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Author SHA1 Message Date
veilor-org
7060d9aa6b docs: refine strategy — ostreecontainer install + mesh stack + browser stack
Refines docs/STRATEGY.md per parent-operator handoff (2026-05-05).
Locks in five things the original draft didn't cover, and corrects
one mistake.

## Refinement: ostreecontainer install path

The original draft proposed a two-step install: Anaconda partitions
+ kickstart, then on first boot a `veilor-firstboot-rebase.service`
runs `bootc rebase ghcr.io/veilor/veilor-os:43`. This commit drops
that step.

Anaconda's `ostreecontainer --url=... --transport=registry`
directive populates the root filesystem directly from the OCI image
during the install pass. No first-boot rebase, no transition
window, no second reboot. Same end state, simpler path.

Stay on `ostreecontainer` through v0.8. Do NOT migrate to the new
`bootc` kickstart command until v1.0 — it blocks multi-disk and
authenticated registries. Do NOT use `bootc-image-builder
anaconda-iso` output — deprecated in image-builder v44+. Produce
the OCI image and the bootstrap ISO as separate artifacts.

This compresses the v0.7 BlueBuild spike from 2 days → 1 day.

## Correction: keep Trivalent as default

The original strategy.md treated Trivalent (secureblue's hardened
Chromium) as an override-and-remove. That was wrong: Trivalent's
COPR tracks upstream M147+ within hours, ships hardened_malloc +
JIT-less + Drumbrake WASM. Default browser pick.

Mullvad Browser layered alongside for anti-fingerprint. Thorium
remains opt-in via `ujust install-thorium` only — its CVE lag is
months and contradicts the threat model. Never default.

## Mesh stack baked in

Three-layer warm-stack documented in STRATEGY.md:
- L3a Tailscale + Headscale (Day 1, daily driver)
- L3b Yggdrasil-go (Day 1, idle warm-fallback, AllowedPublicKeys mode)
- L3c Reticulum/RetiNet AGPL fork (opt-in via ujust install-reticulum)

Threat floor table: ISP-DNS-block (i, Day 1), ISP-Tailscale-block
(ii, Phase 2 promote Yggdrasil), internet-down (iii, opt-in RetiNet
+ RNode).

Tier model: tag:admin / tag:infra / tag:guest with failsafe pre-auth
key on yubikey + paper + Authentik OIDC group.

## Onboarding

Token paste / QR (user picks). Misskey signup mints reusable
24h-TTL pre-auth key. NOT auto-OIDC at first boot.

## Iroh seeding daemon stub (v0.8 / Phase 2)

`veilor-seed.service` documented but NOT implemented until Iroh hits
1.0 (current 0.96–0.98 RC, Q1 2026 target slipped). BLAKE3 +
iroh-gossip per-service topic. Static media only — DEFER DB
replication forever.

## External dependency tracked

nullstone Traefik `no-guest@file` ACL is currently 0.0.0.0/0
allow-all (XFF chain breakage 2026-05-03). Must be fixed before
veilor-os first-public-ISO ships, otherwise tag:guest provisioning
leaks the full vhost surface to every veilor user. Parent operator
owns the fix; explicitly out of veilor-os scope.

## Files

- docs/STRATEGY.md — full refinement
- docs/ROADMAP.md — v0.7 spike entry now reflects ostreecontainer
  + mesh stack + 1-day spike target
- README.md — drops the "v0.2.5 pre-release" badge + status box
  (out of date), adds bootc/atomic trajectory paragraph

## What did NOT change

- v0.5.x main branch is untouched. The ostreecontainer swap belongs
  in the v0.7 spike branch, NOT v0.5.32.
- nullstone Traefik config is untouched. Out of scope.
- The kickstart and overlay code is untouched.
2026-05-05 15:15:52 +01:00
veilor-org
50a241a603 docs: STRATEGY.md — hybrid kickstart bootstrap + bootc OCI on secureblue
Locks in the strategic decision from 2026-05-05 secureblue research
agent: pivot the technical base toward bootc/OCI, but as a layer over
secureblue's `securecore-kinoite-hardened-userns` rather than a
Containerfile-from-scratch.

## What changed

- New: `docs/STRATEGY.md` — full hybrid plan (kickstart bootstrap →
  first-boot bootc rebase → bootc-only at v1.0). Documents secureblue
  rationale, our overrides (drop Trivalent, restore sudo + Xwayland),
  next concrete steps for v0.7 spike (BlueBuild recipe + GH Actions
  workflow + `veilor-firstboot-rebase` one-shot).

- Updated: `docs/ROADMAP.md` v0.7 bootc-spike subsection — supersedes
  the Agent 3 Containerfile-from-scratch plan with the BlueBuild
  layering plan. Spike compresses 1 week → 2 days; hardening review
  inherited from 30 secureblue contributors.

## Why hybrid, not pure pivot

- Anaconda's LUKS UX (single passphrase prompt + custom
  partitioning) is mature; bootc-image-builder's installer is not yet
  on par. Keep the kickstart as the bootstrap.
- bootc upgrade gets us atomic A/B + signed image chain + instant
  rollback that we can't realistically build alone with our
  contributor count.
- The kickstart work is not lost — it becomes the day-zero installer
  through v0.7. v1.0 deprecates it entirely once bootc-image-builder
  installer ISO matures.

## Why secureblue, not Athena (Arch)

| Axis | secureblue | Athena OS |
|---|---|---|
| Maintainers | 30 | 8 |
| MAC enforcing OOB | SELinux + custom policy | AppArmor active, profiles mostly unconfined |
| Atomic / immutable updates | Yes (bootc/rpm-ostree) | No (rolling) |
| Threat model published | No | Yes |
| MS-signed Secure Boot shim | Yes (Fedora shim) | Yes (with auto-MOK) |

Athena's only structural advantage is the published threat model.
We're already drafting one (Agent 5 of 2026-05-05 wave) — we get
that win regardless. secureblue's contributor count + atomic update
infrastructure is the leverage.

## Strategic credibility win

Publishing `docs/THREAT-MODEL.md` BEFORE the v0.7 launch positions
veilor-os ahead of secureblue (no threat model) and Athena (has
threat model but smaller contributor base) on the one axis that
matters most.

## Open questions documented in STRATEGY.md

- secureblue contribution acceptance for upstream patches (USBGuard
  id-based-rules fix, threat model framework)
- Brave vs Mullvad-Browser pick for default browser
- bootc rebase first-boot fallback if rebase fails
- Fedora 44 transition timing follows secureblue's release tags
2026-05-05 15:05:59 +01:00
veilor-org
4e9782a18a docs: 9-agent research wave findings — v0.5.32 blocker map
Logs the full output of the 9-agent deep-dive run on 2026-05-05 to
docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/. Pulls every actionable finding
into one indexed location so v0.5.32 planning has a paper trail.

Files:
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/README.md             — index
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/01-...real-hardware.md — Plymouth + LUKS edge cases
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/02-...firstboot-ux.md  — SDDM + first-boot UX
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/03-...spike-plan.md    — bootc-image-builder 1-week spike
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/04-...tier-2.md         — AppArmor + nftables + audit + homed
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/05-...launch.md         — threat model + v0.7 launch checklist
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/06-...log-capture.md    — virtio-9p host-share for anaconda logs
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/07-...skel-branding.md  — /etc/skel gap audit
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/08-...ci-hardening.md   — SHA-pin actions + SBOM + SLSA L3
  docs/research/2026-05-05-agent-wave/09-...failure-modes.md  — real-hardware pessimistic audit

Plus the prior linter-applied:
  docs/ROADMAP.md      — Lessons learned section, v0.5.32 active block,
                          v0.6 promotion of veilor-postinstall + veilor-doctor,
                          v0.7 bootc spike scheduled
  docs/THREAT-MODEL.md  — drafted by Agent 5; in/out scope, comparison
                          matrix, v0.7 launch checklist

Top blockers identified for v0.5.32 (cross-cited in README):
  1. Suspend/resume wifi death (kernel.modules_disabled=1)
  2. veilor-firstboot.service WantedBy=graphical.target
  3. kernel-upgrade grub drift
  4. USBGuard hash-rules problem (already learned on onyx)
  5. firewalld blocks tailscale0
  6. /etc/skel/ empty
  7. virtio-9p log capture replaces broken virtio-serial path

Wave + verifier pattern (per ROADMAP lessons learned #4) validated:
9 parallel agents on distinct topics produced converging blocker
list. The same pattern landed v0.5.31 four-bug fix from the prior
4-agent verification wave on v0.5.30 outcome.
2026-05-05 14:52:53 +01:00
veilor-org
e848c7ffc3 v0.5.28 (partial): lock locale to en_US, roadmap post-install menu
Install-flow change + roadmap update. The roadmap entry is the
durable record; the code change is the immediate effect.

## Locale picker removed

The "[4/4] Locale" prompt is gone. Locale is hardcoded to en_US.UTF-8
for the install. Two reasons:

1. The picker only offered en_GB and en_US, both of which install
   identically apart from the langtag string and a couple of date /
   currency conventions that nobody who's mid-install is thinking
   about. It's a fake choice that adds a screen.
2. `localectl set-locale` post-install handles every locale on earth
   in one command. The v0.7 `veilor-postinstall` first-login menu (see
   roadmap below) will offer a locale + keyboard layout switch with
   live preview, which is the right place for that decision.

Step counters updated [1/4]→[1/3], [2/4]→[2/3], [3/4]→[3/3]. The Locale
row stays in the confirm-summary box because users still want to see
what they're getting installed.

## Roadmap

- New section v0.5.27–v0.5.28 — documents the install-path
  stabilisation work explicitly so the bridge between "first green
  ISO" and "looks polished" is not invisible. Calls out the LUKS BLS
  fix that landed in v0.5.27 + the gum-input replacement scheduled
  for v0.5.28.
- v0.6 — `veilor-doctor` description expanded: this is the
  post-install audit tool. Every user runs it weekly to see drift
  from baseline.
- v0.6 — new entry `veilor-postinstall`: EndeavourOS-style first-login
  welcome menu, single TUI screen, asks once. Covers the "I just
  installed, what do I configure" gap in one explicit step instead of
  scattered docs.
2026-05-05 02:48:36 +01:00
s8n
a7e7d6e10c docs: CHANGELOG v0.2.0-v0.2.5, README rewrite, ROADMAP, release notes update (#5)
Co-authored-by: veilor-org <admin@veilor.org>
2026-05-02 03:42:39 +01:00