NO_INJECT=1 ./test/run-vm.sh  # skip SSH-key auto-injection
-#
-# SSH-key auto-injection (chosen approach: dual — cloud-init NoCloud + QEMU
-# monitor sendkey fallback)
-# ------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Goal: previously each test required logging in at the QEMU console and
-# running `passwd -d liveuser`, editing sshd_config, etc. before
-# `ssh -p 2222 liveuser@localhost` worked. This script eliminates that.
-#
-# Primary path (works for the *installed* system, not the live image):
-#   * Detect host pubkey at ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
-#   * Build a NoCloud cloud-init ISO (user-data + meta-data) via mkisofs/xorriso
-#   * Mount it as a second virtual cdrom — Anaconda/cloud-init picks it up
-#     automatically when installing because the seed has the magic
-#     `cidata` volume label.
-#
-# Fallback path (works for the *live* image, which doesn't run cloud-init by
-# default — dracut-live + livesys-scripts mount squashfs read-only and skip
-# cloud-init.target):
-#   * Open a QEMU monitor unix socket (-monitor unix:...).
-#   * After ~90s (long enough for SDDM autologin → liveuser), background a
-#     helper that pipes a sequence of `sendkey` events to the monitor:
-#         Ctrl+Alt+F2  (drop to TTY)
-#         "sudo passwd -d liveuser && sudo systemctl reload sshd\n"
-#     This unblocks SSH on port 2222 without manual interaction.
-#
-# Both paths are best-effort; if the host has no pubkey, both are skipped
-# and the script behaves exactly as before.
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
@@ -40,8 +12,6 @@ REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
 TEST_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/test"
 DISK="$TEST_DIR/veilor-vm.qcow2"
 NVRAM="$TEST_DIR/veilor-vm.nvram"
-SEED_ISO="$TEST_DIR/cloud-init-seed.iso"
-MONITOR_SOCK="$TEST_DIR/veilor-vm.monitor.sock"
 
 ISO="${1:-$(ls -t "$REPO_ROOT"/build/out/*.iso 2>/dev/null | head -1)}"
 [[ -n ${ISO:-} && -f $ISO ]] || { echo "[ERR] No ISO found. Build first: ./build/build-iso.sh"; exit 1; }
@@ -58,173 +28,19 @@ fi
 
 # Reset on FRESH=1
 if [[ "${FRESH:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
-    rm -f "$DISK" "$NVRAM" "$SEED_ISO"
+    rm -f "$DISK" "$NVRAM"
 fi
 
 # Provision disk + per-VM nvram once
 [[ -f $DISK ]]  || qemu-img create -f qcow2 "$DISK" 40G
 [[ -f $NVRAM ]] || cp "$OVMF_VARS_SRC" "$NVRAM"
 
-# ── Locate host SSH pubkey (ed25519 preferred, rsa fallback) ──
-HOST_PUBKEY=""
-if [[ "${NO_INJECT:-0}" != "1" ]]; then
-    for cand in "$HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub" "$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub"; do
-        if [[ -f $cand ]]; then
-            HOST_PUBKEY="$(< "$cand")"
-            echo "[INFO] using host pubkey: $cand"
-            break
-        fi
-    done
-fi
-
-# ── Build cloud-init NoCloud seed ISO (primary path) ──
-SEED_ARGS=()
-if [[ -n $HOST_PUBKEY ]]; then
-    SEED_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
-    trap 'rm -rf "$SEED_DIR"' EXIT
-
-    cat > "$SEED_DIR/meta-data" <<EOF
-instance-id: veilor-test-vm
-local-hostname: veilor-test
-EOF
-
-    cat > "$SEED_DIR/user-data" <<EOF
-#cloud-config
-users:
-  - name: liveuser
-    ssh_authorized_keys:
-      - $HOST_PUBKEY
-  - name: admin
-    ssh_authorized_keys:
-      - $HOST_PUBKEY
-    lock_passwd: false
-    passwd:
-ssh_pwauth: true
-runcmd:
-  - rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-veilor-hardening.conf
-  - systemctl reload sshd || systemctl restart sshd || true
-EOF
-
-    # Build NoCloud ISO. Volume label MUST be "cidata" (case-insensitive)
-    # for cloud-init's NoCloud datasource to pick it up.
-    if command -v mkisofs >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        mkisofs -quiet -output "$SEED_ISO" \
-            -volid cidata -joliet -rock \
-            "$SEED_DIR/user-data" "$SEED_DIR/meta-data"
-    elif command -v xorriso >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        xorriso -as mkisofs -quiet -output "$SEED_ISO" \
-            -volid cidata -joliet -rock \
-            "$SEED_DIR/user-data" "$SEED_DIR/meta-data"
-    elif command -v cloud-localds >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        cloud-localds "$SEED_ISO" "$SEED_DIR/user-data" "$SEED_DIR/meta-data"
-    else
-        echo "[WARN] no mkisofs/xorriso/cloud-localds — skipping cloud-init seed"
-        SEED_ISO=""
-    fi
-
-    if [[ -n $SEED_ISO && -f $SEED_ISO ]]; then
-        echo "[INFO] cloud-init seed ISO: $SEED_ISO"
-        SEED_ARGS=(-drive "file=$SEED_ISO,media=cdrom,readonly=on")
-    fi
-fi
-
-# ── QEMU monitor unix socket ──
-# Always exposed so the host can drive the VM via `socat - UNIX-CONNECT:...`
-# (sendkey, screendump, etc.) for debugging. Independent of pubkey injection.
-rm -f "$MONITOR_SOCK"
-MONITOR_ARGS=(-monitor "unix:$MONITOR_SOCK,server,nowait")
-
-# ── Auto-inject helper (live ISO doesn't run cloud-init) ──
-# Started in the background after a delay; sends keypresses through the
-# QEMU monitor unix socket to drop to a TTY and unblock SSH for liveuser.
-if [[ -n $HOST_PUBKEY ]]; then
-
-    (
-        # Wait for the VM to reach a usable login prompt (SDDM autologin →
-        # liveuser session is the most realistic target). 90s is enough on
-        # KVM/4 vCPUs; tune via VM_BOOT_DELAY if needed.
-        sleep "${VM_BOOT_DELAY:-90}"
-        [[ -S $MONITOR_SOCK ]] || exit 0
-
-        # send_chord <key1> [key2 ...]   — chord released between calls
-        send_chord() {
-            local IFS='-'
-            local chord="$*"
-            printf 'sendkey %s\n' "$chord"
-        }
-
-        # send_str <text>   — only ASCII printable + space + return
-        send_str() {
-            local s="$1" ch
-            local i=0
-            while (( i < ${#s} )); do
-                ch="${s:i:1}"
-                case "$ch" in
-                    ' ')      printf 'sendkey spc\n' ;;
-                    [a-z0-9]) printf 'sendkey %s\n' "$ch" ;;
-                    [A-Z])    printf 'sendkey shift-%s\n' "${ch,,}" ;;
-                    '-')      printf 'sendkey minus\n' ;;
-                    '_')      printf 'sendkey shift-minus\n' ;;
-                    '/')      printf 'sendkey slash\n' ;;
-                    '.')      printf 'sendkey dot\n' ;;
-                    '&')      printf 'sendkey shift-7\n' ;;
-                esac
-                i=$((i+1))
-            done
-        }
-
-        {
-            send_chord ctrl alt f2
-            sleep 1
-            # Type: liveuser <enter> (no password by default on live)
-            send_str "liveuser"
-            printf 'sendkey ret\n'
-            sleep 2
-            send_str "sudo passwd -d liveuser"
-            printf 'sendkey ret\n'
-            sleep 1
-            send_str "sudo systemctl reload sshd"
-            printf 'sendkey ret\n'
-        } | socat - "UNIX-CONNECT:$MONITOR_SOCK" 2>/dev/null || true
-    ) &
-    INJECT_PID=$!
-    trap 'kill $INJECT_PID 2>/dev/null || true; rm -f "$MONITOR_SOCK"; rm -rf "${SEED_DIR:-}"' EXIT
-fi
-
 echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
 echo "  veilor-os :: VM test"
 echo "  ISO   : $ISO"
 echo "  Disk  : $DISK"
 echo "  NVRAM : $NVRAM"
-echo "  Seed  : ${SEED_ISO:-<none>}"
-# Anaconda virtio-serial log channel.
-#
-# Anaconda 43.x autodetects /dev/virtio-ports/org.fedoraproject.anaconda.log.0
-# and streams program/packaging/storage/anaconda logs through it in real
-# time, before any tmpfs / pivot, before networking. Survives kernel
-# panic. The host gets a tail-able file. No anaconda CLI flag, no
-# kickstart change, just the QEMU virtio-serial wiring.
-#
-# We've lost logs three times in a row to anaconda failures + tmpfs
-# reboots. Wiring this up so future failures auto-capture.
-ANACONDA_LOG="$TEST_DIR/anaconda-vm-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).log"
-ANACONDA_LOG_DIR="$TEST_DIR/test-runs/$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"
-mkdir -p "$ANACONDA_LOG_DIR"
-ANACONDA_LOG_ARGS=(
-    # Belt: virtio-serial (anaconda's setupVirtio rsyslog forward, fragile —
-    # depends on rsyslog being installed in the live ISO).
-    -chardev "file,id=anaclog,path=$ANACONDA_LOG"
-    -device virtio-serial-pci,id=vs1
-    -device "virtserialport,chardev=anaclog,bus=vs1.0,name=org.fedoraproject.anaconda.log.0"
-    # Braces: virtio-9p host directory share. veilor-installer mounts this
-    # at /mnt/hostlogs and rsyncs /tmp/*.log there post-anaconda.
-    -virtfs "local,path=$ANACONDA_LOG_DIR,mount_tag=hostlogs,security_model=mapped-xattr,id=hostlogs"
-)
-echo "  AnaLog : $ANACONDA_LOG"
-echo "  HostFS : $ANACONDA_LOG_DIR (9p tag: hostlogs)"
-
 echo "  Mode  : ${SECBOOT:+secboot}${SECBOOT:-stock UEFI}"
-echo "  Inject: ${HOST_PUBKEY:+yes}${HOST_PUBKEY:-no (no host pubkey)}"
 echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
 
 exec qemu-system-x86_64 \
@@ -238,10 +54,7 @@ exec qemu-system-x86_64 \
     -drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file="$OVMF_CODE" \
     -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file="$NVRAM" \
     -drive file="$DISK",if=virtio,format=qcow2,cache=writeback \
-    -drive file="$ISO",media=cdrom,readonly=on \
-    "${SEED_ARGS[@]}" \
-    "${MONITOR_ARGS[@]}" \
-    "${ANACONDA_LOG_ARGS[@]}" \
+    -cdrom "$ISO" \
     -boot menu=on,splash-time=2000 \
     -netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
     -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0 \

test/test-runs/2026-05-06-v0.5.32-build.md

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-# Test run — v0.5.32
-
-- **Date:** 2026-05-06
-- **ISO:** `veilor-os-43-20260506-HHMMSS.iso` (sha256: `TBD — fill in once A1 reports the build artifact`)
-- **Tester:** A1 (build) + operator (P) + A5 (report scribe)
-- **Build host:** forgejo-runner on nullstone (runner label `ubuntu-24.04`,
-  image `catthehacker/ubuntu:act-24.04`); first ISO produced off the
-  Forgejo build pipeline after the GH Actions mirror was disabled
-  2026-05-06.
-- **Environment:** VM (qemu/q35/ovmf, 4 vCPU, 4 GiB RAM, virtio-vga,
-  virtio-9p host log mount). Real-hardware run is a separate report —
-  this file is the VM run only.
-
----
-
-## Result
-
-⏳ **Pending A1 build.** Operator + A5 fill in pass/fail per-step once
-the actual VM test is walked through against the v0.5.32 ISO. Until
-the ISO sha256 lands here, treat every row in the per-step table as
-unverified.
-
-One-line summary (write here once known): _TBD_.
-
----
-
-## Regressions vs previous run
-
-(v0.5.31 was the last tagged release; compare against any pass-with-issues
-notes from that test run if a report exists. Empty otherwise — fill in
-during the actual test walkthrough.)
-
-- _TBD_
-
----
-
-## Per-step results
-
-Walk `test/TESTING.md` step-by-step. Mark each pass/fail with a brief
-note when failed. Until the test runs, every row is `⏳ pending`.
-
-| #  | Step                              | Result | Notes |
-|----|-----------------------------------|--------|-------|
-| 1  | Live boot to installer banner     | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 2  | Installer menu render             | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 3  | Disk picker                       | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 4  | LUKS + admin passwords            | ⏳ pending | Operator types directly into QEMU window — plymouth ignores synthesised keys. |
-| 5  | Locale                            | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 6  | Confirm                           | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 7  | Anaconda transaction              | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 8  | Reboot                            | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 9  | GRUB single veilor-os entry       | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 10 | LUKS unlock prompt                | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 11 | First boot → SDDM → KDE           | ⏳ pending |  |
-| 12 | Hardening checks                  | ⏳ pending |  |
-
----
-
-## Hardening verification
-
-```text
-$ getenforce
-TBD
-
-$ systemctl is-active fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld
-TBD
-
-$ cat /proc/cmdline
-TBD — must include rd.luks.uuid=luks-... and the v0.5.32 cmdline set.
-
-$ lsblk -f
-TBD
-
-$ systemctl is-enabled veilor-firstboot.service
-TBD — must report enabled with WantedBy=graphical.target (blocker #2).
-
-$ nft list ruleset | grep -i tailscale
-TBD — tailscale0 must be in the trusted zone (blocker #5).
-
-$ cat /etc/skel/.config/kdeglobals 2>/dev/null | head
-TBD — branding must be present (blocker #6).
-
-$ ls /var/log/anaconda/host-9p-mount/
-TBD — virtio-9p Anaconda log capture (blocker #7).
-```
-
-Paste real output. If any service is inactive, any cmdline arg is
-missing, or any blocker artifact is absent, raise as a Regression
-above.
-
----
-
-## Findings
-
-The 7 v0.5.32 blocker fixes from the
-[2026-05-05 9-agent research wave](../../docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/README.md)
-land in this build. Each is listed here as an **expected behaviour**
-the tester must observe — if any of these regress, log it under
-Regressions above.
-
-1. **Suspend/resume wifi survives lid-close.** `kernel.modules_disabled=1`
-   no longer fires before the wifi module reloads on resume. Test:
-   suspend the VM (or lid-close on real HW), wake, reconnect to the
-   same network without manual `modprobe`.
-2. **`veilor-firstboot.service` is `WantedBy=graphical.target`.** The
-   first-boot admin password flow must run on real installs, not just
-   on multi-user.target boots. Test: fresh install boots straight to
-   the TTY password prompt before SDDM lights up.
-3. **Kernel-upgrade does not drift GRUB.** First `dnf upgrade kernel`
-   must leave the system bootable — `grub2-mkconfig` is wired into the
-   kernel-install hook. Test: install, run `sudo dnf upgrade kernel`,
-   reboot, system comes up.
-4. **USBGuard rules are id-based, not hash + parent-hash.** Mirrors the
-   onyx dock-replug fix in `feedback_usbguard_dock.md`. Test:
-   unplug/replug a known device — it stays allowed. The hash variant
-   re-blocks on every replug; the id variant must not.
-5. **firewalld trusts `tailscale0`.** The interface is in the trusted
-   zone out-of-the-box. Test: bring tailscale up, ping a peer in the
-   mesh — no firewall mods required.
-6. **`/etc/skel/` carries veilor branding.** New users get the black
-   colour scheme, Konsole profile, and Plasma layout on first login.
-   Test: `useradd test`; log in as `test`; KDE comes up branded, no
-   white flash, Fira Code system font.
-7. **virtio-9p Anaconda log capture is active by default.**
-   `test/run-vm.sh` mounts a host directory into the VM; Anaconda logs
-   land there during install. Replaces the broken virtio-serial path
-   from earlier runs. Test: run install in VM; host-side mount has
-   `program.log`, `storage.log`, `packaging.log` populated.
-
-Free-form notes from the actual walkthrough — cosmetic glitches, slow
-paths, surprising behaviour — append below.
-
-- _TBD — fill in during the operator-driven VM run._
-
----
-
-## Action items for next release
-
-(Empty until the test exposes something. PRs / commits opened during
-the run go here.)
-
-- [ ] _TBD_

test/test-runs/_TEMPLATE.md

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-# Test run — vX.Y.Z
-
-- **Date:** YYYY-MM-DD
-- **ISO:** `veilor-os-43-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.iso` (sha256: `...`)
-- **Tester:** name / handle
-- **Environment:** VM (qemu/q35/ovmf, 4 vCPU, 4G RAM, virtio-vga) — OR — Real HW (model, CPU, GPU)
-
----
-
-## Result
-
-✅ Pass / ⚠️ Pass-with-issues / ❌ Fail
-
-One-line summary.
-
----
-
-## Regressions vs previous run
-
-(Things that worked in the prior tagged release but failed here. Empty
-if none. Always check this section first when reading the report.)
-
----
-
-## Per-step results
-
-Walk `test/TESTING.md` step-by-step. Mark each pass/fail with a brief
-note when failed.
-
-| # | Step | Result | Notes |
-|---|------|--------|-------|
-| 1 | Live boot to installer banner | ✅ |  |
-| 2 | Installer menu render | ✅ |  |
-| 3 | Disk picker | ✅ |  |
-| 4 | LUKS + admin passwords | ✅ |  |
-| 5 | Locale | ✅ |  |
-| 6 | Confirm | ✅ |  |
-| 7 | Anaconda transaction | ✅ |  |
-| 8 | Reboot | ✅ |  |
-| 9 | GRUB single veilor-os entry | ✅ |  |
-| 10 | LUKS unlock prompt | ✅ |  |
-| 11 | First boot → SDDM → KDE | ✅ |  |
-| 12 | Hardening checks | ✅ |  |
-
----
-
-## Hardening verification
-
-```
-$ getenforce
-Enforcing
-$ systemctl is-active fail2ban usbguard tuned auditd firewalld
-active
-active
-active
-active
-active
-$ cat /proc/cmdline
-... rd.luks.uuid=luks-... ...
-$ lsblk -f
-...
-```
-
-Paste real output. If any service is inactive or any cmdline arg is
-missing, raise as a Regression above.
-
----
-
-## Findings
-
-Free-form notes. Cosmetic glitches, slow paths, surprising behaviour.
-
----
-
-## Action items for next release
-
-- [ ] ...
-- [ ] ...
-
-(Linked PRs / commits if you opened any during the test.)